Section 4

ETHICS AND CURRENT SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

ETHIK UND WISSENSCHAFTLICHE FORSCHUNG
Norberto Abreu e Silva Neto

Resignation of Feelings and Will

Aiming to know my way about the enigmatic 'will' I wrote this paper taking as a point of departure the remarks Wittgenstein made in TS213\(^1\) regarding its relation to philosophical activity, which I summarized as follows: The difficulty of philosophy is different from intellectual difficulties faced by scientists, because it demands a changing of point of view. When a philosopher tries to understand the significance of an object he must overcome resistances of will, that means, in order to change his perspective a resignation of feelings is demanded from him. What makes an object hardly understandable is the opposition between our wish to understand it and that comprehension most people want to see. Consequently, out of this conflict between our wish for a perspicuous view of the object and the vision imposed by a certain majority it would result that objects we have nearby could become the most difficult ones to understand. Further on Wittgenstein points out how the resistances of will could be overcome by a philosopher and the way I interpreted it the recommendations he makes implies some kind of self-analysis by means of which the philosopher would recognize how the will of a majority hinders his own perception of the object whose significance he wants to know\(^2\). But how to proceed in doing such self-analysis?

A hint for this proceeding is given by him in the next section of TS213, where discussing the possibility of philosophical errors he points out as a source for them our thinking oriented by certain analogies we do not recognize as such. This ignorance would make us to integrate false analogies in our language which in turn would be responsible for the missteps given by thought in the accomplishment of philosophical activity. The integration of false analogies into language, he asserts, "means a constant fight and restlessness"\(^3\). Very well, since we do not integrate false analogies in our language because of magical powers, where to search for their origins?

The first movement I made lead me to the recognizing of the false analogies I have acquired by living in a society which ascribes a high value to scientific

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\(^1\) I am quoting from an integral reproduction of Ludwig Wittgenstein "Philosophie" edited by Heikki Nyman (1989) which was published in 1981 Crítica, Lisboa: n. 6, May.

\(^2\) TS213, #86, 406-407.

\(^3\) TS213, #87, 408-409.
explanations, and in what refers to the will that the most valued explanation in use could be found in the theories of human motivation grounded upon Freudian psychoanalytic thought, the dominant trend in psychology in our fin-de-siècle. Of course Freudian explanations never met a solid place in my thought and Wittgenstein’s arguments against this way of thinking gave me reasons to get rid of them. According to his criticism the will cannot be identified with or seen as a psychic mechanism causing voluntary actions, because underlying this idea there is a misleading analogy between the functioning of man and machine which is in the core of Freudian theories. Throughout his work Wittgenstein fights against this false analogy and against the idea which explains voluntary actions as having psychic causes that could be identified in the act of will. Among the many arguments he offers his readers to challenge this idea I would like to bring out here the comparison where he distinguishes very clearly the belonging of the words ‘will’ and ‘phenomenon’ to different spaces: "The will can't be a phenomenon, for whatever phenomenon you take is something that simply happens, something we undergo, not something we do. The will isn't something I see happen, it is more like my being involved in my actions, my being my actions".4

My second movement was an answer to my need of clearing up the ethical sense in which the word will is used by Wittgenstein which in turn addressed back to the problem of the scientific explanations we use. The young Wittgenstein developed the idea of will as the bearer of ethics. Asking about the difference in principle between the will in its ethical sense and what puts the human body in movement (desire) he comes to the conclusion that it is the will which gives significance to the things, and that without it there would not exist also this center of the world we name the I which results to be the bearer of ethics. Will and I are united. Firstly he names will above all the bearer of good and evil 5 and further on he asserts good and evil are in essence the I.6 But, the I is not an object. We stand never in face of the I as we objectively stand in face of all objects. This leads him to the conclusion that in philosophy we can and should speak of the I in a non-psychological sense: "The philosophical I is not the man, neither the human body nor the human soul, of which psychology is concerned with, but the metaphysical subject, the boundary -- not one part -- of the

4 _PG_, #97.
5 _NB_, 171. The quotations from _NB, TLP_, and _PI_ are from 1984 Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag.
6 _NB_, 175.
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world". Yet, being ethics a condition of the world of which there is nothing that can be said because it is transcendental, the same would be valid to will when identified as its bearer. Thus, it would remain a use of the word the will of which we could talk about: the psychological sense. And such conclusion seems to be in agreement with his final proposal in the *Tractatus*: the right method in philosophy would have properly nothing to say, except those propositions that can be said: the propositions of natural science.

Despite this verdict on propositions of natural science as being the only ones that could be discussed, it is well known Wittgenstein was not interested in scientific questions but in philosophical ones. He makes clear that the spirit in which he wrote his works could not be understood by the typical western scientist, because he was not aiming at the same target they have, that means, he was not interested in building complicated structures and, as he says, because his way of thinking was different from theirs. Besides, in different places of his work we can find how the so called scientific explanations could act as hindrances to philosophical activity, and naturally as fuel to resistances of will. For example, from his *Conversations on Freud* we can understand a philosopher must take care of morbid thought habits that can be settled down in his vision by a 'certain way of thinking' grounded upon the notions of causal law and determinism.

We can learn also from a report of Rush Rhees that the philosopher cannot follow the scientists' attitude and simply let his philosophical activity to run on the 'railway tracks' of 'scientific method', because the results someone obtains working under the pressure of and believing in it as the best method of acquiring knowledge could be different from the results he could obtain through philosophical methods. On the other hand, referring to the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the least possible number of primitive natural laws by means of generalizations, Wittgenstein advises us that our concern about the methods of science feeds our wish of generality, and that this desire could lead the philosopher to the irresistible temptation of asking and answering questions in the same way as scientists do. "This tendency", he says,

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7 *TPL*, 5.641.
8 Ibid., 6.423.
9 Ibid., 6.53.
11 LCA, 41-52. I quote here the American edition by University California Press.
"is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher to complete darkness".  

Without disagreeing with Wittgenstein's remarks about the tragic consequences resulting from using the 'railway tracks' of scientific methods, that I understand as the highly valued 'railway tracks' of a deterministic point of view in science, however due to resistances of my will imposed by this sort of scientific education, at this point of the work I found it would be impossible going on without comparing his position with another one which considers scientific methods in a more positive way. So I confronted it with Carnaps' perspective whitout understanding it of course as a deterministic one.  

Carnap and Wittgenstein had the same definition of philosophy: the logical clarification of thoughts but they did not have the same aim for the work in this activity. Although Wittgenstein shared with the Vienna Circle its aims, that means, the factual antimetaphysical research and the fight for a scientific conception of the world, he and Carnap gave different interpretations of the definition. While Wittgenstein had as a target bringing into practice the logical clarification of thoughts as having an aim in itself, on his side Carnap was interested in the use of clarity aiming at the building of complex structures.  

Carnap recognized and discussed the divergence between Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle regarding the question of building language systems in symbolic logic and it could be found, he says, in the very fact that in the Vienna Circle mathematics and empirical sciences were taken as models of the "best and most systematized form of knowledge to which all philosophical work about the problem of knowledge should be oriented". Taking the 'scientifical method' as being "the best way of acquiring knowledge" Carnap fought strongly for its use, and made his position very clear: "Cultivate philosophy can only consist of clarifying the concepts and propositions of science through logical analysis". From this perspective on he criticized Wittgenstein for having an indifferent and sometimes negative attitude towards mathematics and science which he considered harmful to the fruitfulness of his philosophical task.

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16 Ibid., 144.
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Well then, if Wittgenstein's position is that the only propositions which can talk about are those of natural sciences and if these should be a result of an analysis that uses the method of logical clarification of thoughts, it seems to me hard to understand where lies its difference with Carnapien perspective. I cannot see them both doing anything different than exploring the world of logical possibilities. Wittgenstein said he was not interested in constructing a build but he also said his interest was in "having a surveyable view of the foundations of possible buildings". On his side Carnap investigated the logical development of possible systems and structures. To my understanding they represent a non-deterministic way of doing science in which I see each one working according to his own perspicuity. In favour of this idea I would like to mention what Carnap tells us in his Intellectual Autobiography. As he reports, in order to uphold conversations with his diverse friends he used different philosophical languages because he felt necessary to adjust himself to their forms of thinking or of speaking. In doing so he realized his neutral attitude regarding the diverse forms of philosophical language and formulated it as the 'principle of tolerance' which he recognized as central to his own mode of thinking and as his way of dealing with the many influences he received.

Shortly it seems to me they both offer variations of one and the same method: language criticism as developed by Austrian philosophical tradition, and the way they used it reflects nothing more than their personal views of how to deal with grammatical facts. In this sense I cannot agree that Wittgenstein's negative attitude had been harmful to his philosophical task because nothing could be more fruitful than the medicine he gave for healing psychology from the disease he diagnosed: "In psychology there exists precisely experimental methods and conceptual confusion". And in what refers to Carnap is my opinion that following a different road from Wittgenstein but having in mind his suggestions about positive modes of seeing Metaphysics he was able to leave us a useful conception for the analysis of our 'metaphysical inclinations'.

According to K. T. Fann, it was suggested by Wittgenstein that despite their absurdity the ideas expressed by metaphysical statements were of greater importance because "they show clearly the grammar of some important words of our language". Well then, I can see this positive mode of seeing

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18 CV, 7.
20 PI, 580.
Metaphysics as developed in Carnaps *The Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language*. In my opinion his search for distinguishing diverse components of meaning in the metaphysiscal (pseudo)propositions was for him a plunge into the grammar of the important metaphysical statements pointed out by Wittgenstein, and his conception of metaphysics as "the expression of an emotive attitude towards life" whose components of meaning "can have deep psychological effects" results to be a very important instrument in the therapeutic work to be done for healing psychology from its disease.

Taking up again the beginning of this paper for reaching a conclusion. If a change of perspective in the way we see objects is a condition of philosophical activity that requires facing resistances of will, and if willing is identified with ethics, then what has to be changed are the philosopher values. And since ethics is nothing more than a form of living, what alternative could a philosopher have to solve his philosophical problems without changing his way of living? And taking Carnaps conception of metaphysical (pseudo)propositions as expressions of an emotional attitude towards life and understanding the 'railway tracks' of deterministic scientific methods as the real sources of Metaphysics, as Wittgenstein pointed out, what would be the results of an analysis that took into consideration the scientist's intellectual difficulties? Aren't they also resistances of will?

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"Banana, Apple or Peach?"
On Rational and Intransitive Preferences

Suppose Mary now prefers a banana to an apple and an apple to a peach. Suppose further Mary is rational. Does it follow that she prefers a banana to a peach? How could she, under these circumstances, prefer a peach to a banana without being irrational? One of the most important standards for the rationality of values and preferences seems to be the axiom of transitivity:

\[(T) \ (x)(y)(z) \ ((xPy \ & \ yPz) \rightarrow xPz)\]

A rational person prefers a to c if she prefers a to b and b to c. \(^2\) Fulfilling the transitivity condition might not be sufficient for rationality but it seems to be necessary.

Many people think this is an obvious and fundamental truth. In Neumann and Morgenstern's *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (T) is among the axioms of the theory \(^3\) and the authors take it to be "a plausible and generally accepted property". \(^4\) Many authors, including von Wright, Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes, Jeffrey, Nozick, and Putnam, agree. However, (T) leads to serious problems. My conclusion will be that transitivity is not a necessary condition for the rationality of preferences. First, I will argue for this conclusion (I). Second, I will discuss a proposal to avoid this conclusion (II).

I

Consider the following example. Fred is doing his work and gets hungry. He decides to buy a slice of pizza for $2 at a take-away. Before he arrives there he remembers that for only $2 more he can get a whole plate of spaghetti at a

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1 The relation P is that of strict preference and thus excludes indifference.
2 It does not matter here whether the variables 'x', 'y', 'z' range over and 'a', 'b', 'c', etc., refer to options, objects or sentences being true, etc.
3 cf. von Neumann, Morgenstern 1953, 26f.
4 von Neumann, Morgenstern 1953, 27
7 cf. Jeffrey 1974, 371
8 cf. Nozick 1993 144
cheap Italian restaurant. Since $2 do not really count for Fred and since he is much better off with a whole plate of spaghetti he changes his mind and starts walking to the restaurant. Then he has a new idea: for only $6 he can get a saltimbocca at a trattoria nearby. Since $2 still do not count very much for him and since he likes saltimboccas much more than spaghetti he decides to go to the trattoria. But then he remembers his first plan: he just wanted to go out and get a slice of pizza for $2. For Fred, however, a price difference of $4 makes a remarkable difference whereas $2 does not; since he is not that fond of saltimboccas he decides to go back to his original plan.

What has happened here? Let:

'c' stand for 'getting pizza for $2',
'b' stand for 'getting spaghetti for $4' and
'a' stand for 'getting saltimbocca for $6'.

Assume Fred's preferences have not simply changed during his deliberations (we might have independent evidence for this assumption). Then, Fred's preference ranking is the following:

\[ (P_{1}) \ b_{Pc} \ & \ a_{Pb} \ & \ c_{Pa} \]

In other words, Fred's preferences violate (T). There is no best option for Fred; rationality does not tell him which of the three options he should choose.\(^{10}\)

Does this mean Fred is irrational? Or is there something wrong with (T)? Let us suppose a, b and c do not differ in price or in any other relevant aspect except Fred's gusto. We can call preferences between options that differ only in one relevant aspect 'one-criterion preferences'. If you prefer a banana to an apple and an apple to a peach and nothing but the taste of the fruit counts for you and if you are rational then you prefer a banana to a peach. In such cases violating (T) would be obviously irrational.

However, our original example was more complex. There are two independent relevant aspects for the decision: price and quality. Fred's preferences are (at least) 'two-criteria preferences'. Moreover, a difference of $2 does not really count for Fred whereas a difference of $4 does. The money-criterion is 'non-lin-

ear' in the sense that doubling the expense of money does not mean doubling the negative subjective utility.

Given these explanations it seems obvious that Fred is not irrational. There is no way for him to be more rational. It is not 'his fault' that his preference ranking has the form (P₁); rather, the form of his preference ranking is due to the structure of the choice situation. Fred violates (T) without being irrational. Hence (T) cannot be a universal rationality constraint for preferences.

Given all these considerations it is plausible to propose the following general thesis (that cannot be proven here):

(I) If
(a) the person's preferences are two-or-more-criteria preferences and if
(b) at least one of these criteria is non-linear to a certain degree

then

(c) the person's preference ranking violates (T) without the person being irrational.¹¹

One might argue that (I) is not strong enough: (Ia) and (Ib) only imply the possibility that the person's preference ranking violates (T). Given (Ia) and (Ib) it might still be possible that aPb & bPc & aPc. This is the case if the following condition holds:

(SW) The different criteria are non-linear 'in the same way'; the non-linearity of the different criteria is such that intransitivity never arises.

Fred's desire for saltimbocca could be so strong that even spending $4 more would not be irrational.

This objection against (I) fails. Given (Ia) and (Ib), (T) requires that 'aPb' and 'bPc' alone imply 'aPc'. But this is not the case here. Only if the further condition (SW) is fulfilled can we conclude that aPc. Since we cannot take (SW) for granted in every case intransitivity does not hold across the board.

If it is true that most of our preferences are more-criteria preferences and most of the criteria are non-linear then it is also plausible to assume that in many important cases (T) is no rationality constraint for preferences. Many rational preference rankings are intransitive. Only in the two special cases of one-

criterion preferences and of linear multi-criteria preferences does rationality imply transitivity.

The conclusion that transitivity is no general rationality constraint is plausible but seems to have disastrous implications. Rational decisions identify one option or one group of options as the best of all available options. In the case of intransitive preferences there is no best option for the person so that she might run around in circles. Which of her options the person should choose is not a matter of rational decision. This does not mean that the person has to decide irrationally; rather, her choice of one of the options is beyond rationality or irrationality. Moreover, she does not need to run around in circles forever. Tired of deliberating, she might just pick the first option at hand. Thus, giving up (T) as a general rationality constraint does not lead to the disaster of irrationality and paralysis of decision-making. Rather, we see that rationality does not require what it seemed to require.

There is another, very common objection to my conclusion: the 'Money Pump'-argument. The objection is as follows. Suppose Fred has a preference ranking of the form (P ). He might agree to give one dollar to Mary if she offers him an option that is better than the one he already has. Suppose Fred starts with the option c. Then, he is ready to pay one dollar to Mary if she offers him the preferred option b. But then again, he will pay one dollar to get the preferred option a. Since he prefers c to a he will pay a third dollar to get option c, and so forth. Fred will run around in his circle of intransitivity until there is no money left to spend on the money pump. Many people think that the possibility of a money pump proves that intransitive preferences are irrational. But this objection is not convincing. First, a rational person would simply refuse to make the money pump-agreement. Second, and more important, it is a bad idea to argue for (T) by pointing out that transitivity prevents money-pumping. What we want is a theoretical argument for or against (T). The money pump-objection only offers a practical consideration concerning the possible loss of money, given intransitivity. But whether or not we lose money by acting on our preferences does not imply anything about the rationality of our preferences. Thus, the money pump-argument does not succeed in showing that intransitivity entails irrationality.\footnote{cf. also Schick 1986, 116ff.; Anand 1993, 61ff.}

Why does (T) seem so convincing as a universal rationality constraint? It seems to work for the most basic and simple cases: if you prefer a banana to an apple and an apple to a peach then you should also rationally prefer a banana to
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a peach. One might argue that if transitivity is a rationality constraint for such simple cases then it is also valid for the more complex cases. The Cartesian methodological rule to start the analysis with simple cases is, of course, the right one. However, we have seen that the simple banana-apple-peach case is not a basic but a limiting case. Thus, it can be misleading to focus on simple cases. As Wittgenstein remarked: "A main cause of philosophical disease -- a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example".13

II

So far I have argued for the conclusion that transitivity is no general rationality constraint. This conclusion can be avoided by changing the method of description of preferences. I want to discuss such a proposal now. The basic idea is that the description must be much more fine-grained. Not only options but also the relevant aspects and criteria have to enter into the description of the preferences. Let us re-describe our first example. Instead of:

'bPc'

we have

'(getting spaghetti instead of pizza) P (keeping $2)';

instead of

'aPb'

we have

'(getting saltimbocca instead of spaghetti) P (keeping $2)';

and instead of

'cPa'

we have

'(keeping $4) P (getting saltimbocca instead of pizza)'.

Thus described, Fred's preference ranking is unproblematic. It has the form:

\( (P_2) \ dPe \ & \ fPe \ & \ gPh. \)

This is not at all paradoxical. The intransitivity vanishes if we give a fine-grained analysis of the preference ranking. We do not have to give up (T). Transitivity would still be a general rationality constraint.

13 Wittgenstein 1967, 593
There is nevertheless a certain price to pay for this 'way out': transitivity loses its status too. Let us modify our original example. Assume Fred also prefers a $6 saltimbocca to a $2 pizza. According to the rough analysis, his preferences are transitive and have the form:

\[(P_3) bPc \& aPb \& aPc\]

However, if we switch to the fine-grained analysis, his preference ranking has the form:

\[(P_4) dPe \& fPe \& hPg\]

With the fine-grained analysis, not only the possibility of intransitivity but also the possibility of transitivity disappears. Preferences lose their internal connections. For our preference-triples the question of transitivity would not even arise. Transitivity would be like the Queen of England: still reigning but without much influence.  

Thus, we seem to face the following situation. We can either stick to a rough description of preferences and accept that transitivity is no general rationality constraint for preferences (or: a rationality constraint only for special cases) or we can switch to a fine-grained description of preferences and keep the principle of transitivity at the price of devaluing it. In both cases, transitivity does not play the important role it prima facie seems to play.

In other words: whether our preferences conform to or violate the principle of transitivity depends on how we describe them. Under fine-grained descriptions the question of transitivity and intransitivity does not even arise. Under rough descriptions transitivity is possible but only in special cases. The main conclusion is that transitivity is no necessary condition for the rationality of preferences. This might be astonishing but it should not disturb us.

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14 According to another proposal we should replace expressions of the form 'mPn' by expressions of the form 'm when compared to n P n when compared to m'.

It is obvious that this, too, avoids intransitivity. But transitivity, too, would be impossible. Furthermore, this kind of re-description violates the intuitive idea that we should not describe the things we compare in terms of the comparison itself. Cf., for a similar proposal, Lee 1984, 130ff. and, against it, Philips 1989, 481.

According to a third proposal of how to 'avoid intransitivity' apparent intransitivity might turn out to merely indicate a change of preferences during deliberation. This can, of course, happen. But one needs evidence for this claim because referring to intransitive preferences would simply beg the question. Moreover, the possibility of change of preferences in no way implies that our preferences cannot be intransitive without being irrational.

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The Rationality of Ends

There is a dilemma between what, with some caricature, can be called the Humean and the Kantian conceptions of ends. If ends are merely the objects of desires, they cannot be rationally criticized; if they are determined by reason, they cannot motivate.

Four strategies for resolving the dilemma are available. One is to develop the concept of desire to the point at which desires can be rationally criticized. The second is to develop the concept of reason to the point at which it includes motivational force. The third is to show how both reason and desire contribute to the determination of ends, and the fourth is to show that ends are determined otherwise than by reason or desire.

I shall adopt the first strategy. If a desire can be rationally criticized, the criticism must be by reference to a criterion. There are two criteria: associated properties and other desires.

Associated properties

We desire things in virtue of their properties: N desires X because he believes that X has a certain property (or certain properties), 'because' here signifying the relation of basing. Call the property in virtue of which a person desires something 'the property associated with the desire' -'the associated property' for short. Likewise call his belief that the thing has that property 'the associated belief'. The best analysis of basing is as a relation of causal explanation: to say that N's mental state S is based on his mental state T is to say that the fact that N has S is explained by the fact that there is an appropriate causal chain from T to S.

The fact that we desire things in virtue of their properties provides the foundation for one form of rational criticism of desires. Here are some examples of such criticism and its effects. Suppose N desires X in virtue of P. It is then proved to him that X does not have P. Assume N accepts the proof. Then, unless N also desires X in virtue of some other property, his desire cannot continue. This impossibility is not psychological, like an inability to bring oneself to like mince: it is conceptual: an ascription of the desire to N is no longer intelligible.

Another possibility is that N is brought to see that he has mistaken the property associated with his desire: in fact he desires X in virtue of Q. If it is now
proved to him that \( X \) does not have \( Q \), the position is as above. If he is shown that \( X \) does have \( Q \), he may continue to desire \( X \), possibly with different intensity, or his desire may cease. If for example he has been deceiving himself as to the associated property out of shame, his discovery that it is \( Q \) may cause his desire to stop or diminish.

The associated belief may be confused: \( N \) may be shown that he is representing \( X \) to himself in a vague or ambiguous way that fails to distinguish different properties. Clarification can have various effects. For example \( N \) may realize that he desires \( X \) only in virtue of a subclass of the properties in question, in which case the desire may continue with reduced intensity. Or he may realize that he desires \( X \) in virtue of some of the properties and is averse to \( X \) in virtue of others.

Where \( N \) is brought to see that, while he desires \( X \) in virtue of \( P \), he is averse to \( X \) in virtue of \( Q \), there are several possible consequences. (i) His desire is greater than his aversion, so he continues to desire \( X \), probably with reduced intensity. (It is useful here to distinguish pro tanto desires and aversions from desires and aversions on balance.) (ii) His aversion exceeds his desire; in that case it is likely that he will stop desiring \( X \) or will at any rate desire it with reduced intensity. (iii) Desire and aversion are equal and cancel each other, so that he becomes indifferent to \( X \). (iv) Desire and aversion are equal but do not cancel, so that he sustains mixed feelings towards \( X \). (v) He searches for something that has \( P \) but not \( Q \) and, on finding one, stops desiring \( X \).

These examples show the variety of ways in which desires can be rationally criticized in relation to their associated properties and the variety of effects such criticism can have. It can lead to a change in a desire's intensity, to the cessation of a desire, to the formation of a new desire or to the unintelligibility of an ascription of desire.

**Other desires**

The second criterion for the rational criticism of desires is implicit in the example of mixed desire and aversion. \( N \)'s desire can be rationally criticized by reference to his other desires. The most straightforward form of such criticism is assessment of the desire's realization as compatible or incompatible with that of \( N \)'s other desires. Again a finding of incompatibility between two desires can have various results. \( N \) may continue to feel both and put up with the conflict. He may come to feel one less intensely, or stop feeling it at all. He may take steps to rid himself of one. Direct control over the desire may be impossible, but indirect steps may be available to him.
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In resolving conflicts account must be taken of the fact that a person's desires are normally structured in hierarchies. There is a hierarchy of intensity: I want marmalade more than jam. There is a hierarchy of range: a desire to be a sailor encompasses more of a person's life than a desire for an afternoon nap. There is a hierarchy of orders: I want a cigarette but I want not to want to. Generally, when conflicting desires fall in the same hierarchy, it is rational to sacrifice the lower to the higher; but the position is complicated by the facts, first, that \( D_1 \) may be higher than \( D_2 \) in one hierarchy and lower in another (I would quite like to give up smoking but I am dying for a cigarette) and, second, that a desire may be outweighed by a sufficient number of desires lower in the same hierarchy: an aspiring monk might reject the cloister because it forecloses the satisfaction of too many shorter-term desires.

This criterion imposes no limit on the rational formation of new desires. Suppose N has just \( D_1, D_2 \) and \( D_3 \). Given \( D_1 \) and \( D_2 \), it may be hard or impossible for him to achieve \( D_3 \). He therefore brings himself to replace \( D_3 \) with \( D_4 \). A tension now develops or becomes apparent between \( D_2 \) on the one hand and, on the other, \( D_1 \) and \( D_4 \); so N replaces \( D_2 \) with \( D_5 \). By the same process N comes to substitute \( D_6 \) for \( D_1 \). In this way N can rationally change all his desires, though not all at once.

It might be objected that, if the requirement of consistency is the motor of change, successive modifications will diminish to a point of reflective equilibrium. But, the objection runs, the demand for rational criticism of ends envisages rational change of a more radical kind. There are four answers to this. First, it is unclear that we do demand rational change beyond equilibrium. Second, the claim that equilibrium will be reached is an empirical speculation on scanty evidence. Third, any equilibrium is likely to be unstable and temporary: it can be upset by the development of new desires, by the withering of old or by changes in external circumstances. Fourth, the requirement of consistency is not the only motor of rational change. Suppose one of N's end-desires is for X. He may come to see that some broader state of affairs, Y, is not relevantly different from X and thus form an end-desire for Y. This is not a matter of mere consistency.

Rationality of ends and means

Since desires can be rationally criticized against these two criteria, rational criticism of ends is not precluded by the conception of ends as the objects of desires. This resolves the dilemma.
The rationality of ends is sometimes seen as problematic because it is contrasted with the rationality of means, which is assumed straightforward. Deliberation of means is widely regarded as a paradigm of rationality - a fact lamented by some. I shall finish by blurring the contrast, which has three components.

The first is the thought that a means-desire has an associated belief - that its object is a means to something - and that we have a fairly clear understanding of the rationality of belief. But this fails to distinguish means-desires from end-desires; it has already been noted that every desire has an associated belief.

The second component is the reflection that the means-end relation is empirically discoverable. This empirical element, it is thought, distinguishes means-desires from end-desires and accounts for their greater tractability to rational criticism. The assumption of a tight connexion between the empirical and the rational - an assumption that is both a cause and a consequence of the success of natural science - deserves scrutiny, but a short way with this suggestion is to point out that it too fails to contrast means-desires with end-desires. Granted the property associated with a means-desire is empirical; the same may be true of an end-desire. N may desire, for itself, to drink a dry Martini: whether he drinks one can be settled by watching him.

The third component is the thought that whether or not a person desires something as an end is in a sense a brute fact. Rational criticism in accordance with the first of the two criteria proposed may lead him to revise his views as to the property associated with the desire; but, once he has clearly identified the property, he simply desires the thing in virtue of it. Here, it seems, rationality comes to an end.

The difficulty is to give a sense to 'brute' in which someone's having an end-desire is a brute fact but his having a means-desire is not. If the claim is merely that end-desires cannot, while means-desires can, be justified teleologically, it is a tautology. The suggestion may be that the bruteness belongs to the connexion between the end-desire and its associated property. But there are several rejoinders to that. First, it is hard to see in what sense the connexion can be brute, given, as has been shown, that associated properties furnish a criterion for the rationality of desires. Second, the connexion between a desire and its associated property is mediated by the associated belief: to say that N desires X in virtue of P is to say that N's desire for X is based on his belief that X has P. Third, basing is an explanatory relation: the connexion between desire and associated property is presumably not brute if the latter enters into the explanation of the former. Fourth, the previous three responses apply equally to end-desires and
means-desires.

Perhaps the claim of bruteness amounts to this. By the analysis of basing given earlier, N's desire for X, as an end, in virtue of P is based on his belief that X has P just in case the fact that N has the desire is explained by the fact that there is an appropriate causal chain from the belief to the desire. The relation between the desire and the belief thus does not consist in N's having some further mental state; in particular, it does not consist in N's having some further belief as to the relation between the two. One way of putting this is to say that the basing relation is opaque to N. The suggestion is that opacity is the same as bruteness.

But again on this interpretation the charge of bruteness applies to end-desires and means-desires alike. Indeed it applies to cases where the basing relation connects two mental states of the kind whose rationality is generally admitted to be the least problematic, namely beliefs. It might be replied that this goes to show that the above analysis of basing is wrong; but, if it is, it will not be improved by a definition that eliminates opacity. Any analysis of the relation as consisting in a belief about the relata generates an infinite regress.

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Humane und humeanische Ethik

Vorbemerkungen

Die These, welche diesem Vortrag zugrunde liegt, und die im Folgenden wenigstens ansatzweise begründet werden soll, lautet: "Die humeanische Ethik ist keine humane Ethik." Die Methode der Begründung ist vornehmlich die "aposteriorische".

Unter dem Kürzel einer "humeanischen Ethik" soll die praktische Philosophie David Humes und seiner Nachfolger, der Humeaner, verstanden werden. Praktische Philosophie ist die gesamte das richtige Handeln betreffende Philosophie, v.a. die Lehre von Moral und Recht und die damit verbundenen Begründungsfragen. Der Ausdruck "humane Ethik" muß etwas ausführlicher eingeführt werden. Eine Ethik soll "human" genannt werden, wenn aus ihr hervorgeht, daß darin eine unbedingte Achtung vor dem "humanum" als solchem gefordert wird, d.h. die Schätzung eines jeden Menschen als Menschen oder "Person". Damit ein Mensch Person ist, also einzigartig, unersetzbar und selbstzwecklich, muß er über seine Geburt von menschlichen Eltern hinaus nicht noch irgendwie zusätzlich ausgezeichnet oder qualifiziert sein. "Inhumanität" im allgemeinsten Sinne liegt dann genau dort vor, wo bestimmten Menschen oder Menschengruppen diese grundsätzliche Achtung vorenthalten bzw. deren grundsätzliche Menschenwürde mißachtet wird. - Meine These von der humeanischen Ethik als einer inhumanen setzt die gerade kurz umrissene Bedeutung der Begriffe "Humanität" und "Inhumanität" voraus. Daß kein anderes - und vielleicht sogar adäquateres - Verständnis dieser Begriffe möglich ist, wage ich kaum zu behaupten, geschweige denn hier dafür zu argumentieren. Aber daran soll festgehalten werden: Wird "human" so oder wenigstens prinzipiell so verstanden wie dies gerade umrissen worden ist - und immerhin finden wir dieses oder ein sehr ähnliches Verständnis sehr weit verbreitet in der westlichen Geistesgeschichte (etwa in der Scholastik, bei Kant und vielen anderen humanistischen Philosophen) - dann lassen sich aus der praktischen Philosophie Humes unschwer einige inhumane Konsequenzen ableiten oder darin aufspüren, nämlich solche in bezug auf Straftäter, Staatenlose und "Nichtweiße". - Damit ist auch schon angedeutet wie der Ausdruck "aposteriorische Methode" zu verstehen ist, nämlich in dem scholastischen Sinn, wonach der Wert einer These
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oder Theorie nicht aus der Kritik ihrer Voraussetzungen ("a priori"), sondern aus der ihrer Folgen bestimmt werden soll.

I


Diese Position erfordert nun für die Beurteilung eines Verbrechens, daß nicht die einzelne Tat, sondern der ganze Charakter des Angeklagten zur Diskussion gestellt werden muß. Es wäre ganz unsinnig, nur die Tat bewerten zu wollen. Zitat: "Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishable; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound [beitragen] to his honor, if good, nor infamy, if evil." Nur weil die Tat nach einer Regel aus dem Charakter hervorgeht, ohne daß hier ein freier Willensentschluß irgendwie intervenieren könnte, dürfe der Verbrecher bestraft, etwa in Gefängnisse gesperrt werden. Andernfalls könnte "die Verruchtigkeit" der Tat "niemals als Beweis der Verderbtheit" des Charakters dienen.


II

Eine weitere solche Folge ergibt sich im Anschluß an die Ausführungen Humes im II. Teil des dritten Buches seines "Treatise of Human Nature", welcher überschrieben ist mit "Of Justice and Injustice" sowie im Anschluß an die dazu weitgehend parallelen Thesen über die Gerechtigkeit in seiner "Enquiry

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2 A.a.O., S. 80.
3 Ebd.: "The wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other."
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Concerning the Principles of Morals"⁵. Diese Konsequenz betrifft nicht Rechtsbrecher bzw. Gefangene, sondern Menschen, welche sich außerhalb einer staatlichen Gemeinschaft befinden, also Staatenlose ebenso wie solche, die in einer Anarchie nach dem Zusammenbruch eines Staatswesens, etwa infolge eines Krieges, leben. Die Philosophen vor Hume sind sich zum allergrößten Teil (die griechischen Sophisten bilden hier eine bezeichnende Ausnahme) darin einig gewesen, daß jedem Menschen von Natur aus gewisse Grundrechte zukämen. Aristoteles unterschied erstmals deutlich das, was nach der Natur (d.h. bei ihm, gemäß der geistig-ethischen Bestimmung des Menschen) von dem, was nach menschlicher Satzung Recht ist. Die Stoa bildete diesen Gedanken weiter zu der These, es gäbe ein allgemeines Weltgesetz, welches als Natur- und Sittengesetz für alle Menschen (aller Zeiten und Erdkreise) gelte.


Hume bestreitet nun schon, daß ein solcher Rechtssinn eine natürliche Tugend sei und nach weit weniger will er zugestehen, daß jedem Menschen nur weil er/sie Mensch ist, schon gewisse Rechte zukämen. Recht und Unrecht gäbe es nur in einem geordneten Gemeinwesen. Zwar wäre ein gewisses Wohlwollen

⁵ A.a.O., vol. 4, S. 179-197 ("Of Justice").
Sigmund Bonk
gegenüber seinen nächsten Verwandten und Freunden durchaus etwas Natürli-
ches (Hobbes hätte ein zu misanthropisches Menschenbild vertreten wo er den
Menschen im Naturzustand als ausschließlich selbstisch und sogar "wölfisch"
beschrieben habe) aber ein Rechtsbewußtsein und eine natürliche Nächstenliebe
seien doch ganz verschiedene Dinge. So werde auch ein gerechter Mensch von
einem wohlwollenden oft nicht verstanden. Der Gerechte blicke auf das Ge-
meinwesen als Ganzes, bzw. auf die Regeln zum Erhalt desselben, der Wohl-
wollende auf den besonderen, einzelnen Fall bzw. die konkrete Person. Weder
könne man aus reiner Vernunft auf ein Sollen schließen, z. B. auf ein: "Du sollst
dinem Nachbarn nichts wegnehmen" - es gäbe keinen gültigen Schluß vom
"ist" zum "soll" aus reiner Vernunft ("Humes Gesetz") - noch existiere ein na-
türlicher Gerechtigkeitssinn. Und auch das Konstrukt eines Gesellschaftsver-
trags ist, gemäß Hume, eine unsinnige Erfindung, setze derselbe eben doch
schon irgendeine Form von Recht oder Gerechtigkeit voraus:

"It has been asserted by some, that justice arises from HUMAN
CONVENTIONS, and proceeds from the voluntary choice, consent,
or combination of mankind. If by convention be here meant a pro-
mise (which is the most usual sense of the word) nothing can be
more absurd than this position. The observance of promises is itself
one of the most considerable parts of justice; and we are not surely
bound to keep our word, because we have given our word to keep
it." 6

Woher kommt es dann, daß überhaupt irgendwelche Zusagen und Verträge
gehalten werden, fremdes Eigentum als solches anerkannt wird usf.? Nun, im
Staat aufgrund der Angst vor Sanktionen der exekutiven Gewalt aber auch vor
solchen der Mitmenschen - mit einem bekannten Wortbrüchigen wird bei-
spielsweise kaum noch jemand Geschäfte machen wollen. Im vor- oder außer-
staatlichen Zustand aber dürfte ein berechnender Sinn für gemeinsame Interes-
sen unterstellt werden, ein Sozialkalkül solcherart, daß das Einräumen von
Rechten gegenüber Mitmenschen einer Kon v e n t i o n den Weg bereitet, die
letztendlich dem ein Versprechen gebenden Menschen selber zugute kommt.
Sobald dieser Nutzen allerdings nicht mehr vorausgesehen werden kann, fällt
auch die potentielle Verpflichtung fort, den anderen als Rechtssubjekt anzuse-
hen:

"The USE and TENDENCY of that virtue [Gerechtigkeit] is to pro-
cure [herbeiführen] happiness and security, by preserving order in

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society: But where the society is ready to perish from extreme necessity, no greater evil can be dreaded from violence and injustice; and every man may now provide for himself by all the means, which prudence can dictate, or humanity permit. 7

Die Menschlichkeit ("humanity"), von der hier die Rede ist, stellt nach Humes Auffassung ein weitgehend allgemein verbreitetes Sympathiegefühl von Menschen gegenüber Mitmenschen dar, birgt aber in sich keinerlei Rechte und Pflichten. Denken wir etwa an die Kriegsgebiete, in denen die staatliche Ordnung zur Zeit tatsächlich zusammengebrochen ist, so müßten wir als Humeaner einräumen, daß die geplagten Menschen dort keinerlei Rechte auf Leben, Unversehrtheit, menschenwürdige Behandlung, Eigentum usw. haben. Da die überlegenen Angreifer womöglich keinen Nutzen am Zustandekommen von Rechtskonventionen sehen, sind die Bekriegten, nicht nur de facto, sondern auch de iure, auf das angeblich allgemeine, zwischenmenschliche Wohlwollen der Soldaten angewiesen: u.E. eine weitere inhumane und dieses Mal geradezu zynische Konsequenz der Humeschen (Rechts-)Philosophie...

III


"The general opinion of mankind has some authority in all cases; but in this of morals 'tis perfectly infallible." 8

Mit solchen Äußerungen wurde Hume, philosophiegeschichtlich betrachtet, zum Vater der schottischen Common-sense-Philosophie (Reid, Beattie, Oswald, Stewart, Hamilton und andere mehr). Der bekannteste Vertreter dieser Schule, Thomas Reid, ist ein begeisterter, wenn auch kritischer Leser Humes (seine Kritik richtete sich stets gegen diejenigen Passagen in Humes Werken, welche

seines Erachtens Gefahren für die christliche Religion in sich bergen). In einem bekannten Brief an Hume schreibt er, er würde sich immer als sein "Schüler in der Metaphysik" betrachten und er hätte aus den Schriften Humes mehr über Philosophie gelernt als von allen anderen Philosophen zusammen.\textsuperscript{9} Aus diesen und anderen Gründen kann Reid wohl mit einigem Recht als "Humeaner" bezeichnet werden. Das Hauptkennzeichen seiner Philosophie ist es, daß er stets den sogenannten gesunden und allgemein verbreiteten "Common sense" gegen die sogenannte abstrakte (ungesunde) Vernunft und die seiner Auffassung nach größtenteils abwegigen bis buchstäblich krankhaft verrückten Ideen der Philosophen von Profession verteidigen und ausspielen will: Grundlage jeder "gesunden Philosophie" sei eben der Common sense. Dieser, wie gesagt, seinem Ursprung nach, Humesche Gedanke ist dann mit einiger zeitlicher Verzögerung über den Atlantik nach Amerika hinüberdiffundiert, wo er wiederum einige bedeutende\textsuperscript{10} und einige andere, sehr prekäre Konsequenzen zeitigte. Dort, und besonders in den Südstaaten, galt es nämlich als allgemeine Ansicht, "general opinion" oder "Common sense", daß Afrikaner weißhäutigen Amerikanern in jeder, es sei denn, rein physischer Hinsicht deutlich unterlegen sind; somit be-stehne auch in der Sklaverei nichts sittlich Verwerfliches. Hume hat diese Auffassung übrigens auch persönlich unterstützt. In dem Essay "Of National Characters" findet sich eine Fußnote, die als "Hume's Doctrine" eine "zentrale Rolle in Nordamerikas rassistischer Literatur" gespielt hat.\textsuperscript{11} Das Zitat ist so schlimm, daß nur der Anfäng zitiert werden soll:

"I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (...) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturers among them, no arts no science.."\textsuperscript{12}


\textsuperscript{10} Bedeutende u.a. durch den Einfluß dieser Philosophie auf Thomas Jefferson und seinem Vertrauten Thomas Paine, dessen Traktat mit dem Titel "Common Sense" geradezu der Funke war, der zur Amerikanischen Revolution und Unabhängigkeit geführt hatte. Die Schrift kam am 10.1.1776 aus der Presse und "became overnight a best-seller; shortly after its publication almost a half a million copies were sold, and many of its most trenchant [scharf] paragraphs were reprinted in newspapers all over the country." (Philip S. Foner, The Age of Reason by Thomas Paine, Introduction, New York 1991, S. 12).


\textsuperscript{12} A.a.O., vol. 3, S. 252.
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Die Thematik "Rassismus und Common Sense-Ethik" und zugleich den ganzen Vortrag abschließend, sollen nun noch einige Passagen aus dem Buch "Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft" von Max Horkheimer zitiert werden, die aufschlußreicher und eindrucksvoller sind als es alle möglichen Schlußbemerkungen aus meiner eigenen Feder sein könnten:

"Charles O'Connor, ein berühmter Rechtsanwalt der Periode vor dem Bürgerkrieg, der einmal von einer Fraktion der Demokratischen Partei als Präsidentschaftskandidat aufgestellt war, argumentierte (nachdem er die Segnungen der Zwangssklaverei umrissen hatte) folgendermaßen: »Ich bestehe darauf, daß die Negersklaverei nicht ungerecht ist; sie ist gerecht, weise und wohltätig ... Ich bestehe darauf, daß die Negersklaverei ... von der Natur verordnet ist ... Indem wir uns dem klaren Dekret der Natur und Gebot g e s u n d e r Philosophie beugen, müssen wir jene Institution als gerecht, wohltätig, gesetzlich und angebracht erklären.« [...] Ein anderer Wortführer der Sklaverei, Fitzhugh, Verfasser der Sociology for the South, scheint sich zu erinnern, daß Philosophie einmal für konkrete Ideen und Prinzipien einstand, und er greift sie deshalb im Namen des gesunden Menschenverstandes an: »Menschen mit gesundem Urteil geben gewöhnlich falsche Gründe für ihre Meinungen an, weil sie keine abstrakten Denker sind ... Die Philosophie schlägt sie im Argumentieren glatt aus dem Felde; dennoch haben Instinkt und gesunder Menschenverstand recht, und die Philosophie hat unrecht. Die Philosophie hat immer unrecht, Instinkt und gesunder Menschenverstand haben immer recht, weil die Philosophie unachtsam ist und von engen und unzulänglichen Prämissen aus schlußfolgert.« [Und Horkheimer fügt hinzu:] "Aus Furcht vor idealistischen Prinzipien, dem Denken als sochem, Intellektuellen und Utopisten, ist der Verfasser stolz auf seinen gesunden Menschenverstand, der in der Sklaverei kein Unrecht sieht."\(^13\)

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\(^13\) Max Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft, in: Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 6, hg. von, Alfred Schmidt, S. 45f.
Norbert Campagna

Die Wissenschaft im Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Partikularinteressen und Allgemeininteresse


Diese Entwicklung ist in erster Linie durch die Tatsache bedingt, dass die Wissenschaft und die Technologie nur noch vordergründig dem Allgemeininteresse dienen, in Wirklichkeit aber unter die Kontrolle von Partikularinteressen -vornehmlich wirtschaftlicher, aber auch militärischer Natur- geraten sind. Dies ist heutzutage besonders deutlich auf dem Gebiet der angewandten Molekularbiologie, d.h. der Gentechnik zu sehen. Die gentechnische Manipulation des Erbguts von Pflanzen wird zwar desoliteren im Namen bestimmter Allgemeininteressen gerechtfertigt -z.B. im Namen des Kampfes gegen den Hunger-, aber in Wirklichkeit stehen die wirtschaftlichen Interessen bestimmter Firmen im Vor-
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dergrund. Firmen, die auf dem Gebiet der Gentechnik aktiv sind, denken in erster Linie an die möglichen wirtschaftlichen Profile, die sie mittels der neuen Technologie erzielen können. Die Sicherheit der Bevölkerung, oder die sozioökonomischen Konsequenzen für Entwicklungsländer werden, wenn überhaupt, nur am Rande berücksichtigt. Um dies zu beweisen, genügt es darauf hinzuweisen, dass heutzutage viele Firmen darauf drängen, die Gesetzgebung betreffend die Freisetzung und Vermarktung gentechnisch manipulierter Pflanzen oder Produkte aufzulockern, und dies obwohl noch nicht bewiesen ist, dass die gentechnisch manipulierten Lebewesen keine qualitativ neue Gefahr für den Menschen und die Umwelt darstellen. Stünde hier wirklich das Allgemeininteresse im Mittelpunkt, so würden die auf dem Gebiet der Gentechnik führenden Firmen der Sicherheit eine viel größere Bedeutung einräumen, als sie dies im Augenblick tun.

Wenn die Wissenschaft und die Technologie heute immer mehr in Bedrängnis geraten, wenn sie sich in einer sich stets vertiefenden Legitimationskrise befinden, dann zum grossen Teil deshalb, weil sie unter die Kontrolle von Partikularinteressen geraten sind. Diese Partikularinteressen können unter Umständen mit dem Allgemeininteressen übereinstimmen, sie müssen es aber nicht. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es wichtig darauf hinzuweisen, dass sich die Wissenschaften nur deshalb in dem uns heute bekannten Masse entwickeln konnten, weil sie durch Partikularinteressen -und vornehmlich durch wirtschaftliche Partikularinteressen- instrumentalisiert werden konnten. Die Verstrickung von Wissenschaft und Partikularinteressen darf also nicht nur im Lichte der negativen Konsequenzen betrachtet werden. Es geht vielmehr darum, die Wissenschaft wieder unter die Kontrolle von gesellschaftlich vermittelten Partikularinteressen zu bringen. Heute ist die Situation aber derart, dass die Abhängigkeit der Wissenschaft von unvermittelten Partikularinteressen die Menschheit an den Rand des Abgrunds zu bringen droht. Angesichts dieser Situation ist es wichtiger denn je, dass sich die Wissenschaft und die Technologie aus der fast exklusiven Kontrolle durch unvermittelte Partikularinteressen befreien, und dass sie sich wieder dem Allgemeininteressen verpflichten.

Das grosse Problem bei der Orientierung am Allgemeininteressen besteht allerdings darin, dass es heute nicht mehr möglich ist davon auszugehen, dass es ein von jedem anerkanntes Allgemeininteresse gibt, bzw. dass das Allgemeininteresse sich eindeutig inhaltlich bestimmen lässt. Sowohl die Befürworter wie auch die Gegner der Gentechnik berufen sich auf das Wohl der Menschheit, die ersten, um zu behaupten, dass die Gentechnik dem Wohl der Menschheit förderlich ist, die anderen, um zu behaupten, dass die Gentechnik die Menschheit

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an den Rand des Abgrunds führen wird. Ähnliches gilt für die in-vitro Befruchtung: ihre Befürworter behaupten, sie würde die Frauen befreien, während ihre Gegner behaupten, sie würde einerseits die Frauen unter die Kontrolle der Ärzte bringen, und andererseits den Weg für eine effiziente eugeni sche Bevölkerungspolitik öffnen. Und auch die mittels der neuen Reproduktionstechnologien mögliche Eugenik wird unterschiedlich bewertet: Die einen sehen in ihr eine Wohltat, die vielen Menschen Leid ersparen kann, während die anderen sie als das Übel schlechthin betrachten.


In diesem Zusammenhang ist es wichtig, das Recht auf Forschungsfreiheit neu zu überdenken. Ein Forscher hat sicherlich ein Interesse daran, selbst darüber zu bestimmen, worüber er forschen wird. Allerdings begründet dieses legitime Interesse noch kein absolutes Recht auf Forschungsfreiheit, zumal dann nicht, wena diese Forschung anwendungsbezogen ist, wie dies heute fast auf allen Gebieten der Naturwissenschaften der Fall ist. Dabei ist zu bemerken, dass Forschungsfreiheit nur bedeuten kann, dass es letztendlich der Forscher ist, der darüber bestimmt, was wahr und was falsch ist, und nicht die öffentliche Mei-
nung oder eine politische oder religiöse Instanz. Auch wenn dem Forscher nicht vorgeschrieben werden kann, was als wahr und was als falsch zu gelten hat, so kann ihm trotzdem von der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit vorgeschrieben wer-
den, was er erforschen darf, und welche Mittel -z.B. Humanexperimente- er bei seiner Forschung benutzen darf, bzw., was als unzulässig zu betrachten ist.

Angesichts der Tatsache, dass die moderne wissenschaftliche Forschung in einem immer grösseren Masse durch Partikularinteressen instrumentalisiert
wird -wie etwa aus der Tatsache hervorgeht, dass immer mehr hochspeziali-
sierte Forscher für die Privatindustrie arbeiten-, kann das Recht auf Forschungs-
freiheit nicht mehr als Argument angeführt werden, um eine öffentliche Kon-
trolle der Forschung abzulehnen. Im Gegenteil, die Forschung wird erst dann wieder frei sein können, wenn sie sich von den Partikularinteressen befreit, in
deren Dienst sie im Augenblick steht, und wenn sie sich wieder dem Allgemeininteresse verpflichtet. Die Forschung kann nur als demokratisch legiti-
merte Forschung frei sein. Und diese Legitimation kann nicht mehr eine materiale sein, sondern sie lässt sich nur noch als formale denken. Legitim ist die Wissenschaft nicht schon, wenn sie der Förderung des Wohls der Menschheit dient -oder behauptet, dass dieser Förderung oder irgendeinem anderen Wert dient. Legitim ist sie nur dann, wenn sie konsensfähig ist.

Es muss hier nachdrücklich darauf hingewiesen werden, dass die moderne Wissenschaft nicht mehr nur der Suche nach der theoretischen Wahrheit ver-
pflichtet ist. Sie ist keine rein kontemplative Forschung mehr, sondern sie ist
schon ihrem Wesen nach auf die Anwendung ausgerichtet. Die Technologie existiert nicht neben der modernen Wissenschaft, sondern die moderne Wissen-
schaft ist technologisch. Sie gewinnt ihre Erkenntnisse durch Rückgriff auf die
Technologie, und diese Erkenntnisse schaffen neue Technologien. Durch sie
soll der Mensch nicht nur die Wahrheit erkennen, sondern diese Erkenntnis der
Wahrheit soll es ihm auch erlauben, sich in der Welt einzurichten, zum Beherr-
scher und Besitzer der Natur zu werden, wie Descartes es schon mit aller Deut-
lichkeit im 17. Jahrhundert formuliert hat. Damit gewinnt die Wissenschaft aber
eine ethische Dimension. Die Wissenschaft wird zu einem Instrument, das uns
dabei behilflich sein soll, das gute Leben zu verwirklichen. Was das gute Leben
allerdings ist, kann die Wissenschaft von sich aus nicht bestimmen. Diese Be-
stimmung ist vielmehr die zentrale Aufgabe von all denjenigen, die an diesem
guten Leben teilnehmen sollen. Alle Betroffenen müssen darüber mitentschei-
den können, welche Wege die Wissenschaft einschlagen soll, auf welchen Ge-
bieten die Forschung vorangetrieben, und auf welchen Gebieten sie eingestellt
werden soll.
Wenn die Wissenschaftler ein Interesse daran haben, ihre Forschung frei treiben zu können, so haben sie auch ein diesem Interesse vor- oder übergeordnetes Interesse, nämlich ein Interesse daran, dass ihre Forschungstätigkeit legitimiert ist. Insofern es keine allgemein anerkannten Hintergrundwerte mehr gibt, die als implizite Legitimationsquelle dienen könnten, und insofern die Orientierung an Partikularinteressen allmählich zu einem Legitimationsschwund führt, da diese Orientierung destruktive Konsequenzen hat, kann die Wissenschaft nur dadurch ihre Legitimität wiedererlangen, dass sie sich dem kritischen Diskurs aller Betroffenen stellt. Da sie heute kaum bereit ist, dies freiwillig zu tun, kann es durchaus legitim sein, sie politisch - und 'politisch' kann hier nur heissen 'im Hinblick auf die Polis, d.h. auf das Allgemeininteresse' - dazu zu verpflichten.


Es ist davon auszugehen, dass sich viele Wissenschaftler gegen solche Massnahmen aussprechen werden, wobei sie sich u.a. auf das schon vorher erwähnte Recht auf Forschungsfreiheit berufen werden. Insofern hier ein fundamentales Recht in Anspruch genommen wird, muss auch die Gegenargumentation stark sein. Und hier scheint die diskurstheoretische Kategorie der Strategiekonterstrategie anwendbar zu sein.

Es ist zunächst einmal festzustellen, dass das Handeln der meisten Wissenschaftler heute kaum den Kriterien des kommunikationellen Handelns gerecht wird. Wir haben es vielmehr mit rein strategischem Handeln zu tun, und zwar vor allem in denjenigen Fällen, in denen der Wissenschaftler im Dienste eines Privatunternehmens steht, oder sogar im Rahmen eines joint venture mit an der Spitze eines solchen Unternehmens steht. Die wissenschaftlich-wirtschaftliche Rationalität hat hier jede Spur von kommunikationeller oder ethischer Rationalität verloren. Die Forschung verpflichtet sich nicht mehr in erster Linie dem reflektierten Allgemeinwohl und der ethischen Akzeptabilität der aus ihr hervorgehenden Technologien, sondern der Rentabilisierung des Unternehmens. Diese Verstrickung von Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft ist einer der wichtigsten Faktoren die dazu geführt haben, dass die Wissenschaften die öffentliche Kon-

Es soll abschliessend darauf hingewiesen werden, dass eine Orientierung am Allgemeininteresse keinesfalls bedeutet, dass die Partikularinteressen einfach verschwinden sollen. Es geht vielmehr darum, die Partikularinteressen im Rahmen eines gesellschaftlichen Diskurses zu vermitteln. Das Allgemeininteresse lässt sich nämlich nicht anders bestimmen denn als die Gesamtheit der vermittelten Partikularinteressen. Insofern befindet sich die Wissenschaft in einem Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Partikularinteressen und Allgemeininteresse. Faktisch steht sie im Dienste von unvermittelten Partikularinteressen. Sie ist sich aber der Tatsache bewusst, dass sie sich, wenn sie als legitim erscheinen will, auf das Allgemeininteresse beziehen muss. Da sie aber kein vorgefertigtes Allgemeininteresse vorfindet, und wenn sie sich von ihrem ideologischen Schleier - oder von ihren 'edlen Lüge'-befreien will, dann kann sie dies nur dadurch erreichen, dass sie sich nur noch in den Dienst von gesellschaftlich vermittelten Partikularinteressen stellt.

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Autonomy and Externalism

Our culture places a high value upon personal autonomy. In this essay I try to apply Wittgenstein's general remark "Ein >innerer Vorgang< bedarf äußerer Kriterien" (PU, 580) to the contemporary debate on personal autonomy and moral responsibility in analytical philosophy.

I

I start with a declaration of Harry Frankfurt: "[...] to the extent that a person identifies himself with the springs of his action, he takes responsibility for those actions and acquires moral responsibility for them; moreover, the questions of how the actions and his identifications with their springs are caused are irrelevant to the questions of whether he performs the actions freely or is morally responsible for performing them." (1975, 54; my italics) And elsewhere, he adds: "The determining conditions that are pertinent here are exclusively structural arrangements. I mention this, [...] , since it bears on the familiar issue of whether historical considerations—especially causal stories—have any essential relevance to questions concerning whether a person's actions are autonomous." (1987, 171, note 13) According to Frankfurt, then, the causal history or genesis of desires of whatever order clearly has no role whatsoever to play in the constitution of autonomy (and responsibility). A person's possibility of reflexive identification with or endorsement of his motivational make-up is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for the autonomy of his motives. The harmony or coherence between first-order desires and second-order volitions—volitional harmony—is entirely sufficient for autonomy. (Cf. Frankfurt 1971)

The 'virtues' of Frankfurt's hierarchical model are well known. It elegantly answers the classical question: How is personal autonomy possible, given the biological, psychological and social conditioning of persons? For identification and volitional harmony are perfectly compatible with whatever kind of determinism. In this sense, Frankfurt's compatibilist hierarchical analysis is a natu-

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1 An earlier version of this essay was presented to a seminar on Personal Autonomy at the Princeton University in the winter of 1995. I would like to thank Hilary Bok, Susan Brison, Sarah Buss, Sam Flieschacker, Yael Tamir and especially Harry Frankfurt for their comments on that occasion.
ralistic analysis to be contrasted with, for example, a Kantian theory of noume-
nal freedom or a Chisholmian libertarian analysis in terms of contra-causal
freedom. Yet Frankfurt’s hierarchical model also has its ‘vices’: next to its
standard difficulties—the problems of identification (infinite regress) and nor-
mativity—(cf. Cuypers 1992), the model also specifically faces, according to
many other participants in the debate on autonomy and responsibility, the im-
portant problem of manipulation. It is, I think, instructive to situate this problem
in a wider philosophical context and to describe it as a version of the problem of
internalism.

II

The ‘internalism/externalism’ controversy is best known in relation to theo-
ries about the meaning of words and the content of thoughts. According to ex-
ternalist theories of linguistic meaning (and mental content), the meaning of
words essentially depends upon causal relations with objects in the external
world, or even upon causal interactions with other people in the linguistic
community. In Hilary Putnam’s laconic phrase: "Cut the pie any way you like,
‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head!” (1975, 227) A distinction is sometimes made
between ‘perceptual’ externalism and ‘social’ externalism: thought-contents
necessarily either depend upon things perceived or, alternatively, upon what is
present to other people’s minds. Putnam is the most well-known proponent of
the former view, while Saul Kripke (1982) is the canonical representative of the
latter variety of externalism. The later Wittgenstein can retrospectively be inter-
preted as combining both forms of externalism: not only ‘the natural history of
mankind’ but also ‘forms of life’ are necessary conditions for the constitution of
meaning and content.

Now the ‘internalism/externalism’ distinction is, to my mind, also applicable
to the debate on personal autonomy. If externalism about autonomy means that
the constitution of autonomy necessarily encompasses causal connections with
(a) the external world and (b) other people, then Frankfurt’s hierarchical model
is a version of what I propose to call free-will internalism. The internalist’s po-

dition is elegantly summarized in Frankfurt’s saying: “I always thought that I
am pretty much self-contained!” (personal conversation)

Quite recently Frankfurt’s free-will internalism has come under attack. Against
Frankfurt’s hierarchical model the objection of internalism has been
levelled based upon historical or genetic considerations. It is argued that causal
or historical features—a kind of external features—are all-important and pivotal
to the constitution of autonomy and responsibility. (Cf. Christman 1991, Buss 1994, Fischer & Ravizza 1994) According to historical accounts of autonomy (and responsibility), autonomy is essentially a historical phenomenon in the sense that the type of process of preference-formation (in the past)—how preferences came about—is vital to the presence or absence of autonomy (now). Although all preferences have a causal origin, only autonomous preferences have the right kind of causal history—their formation-process is free from subversive causal influences.

By contrast and as amply illustrated by the quotations with which I begun, Frankfurt does not at all take into account the causal genesis or history of preferences (volitions or effective desires): autonomy is just a matter of harmoniously ‘meshing’ higher-order and lower-order attitudes at a given moment. Consequently, his hierarchical model is a ‘current time-slice’ approach—in other words, autonomy is a ‘snapshot’ or ‘instant’ notion. Or again: being autonomous is a purely structural phenomenon defined in terms of a particular pattern of instant properties. Against this free-will internalism the proponents of a historical approach to autonomy point out the problem of manipulation: higher-order and lower-order elements can be in a harmonious mesh although the harmony is causally produced by an intuitively ‘autonomy-thwarting’ process. Before elaborating on this problem, I indicate another way in which Frankfurt’s model might be objectionably internalist.

Frankfurt’s hierarchical analysis of autonomy not only leaves out the external world but also other people. Nothing analogous to ‘social’ externalism is present in his model of the autonomous self. In this matter, Frankfurt’s individualistic picture sharply contrasts with Charles Taylor’s social picture of authenticity. According to Taylor (1991), a person’s authenticity—his ‘real’ and ‘true’ autonomy—necessarily depends upon his dialogical relations with other people. Dialogue with and recognition by others belong to the very possibility conditions of the idea of authenticity. (Cf. Cuypers 1995) If this is correct, then Frankfurt’s individualistic model turns out to be insufficient. For Frankfurt holds that nothing about other people is presupposed when a person critically reflects upon his own desires and forms his second-order volitions—identification and volitional harmony are entirely sufficient for autonomy.

III

According to Marina Oshana a naturalized analysis of autonomy can be naturalistic either (a) in a weak or (b) in a strong sense depending upon the condi-
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tions it satisfies. If an analysis satisfies the first condition that "the properties which constitute autonomy must be natural properties, knowable through the senses or by introspection (or must supervene on natural properties)" (Oshana 1994, 77; my italics), then it is only naturalistic in the weak sense. If an analysis also satisfies the second condition that "the properties that constitute autonomy must not be restricted to phenomena 'internal' to the agent" and, consequently, that "in addition, certain objective, 'external' properties are required" (idem), than it is fully naturalistic—naturalistic in the strong sense. Accordingly, it follows from the preceding that Frankfurt's analysis of autonomy is naturalistic in the weak but not in the strong sense. Although Frankfurt's hierarchical model fulfils the first naturalistic condition, it does not fulfil the second externalistic condition. Now proponents of a historical approach to autonomy argue for the necessity of the strong externalistic condition by raising the objection of manipulation against an internalistic approach even if free-will internalism is already naturalistic in the weak sense.

In a nutshell, the problem of manipulation is this. A person's identification and volitional harmony can, without his knowledge, be caused by processes such as secret hypnosis, subliminal advertising/messages, clandestine electronic brainstimulation, unperceived brainwashing, concealed conditioning, etc. These disguised processes and mechanisms not only tamper with first-order desires, but also with second-order volitions and the relations between lower and higher orders. In other words, they interfere as much with the desires a person 'has' as with his reflexive capacities to identify with them. Now the objection from manipulation is squarely based upon the strong intuition that these manipulative mechanisms radically undermine autonomy. Consequently, since identification and volitional harmony are compatible with these 'autonomy-thwarting' mechanisms, identification and volitional harmony cannot be sufficient for autonomy. The further claim based on the problem of manipulation is then that (causal) historical or genetic considerations have to be brought in to adequately account for autonomy.

IV

Frankfurt himself reflected on the issue whether the problem of manipulation would be damaging to his analysis of autonomy and responsibility. (1975, 52-54) He distinguishes between two types of manipulation by an external agency, fancifully called the Devil/neurologist (D/n). (a) The 'marionette' case is a case of continuous manipulation in which the D/n intervenes in the life of the victim
at every occasion (compare with ‘occasionalism’). (b) The ‘being programmed’
case is a case of pre-installed or pre-fixed manipulation in which the D/n in the
beginning accommodates the victim with a stable character or program that ever
thereafter determines his life (compare with ‘pre-established harmony’). Al-
though Frankfurt argues that neither of these two types of manipulation criti-
cally challenge his ‘pure mesh’ or ‘current time-slice’ approach to autonomy,
there still remain, I think, serious difficulties.

With regard to the ‘marionette’ case Frankfurt judges that the case is irrele-
vant to the issue of autonomy because the victim is not even a person. However,
this judgement begs the issue, since Frankfurt allows the victim to have com-
plex states of mind such as second-order volitions which define personhood.
Furthermore, from the subjective standpoint of the victim and according to
Frankfurt’s own criteria for autonomy, the marionette actually is autonomous at
a certain time if the internal ‘identification/volitional harmony’ condition is ful-
filled at that time. Frankfurt remarks that from the objective standpoint of the
observer "[the victim’s] history is utterly episodic and without inherent con-

cnectedness." (53; my italics) But it is not at all clear why manipulation by the
D/n has to exclude connectedness ‘from the inside’ and eliminate subjective
personal continuity. Moreover, and most surprisingly, the lack of an objective
personal history is, according to Frankfurt’s judgement, sufficient to withhold
the ascription "autonomous person" from the victim. But is it not at all transpar-
ent why such a historical condition should all of a sudden be decisive in the as-
crion of autonomy and personhood. In view of Frankfurt’s free-will internal-
ism, it remains a mystery why conditions ‘from the outside’ should count in the
constitution of autonomy.

In connection with the ‘being programmed’ case Frankfurt claims that the
victim can become autonomous (and morally responsible) in the same way
normal other people can, namely "by identifying himself with some of his own
second-order desires" (53) which make up his pre-installed character. However,
whereas the process of (third-order) identification can be manipulated by the
D/n as well in the ‘being programmed’ case, it is not so determined in the nor-
mal case. If this process of identification itself is also manipulated by either
continuous or pre-fixed interference on the part of the D/n, then identification
and the resulting second-order volitions intuitively do not seem to be within the
victim’s active control. As against this, Frankfurt holds that second-order voli-
tions—second-order desires with which a person has identified himself—are
necessarily active: "As for a person’s second-order volitions themselves, it is
impossible for him to be a passive bystander to them. They constitue his activ-
ity—i.e., his being active rather than passive—and the question of whether or not he identifies himself with them cannot arise." (54) But this bold statement is either arbitrary or illegitimately based upon the belief that second-order volitions are somehow secure against manipulation. For, if Frankfurt’s free-will internalism implicitly appeals to the immunity of second-order volitions to causal interference and thereby revives the ‘noumenal’ self or reissues a person with ‘contra-causal’ freedom, then it even violates the weak naturalistic condition. Now Frankfurt himself later admitted that a person can be as passive—as wanton—with regard to his second-order volitions as with regard to his first-order desires: "The mere fact that one desire occupies a higher level than another in the hierarchy seems plainly insufficient to endow it with greater authority or with any constitutive legitimacy." (1987, 166) But even if this (regress) problem can be solved in terms of decisive identification which constitutes active second-order volitions, the process itself of decisively identifying oneself still can be induced by an external and manipulative agency—i.e., by an intuitively ‘autonomy-thwarting’ mechanism.

V

Frankfurt is very unwilling to acknowledge that manipulation really poses a problem for his hierarchical model of autonomy. But notwithstanding his reluctance, he himself indirectly suggests, in the course of analysing the concept of lying (1991, 5-6), why manipulation intuitively undermines a person’s sense of autonomy. To my mind, if one substitutes "manipulation" for "lie" in the question "When we object to being the victim of a lie, just what is it that we find so objectionable?" (5), a good phenomenological reason can also be given why manipulation undercuts autonomy. Although there are obvious differences between manipulation and lying, their partial analogy is instructive and revealing.

According to Frankfurt, lying does not so much undermine the cohesion of human society as it undercuts the cohesion of the self. A victim’s reaction to lying is not social but personal in that lying affronts his pride and self-esteem. Especially the ‘objective’ characteristic of the act of lying is also relevant to the problem of manipulation: "Someone who tells a lie invariably attempts to deceive his victims about [...] the state of affairs to which he explicitly refers and of which he is purporting to give a correct account; [...]" (6) By misrepresenting the facts the liar takes himself to be the creative author of the victim’s world—in terms of our analogy, the liar plays the role of the D/H. The liar "[...] arrogates to himself something like the divine prerogative of creative speech, [...]"
This arrogance offends our pride. We are angered by the liar’s insulting effort to usurp control over the conditions in which we understand ourselves to live.” (Idem; my italics) Hence, the world of the victim of lying is no longer within his control. He can no longer see himself as the independent source of knowledge about the world. Such a predicament undercuts a person’s self-esteem because in his understanding of the conditions in which he lives he does not want to be deceived or to be under an illusion about those conditions.

Correspondingly, in as much as being the victim of manipulation is analogous to being the victim of lying, the arrogance of manipulation is similarly offensive to a person’s sense of autonomy. What we find so objectionable in being the victim of a manipulative mechanism is that the manipulator—the D/n, another person or a machine—usurps control over the conditions in which we understand ourselves to live. This usurpation insultingly undermines our self-respect and thwarts our sense of autonomy. And the only way to find out that we are under no illusion as to our autonomy seems to be a historical or genetic investigation into its (causal) origin. Consequently, the ‘inner process’ of identification which constitutes autonomy stands in need of outward historical criteria.

References


Autonomy and Externalism


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Gaffer Schwerdtleins Death
A Scientist’s Way into metaethical Disaster

Mephistopheles. O saintly man! Why, here’s a coil!
What, hast thou never yet been driven
To swear to what you couldst not prove?
Of God and of the world, and all that therein move,
Of Man, his heart and mind, his anger, hatred, love,
Hast not with might and main thy definitions given.
With brazen front, unaltering breath?
And should one sift the matter throughly,
Thou knew’st as much thereof, confess it truly,
As now thou know’st of Gaffer Schwerdtleins’s death.

J.W.v.Goethe; Faust I

(0) We all know the famous last thesis of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”. At least one intention Wittgenstein seems to have had in mind while writing down this thesis is that it is not possible to articulate a moral judgement that is meaningful in the same sense in which scientific judgements are meaningful. Judgements having cognitive content (like scientific judgements) seemed to be committed to a purely descriptive status. And since moral judgements seemed to be essentially pre- and not de scriptive, there seemed to be no possibility to regard any given moral judgement as having any cognitive content. This position is known as “ethical noncognitivism” and is elaborated not only by the early Wittgenstein, but also by Ayer, Carnap and Mackie. The question as to whether moral judgements have any cognitive content or not is still debated between philosophers. The actual discussion seems to result in a position that on the one hand acknowledges the “non-factuality” of moral values, but on the other hand maintains that moral questions can be rationally debated. Some main participants in this discussion are Richard Hare, Hilary Putnam, Simon Blackburn and Ken Bimmore. But I don’t want to concentrate on that philosophical branch of the metaethical discussion. Instead, I want to sketch and to evaluate a metaethical argument put forward not by philosophers but by some scientists who think that we indeed can speak whereof “one must be silent”. But (presumably) due to a lack of philosophical education, they come up with metaethical conclusions which are untenable. The closer analysis shows that the proposed position is justified as
Gaffer Schwerdlein's Death

good as Faust's testimony of Gaffer Schwerdlein's death. In the remainder I will be concerned with sketching and evaluating that scientist's way into metaethical disaster.

(1) The Argument: The promised argument is elaborated, for example, by David Peat and Kalervo Laurikainen. It is usually formulated in an ecological context and its exponents always recur on the work of the physicist Wolfgang Pauli. After being logically reconstructed, the argument seems to consist of the following premises and conclusion:

P1: The destruction of the environment is a moral distress threatening us all. We should have another attitude towards nature.

P2: Responsible for this destruction is the epistemological and ontological separation of mind and matter which traces back to Descartes.

P3: We could redress this destruction if we abolished the separation of mind and matter (without simply reducing mind to matter or vice versa).

P4: The separation of mind and matter is established and strengthened by the sciences, which have successfully acquired instrumentally usable knowledge of the world under that paradigm.

P5: The recent development of the sciences has falsified that paradigm.

C: The recent development of the sciences has delivered findings whose acceptance compels to the abandonment of the attitude which is responsible for today's ecological disasters.

We can sum up this argument in the following proposition: A concept of the world, whose acceptance has morally bad consequences, has been falsified and replaced by a concept of the world whose acceptance has morally good consequences; and this moral progress is based on scientific discoveries. To understand this argument, it is necessary to explain its crucial premises P2 and P5 in some detail.

(1.1) The separation of mind and matter: How can an epistemological and ontological dualism be responsible for ecological disaster? It is argued that this dualism fosters an attitude according to which man and nature are totally separated from each other. Having this dualism in mind, one tends to regard nature as a pure quarry which can be exploited without further reasoning. We come to restrict the set of moral objects to human beings, and everything else analytically becomes morally irrelevant.
(1.2) The reunion of mind and matter: The cartesian dualism, it is argued, has been overcome by quantum mechanics. The quantum theory is said to show the essential connectedness of the observer and the observed, of mental events in the experimentator and properties of objects. The wave function, which describes the state of a quantum system, yields only probability statements for the outcome of a given experiment. It is only when the experimentator registers the signal of a quantum object that the wave function "collapses" and a sharp value can be read off. Therefore we can say that the person of the experimentator with all its mental qualities determines the properties the quantum object assumes and reveals. These aspects of quantum mechanics show that it is and has always been false to draw a demarcation line between the areas of the mind and the matter.

(1.3) Restoring value: After the cartesian dualism has been overcome, we allegedly face a new concept of the world. The application of psychological concepts like "sense", "meaningfulness" and "value" is no longer restricted to the area of the mental. On the contrary: Since the human mind is able to determine properties of material things, it is adequate to assume that estimating the world as valuable means creating a world that is valuable. Conceding this, we find ourselves in a situation in which it is inconsistent to regard something as valuable that does not square with the principles of nature.

(2) Internal criticism: A first critical access to the argument above can be called "internal", because it concentrates on single premises of the argument. \( \textbf{P1} \) seems to me to be correct, but not \( \textbf{P2} \).

(2.1) Exonerating Descartes: Considering our ecological problems, I think that it is not the epistemological and ontological dualism between mind and matter that is responsible, but rather the fact that in normal life no such dualism obtains. Just because it is easily possible to get into the mental state of being satisfied through snatching up material things, the condition of the possibility of ecological disaster arises. If there really was a separation of mind and matter, there wouldn't have been any ecological disaster, since we wouldn't have been able to experience any (mental) use of the consumption of (material) resources. There are two possibilities: (1) We can be Cartesians on the ontological and epistemological level. That case leaves all value questions simply untouched, since our moral problems concerning the ecosphere are pragmatical problems. (2) We can (furthermore) be Cartesians on that pragmatical level. On that level Cartesianism (if we meant a strict separation of mind and matter by that term) would immediately collapse because of its obvious falsity. Even Descartes wouldn't have been a Cartesian in that sense, because he saw very clearly that
there is a connection between mind and matter (although it was and is a problem to reconstruct it). So we can make two assertions about **P2**: 1. A dualism of mind and matter on the epistemological and ontological level is not responsible for ecological disaster. 2. A unity of mind and matter on the pragmatical level allows the possibility of ecological disaster.

The same reasons which lead to the rejection of **P2** lead to the rejection of **P3**. In a certain sense, **P4** may be conceded. As a de facto present heuristic principle of the sciences, the dichotomy seems to be accepted. But nevertheless we have to be careful: On epistemological as well as on ontological grounds the separation of mind and matter is heavily attacked (without axiological ambitions). In epistemology, developments during this century seem to have shown that the process of acquiring knowledge is not neutral relative to the previously acquired knowledge. The knowledge we have partially influences the knowledge we are going to discover. We have no cognitive access to the world that is not already contaminated by our knowledge of the world. In ontology, we have for example neurobiological efforts to reduce the area of the mental to the area of material.

(2.2) **Moderating the interpretation of quantum mechanics**: With regard to **P5**, we can remark that a measuring procedure is terminated when the detector registers a signal. But this detector needs not necessarily be equipped with mental properties: It could be a robot or a computer as well. This shows that the mentioned connectedness between the observer and the observed is no connection between mind and matter and a fortiori no reunion between them. The proponents of our argument see this, but they reply that a signal has at first to be interpreted, before a statement concerning the measured event can be formulated. This interpretation in turn is a psychic process in the observer; the observer plays no detached role. Acquiring knowledge of the world requires therefore a psychic component — the component of interpretation. We can concede this. But this is no peculiarity of quantum mechanics at all. It holds for the whole enterprise of empirical investigation and is perfectly compatible with our remarks concerning the axiologically neutral criticisms of **P4**. Concerning the resuscitation of the material world, we see that quantum theory makes no contribution.

(2.3) **Micro- and Macro-Level**: A last critical remark on the internal branch may concern **C**. Even if there was a connection between mind and matter specifically revealed by quantum mechanics, we could still say the following: It seems to be clear that value problems concern us on a macroscopical level, on a level where we are to be described as thinking and feeling human beings. They
do not concern us on that microscopical level where we are to be described as complicated quantum systems. So if the quantum effects should have any practical impact, it would be necessary that they occur in our practical life. If we prefer vanilla ice-cream to the strawberry type, it should be possible to turn a strawberry-vanilla-superposition into the vanilla possibility while opening the freezer. But such thoughts are nonsense, not only according to common sense, but especially according to quantum theory. Apart from that, they are useless, since on the practical level there is already no strict separation of mind and matter which could be overcome. Besides, if we lived in such a strange world, the moral problems would presumably be larger and not smaller.

(3) External Criticism: A second critical access to our argument can be called "external", because it concedes the whole argument and highlights the situation which occurs in that case of concession.

(3.1) Naturalistic Fallacy: The first thing that would happen if we conceded the argument would be nothing at all. Even if we all agreed that the system of nature "makes sense", nothing could prevent us from being totally indifferent to the course of nature. The pure fact that there is a kind of "making sense" in the course of nature does not urge anyone to any special kind of behaviour. Quantum mechanics may restore a value-laden nature, but without some imperative component no directive thesis for our practical life follows.

(3.2) Superabundance of Norms: We can supply that want and invent an imperative premise. This could run as follows: "Live according to the principles of nature!" But then we get the problem that it is not clear which principles should guard us. An imperative of such generality commands everything and nothing. In the sense that we cannot act against the laws of nature, we are always living according to the principles of nature. Some parts of the course of nature seem to be dubious models for the moral life: Female spiders which eat their husbands after copulation or the laws governing the rotation of the planets are unsuitable for guarding our moral life. This shows that we need a further selection of principles if we shall be able to make any use of the quantum-based unity of nature.

(3.3) Counterintuitive Principles: A near specification of the imperative would be the following: "Live according to the principles of sustaining life!" That sounds good. Here one seems to be able to derive commandments which lead, for example, to the preservation of nature. But on the other side we face principles that have their place in nature, but would seem to be the embodiment of evil when transferred into morals. These are principles of neglecting and refusing the weak and the sick. Nobody would seriously demand that we install
such principles in our system of morals, and this shows again that we have to call upon external principles when working out an acceptable system of morals. The course of nature alone is not sufficient to deliver such a system.

It is finally not to see how the peculiarities of quantum mechanics should be of any help in removing ecological disaster apart from the way in which all sciences can help us in moral questions: The knowledge produced by the sciences can help us in solving our moral problems in the sense that it can tell us what is possible and what is not possible. It can not tell us what is morally good and what is morally bad.

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Cognitive Ethics
An Urgent Need in the Age
of Science and Technology

Introduction

"To preach morals is easy, to logically justify morals is difficult." This is how Arthur Schopenhauer introduces his uncrowned essay of praise. 1 By now, we know a little bit more and, what is of special importance, progress in science and technology challenges our thinking about ethics ever anew. The purpose of this paper is an attempt to clarify some fundamental problems (descriptive ethics) in order to later briefly deal with some specific problems (prescriptive ethics). It is to be shown that ever new questions awaiting decisions can only be answered in terms of a "hierarchy of values".

I should like to start with a few theses the foundation of which is not given here [See Gottlob, 1989 2]

(1) Ethics serve the purpose of facilitating the communal life of human beings.
(2) Ethics must be "ethics of success" or result-oriented ethics (Ethics of Responsibility). 3
(3) Egotism (taking the long view) can be both motivation of and incentive for ethical behavior.
(4) Sacrifices made for ethical reasons can be regarded as "premiums" in the same sense as we pay our insurance premiums.

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1 A. Schopenhauer, 1986, in "Kleine Schriften" ["Miscellanea"], Collected Works, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, p. 629
2 R. Gottlob 1989, "Der Skandal der Philosophie" ["The Scandal of Philosophy"], Die Blaue Eule, Essen.
3 Into this category belong also the ethics of utilitarianism, as well as the related "ethics of minimal suffering" (St. Toulmin, 1950, in "An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics", Cambridge). The rejection of any "Ethics of Success" in "Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft" (1788), 1990, Mainier, Hamburg, p. 36, must needs appear incomprehensible to us today, since it is in conflict with the ethics of responsibility.
A) The Three Roots of Ethics

1) Genetic Root:
There cannot be the slightest doubt that certain genetic modes of behavior come to us as inherited drives and urges. The procreative urge, the care for one's young, as well as the need for caring in general, the fondness of children or young ones, similar to the drive for self-preservation, can be found throughout the animal kingdom. A certain propensity for cooperation, as well as pity on the weak and the suffering equally occur in the animal kingdom and appear to be innate to most human beings.4

2) Cultural Root:
This comprises everything in the line of ethical norms and standards mankind hitherto has developed. The neolithic revolution, the densely packed communal life in the cities, and all subsequent social changes needed - and therefore produced - certain rules, facilitating or even making a satisfying and fruitful life together possible. Children are taught these rules within the family, in school, and in religious education, while adults are made to adhere to them by a structure of laws and regulations. - I regard it as conceivable that Kant's "the moral law within me" springs from these two roots.

3) Cognitive Root:
The first two roots can be traced back to a period of time between the development of the higher vertebrates and the last few centuries. They are definitely not suitable for coping with the progressively accelerating development of science and technology that has taken place within the last two to three centuries and is still continuing at a breathtaking rate. The immense rise in power of the human species [availability of a vast energy potential, the "communications explosion" with its potential of influence and control over human behavior and attitudes, exponential population growth by reduction of infant mortality, manipulation of the genome, etc.] is threatening the survival of man in a world still worth living in. Our evolutionary heritage and our "set" of cultural traditions are no longer adequate to cope with these developments; they demand an additional principle: cognitive ethics.

4 Evolutionary ethics were emphasized mainly by the proponents of the "Evolutionary Theory of Cognition". See e.g. H.Mohr, pp.19 - 31, or F.Wuketits, pp. 208 - 234, as well as other (partly also critical) authors in W. Lütterfelds, (Ed.) "Evolutionäre Ethik zwischen Naturalismus und Idealismus" ['Evolutionary Ethics Between Naturalism and Idealism"], Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1993.
B) The Hierarchy of Values

1) General:

A guideline for action and behavior under unaccustomed conditions and circumstances could be found in a hierarchy of values. Only since we have recognized - say, at the time the first A-bomb was dropped - that we are collectively capable of threatening human survival on earth, a definite guideline for human action emerged:

2) The Highest Value:

"The survival of man in an environment worth living in". Hans Jonas writes: "None of the former systems of ethics had to take into account the global conditions of human existence and the distant future, or even the existence of the species man. Since today these encompassing aspects have to be considered demands, to put it into a nutshell, an entirely new concept of rights and obligations for which no earlier system of ethics has provided even the barest of principles, let alone the finished data." This highest value can be easily justified: Nearly all human beings enjoy living and wish to live on through their descendants. At the same time, man represents the most highly developed and most complex structure in the entire universe as we know it. Snuffing out human life or the destruction of an environment in which life is worth living thus would be an irreversible process, which would concern all of us and for which no one would want to be responsible.

3) The Nearest Other High Values:

Here, one is tempted to list, after mankind as a whole, larger groups or aggregates: Continents, states, countries, cities, etc. Experience, however, has shown us that the egotism of large groups, such as also races and religious communities is only harmful. Thus we have to assign second place to the individual. This is quite obvious if we consider that, as a matter of fact, the community is to serve the individual and not vice versa. The individual should not be sacrificed to any higher value. In our hierarchy of values, the individual with its inalienable rights is followed by the family, smaller groups, such as "neigh-

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5 Earlier attempts, such as e.g. N. Hartmann, 1935, "Ethik" ["Ethics"], DeGruyter, Berlin, or M. Scheler, 1954, in "Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materielle Wertethik" ["Formalism in Ethics and Ethics of Material Values"], Francke, Bern, were not then able to take into account the breathtaking pace of new developments.

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borhoods" and village communities. Only after this come larger groups like cities, countries, etc. Further values follow: The animal and plant kingdoms, and cultural values.

C) Some Consequences for Research in the Natural Sciences

1) Who Failed?
From this ranking we can deduce, among other things, that science and technology must serve the survival of man in an environment worth living in. But has this hitherto been the case? Do we not actually owe a great part of our problems of survival to science? Is not the population explosion, mainly in the developing countries, also a direct result of the reduction of infant mortality, which, just as snow-balling waste, the greenhouse effect, the ozone gap, and the A-bomb, ultimately is a product of scientific progress? - All considered, is there such a thing as

2) A Science Free From Values?
Here, we are claiming that, far from being free from values, science alone [to the extent that it generates new knowledge] is actually to a high degree dominated by values. Would we e.g. be able, without the "green revolution" caused by science and technology, to feed the current ever expanding population of the world? Do we not hope of genetic engineering that it may help us to postpone the Malthusian catastrophe by a few decades? Science provides us with power, and power, depending on its

3) Application

...can be useful and valuable, neutral, or harmful, and we can state that the harmful effects frequently ascribed to science can be traced to improper application of the achievements of science. This gives rise to the question: Would it have been right to simply let the children in the Third World die? Even at that time, the special value of the individual on our scale of values would have made such a course of action or inaction unthinkable. What we actually failed to do was to foresee and gauge the even then predictable consequences of this - in itself ethical - behavior and to plan and implement appropriate counter-measures. While we may not sacrifice a single individual for the benefit of global survival, we may, nevertheless, demand from everybody adequate sacrifices for this pur-

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pose. If one had at that time, prior to general knowledge of contraceptive methods, attempted to reduce the birthrate through information dispersal among the population, extension of the period of compulsory education, and creation of - at least rudimentary - care for the aged, today's problems with exploding population growth would be much less dramatic. On the other hand, today's options for family planning still depend on a minimum standard of education among the population. Consequently, raising the general level of education with respect to questions of applying technology should be at the top of our list of priorities. How should a citizen without at least basic knowledge in engineering, physics, and biology be able to weigh the hazards of energy production from fossil fuels against the risks of atomic energy, and thus be qualified for taking part in decision-making within the democratic process? Do we not experience how today even the people in influential positions in politics are quite out of their depth when it comes to making decisions on the use of gene technology? Certain definitive rules and guidelines for the

4) Behavior of Scientists

can be deduced from the above hierarchy of values. Our main concern must be that - on the one hand - individuals are not to be sacrificed, while - on the other hand - research dedicated to the survival of our species must have priority. Where animals are concerned, avoidance of needless pain and suffering is a matter of course. Humans, however, may only be used in predictably harmless experiments. Experiments involving risks to the health of test persons have to be subjected to a most rigorous code [using alternate sources of information to the limit, informed consensus, etc.] The standards of tried and tested rules for research and scientific honesty must be strictly adhered to.

5) To What Extent is Confirmed Cognition Possible?

In our age of relativism and the ongoing battle between "realists" and "constructive empiricists" assured cognition is in doubt. My own investigations show that, in certain cases, hypotheses can ascend to the rank of assured knowledge [laws of nature], provided there is proof of necessity. Thus, statements like "Water is HO\_2", "The earth is a planet of the solar system", "All human beings require oxygen in order to live", etc. may safely be regarded as assured. Are we capable of concluding from past experience what will be valid also in

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the future? Many philosophers, Wittgenstein\textsuperscript{10} and Popper\textsuperscript{11} among them, deny this. Yet under certain conditions we can make reliable predictions, such as e.g. "If we continue to dispose of toxic effluents into the sea, while at the same time engaging in excessive fishing in our oceans, an important source of protein for the feeding of mankind soon will no longer be available."

6) A Change of Concepts

is capable of altering our ethical behavior. Only fifty years ago, it would have been an unthinkable horror scenario, had we removed vital organs, or even the heart itself, from a human body for purposes of transplantation while the heart was still beating. Today, this is part of the everyday routine of surgery: Our concept of death has changed from cessation of heart functions to the total failure of brain functions. Thus death and a heart still beating are no longer mutually exclusive.

D Some Further Consequences of the Hierarchy of Values

1) Democracy:

The high rank of the individual in the hierarchy of values is cause for the right to be part in decision-making processes, at least in cases, where the individual is concerned, and provided the individual is in possession of the qualifications required.

2) Duties and Obligations:

Certain rights always need to be balanced by corresponding duties and obligations. Each and every citizen who wishes to be part of the democratic deciding processes is under obligation to inform himself adequately on all issues to be decided.

3) Globality:

The states have to cede sovereignty rights to hierarchically higher authorities, and the latter, in turn, to a global organization. This organization has to develop a body of globally binding international law and to care for global observation of the fundamental rights of man. Foremost among these is encompassing.

4) Education:

It devolves upon the state to provide its citizens with the opportunity to achieve a sufficient level of general education as well as provide information on

\textsuperscript{10} L. Wittgenstein in TLP, # 5.1361

specific issues demanding decisions. (Also see C 3). The state has to monitor whether its citizens are actually meeting their educational obligations. It has to be the goal of education not only, as currently practiced almost exclusively, to prepare man for successfully competing with his fellow man, but rather to awaken insight in ethical issues and the capability for co-operation - in small groups as well as worldwide. In all matters of development aid, education must be the primary target.

5) Philosophy:

Its primary task is to test the precise limits of man's cognitive capabilities. Knowledge of these limits has to become the core of a new system of education in order to safeguard humans against excessive credulity which could make them fall victim to false prophets. This knowledge, on the other hand, must also clearly demonstrate our cognitive faculties in order to prevent unwarranted scepticism and defeatism.

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Blameworthiness and Cultural Norms

Traditional wisdom counsels that two conditions must be satisfied for a person to be blameworthy for her intentional actions, a control condition which says, loosely, that the person's action should be voluntary; and an epistemic one which requires, roughly, that the person not be relevantly ignorant of what she is doing.

In this paper, I first argue against any epistemic condition which entails that a person is blameworthy for performing an action only if that action is in fact wrong. On my view, an agent is blameworthy for performing an action on the condition that she has the belief that her action is wrong, and the belief plays an appropriate role in the generation of her action. I then argue that a consequence of this view is that a person who engages in behavior condoned by the norms of her culture, but which people outside her culture find objectionable, may well not be deserving of blame for that behavior, even though that behavior may be wrong.

Imagine a society whose culture upholds a caste system. There are various classes, the top occupied by the 'Rulers,' and the bottom by the 'Lows.' Nativity in a class fixes one's position in that class for one's entire life. Deeply entrenched cultural values strictly forbid marriage among Lows and Rulers. Suppose Seth, a Low, loses his heart to Smita, the daughter of a Ruler. Although attracted by him, Smita shuns Seth's advances. Keeping with her cultural norms, she has Seth flogged for his 'impudence.' Smita sees nothing wrong in so disciplining Seth; indeed, she is loyal to, and respects, the tradition which would brand her failure to chastise Seth's approaches as morally unacceptable.

This case elicits or would elicit a predictable reaction from many who are not part of that culture: Smita's seeing to it that Seth is whipped is disparaged as being morally wrong; perhaps Smita (herself) is discredited as being morally reprehensible in light of her treatment of Seth; and, most importantly for our purposes, Smita is regarded as being to blame (in the sense of 'blame' that entails moral responsibility) for ensuring that Seth is flogged.

If Smita is thought to be blameworthy for her behavior, why precisely is this so? One response lies implicit in this sort of exclamation: "Smita did something terribly wrong, and had she only been thinking clearly, she would have realized her wrongdoing!" The response underscores the idea that treating a person in
the manner in which Smita did—ensuring Seth's chastisement—is, from a more rational, 'objective,' and perhaps culturally neutral perspective, morally wrong. If this response is to carry weight, the perspective in light of which Smita's act is deemed wrong must be epistemically privileged; it is supposed to be the correct perspective. Furthermore, the response assumes that Smita knows (or ought to) know that her treatment of Seth, given this perspective, is wrong.

I wish (initially) to direct attention to one salient feature of this response: as knowledge entails truth, the response relies implicitly on the condition that a person is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if that action is in fact wrong. However, the ensuing considerations cast serious doubt on this condition.

First, ponder this example: Doing the best she can to murder her patient, doctor Deadly does what very credible evidence to which she has access indicates will kill the patient--she injects the patient with medicine C. Happily for the patient, there has been an innocent error in diagnosis. Contrary to what Deadly believes, her patient is suffering from a disease curable only by taking C. Giving C results in the lucky patient's full recovery. Allowing for moderate consequentialist considerations, although it is arguably obligatory for Deadly to inject her patient with C, it seems Deadly is to blame for the injection of this drug. She acts just as she would have--with the same sort of base intentions and calculated deliberation--had her giving C resulted in the patient's demise.

Next, consider the following type of example formulated by Harry Frankfurt. Imagine that, despite believing that squeezing the trigger (to kill Max) is wrong, Jones--on her own--arrives at a decision to kill Max, and when the moment is right successfully implements her decision. Unbeknownst to her, had she shown any inclination not to intend or decide to murder Max, Demon who had scrupulously been monitoring the situation all along, would have, via direct manipulation of Jones' brain, caused her to form an intention to squeeze the trigger and to act on that intention. As Demon does not show her hand in the sequence of events that culminates in Jones' squeezing the trigger, it appears that Jones is morally blameworthy for squeezing the trigger even though (arguably) she could not have done otherwise. She is blameworthy, roughly, because her action of squeezing the trigger is under the control of her practical

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reasoning, it issues from autonomous actional elements (like beliefs and desires), and Jones performs it in spite of her belief that squeezing the trigger is wrong.

It is straightforward to show that (in her circumstances) Jones' squeezing the trigger is not (objectively) wrong. For these principles are true:

(OW): S has a moral obligation to perform [not to perform] A if and only if it is morally wrong for S not to perform [to perform] A; and
(K): S has a moral obligation to perform [not to perform] A only if it is within S's power to perform [not to perform] A.

(OW) and (K) entail that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for wrong actions:

(WAP): It is morally wrong for S to perform [not to perform] A only if it is within S's power not to perform [to perform] A.

As Jones (in her circumstances) cannot refrain from squeezing the trigger, (WAP) and the facts of the case entail that Jones' squeezing the trigger is not wrong. But then the objective condition, which requires that an action be wrong for an agent to be to blame for performing it, implies implausibly that Jones is not blameworthy for squeezing the trigger. So once again we have reason to jettison that condition.

The foregoing considerations strongly motivate the view that moral blameworthiness is affiliated with belief in what is objectively wrong. Although capturing the correct belief condition promises to be taxing, I provisionally recommend the following:

Blame1: S is morally blameworthy for performing A only if S has an occurrent or dispositional belief, BAW, that A is wrong, and S performs A despite entertaining BAW and believes (at least dispositionally) that she is performing A. (Entertaining a belief involves accessing it in some way and not merely having it.)

Blame1 has striking consequences for Smita's case. To trace them, I suggest that deliberative intentional action involves some psychological basis for evaluative reasoning; a practical judgment made on the basis of such reasoning recommending a particular course of action; an intention or decision formed or acquired on the basis of that judgment; and an action executing that intention or decision. Elaborating, I believe that an agent's deliberations that issue in a practical judgment about what to do, plausibly involve the assessment of reasons for or against action, by appeal to an evaluative scheme of the agent's. An agent's
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evaluative scheme is comprised of these constituents: (a) Normative standards the agent believes ought to be invoked in an assessment of reasons for action. For instance, Tammy might believe that financial decisions should be made on the counsel of her accountant, culinary choices should be made in accordance with Julia Child's recommendations, and moral choices should be based on her religion. I make no presumptions about norms being shared by agents. Unlike Tammy, Jim might believe that decisions across all 'domains,' economic, culinary, etc. should be predicated on utilitarian considerations. (b) The agent's long-term goals deemed valuable by the agent. Jim, for example, may underscore his commitment to attempting to maximize overall happiness. (c) Deliberative principles the agent utilizes to arrive at practical judgments about what to do or how to act. For instance, Jim may believe that the best way to maximize utility is to rely on rules of thumb like 'keep your promises,' 'don't cheat,' etc. (d) Lastly, motivation to act on the basis of the normative standards in (a) and goals in (b) using the deliberative principles in (c). By utilizing one's evaluative scheme, one can arrive at all things considered judgments about what to do or how to act in particular circumstances.

Focusing on constituent (a), for many if not all of us, several if not all, of the normative standards, or elements of such standards, on which we rely to appraise reasons for or against courses of conduct, ultimately owe their origin to the norms embedded in the culture in which we are situated. It is these cultural norms that the multitude of us internalize during our formative years, and which will later exert a powerful influence on how we experience the world, and on how we deal with the barrage of decisions we are required to make to cope with daily living. I hypothesize that a significant array of our normative beliefs—including beliefs about what is morally right and wrong—derive in the end from our cultural norms. Cultural traditions, I believe, also frequently exert commanding leverage on the long-term goals one deems worthwhile pursuing, partly by imposing fierce loyalties. They channel our lives into certain directions, by making salient various options and downplaying or never revealing others. With loyalty or allegiance comes motivation. Smita, for example, accepting her cultural norms, is motivated to uphold the age-old cultural practices of her society.

Reconsider Smita's treatment of Seth. Given the foregoing considerations about the genesis of one's beliefs about what is normatively right or wrong, we may assume that Smita's moral beliefs ultimately stem, in large measure, from her cultural norms. As these norms morally sanction the sort of treatment she ensures Seth receives for his advances towards her, Smita believes, in light of
the influence these norms exert on her moral beliefs, that she is doing no wrong by seeing to it that Seth is punished. But then the condition laid down in Blame1 for being to blame is not satisfied; the state of affairs, Smita's ensuring that Seth is punished, is not grounded in any belief of Smita's that she is doing wrong. The result is the deflationary one that Smita is not to blame (in the sense entailing moral responsibility) for treating Seth in a manner which would appear reprehensible to many who are not part of Smita's culture.

Turning now to some objections, one revolves on the assumption that a person like Smita is free to adopt an 'objective,' culturally neutral set of norms, whose pronouncements see no moral fault in Seth's advances but morally censure the type of treatment he receives at the hand of Smita for his advances. The objector might even insist that Smita may judge, on the basis of her own evaluative scheme, that these more neutral norms are better than those of her own. After all, we do have the ability to reflect on our own evaluative schemes, and amend them in the wake of such reflection, where the reflection itself is not tainted by 'autonomy-undermining factors.' But then, the objection continues, if Smita does have the capacity to adopt a more neutral scheme, or elements of such a scheme, which censure her treatment of Seth, but fails to do so, she is still to blame for seeing to it that Seth is punished.

This objection, however, has deficiencies. There is, firstly, the worry of whether persons are significantly free to adopt whatever norms they see fit. For many this is not a realistic option. The influence of culture and tradition on the imposition of values, loyalties, and directions is not easily discardable. For a vast majority of us, it is misleading even to suppose that through a series of past actions, we have deliberately and freely brought it about that we endorse the culturally derived values that we do. Secondly, even granting the more sensible suggestion that evaluative schemes are susceptible to assessment and modification, why should it be thought that a person will in fact engage in such reflective modification? Perhaps some will propose (what I think is dubious), that in light of the true or correct morality, if there is one, one should engage in such activity. But even granting this problematic conjecture, there is no guarantee that one will. At best, then, this objection alerts us to the possibility that Smita may be blameworthy for failing to engage in reflective evaluation of the cultural norms she has perhaps uncritically accepted. Or maybe she is blameworthy for acquiring the belief that it is morally permissible to censure Seth for his advances. But this is not to sustain the distinctive charge that she is to blame for seeing to it that Seth is punished.

A second objection insists that there is something clearly right about finding
Smita’s (relevant) beliefs about, and (relevant) actions concerning Seth, reprehensible. We condemn Smita for them regardless of whether she was free with respect to either the acquisition of these beliefs or her acting on them. Doesn't this show that Smita is to blame for her (germane) beliefs and actions?

Again, I think this objection misses the mark. It ignores the view that there are different ways in which a person is accessible to moral evaluation, and being to blame is only one such way. For instance, we might claim that Smita's treatment of Seth is morally reprehensible, and that she has some morally reprehensible beliefs about the Lows. We might denounce her for failing to cultivate compassion for Seth. Further, we might find her morally reprehensible in light of the fact that she has done something morally reprehensible. But none of these moral evaluations amount to an attribution of blameworthiness in the sense of 'blameworthy' that entails moral responsibility.

In conclusion, the epistemic condition of blameworthiness I have proposed, together with the empirical hypothesis that many of our normative beliefs ultimately originate from the various norms that are part of the culture in which we find ourselves, has deflationary results. Outsiders relative to a culture are quick to attribute blame to persons from that culture who perform acts deemed morally reprehensible by them. The moral assessments of these outsiders may be correct in various respects, but woefully mistaken in one: the 'insider' like Smita may well have performed an act that is morally reprehensible, but she need not be morally blameworthy for her act. Indeed, outsiders may be deserving of blame for failing to see this.

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Praktische Rationalität oder Freiheitsgesetz
Begründungsprobleme rechtlicher und politischer Normen

I


Die Entstehung dieses Paradigmas ist eine Antwort auf die wechselhafte Geschichte des Verhältnisses von Utilitarismus und Wohlfahrtsökonomie. Behaupteten die Vertreter der 'alten' Wohlfahrtsökonomie (Edgeworth, Marshall, Pigou) unter Zugrundelegung des utilitaristischen Kalküls, daß gesellschaftliche Zustände durch die Größe der Nutzensumme zu bewerten seien, so wird in den Arbeiten der 'neuen' Wohlfahrtsökonomie (Pareto, Bergson, Samuelson) die...
Möglichkeit bestritten, gesellschaftliche Zustände durch den Gesamtnutzen zu bewerten. Bestritten werden dabei sowohl die ethischen Prämisse der 'alten' Wohlfahrtsökonomie als auch deren Annahmen zur kardinalen Meßbarkeit und interpersonalen Vergleichbarkeit individueller Nutzenwerte (Bohnen 1964). Sie operieren mit bloß individuellen Wohlfahrtsfunktionen, die lediglich ordinale und interpersonal nicht vergleichbare Nutzenindikatoren zugrundelegen und gesellschaftliche Zustände anhand sogenannter Paretooptima nur bzgl. ihrer Effizienz, aber nicht als moralisch besser oder schlechter zu bewerten erlauben.\(^2\)


Ich unterscheide im folgenden drei Ausprägungen dieses Paradigmas. Nach der ersten können moralische Normen allein durch die realen Interessen der einzelnen Individuen begründet werden (Buchanan (1975/1984), Gauthier (1986)). Rational begründen lassen sich nach dieser Konzeption nur solche Moralprinzipien, die die Individuen allein aufgrund ihrer realen Interessen wählen und für allgemeinverbindlich halten würden. Solche Modelle lehnen Lösungen ab, die die Entscheidungsalternativen dadurch einschränken, daß sie die Ausbildung individueller Präferenzen gewissen Restriktionen unterwerfen oder bestimmte Rechte als unaufhebbar postulieren. Ersteres geschieht, wenn als weitere Prämisse der Entscheidungssituation die Unkenntnis der am ursprünglichen Entscheidungsprozeß Beteiligten über ihre individuelle Ausstattung und Fähig-

\(^2\) Als paretooptimal gelten dabei solche Zustände, in denen es nicht mehr möglich ist, durch Tauschoperationen mindestens eine Person besser zu stellen, ohne eine andere zu schädigen.

\(^3\) 'Rational' wird hier - im Gegensatz zum unten gebrauchten Term 'vernünftig' - ausschließlich im ökonomischen Sinne gebraucht. Eine Person handelt nach dieser Bestimmung rational, wenn sie sich unter den ihr zur Verfügung stehenden Handlungsalternativen für diejenige entscheidet, die eine optimale Erfüllung ihrer Ziele erwartet lassen, oder in der Sprache der Ökonomie, wenn sie ihren Erwartungsnutzen maximieren.
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keiten einerseits, über die Position, die sie in der zukünftigen Gesellschaft einnehmen werden, andererseits eingeführt wird, um eine unparteiische Sozialwahl zu erzwingen (Harsanyi, Rawls); letzteres wenn bestimmte Freiheitsrechte als nicht zur Disposition stehend, aus der Sozialwahl ausgenommen werden (Rawls, Nozick).

II


Seinen Überlegungen liegt die Annahme zugrunde, daß aufgrund bestimmter Gegebenheiten, wie Knappheit der Güter, negativer externer Effekte, und der Möglichkeit, die Güter durch geeignete Formen der Kooperation zu vermehren, das Zusammentreffen des allein an individueller Rationalität orientierte Handeln zu einem Ergebnis führt, daß für alle wesentlich ungünstiger ist, als wenn sie sich auf kooperative Lösungen eingelassen hätten.4

Eine Lösung des Kooperationsproblem zeigt nach Gauthier die Theorie rationalen Verhandelns. Ihr Grundgedanke besteht darin, daß rationale Akteure, die sich in einen Verhandlungsprozeß freiwillig auf eine gemeinsame Strategie einigen, zu einer fairen Übereinkunft gelangen und sich daher verpflichtet fühlen, diese einzuhalten. Sofern es mehrere gegenüber der Nichtkooperation paretooptimale Zustände gibt, schlägt Gauthier als Verhandlungsregel vor, daß alle Beteiligten zunächst einen Anspruch auf das für sie individuell bestmögliche Ergebnis erheben und dann im Verhandlungen solange Konzessionen anbieten, bis ein für alle befriedigendes Ergebnis erzielt wird (Gauthier (1986) 133 ff). Ein solches ist erreicht, wenn die Größe der maximalen relativen Konzession (i.e. die Konzession im Verhältnis zum beanspruchten Nutzenzuwachs) ein Minimum erreicht, d.h. nicht größer ist als die maximale relative Konzession, die durch jedes andere Ergebnis erforderlich ist (Principle of Minimum Relative Concession).

4 Eine solche Konstellation wird typischerweise durch das sogenannten Gefangenen-Dilemmas modelliert.
Es läßt sich nun leicht zeigen, daß das Konzept der Verhandlungslösungen unter Voraussetzung kontingenter Anfangsbedingungen zu moralisch offensichtlich unerwünschten Resultaten führen kann, weil sie vom status quo abhängig sind, d.h. Personen mit natürlichen Stärken und Fähigkeiten bevorzugt; ebenso bevorzugt es die in der Verfügung über Güter und Machtmittel besser Gestellten, wie es die Risikobereitschaft honoriert, diese auch einzusetzen.\(^5\)


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wenn die Verteidigung des Erworbenen und die gewaltsame Aneignung auch für den Stärksten mit höheren Kosten verbunden ist, als die Vereinbarung einer kooperativen Lösung. Vereinbart werden dann Regel zum Schutz festgelegter Individualshären und der Kontrolle der Einhaltung dieser Regeln. 6 Da die Individuen im vorvertraglichen Zustand unterschiedlich viel Güter in ihre Gewalt bringen konnten, fallen diese Individualshären unterschiedlich groß aus, gleich sind sie nur bzgl. der Schutzes und der freien Verfügung über diese Individualshären. Da die Ausgestaltung des Vertrages also von der im vorvertraglichen Zustand erreichten Verteilung von Gütern und Drohpotentialen abhängig ist, läßt sich mit diesem Modell im Grund jede faktische Verfassung rechtfertigen. Buchanan demonstriert dies selbst drastisch, indem er auch die Möglichkeit eines Sklavenvertrages einräumt, in dem sich die Schwächeren um des nackten Überlebens willen unterwerfen. Auch ein solcher Vertrag würde - in der Deutung Buchanans - "individuelle Rechte festlegen, und im Ausmaß seiner gegenseitigen Anerkennung wäre die Gewähr für wechselseitige Vorteile gegeben, wenn in Folge der Aufwendungen für Verteidigung und Eroberung zurückgingen" (Buchanan (1984) 86). Der Vertrag zeichnet mithin nichts mehr aus, vor allem nicht - wie es die Intention Buchanans ist - den liberalen Rechtsstaat. 7 Entgegen den Annahmen Buchanans sind die ausgehandelten Rechte jedoch auch nicht definitiv geschützt. Denn wenn die im Vertrag vereinbarte Verteilung die Individuen nicht mehr zufriedenstellt, steigen die Kosten für Kontrolle und Erzwungung der Regel eventuell so sehr, daß es besser wäre, einen neuen Vertrag auszuhandeln (Buchanan 112f). Dies zeigt, daß das Konzept der Verhandlungslösungen ohne weitere normativen Grundlagen keine rechtlichen oder moralischen Verbindlichkeiten begründen kann, sondern allenfalls die Stabilität gewisser Regelungen verbürgt, solange ein allgemeiner Konsens der großen Menge der Beteiligten sie trägt.

6 Vereinbart werden nach Buchanan ferner Regel für die Produktion von Gemeinschaftsgüter, definitiv ausgeschlossen jedoch die Möglichkeit von Umverteilungsmaßnahmen.

7 Gauthier entgeht dieser Konsequenz nur, indem er für den Naturzustand eine ganze Reihe normativer Restriktionen annimmt: daß jede Person die Grundaussatung, die sie beim Eintritt in die Kooperation besitzt, ohne die Übergabe ihrer Position durch die Verschlechterung einer anderen erworben habe; daß jede Person ein exklusives Recht auf den Gebrauch ihres Körpers und ihrer Kräfte wie über die Produkte der eigenen Arbeit habe, etc. (Gauthier 192ff). Es zeigt dies aber umsoweit das Scheitern des Unterfangens einer bloß an individueller Rationalität orientierten Moralbegründung.
Franz Hespe

III


Es ist auffallend, daß Rawls Definition der original position in A Theorie of Justice nur in einem wesentlichen Punkt von der eben skizzierten abweicht: Rawls geht von der - empirisch alles andere als überzeugenden* - Annahme aus, daß die Individuen sich in dieser Situation gemäß der Maximinregel verhalten

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* vgl. dazu Harsanyi (1976).
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würden, d.h. wegen der extremen Unsicherheit und geringen Risikobereitschaft unter vorgegebenen Handlungsalternativen oder Regelungen diejenige wählen würden, die bei denkbar ungünstigstem Ergebnis die vorteilhafteste wäre. Nur unter dieser Voraussetzung würde sich jeder rational für das Differenzprinzip, i.e. für eine Gesellschaftsordnung entscheiden, in der man - gesetzt man nehme den niedrigsten sozialen Rang in der Gesellschaft ein - den relativ größten Vorteile erreichen würde.

Die Entscheidung für eine utilitaristische Wohlfahrtsfunktion oder das Rawlsche Differenzprinzip hängt also allein von Annahmen über die Wahrscheinlichkeitsabschätzungen und die Risikobereitschaft der an der idealisierten Wahlsituation Beteiligten ab. Für diese selbst können aber keine notwendigen, sondern allenfalls intuitiv einleuchtende Gründe angegeben werden. Die Annahmen lassen daher eher vermuten, daß das gewünschte Ergebnis für ihre Wahl maßgeblich ist. Gleiches gilt für Annahme der Unkenntnis über die zukünftigen eigenen Fähigkeiten und Mittel als Rahmenbedingung der idealisierten Entscheidungssituation. Sie selbst kann nicht mehr durch rational Entscheidung begründet werden, sondern ist Resultate unserer intuitiven Überzeugungen von Fairness und Unparteilichkeit, so daß die aus diesem Entscheidungsverfahren resultierenden Prinzipien nichts anderes sind als Erklärungen dieser Grundüberzeugungen. Schwerer wiegt möglicherweise noch, daß diese Rahmenbedingungen die begründungstheoretische Vorgabe, daß sich grundlegende Prinzipien aus der Orientierung am rationalen Eigeninteresse begründen lassen müssen, außer Kraft setzt. Um mit unseren moralischen Grundüberzeugungen vereinbare Prinzipien zu rechtfertigen, muß das am Selbstinteresse und ökonomischer Rationalität orientierte Entscheidungssubjekt durch die Randbedingungen der Entscheidungssituation in seinen Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten so eingeschränkt werden, daß das Selbstinteresse gerade keine Rolle mehr spielt.

Praktische Rationalität - ohne Heranziehung nichtrationaler Momente - ist, so haben wir gesehen, nicht in der Lage, gesellschaftliche Zustände vor anderen als moralisch oder rechtlich auszuzeichnen und daher auch nicht in der Lage, daß als rechtlich behauptete auch dann noch als verbindlich zu begründen, wenn sich die Situation so ändert, daß sie für manche oder viele als nicht mehr vorteilhaft erscheinen.9

9 Wo eine solche Verbindlichkeit begründet wird, geschieht dies, wie bei Rawls, durch außerrationale (wohlgermert im ökonomischen Sinne außerrationale) Momente, etwa der Annahme, daß das moralisch Richtige als solches verbinde, und die rationale Entscheidung nur als heuristische Kriterium zur Auszeichnung des moralisch Rechten diene.
Franz Hespe

IV

Eines der zentralen Probleme aller Sozialwahltheorien ist, daß Freiheitsrechte jederzeit zugunsten anderer Wohlfahrtsgewinne aufgegeben werden können. Dies hat einige Theoretiker - wie Rawls und Nozick - dazu veranlaßt, unverzichtbare Freiheitsrechte in ihre Theorien miteinzubeziehen. Bei Rawls geschieht dies mit dem Argument, daß die Freiheitsrechte für die Individuen eine so hohe Präferenz hätten, daß sie selbst gegen noch so hohe Wohlfahrtsgewinne anderer nicht ausgetauscht würden, bei Nozick werden sie als Ausgangslage schlechtweg postuliert. Beides ist nicht sehr überzeugend.


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10 Als einzige Begründung dient die Berufung auf die Locksche Tradition (Nozick, o.J. 14, 25).
11 vgl. dazu die scharfsinnigen Scholien in Geißmann/Herb (1988); diese Interpretation steht allerdings in Gegensatz zur vorherrschenden Interpretation der Hobbschen Theorie insbesondere im angelsächsischen Raum.
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mit der Handlungsfreiheit aller anderen und als Pflicht, die Handlungsfreiheit auf diese Restriktion zwangsweise einschränken zu lassen, definiert. Bei Kant wird dieses Recht der Menschen jedoch unmittelbar in ihrer Qualität als Rechtspersonen verankert und nicht auf ein dem zugrundeliegendes Lebensrecht zurückgeführt.


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Impartiality and Knowledge in Ethics

The problem of relativity of judgement has always occupied central position among the classical ethical problems. Working in the field of philosophical ethics one is bound to face, sooner or later, its particular challenge: on the one hand, it seems that none of so far proposed absolutist theories can stand rational criticism and the fact of diversity of moral attitudes apparently contradicts absolutist views; on the other hand, ethical relativism seems to contradict our fundamental moral feelings. Hence the continual attempts towards demonstrating that it is possible to formulate an absolutist theory of ethics remaining in agreement with the contemporary knowledge of man. The underlying assumption of those attempts has been that diversity of moral judgements results from mistakes in their formation: it is not the case that two contradictory ethical judgements can be true together; among diverse moral opinions there is the undoubtedly right one. This is known as metaethical absolutism.

A metaethical absolutist must in the first place be able to specify the reasons which, according to him, lead people to make mistakes in their moral judgements. In other words, he must formulate an criterion by means of which it would always be possible to tell the correct judgement from the mistaken one. The concept's involved in such a criterion would pertain to the knowledge of the situation as well as to impartiality of judgement.

Both the mentioned concepts are far from being clear and have been a matter of controversy and lively discussions. The agreement does not go far beyond stating that to be able to present a criterion distinguishing between correct and incorrect judgements, one has to, firstly, effectively point out the morally relevant elements of the situation, and, secondly, recognize whether a judgement has been impartial. Impartiality is closely associated with emotional reactions of the judging subject - with the elimination of personal bias and prejudices. Thus, all the absolutist metaethical theories - whether intuitionist, or naturalist - attempt to explain what it is for an element of a situation to be morally relevant, and under which conditions judgements of the people involved are impartial. The requirements of sufficient knowledge and impartiality are regarded as essentially independent from each other. Our judgement can be mistaken since we have not been impartial in its formulating - despite sufficient knowledge; as well as vice versa, in spite of being thoroughly impartial we can go wrong in
our judgement, for we have not had sufficient factual knowledge.

In contemporary ethical theories we encounter basically two different methods of arriving to what we may call the impartiality criterion. The advocates of theories which assume that the motivations of human activity are, in the last account, entirely egoistic, often see the possibility of eliminating bias and prejudices in putting the judging subject in such circumstances in which he would not be able to strive toward immediate improvement of his situation at the expense of others. The paramount example of a theory of this kind is J. Rawls' original position model. In his theory people's judgements are governed by basic principles, which have been established in the original position i.e., the situation in which subjects possess no knowledge of their respective particular situations but only a general knowledge about persons and society. Thus, in the original position subjects are forced to adopt principles which are most profitable for even worst situated. They still think only about their own interest, but the veil of ignorance makes them all think alike. Impartiality is enforced by limiting the relevant knowledge of subjects.

The adherents of the opposite solution tend to see the guarantee of impartiality in broadening of subjects' knowledge. One of the most widely known theories of this type is R. Hare's. Claiming that universality is one of the essential features of moral principles, he postulates that correctness of a judgement can be tested by testing whether in a similar situation everyone would judge the same way or, whether we would judge the same if we were them (whoever that may be). A judgement is impartial if the judging subject has taken enough care to make it acceptable from various points of view.¹

The gist of both the quoted standpoints is essentially the same: they attempt to qualify somehow the motivations of the judging subject to enforce the situation of others to be taken into account - whether directly, by pointing out techniques enabling to comprehend other points of view (Hare), or indirectly, by depriving the subject of knowledge of his own situation (Rawls). Worse, both of them seem to fail in providing an independent criterion of impartiality - the main reason for it being that they positively state what is, and what is not, a morally relevant element of situation. They assume that it is possible to point out, on a general level, which elements are not relevant. The key concept appears to be the so-called universalization principle. In either case, the individual features of the situation, for instance, its involving particular people, turn out to be morally irrelevant. Both theories, therefore, seem to resort to this principle,

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whose popular, though not too precise formulation could be: "what is good for one is good for any other in the same circumstances".

The universalization principle is not, however, connected with the absolutist metaethical standpoint, nor is its analytical status generally agreed upon. Its rejecting does not necessarily imply acceptance of the view that the truth of a moral statement is dependent on the person uttering it. Maintaining that in a certain situation I have some obligations which nobody else would have in precisely the same situation, and maintaining that the truth of a statement of obligation depends on who formulates it are by no means the same thing. The claim that an individual person's participation in a situation is not totally irrelevant for this situation does not, at least as it stands, contradict the absolutist theory. The universalization principle is sometimes confused with the generalization principle, which states that if two situations are similar from the moral point of view, they have to be similarly evaluated. The generalization principle is, however, hypothetic: it does not mention any characteristics of the situations that would qualify them as morally similar (which is precisely what the universalization principle does). It is only a rule of grammar of value adjectives.

The above discussion seems to suggest that the impartiality criteria which resort to the universalization principle in fact link impartiality with certain conceptions of what can and what cannot be a morally relevant element of the situation. More significantly, theories relying on the universalization principle are insufficient from the practical point of view. Indeed, they are hardly applicable at all. Neither the "if-I-were-you" technique of Hare, nor the 'veil of ignorance' of Rawls are precise enough to establish the correctness of a given judgement beyond any reasonable doubt. For it is always possible to argue that the person charging us with impartiality has itself employed the relevant technique clumsily or imprecisely.

The universalization principle does not specify as well which of the universal elements are morally relevant and which can be disregarded from the moral point of view. It states only that all the non-universal elements are irrelevant.

The question then arises, whether an impartiality criterion, precise beyond reasonable doubt and independent from the conception of morally relevant elements of the situation is possible at all. Let us approach this question by looking at yet another attempt to define impartiality, namely that of R. Firth's "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer". Firth proposes that the meanings of ethical terms be established by resorting to reactions of approval of a particular

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subject - the ideal observer. Firth's theory belongs to the wide range of naturalist standpoints which attempt at construing a criterion of correctness (adequacy, rationality, etc.) of judgement. The ideal observer comprises three basic characteristics: he is omniscient, impartial and he is a normal human being in every other respect. The ideal observer's impartiality is defined by means of two other notions: it consists in being disinterested and dispassionate.

Firth employs in his definition the concept of essentially particular properties. These are the properties that cannot be described without using proper names and/or occasional terms. Then he proceeds to define particular interest: "someone has a positive particular interest in x if, (1) he desires x, (2) he believes that x has a certain essentially particular property P, and (3) he would not desire x, or would desire it less intensely (...), he did not believe that x had this property P". 3 Apart from essentially particular properties, the author distinguishes essentially general properties and unique particular properties. The general properties are decisive with respect to moral similarity of two given situations. An observer is disinterested as long as he does not give way to emotions resulting from the essentially particular properties of the situation.

Analogously, Firth defines being dispassionate by saying: "an ideal observer is dispassionate in the sense that he is incapable of experiencing emotions of this kind [particular emotions] - such emotions as jealousy, self-love, personal hatred, and others which are directed towards particular individuals as such". 4 Particular emotions are these which are directed towards something only because this something has an essentially particular property.

An immediate question arises, however, about the relationship between general and essential properties of the situation. Even a brief analysis of the definition of impartiality quoted above (i.e. being disinterested and dispassionate) convinces us that the properties essential from the moral point of view are the general properties - Firth accepts the universalization principle. In the case of a theory of an ideal observer this fact is of particular significance, it may seem that the ideal observer is exceptionally well-equipped as far as testing of this very principle is concerned. If this is the case, however, then the universalization principle cannot be employed as a part of the definition of the ideal observer. For it is always possible to ask: Why should the observer treat similarly the situations that does not differ in their general features, but only in these connected with their numerical non-identity? Moreover, as in the cases of the previously mentioned theories, the practical use of Firth's definitions negligible

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- no clear criterion enabling to estimate the influence of particular properties and emotions on the ideal observer reactions seems to be at hand. It is probably fair to say, thus, that Firth's definition does not succeed, as well as the preceding two.

All the analysed definitions of impartiality link it to the underlying decisions on what cannot be a morally relevant element of a situation, as they resort, in this way or another, to the universalization principle. This seems to point further to a connection, perhaps intimate, between impartiality and the postulate of sufficient knowledge of the morally relevant elements of the situation. Instead of seeking after a criterion of impartiality through the universalization principle, it can be said that an impartial judgement is the one that takes into account all and only the morally relevant elements of the situation. Precise knowledge of the situation becomes a primary and necessary condition of impartiality. Impartiality, thus understood, is not an independent condition of correct judgement but rather a postulate that demands making an honest use of our knowledge of the situation. This can be viewed as a generalization of all the definitions discussed above. Firstly, it allows impartiality to be defined even within theories that reject the universalization principle, explaining thereby the natural intuition which seems to say that impartiality is possible even with respect to judgements taking essentially into account some essentially non-universal elements of the situation. Secondly, it makes the concept of impartiality more precise within theories that accept the universalization principle. For impartiality understood as universalizability does not guarantee correctness of a judgement - the universalization principle does not say which non-particular features are morally relevant.

The provisional definition of impartiality proposed above is possible to put into practice only as far as it is possible to specify unequivocally the morally relevant elements of a given situation. Their specification turns out to be essential for the whole question of metaethical relativity as well. The classical definition of this type of relativism says: "Opposite ethical judgements can be true at the same time". It has to be established, however, when judgements are opposite, and this in turn does not seem possible without appealing, in this way or another, to the concept of morally relevant elements of situation. It can be said, for example, that two judgements are opposite if they differently evaluate situations with essentially the same morally relevant features. The very definition of metaethical relativism, and, therefore, that of metaethical absolutism, apparently involve the concept of morally relevant features - this concept then, seems to be a good candidate for a primitive concept of the metaethical theory.
Any attempts to define this concept encounter a major difficulty in impossibility of applying the definition in practice. Whether we accept the universalization principle or not, we will always be faced with the question which may be given the following, somewhat clumsy, wording: Have I done everything possible to get acquainted with all the morally relevant elements of the situation that is the object of my judgement? This question seems to reveal quite clearly that, in a given particular case, it is impossible to transcend the socially, culturally and historically established conceptions of what, for this particular case, is morally relevant. The same applies to the available techniques of discovering morally relevant factors. Opinions about the moral weight and significance of certain features evolve constantly one of their determinants being the prevailing conceptions of man and its place in the world. They are being formed in the ceaseless social and cultural dialogue, separately for almost every type of situation. From this point of view, the definitions of impartiality analysed above can be regarded as formal expressions of actually accepted opinions about the weight and standard in the culture in case of certain elements of ethical situations. Impartiality seems to depend on the cultural pattern of evaluation and of the solution of typical moral problems.

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5 It could be said, with the risk common to all easy generalizations, that in the history of morals the tendency has been towards broadening the range of features considered morally relevant. Such 'discovering new moral aspects of a situation' is very often caused by the impact of another culture.
Peter P. Kirschenmann

Science and the Ethics of Multiculturalism

Currently, multiculturalism (MC) is a fervently debated issue. Science seems to be implicated in this issue, too. For one thing, there is the apprehension that science, with technology in its wake, contributes to the disappearance of cultural differences. Ironically, such equalization once was considered a hopeful promise. Science with its universally valid method was expected to eliminate all individual and cultural prejudices and false opinions, thus rendering people enlightened and rational; and, through its technological applications, it was expected to lead to highest levels of welfare for all people equally. This modernist dream has not been realized and has come under several kinds of attack, which in part reflect the apprehension mentioned. One question is whether such a fear is justified—in factual, conceptual, and evaluative respects.

There are various reasons why, and areas where, MC has become an issue (cf. Kazmi 1994), both within nations and internationally. Some of them, like modern forms of swift and global communication and rapid modes of travel, involve science and technology. Other reasons, not surprisingly, have to do with the doctrines and the critiques of liberalism, whose universalistic pretensions and emphasis on freedom have run parallel to those of modern science. Both forms of universalism and globalistic aspirations have been attacked in the name of pluralistic, often relativistic, particularistic or localistic ideas. 'MC' has been used in such controversies as a description of a matter of fact, as one of a problematic situation, and as an ideal of living together (cf. Norton 1993, also Welsch 1992). This and diverging conceptions of science, culture, individual or cultural identity and development make the question of the relation between MC and science rather complicated and unwieldy.

Concerning this relation, we can roughly distinguish the question of their factual relationship, the question of whether science needs cultural diversity, the already mentioned question of the levelling effects of science and their undesirability, and the question of the place and role of science in a desirable setting of intercultural coexistence. These questions clearly stand in the context of the broader questions concerning the value of cultures and cultural diversity and concerning the ethical principles that should govern the relations between cultures. They thus touch on the central question of MC, which is "what kind of communities can justly be created and sustained out of our human diversity."
(Gutmann 1994, p. xiii). I shall deal with the questions mainly in general terms, relying on comparable general discussions of several authors.

Most will agree with H. Poser (1992/93) that science, where it exists, is part of culture. According to him, the possibility of science is dependent on a cultural pre-understanding of the regulative idea of truth that can engender the particular sceptical ethos of science. In this way he seems to provide an abstract distinction between cultures—which for him, however, surely is not the most relevant basis for judging cultures. He also mentions that cultures could be evaluated in more differentiated ways, insofar as they have facilitated or hampered particular scientific developments.

One argument for the view that diversity of some sort is valuable and needed is a resource argument. Remember P. Feyerabend (1975, 1978) advocating the proliferation of practice-bound methods; or remember even K. R. Popper (1965), with his universalistic critical rationalism, appreciating the variety of metaphysical or mythical traditions, thus following the liberal J. S. Mill (1985). Poser deems socio-cultural diversity indispensable for having enough latitude for revising culturally canonized rules, such as methodological rules, though ultimately for being able to solve the ever new practical problems in the future.

For some, a homogenizing effect of science is inevitable and welcome, since "truth is truth everywhere" or at least the scientific method is the same everywhere. P. Janich (1992/93), distinguishing various types of science, has given more differentiated answers. The unitary ideal of scientific method has no point of contact with cultural differences; technically usable knowledge of universal laboratory science has indeed tended to level them; yet, such special scientific disciplines as natural history can, like the humanities, provide foundations for, and strengthen cultural identities. Stabilization of cultural identities is for him a valuable objective—which implies a well-known identity argument for cultural diversity. Consequently, Janich pleads for developing and conducting 'socially compatible' sciences, which heed this objective. (To my mind, this is a problem-ridden compromise proposal, like 'appropriate technology'). Similarly, for Poser, cultural diversity is above all needed for the constitution of individuality, in which respect he thinks cultures can be judged in the light of the regulative idea of humanity, which for him is expressed in the liberal values of equality, autonomy and human rights. Unfortunately, he fails to elaborate on tensions between this regulative idea and that of truth.

Yet, communitarian critics of liberalism (cf., e.g. Kymlicka 1991, Avineri and de-Shalit 1992), also using an identity argument themselves, have especially questioned the overriding validity of those liberal-humanitarian standards.
According to them, liberalism tends to lead to excessive forms of individualism and social atomism. It is said to neglect, not just the value of community, the common or collective good, but also the facts of our being always embedded in a particular historical socio-cultural context, in which alone moral norms can be meaningfully formulated and remain alive, and our requisite individual identity, sense of belonging and being recognized can be formed. Liberals, by contrast, would stress that personal identity above all is a subjective achievement, involving deliberation and rational choices. A culmination of those debates concerns the question of whether collective rights could and should be given to cultural groups, especially the right to have their own cultural identity respected and protected (cf. Kymlicka 1991). Even many communitarians, though, are not in favor of such a move.

Some comments are in order on the notions of culture and identity. The notion of culture, as we know, is extremely flexible. No wonder that its relation to science is ambivalent. There are restricted uses of the term, restricted to "high" culture; and there are broad, general construals of a definite specificity, such as the one provided by W. J. Bouwsma (1990, p.2), who came to "understanding 'culture' ... as the collective strategies by which societies organize and make sense of their experience. Culture in this sense is a mechanism for the management of existential anxiety." It is such a broad, though specific, construal that seems to be relevant to the issues of MC.

Yet, more important for our discussion is the question of whether cultures exhibit some unity, and what kind of unity. There, of course, is the classical, if romantic, concept of culture which asserted such a unity, by regarding cultures as closed organismic wholes, homogenous and with a determining center—a notion living on in communitarian thought in varied forms. Yet, this classical concept, if it ever applied, does certainly no longer apply to present societies, which internally are highly differentiated—multicultural in themselves, and not just in an ethnic sense (cf. Welsch 1992).

Also, the idea of a cultural identity through time, which is implied by the classical concept, can hardly be maintained. Thus, both synchronically and diachronically, cultures have to be conceptualized in a less unitary way. In this sense, E. Holenstein (1994) proposed a modular view of cultures: they are made up of diverse procedural modules, which are only loosely connected with, and attuned to, one another. Similarly, individual identity must also be conceived in a modular way, and the relation between a given culture the development of individual identity of its members, therefore, is far less direct and determinate than communitarians would have it.
Most contextualist accounts of science, whether social-constructivist or otherwise in tenor, fit in well with such a conception of culture as being modularly structured. In a recent study, T. Lenoir (1992, p. 159) states it as his aim "to elaborate the pragmatist conception of knowledge production as cultural production in the service of a form of life." In explaining what this Wittgensteinian notion here means, he refers to S. Shapin and S. Schaffer’s (1985) widely known account of R. Boyle’s scientific activity. Such accounts view science itself as a (sub-)culture (cf. also Pickering 1992); they also suggest that, or at least raise the question of whether, strategies of scientific activity can become modules in the personal identities, like Boyle’s, as well.

How such personalities and the cultural changes they wrought are to be evaluated is another question, usually not addressed in social studies of science. Normative considerations are definitely not lacking from feminist studies of science. Yet, as H. Longino (1992, p. 200), they have "(at least) a double agenda, critical and constructive". Science is supposed to be both purged from masculinities, ideologies by means of general, neutral criteria and transformed for feminist ends. The two tasks, as she states, cannot be easily combined. Also, feminists usually want women, not just to have the option of co-existing in a respected way as a separate culture, but to be fully included in the dominant culture, preferably after first having changed it.

All cultural groups, of course, will also usually face a double agenda, that of both preserving and renewing or developing. On a modular view of cultural identity, one might think that there should be smooth ways of complying with this agenda; on an evolutionary view of cultures, one might think that the agenda does not even matter. Reality teaches otherwise. From conflicts between cultures, conflicts concerning particular issues, it becomes clear that certain "modules" are "core modules", like language or fundamental beliefs and values, which are not easily changed or replaced. Even though cultures do not form unitary whole, one can speak of cultural traditions in terms of such "core modules". In what manners is science implicated in such conflicts? If one reads in the newspaper about whichever current open civil or ethnic clash or war, one finds no explicit mention of science or science-based technology. But these certainly are involved in the absolute and relative military strength of the conflicting parties. On a more peaceful level, in choices about education in Western states, most will insist that enough scientific subjects. This reveals an alliance between science and dominant powers in a society. Similarly, and quite generally, science has a "continuing symbiotic relation to Western expansionism" (Harding 1993, p. 315).
We have seen Janich venturing a normative suggestion about the integration of science and lived culture, and Poser arriving at the normative exhortation of preserving cultural pluriformity. Neither of them relates these injunctions directly to the issue of MC, the question of how different cultures ought to regulate their co-existence or interaction. Rules to that effect certainly are hard to formulate, starting with the preliminary question of whether all cultures are to be considered equally valuable. H. Proceee (1992) has, at least, proposed, and argued for, two moral meta-principles for judging cultures and their transactions (which also give a defensible form to Poser’s double-edged position): non-exclusion and the promotion of interaction. The first demands respect for, and a certain protection of other cultures, unless they fail to do so themselves. More specifically, they should not be excluded from participating in giving shape to the developing world community. Even more clearly, this vision of a world community backs the second principle, just as it was present in Poser’s resource argument for cultural diversity.

As concerns science, the first principle can be taken to imply that scientifically differently developed cultures should not ignore each other. The second principle, if abided by will probably lead to a further spreading of science, but also to the spreading of criticisms of science. Who is to be responsible for seeing to it that the principles are abided by? It makes little sense to assign the relevant responsibilities to science itself (cf. Kirschenmann 1991). To some extent, it can be attributed to their practitioners, e.g. that of not ignoring the alliance of science and technology with dominant powers and Western expansionism. It is perhaps trivial to add that all cultures in their plurality, that is their members who are in a position to do so, on the other hand, have the responsibility of promoting science and scientific co-operation for peaceful ends.

References


Science and the Ethics of Multiculturalism


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Science and Morality:
Some Cases of Conflicting Norms

Rescher observes that "one of the very first ideas we meet in the Bible is the teaching of the book of Genesis which states that there are some things that man has no business to know." (Rescher 1987: 1) We probably agree with this statement in our everyday life. It becomes however problematic when we move our considerations to the level of science. Of course, in science we know things only after we make inquiry. Are there then things into which we have no business to inquire in science? We can easily get a positive answer to our question: there are obviously things which should not be investigated in science because they do not allow for the use of scientific methods; or things which are not interesting or seem to be useless. I would like however to explore another aspect: are there things into which we should not, for moral reasons, inquire even if we do have a "cognitive business" to know them?

Such a formulation of the question presupposes that scientific inquiry can be evaluated from two distinct points of view: cognitive and moral and, moreover, that positive or negative evaluations from the respective points of view do not always coincide. Thus, if a piece of scientific inquiry might sometimes be evaluated negatively from a moral point of view, then it seems that we can expect to find cases when a piece of scientific inquiry is legitimate from a cognitive but not acceptable from a moral point of view. In what follows I will discuss four situations in which such a conflict between moral and scientific requirements arises. I shall try to illustrate each of them with some examples, recognizing, of course, that real cases are never so clearly cut.

1. Objects

The topic of jury deliberation seems to be interesting from both the cognitive and practical point of view. Yet, as soon as we reflect on the nature of jury deliberation a problem arises: secrecy is its essential characteristic. We do not have a cognitive access to a jury deliberation unless we violate this secrecy. I do not mean that we would need to use hidden recording devices. However, even if

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jury-members agreed to being observed, their being observed would probably affect the very process of deliberation. That observers influence what is observed is not peculiar to jury deliberation. In most cases, we do not care about this fact, but a jury is supposed to arrive at a *just* decision. If the process of deliberation is affected by an observer's presence, we have a reason to think that the decision will be affected as well. That is we are not sure any more that this will be a *just* decision. Thus, arriving at scientific truths would threaten the execution of justice. It is a moral requirement to respect justice and this requirement is in conflict with a cognitive requirement of studying anything which can be studied by means of scientific methods. In other words, morality requires from us the exclusion of jury deliberation as an object of scientific inquiry, even if in principle jury deliberation is accessible to scientific methods.

A similar situation arises when an inquiry interferes with individuals' right to privacy. Many researchers argue that privacy constitutes a basis for many human relations such as friendship (Fried 1970); that any violation of an individual's privacy constitutes a threat to his integrity and dignity (Blaustein 1978). Suppose that our researcher becomes interested in the issue of people's feelings. He discovers a simple relation between the spontaneous movement of one's eyes and the degree of one's sympathy towards an interlocutor. Would it not be practical to know this relation? Is it not a fascinating topic? It might well be. But there is something suspicious in it. Investigation into such a topic, if successful, would leave a person socially transparent. Since I cannot control the movements of my eyes, the degree of my sympathy is revealed to my interlocutor whether or not I want this to be the case and whether or not he wants to know. Such a scientifically enforced transparency would be a violation of individuals' privacy. The fact that our researcher based his conclusion on data freely revealed to him, does not change the controversial character of his inquiry. The conclusion is law-like in nature, and everyone, also those who declined to reveal the relevant information, are subjected to it. Thus, a cognitive interest clashes with a moral requirement of respecting the individual private sphere.

It seems that this intuition stands behind some objections against extensive data banks. A fear is that on the basis of those data it will be possible to formulate law-like relations between various parameters of life. Having those relations and some data which in fact a person might freely have revealed, it would be possible to infer certain other pieces of information which he does not want to have revealed at all.
2. Methods

Having found his topic a researcher still needs to choose methods of inquiry. It seems to be generally agreed upon that there are certain methods which are morally forbidden, regardless of the cognitive profits they might yield. It is quite easy to find examples of such controversial methods: methods involving suffering on the part of human subjects; or methods which cause psychological damage. Let me however give a more sophisticated example: deception in social research. Many authors argue that investigating certain topics (e.g. obedience to authority) is not possible without deceiving subjects about the goal and set-up of an experiment. If a scientist reveals the structure of an experiment, the action of a subject is deprived of authenticity. Some authors agree to use deception under certain conditions such as: informed consent, the possibility of withdrawal and debriefing. This, however, does not solve the problem. Barnes argues that debriefing after deception initiates "a spiral of deception": if we later explain the experimental set-up, then next time a participant suspects deception, tries to figure out what an experiment is about and to adjust his behavior to the expectations of a researcher. In order to ensure the spontaneity of reaction, an experimenter must develop ever deeper levels of deception. Of course, it is a rare case that the same person becomes a subject of experiments many times. Nevertheless, if a description of an experiment becomes a part of a common culture, then everybody might learn about it, also potential participants, and then they may act as if they had already been through the procedure of deception and debriefing (Barnes 1980). Paradoxically, if we try to diminish the moral dubiousness of deception, then we create the demand for more sophisticated deception. Thus, if we try to keep deception honest, then we lose its reliability as a method; if we want to secure reliability, we have to go to deeper and deeper levels of manipulating subjects.

3. Experimental set-ups

Suppose that our researcher chooses his topic and methods without getting involved in moral dilemmas. Is he now free from the need of moral deliberation? By no means. He still needs to decide when and where to do experiments. And it might be that the possibility of dangerous and uncontrollable side-effects of experimentation arises. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with nuclear explosion as a topic of research, and there are non-controversial methods of investigating this topic. Nevertheless, an experimental set-up might be designed in such a way that the whole inquiry becomes morally problematic. For example
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Experiments are carried on in spite of the knowledge that radiation, which is their side-effect, will negatively affect the ecological system and people. In this case a cognitive interest conflicts with the moral requirement of protecting people from damage. Genetic experiments are probably the most discussed example of such a conflict. Some people argue that there are experimental set-ups which should not be carried on because if something goes wrong in a lab we might face new and uncontrollable disaster. In short, in doing experimentation we may again encounter a conflict between the requirements of cognition and that of morality. It seems that the intuition concerning an intrinsic moral dimension of experimentation stood behind the theses advanced at the Asilomar Conference which called for a "pause" in certain aspects of gene-inquiry: to postpone cognition until certain requirements of safety are fulfilled — requirements based in fact on moral consciousness.

4. Dissemination

Suppose now that our researcher completed his inquiry and is now preparing a publication. Can he stop thinking about moral questions? Unfortunately not. We have learnt that the consequences of disseminating and using scientific knowledge are both beneficial and devastating. When observed from a global point of view, science looks like an experiment on human subjects in which the requirements of informed consent and of the possibility of withdrawal at any time are not satisfied. From this point of view the consequences of disseminating the results of scientific inquiry are as relevant to the moral evaluation of research as is the use of controversial methods. If so, we may expect that sometimes a conflict between the cognitive requirement of disseminating results and the moral requirement of responsibility arises. Let us sketch a few such situations.

There might be some pieces of inquiry which, if their results are accepted as genuine scientific knowledge, might be dangerous for our well-being. For the sake of analysis we need to distinguish two sub-cases:

a. results possibly dangerous for individuals.

b. research possibly dangerous for institutions or for society.

The first case is simpler, since we have empirical data: social sciences discovered the so-called "labelling effect" (Kimmel 1981). Suppose that scientists are doing research on depression. They test a group of people and discover that some of them are more likely to become ill; then they communicate their results. It has been observed that merely knowing that one is depression-prone in-
increases the probability of one's illness. The same effect was discovered in connection with the IQ research and the so-called screening for disease. Thus, scientists seem to encounter a dilemma whether to pursue their studies or protect the psychical integrity of individuals since mere the revealed knowledge might have a devastating effect on those who came to acquire it.

The second case is more controversial: is there any knowledge which would have such an impact on society that we should rather refrain from obtaining it than promote its acquisition? At least some thinkers claim we have good reasons to give a positive answer to this question. Sinsheimer thinks that the search for extraterrestrial intelligence should be abandoned, since a discovery of such intelligence would have a devastating impact upon human values. (Sinsheimer 1978) Rescher has suggested that there might even be knowledge that we ought not to believe, on moral grounds, regardless of the weight of evidence we have on its behalf; for example we should not accept the thesis that we humans are mere puppets under the control of a Cartesian demon, because this would destroy our sense of being moral agents (Rescher 1987). Admittedly, it is difficult to find real examples of this sort in actual science. One line of research on intelligence is, however, close to the case under consideration. When "intelligence" was measured by tests developed by Western scientists, people of certain races seemed to be systematically less intelligent than others. This led people to demand that such research should be forbidden as promoting racism. It turned out that those tests were very sensitive to cultural and educational differences and therefore should not be used for cross-cultural comparison. Gärdenfors insists that such a turn would not have been possible if we had imposed the proposed restrictions (Gärdenfors 1990). But what reasons stood behind this turn? It seems that first there was a shift in our approach to research: we did not accept that the tests were correct because of our conviction that no difference in intelligence depends on racial factors. It seems that the topic of research was then changed from investigating intelligence to investigating what was wrong with the intelligence tests. Had we accepted the test as scientifically sound, then we would need to have accepted an essential and natural inequality among humans. A similar situation arises with respect to professional tests. Some tests are taken as gender-bias since men systematically perform them better than women. The claim that there should be no systematic relation between the test performance and the gender of performers is based on the conviction about the gender equality in the relevant respects – the conviction which is not scientific but moral in nature (Lekka-Kowalik 1994).

Another situation in which dissemination of the results of inquiry seems to
create a moral dilemma is a situation where certain applications of a newly discovered piece of knowledge are foreseeable, and even if there are no objections to the goals and means, there are some consequences of that application which are not desirable. An example of such a controversial project is the ageing research which aims at understanding and controlling the process of ageing in human organisms. If this research succeeds then human life span will be dramatically extended and by slowing the ageing process we would extend the period of relatively good health and vigor and shorten the period of the senile decay. Yet, many authors point out that, regardless of how attractive it looks, the extension of the human life span would have a number of consequences with which we might not be able to cope. For example we would need to organize our society in such a way that certain things which we now consider a part of individual freedom would be abandoned. It was seriously proposed that in order to solve the problem of overpopulation we should introduce an obligatory sterilization and a 'children license' which would be given to those who look promising as far as producing healthy offspring is concerned. Since there would be far fewer children, a society could not afford to have them genetically damaged, because it would result in a degeneration of the species. This opens the question of eugenics, the problem of governmental intervention into the private life of individuals, of subjecting individuals to social goals, etc. There are other arguments against ageing research, and, admittedly, they are not decisive. Nevertheless, the existence of a conflict is clear: ageing is a fascinating topic but there are reasonable doubts whether we should desire the effects which application of the new knowledge might bring (Rosenfeld 1985).

The last situation which I would like to describe, in which a conflict arises between a cognitive requirement of dissemination and a moral requirement of responsibility for use of made of scientific results is a situation when there are foreseeable uses of knowledge for morally unacceptable purposes. A paradigmatic example of such a situation is, of course, the use of knowledge by a military complex: the development of weapons, of means of spying, etc. Yet we do not need to invoke technology. The US army used the results of research done by a French anthropologist in certain Vietnamese villages for preparing more sophisticated and more effective strategies of doing battles. Of course, a poor scientist could not have foreseen such a use, and he even protested vigorously. Sometimes, however, it is possible to notice in advance how apparently innocent research can be used outside of science. The so-called Camelot affair might serve as an example. Camelot is the name of the project, conceived as a basic social research, aimed at identifying the preconditions of internal conflict and
discovering the effects of action taken by local governments. Empirical inquiry was envisaged in various countries of Latin America and eventually elsewhere in the world. The practical assumption was that increased knowledge of this kind would allow the US government and army to cope more effectively with internal revolutions in other countries. The project was strongly attacked and eventually cancelled before any substantial research had been done, because people realized the possible use of the results, uses which might threaten for example a sovereignty of a country (Horowitz 1967).

My main purpose was to identify some places in scientific inquiry in which a conflict between cognitive and moral requirements arises. I have no panacea for these conflicts, nor do I advocate here any specific solution for particular problems. Some conclusions can however be drawn. First, such conflicts may arise at all stages of scientific inquiry, not only on the level of methods and applications. Their source is the fact that science is an intrinsically human enterprise: it is done by people, affects people and sometimes is carried out on people. It seems that we often lose sight of this fact. For example, philosophers argue that science is morally positive or at least neutral because knowledge is intrinsically good. Even if we agree with this statement it does not follow that science as action is so as well, even if it leads to knowledge; unless, of course, we accept that the goals justify the means.

My second conclusion is Kuhnian in spirit. Kuhn claimed that in doing science scientists use many non-epistemic factors for their particular decisions: choice of topics, of methods, etc. I suggest that scientists not only do, but should take one kind of non-epistemic factors as relevant for their activity, namely moral requirements. I do not see this as a threat to scientific rationality. I do not advocate the use of moral requirements as epistemic rules; that is, moral requirements cannot dictate what is and what is not scientific. But they should be taken into consideration when, already within science, a choice of topics, methods, of continuing or breaking an experiment is made.

References


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The Holism of *On Certainty* and Moral Thought and Language

The diversity and multiplicity of linguistic forms and intellectual activities is a continuing theme in Wittgenstein's later writings. Working against the monolithic program of the *Tractatus*, he turns again and again in the later writings to particular cases and their capacity to exhibit the failings of the generalizing bent of mainstream philosophy. Surprisingly, many of the remarks in *On Certainty* appear to go in just the opposite direction. Our beliefs are said to form a system, particular beliefs justified by their place in a system of beliefs. When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, but a whole system of propositions.

Wittgenstein offered these holistic views in response to Moore's defense of common sense. Questioning the cogency of claims to know things no one could have doubted, he proposed to explain why doubts of the truths Moore offered would make no sense. In *On Certainty* he did not consider wider applications of his arguments. But it is tempting to think that they apply beyond Moore's claims. Moral discourse in particular appears to exhibit the kind of systematic structure Wittgenstein attributed to the various common sense beliefs standing behind Moore's claims. In this paper I discuss that idea.

It is tempting to think that the holistic suggestions of *On Certainty* are supported by the place given elsewhere in the later writings to forms of life. The notion of a form of life promises a kind of comprehensive understanding seldom offered in Wittgenstein's writings. It suggests the possibility of collecting the variegated phenomena that go to make up our lives in some uniform and philosophically coherent way that is sensitive to both their variety and their organization. Philosophers writing from many points of view have undertaken to exploit that suggestion. I believe that the notion is in fact given the modest task of reminding us of tacitly acknowledged conditions under which various parts of our language and the language of others are used, and that whatever Wittgenstein's attitude might have been toward the idea of a more comprehensive structure underlying our practices and our common life, the notion of a form of life has little or nothing to contribute to that project.

From their first mention in the *Investigations* forms of life are spoken of as activities associated with a language or a part of a language. We are told that to
imagine a language is to imagine a form of life.¹ To imagine the language of the builders in #2, for example, we must imagine the activities in the context of which `slab' and `block' are used. We must think of the people using those words as builders working on a building site, engaged in the typical activities of builders. Wittgenstein says there that we can imagine innumerable such languages, implying, presumably, that we can imagine as many forms of life. It is worthy of note that in the immediate context he says that our language can be seen as an ancient city, a maze of streets and squares from various periods, surrounded by new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.² Recognition of these varying parts of our own language must require recognition of an equal variety of forms of activity or forms of life, and the development of our language in one way or another must go hand in hand with the development of forms of activity in the context of which the new linguistic forms are used. In the Investigations Wittgenstein does not offer specific examples of forms of life, but in stressing the diversity and the multiplicity of language games he does say that the very term "language game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity or a form of life.³ The clearest explicit examples of forms of life occur in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology:

Instead of the unanalyzable, specific, indefinable: the fact that we act in such and such ways, e.g. punish certain actions, establish the state of affairs thus and so, give orders, render accounts, describe colours, take an interest in others' feelings. What has to be accepted, the given--it might be said--are facts of living.⁴

In the typescript a variant to the final sentence is inserted after this paragraph, saying that what has to be accepted are forms of life.⁵ That variant had in fact been used in the manuscript source for the paragraph. Interestingly, Wittgenstein had written in the original manuscript that it is forms of life that must be accepted, adding as a variant that it is facts of living that must be accepted.⁶ His apparent ambivalence may show a certain uneasiness over saying that it is forms of life that have to be accepted, but it is of particular interest that

¹ PI #19.
² PI #18.
³ PI #23.
⁵ Cornell Volume 101, Von Wright catalogue 229, p. 333, #1298.
what he was drawn to say is that what has to be accepted are facts of living. It would be difficult to give a prominent theoretical role to facts of living, particularly if the facts in question are such things as that we punish, give orders, render accounts, describe colours, and take an interest in the feelings of others.

If these are forms of life, there is no neat distinction between language games and forms of life. To describe how the builders in #2 use their impoverished vocabulary we must, of course, say that they are builders, and say something about their activities. Similarly for the shoppers who seek five red apples, or the hiker who notes an arrow on a signpost and takes a turn in his path. Knowing how to go on in producing a working drawing or blueprint for a proposed building is quite a different matter from knowing how to go on in describing an existing building. But Wittgenstein does not say to what extent these activities and techniques are parts of a designated language game, and to what extent they are matters instead of our participation in a form of life. Nor is it to his purpose to do so. He mentions the variety of language games to exhibit the variety of ways in which parts of our language depend upon associated activities, and to emphasize their divergence from philosophical expectations. Mentioning the practice of constructing an object from a drawing serves to remind us of the difficulty we would have in assimilating that apparently descriptive use of language to the idea that the meaning of a sentence consists in its truth conditions.

Considering the use Wittgenstein makes of the notions of form of life and language game, and the examples he offers, it is difficult to suppose that the forms of organization they exhibit could extend across activities and practices of the diversity Wittgenstein often observed. The forms of organization are local, specific to particular concerns and purposes. For that reason the notion of a form of life is not a likely basis for mounting a holistic account of our thought and language. That raises the question how we should understand the frequent mention in On Certainty of "our system" of knowledge, of beliefs, and even of language games. In most of those remarks the generality of the systems mentioned is left unqualified. Thus, speaking of the possibility that he might have been taken far away from the earth, he says, "But this would not fit into the rest of my convictions at all. Not that I could describe the system of these convictions. Yet my convictions do form a system, a structure."7

It may seem somewhat surprising that the philosopher who said that nothing is hidden should have said that while his convictions form a system, he could

7 OC, #102.
not describe the system. His line of argument casts some light on that disclaimer. Addressing Moore's defense of common sense, he observes the unlikely fulfillment of conditions under which one could reasonably doubt a proposition like "The earth has existed for a good many years." "If I wanted to doubt the existence of the earth long before my birth I should have to doubt all sorts of things that stand fast for me." As the argument is developed, it becomes apparent that it is not the special standing of any particular belief that makes it resistant to reasonable doubt, but its relationship in turn to other beliefs not in fact doubted. The truth of "The earth has existed for a good many years" is a necessary condition of the truth of a great many other propositions commonly believed, and not easily doubted. The sheer number of such beliefs and the complexity of their interrelationships gives Wittgenstein's view its plausibility. Considered in abstraction, none of the beliefs said to be resistant to understandable doubt can be regarded as exempt from doubt. But considered in a context in which particular doubts might be raised, those beliefs will stand related to a great number of beliefs not actually doubted in ways that will make them difficult if not impossible to doubt.

It must be said that this is a weak form of holism. The critical idea is that doubt of a specific belief may require doubt of a number of accepted beliefs. Because the truth of beliefs in question is necessary to the truth of a great many other beliefs, those in question cannot reasonably be doubted unless the beliefs dependent on them can be doubted as well. Wittgenstein does not spell out the specific relationships which hold between disputed beliefs and those in place, and relies instead on particular examples to make his point. But the possibility of a plurality of operative constraints varying with the specific concerns in question is not given the prominence one would have expected Wittgenstein to give it.

In this light it is surprising that Wittgenstein should have written of a system of language games. "If I say 'we assume' that the earth existed for many years past (or something similar)," he wrote, then of course it sounds strange that we should assume such a thing. But in the entire system of our language-games it belongs to the foundations. The assumption, one might say, forms the basis of action, and therefore, naturally, of thought." Thinking of some of the specific language games mentioned in the Investigations, it is difficult to know how they might be thought to form a system. Architects' drawings must be susceptible of faithful interpretation on a building site. In that respect they must be in accord

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8 OC, #234.
9 OC, #411.
with other constraints imposed by the task. But that is a far cry from saying that they must be in accord with the requirements of other language games in play. What sense would it make to expect the notation of architects to accord with the language games in play in musical composition, or, for that matter, the formal language of deliberative bodies? Once the notion of a language game is given a fairly wide range of applicability, any conceivable system of language games is likely to be no more than a collection of disparate practices subject only to the particular constraints appropriate to particular language games.

Wittgenstein’s notion of the diversity and independence of language games stands in the way of supposing that those practices are well understood in terms of the holism of *On Certainty*. That is particularly true of moral discourse. The human circumstances and attendant practices in which moral considerations arise are diverse and tend to be quite independent of one another. Prominent moral considerations bearing on particular deliberative judgments may arise in different ways and turn on different circumstances. Suppose you have assured a friend that you would help him in some way, and that he has accordingly proceeded in the expectation that you would do that. Your belief that you are obliged to help him depends upon a mutual understanding, and your own readiness to accept the implications of that understanding. It is in that respect quite different from those communal responsibilities governed to a degree by common understandings, but much more dependent on personal circumstance. While assurances and promises tend to be voluntarily incurred, communal responsibilities arise out of circumstances over which participants have much less control. But their fulfillment often depends to a much greater degree on public spirit and good will. Responses to unexpected but urgent human needs are still different, often depending more on sympathetic human concern than on any sense of communal responsibility.

I mention these salient differences among obligations incurred out of common understanding as no more than a reminder of some of the differences among all the variety of considerations which figure in our moral lives. The striking fact is that in deliberation considerations of these varying sorts, each with its own provenance, come into play. Sometimes the varying considerations compete, in others they work in concert. A civic responsibility may compete with a long-standing obligation of friendship, but sometime be reinforced by that; similarly a sense of justice may in some instances require rejecting expectations of civic service, and in others reinforce those expectations.

If the fabric of moral practices and forms of moral life exhibited the holism suggested in *On Certainty*, deep and continuing conflict would have to be
regarded as an aberration. Like philosophical doubts arising against a web of belief, they would presumably have to be regarded as of questionable sense. But in fact conscientious moral uncertainty created by conflicting moral considerations is commonly taken as a sign of moral seriousness. In On Certainty Wittgenstein stressed the constraint imposed on intellectual activities by their bearing on action. But in the case of moral questions it is the bearing on action which most often exhibits conflict. Where conflicts among disparate moral considerations bear on practical deliberations, the priorities among them are often contested. In the absence of some more comprehensive moral conception or form of life capable of ordering competing considerations, any ordering forthcoming must be regarded as a personal or communal response, and not intrinsic to the considerations themselves. It may be a measure of a person whether in his actions he honors friends or country, or, for that matter, love or justice, but the measure is not itself determined by those concerns or by the varying language games which give them form. The bearing of our various moral concerns on action doubtless introduces some pressure in the direction of a more monolithic ordering, but the independence, diversity, and relative indeterminacy of the language games which give them articulate form stand against that.

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An Argument in Favour of Moral Objectivism

In this paper, I shall try to defend a certain version of moral objectivism. The structure of the argument is as follows: First, moral objectivism is being characterized as a version of cognitivism and distinguished from weak, anti-objectivist cognitivist accounts (I). Hereafter, I shall shift the burden of proof to noncognitivism by giving some *prima facie* arguments which provide ground for a cognitivist analysis of moral discourse (II). After having outlined the defectiveness of the classical objectivist theories, i.e. naturalism and intuitionism (III), in the last section I shall present a modified version of objectivism which is not subject to the standard objections (IV).

I

The terms "ethical cognitivism" and "objectivism" resp. "realism" are not always used in the same way. I take it to be most appropriate to understand "cognitivism" as being the claim that moral judgements are truth-apt.¹ Moral judgements being truth-apt is a presupposition for the possibility of moral knowledge, i.e. knowledge about moral facts. However, only if the facts corresponding to true moral judgements are being interpreted in an objective way, one is justified in talking about objectivism.

This is so since it is important to distinguish between moral objectivism on the one hand and other forms of cognitivism proposing an antirealist interpretation of moral facts, on the other. The latter is true, e.g., of the consensus theory put forward by Jürgen Habermas² as well as of Rawls' constructivism³. Consensus theory and constructivism constitute moral facts by reference to different criteria of coherence. The emphasis here lies on the "constitute": To be a moral

¹ Being cognitivist does not imply that one has to maintain all moral judgements (including imperatives) to be either true or false, nor is one committed to saying that all moral judgements can be reduced to truth-apt judgements.


fact *means* -- in these theories -- nothing but to satisfy a certain criterion of coherence. However, if one believes the falsity of every ethical judgement to be possible, even if it is ideally justified, if one does not identify evidence and truth, then one maintains that there be *objective* moral facts. Consensus theory of truth and constructivism are not compatible with the assumption of objective moral facts. A property is *objective* if an entity has this property independently of subjective states, especially independently of the beliefs of the judging person. Now, I believe it to be *logically* possible that a certain moral judgement is false although it reflects the convictions of all real or imaginable persons -- be it in the Rawlsian original position or in the situation of the ideal discourse.

II

A powerful philosophical movement in our century was and partly still is based on the idea that the adequate interpretation of moral language is *subjectivistic*. Logical analysis of everyday moral language was supposed to confirm a claim one was invited to maintain by the metaphysical assumptions of logical positivism: the claim that moral judgements cannot be objective -- some radical philosophers even took them to be meaningless. What is astonishing is not that *this* assumption was accepted as being plausible, strange is rather the fact that moral language was analysed as *subjective*. This is just not the case. Everyday moral language is doubtless *objectivist*. Moral judgements are characteristically connected with a claim for truth. Diverging moral judgements are not meant as an expression of diverging subjective states, inclinations or preferences but rather as an expression of a difference in beliefs which might possibly be removed by argument, by the exchange of reasons. This impression corresponds with the grammar as well as the pragmatics of everyday moral judgements. The objectivistic character of our everyday moral language is deeply built into the correct usage of the language.

One can maintain that this feature of everyday moral discourse is based on an *error* and that, therefore, the argument for an objectivistic (second order) moral theory from the objectivistic character of everyday moral discourse is not valid. This position -- which is, following J. L. Mackie, called "error theory" --

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4 See J. L. Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (Hammondsworth 1977), Chap. 1, esp. § 7. Several comments to the "error theory" can be found in *Morality and Objectivity*, ed. Ted Honderich (London 1985). The error theory says that people wrongly claim to refer to something "objectively prescriptive" (Mackie) with their moral judgements. This claim which is generally connected with moral judgements is said to be wrong. Mackie argues for this theory with reference to two
is the appropriate although late reaction facing the insight which was gradually spreading in the 70s also in metaethics that subjectivism\(^5\) as the philosophical interpretation of moral judgements is hardly convincing.\(^6\) However, this has an altogether drastic consequence for analytical philosophy. Linguistic analysis and linguistics are not any more reliable as an instrument for philosophical analysis. If one does not doubt that everyday moral discourse displays the claim of objective validity and if one also believes that a subjectivist interpretation of morals is unavoidable -- e. g. because of the ontological queerness of every non-subjectivist interpretation --, then one has abandoned the philosophical method of linguistic analysis -- at least in the traditional form represented by ordinary language philosophy -- as systematically misleading. The fact that Mackie's alternative conception has remained unsystematic and incoherent may be seen as an expression of the resulting methodological helplessness.

The everyday usage of moral judgements invites an objectivist interpretation. The objectivist interpretation takes serious the claim incorporated in our everyday moral discourses, namely that in them we are not expressing subjective preferences, but rather beliefs.\(^7\) Expressing a belief differs from expressing a subjective preference even if the former is not connected with the claim that the belief can be justified. Objectivism without justification does not necessarily become expressivism or -- more general -- subjectivism. The claim that moral beliefs can be justified is not constitutive for for ethical objectivism. If I am convinced that murder is immoral under all circumstances or -- to be more careful -- that a specific murder is immoral, then it might well be that I cannot give any justification for this. I know (believe to know) that this murder is immoral. I do not express a subjective inclination by this. I neither want to say that I personally find this murder detestable (emotivist interpretation) nor would I be rightly understood if one regarded my utterance just as an expression of my

\(^5\) The most important versions of metaethical subjectivism are R. M. Hare's universal prescriptivism and several emotivist and expressivist conceptions. There is a new and interesting expressivist account in Allan Gibbard, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment* (Oxford 1990).

\(^6\) These late insights into the cognitivist features of our moral language emerged at a time when the vigorous metaethical discussions where already declining, which is why the former were not properly appreciated, see e. g. G. J. Warnock, *Contemporary Moral Philosophy* (New York 1967) and *The Object of Morality* (London 1971); J. O. Urmson, *The Emotive Theory of Ethics* (New York 1968); W. D. Hudson, *Modern Moral Philosophy* (Garden City/N.Y. 1970); R. Hancock, *Twentieth Century Ethics* (New York 1974).

\(^7\) See Günther Patzig, *Ethik ohne Metaphysik*, second ed. (Göttingen 1983), Chap. 3.
subjective preferences (expressivist interpretation). Furthermore, I do not want to give a guideline for future actions (prescriptivist interpretation). The standard versions of subjectivism are not convincing. This is not so because I believe to be able to justify my moral judgement. Maybe I do not claim to be able to justify my moral belief, and if I do, this is not crucial. What is crucial is that I believe my moral conviction in this very case not to be deceptive.

III

For a long time cognitivism was taken to be unacceptable in analytical philosophy. The force of noncognitivism relies on the conjunction of two arguments:

1. the naturalistic fallacy
   and
2. the argument from ontological queerness.

While the first argument excludes a naturalist version of cognitivism, the second one incorporates a *reductio ad absurdum* for the intuitionist version. If naturalism and intuitionism were a complete disjunction of moral objectivism, then one would be in trouble with the claim that there is moral knowledge.

The naturalistic fallacy refutes -- if it is valid -- the cognitivist approaches claiming that moral judgements are reducible to empirical judgements. I would like to take for granted that this argument -- maybe not in the form originally presented by Moore -- is valid and that it excludes naturalistic ethics. We now face the question whether one is therefore committed to moral intuitionism if one wants to maintain that there are moral facts and hence (possibly) moral knowledge.

Moral intuitionism cannot adequately be characterized as the complement of naturalism in the realm of cognitivist ethics; it rather is the foundationalist, non-naturalist version of moral cognitivism.

Foundationalism is a second-order theory. It says that first-order theories over a certain domain consist in firstly fundamental self-evident propositions which need not be justified and secondly in propositions which can be "derived" from the fundamental ones. One can distinguish the outright foundationalism of, say, Descartes, Leibniz and the early Carnap from a partial one which only refers to specific realms (e.g. in Aristotle).

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8 Recently ethical naturalism has been put on a new footing: See e.g. Richard Werner, "Ethical Realism", in: *Ethics* 93 (1983); David Brink, *Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics* (Cambridge 1989).
All intuitionist moral theories share the feature of classifying certain moral
resp. ethical propositions as fundamental. Certain propositions in the theory, be
it value judgements as in George Edward Moore\textsuperscript{9} but also in Max Scheler\textsuperscript{10} and
Nicolai Hartmann\textsuperscript{11}, universal imperatives as in David Ross,\textsuperscript{12} or singular
imperatives as in French existentialism but also in Herbert Pritchard,\textsuperscript{13} are
fundamental and rely in their claim to validity on our (direct) moral intuition.
Moral knowledge in intuitionism is autonomous in a certain sense: The justifica-
tory chain for moral propositions does not end outside of, but rather within
moral theory in a class of propositions, which are not justifiable and funda-
mental and which do not require justification.

The crucial argument against moral intuitionism is not of ontological but of
epistemological nature: In the same way as there is no observational base which
is free from theory in the sciences, there is no set of moral intuitions free from
ethical theory. Moral intuitions are formed in a complex interaction between
universal criteria and studies of singular cases from a theoretical context which
contains empirical and normative background knowledge. They do not specify
certain moral propositions with a high degree of generality as axioms and they
do not provide experimenta crucis which are supposed to decide whether a the-
ory is refuted or corroborated. However, there is a gradient in subjective cer-
tainty which provides the reason for developing moral theories as attempts to
systematize our moral belief system and which provides for justification in a
weak, coherential way. An epistemology which focuses on coherence and sys-
tematization as core concepts is an appropriate meta-theory in ethics as in other
fields of human knowledge. It is compatible with a plurality of ontological
propositions, among them also the naturalistic one, but it departs from founda-
tionalism and therefore also from ethical intuitionism.

**IV**

My claim is the following: Moral justifications are just ordinary justifications
insofar as they do not essentially differ from those occurring in the realm of the
descriptive. The objects of justifications are generally claims, judgements,

and Chap VI.

\textsuperscript{10} See Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (Halle
1913).

\textsuperscript{11} See Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethik* (Berlin 1926).

\textsuperscript{12} See David Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford 1930).

hypotheses, assumptions, convictions. To justify a claim means to give reasons for why it is true. The objects of moral justifications are moral judgements resp. beliefs.

Not all moral judgements seem to require a justification which feature they share with nonmoral judgements. Our belief system does contain elements which are to a large extent resistent against revision. Among these elements are apart from empirical also normative, especially moral ones. The conviction that it is morally forbidden arbitrarily to knock down somebody on the street is one of these elements, as is the conviction that over there stands a tree. Theories must be measured against these elements even if there might be circumstances under which the former would suggest to revise the latter.

To justify a proposition is only possible with reference to other propositions. It is impossible to leave our belief system in order to justify certain of its elements. Justification is done by association of elements of the system under the assumption that there is a gradient in certainty among different propositions. Theories are net-like structures of associated propositions. They merge singular propositions into a systematic whole.

Ethical theories are normal theories, they do not rely on self-evident truths of reason and they cannot be derived from propositions which are resistent to critique and which are the condition of the possibility of normative discourse. Nor are they, on the other hand, universalizations of our singular moral intuitions referring to specific situations. This is so since the moral conviction referring to the singular situations cannot be separated from theoretical (normative and descriptive) assumptions and concepts. There is no problem of justification genuine to moral justifications. The starting points for the construction of a moral theory are our normative belief systems which the theory tries to make more coherent and which generally are modified in this process. A normative proposition is justified in the same way as other propositions. By checking its implications we are testing its compatibility with elements of our normative belief system which we do not want to abandon, and by associating it with other propositions which seem to be certain we are trying to embed it into a theoretical context which has been corroborated.

Epistemological coherentism is disputed as a metatheory, however, its claim is a reconstructive one in the first place: It points out how justifications de facto are being performed. The practise of scientific as well as life-world justifications is coherentist. This should not disturb the perception of the vast plurality of different kinds of theoretical systematizations. It could well be that a universal theory of justification is impossible, at least it is one of the most difficult
projects in philosophy of science and epistemology. Epistemological coherentism does not have to carry this burden: It is not justified only when it has developed a universal (coherentist) theory of justification which has been corroborated in all spheres of knowledge. In its modest version epistemological coherentism does not want more than to warn against misinterpretations of justifying activities by reference to their practise. The discrepancy between foundationalist metatheory on the one hand and coherentist justificatory practise on the other is its most powerful argument.

Above, I have been pointing out the ontological neutrality of epistemological coherentism. It seems as if this is hardly reconcilable with my argument in favour of moral objectivism. However, the reconciliation is straightforward. The structural equivalence of justifications does not leave room for a specific type of moral Justifications. Those characteristics of our life-world descriptive beliefs which display an objectivist feature are characteristics of our normative beliefs as well. Among these characteristics is the central role of classical logics and the mode in which we try to resolve a conflict between contradicting beliefs with reference to sound arguments. Embedding theories coherentistically in our life-world belief systems suggests its objectivist interpretation. This applies to moral theories in the same way; they systematize, are justified and corroborated with reference to our life-world normative beliefs. The objectivist character of the latter is transferred to ethics.

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Secondary Qualities, Objectivity, and Our Experience of Value: A Phenomenological Account

Since the 17th century, a major concern of metaphysics and epistemology has been the problem of so-called secondary qualities, such as colours and odours. Although these qualities are experienced as belonging to objects in our external environment, the scientific world-view seems to allow no place for them among the objective properties of material entities. One manner of conceiving this clash is to locate it between ontology and phenomenology: in our everyday experience, redness appears to us as being really out there as a property of red things; scientists tell us, however, that all that is really to be found there on the red surface is a disposition of particles. Acknowledging this, we are most naturally led to the view that secondary qualities must be subjective properties ascribed to objects by us. Their subjectivity has been stated in a sophisticated manner by pointing out that it seems impossible to explain their nature without referring to the way they appear to subjects, whereas no account of primary qualities requires such a reference.\(^1\) Scientific inquiry of red surfaces reveals physical and chemical properties and occurrences; it is however obvious that no information about such things could give a blind person an idea of what redness is. Thus it seems that a secondary quality can be adequately understood only in terms of the appropriate modification of subjective sensibility.\(^2\)

Philosophy of value has found this difference between primary and secondary qualities helpful. There is an analogy between value experience and secondary quality experience in that neither can be made intelligible in an adequate manner without reference to subjective sensibility. Only a person who can see colours can have an understanding of what redness is; accordingly, only a person who shares human concerns and patterns of feelings can have a conception of what it is for an action to be wrong. Those who do not share our forms of sensibility have no access to the way the world is pictured by us in the relevant respects; this is why secondary qualities and values are located on the subjective side of experience.\(^3\)

\(^1\) McNaughton 1988, 67-68.
\(^3\) McNaughton 1988, 73-74.
From the vantage-point of phenomenology, to say that values are subjective seems dubious: admiring a sunset, we experience a beauty that really is there. In the case of secondary qualities, this phenomenological character is even more obvious: if we pick up a hot tea-pot, it is the pot we think is hot. One way of handling this everyday reaction is to declare it a projective error. According to Mackie, the prephilosophical ‘objectivity’ of secondary qualities just shows us how prone we are to conceive our experience of them in a manner that would be appropriate for the experience of primary qualities. So our prephilosophical understanding of our awareness of value, too, would in fact follow the primary-quality model; we take ourselves to be aware of something which is there as an objective property.\(^4\)

Whilst Mackie conceives it as a task of philosophy to correct our everyday understanding of value, McDowell wants to rescue the phenomenological character of values and secondary qualities by suggesting that there is a notion of objectivity applicable to properties that are not adequately conceivable except in terms of a certain kind of subjective sensibility. It is one thing to say that something is objective in virtue of its capability of being understood otherwise than in terms of a certain sort of subjective sensibility, and another thing to say that something is objective in virtue of its waiting there to be experienced by a person who shares the appropriate modification of sensibility. Although certain properties are subjective in the first sense they can still be conceived as objective in the second sense.\(^5\)

In the following pages, I shall pursue the secondary-quality analogy of value experience from a phenomenological viewpoint. For this purpose, I shall first review Husserl’s account of primary and secondary qualities.

In *Ideen I*, Husserl’s inaugural concern about primary qualities is whether they can figure in the phenomenological conception of experience. ‘Geometrical-physical’ qualities make up what is conceived as the ‘true thing’ by scientists; the true thing is “exclusively determined by concepts, such as atoms, ions, energies etc.”\(^6\) These concepts have no extension in the world of sensual appearance. Husserl however considered it a misconception that the true properties of an object would first be revealed by a scientific examination which raises the veil of appearance. The appearing properties of an object of inquiry are the necessary point of departure of physical determinations; it is in virtue of prevailing theories and scientific practices that certain appearing properties are

\(^4\) Mackie 1980, 32, 60-61, 73-74.
\(^5\) McDowell 1985, 110-129.
\(^6\) Husserl 1976, 82-83.
taken to signify the presence of certain physical properties:

Das mit den und den sinnlichen Beschaffenheiten unter den gegebenen phänomenalen Umständen erscheinende Ding ist für den Physiker, der allgemein für solche Dinge überhaupt, in Erscheinungszusammenhängen der betreffenden Art, schon die physikalische Bestimmung geleistet hat, Anzeichen für eine Fülle kausaler Eigenschaften dieses selben Dinges, die als solche sich eben in artmäßig wohlbekannten Erscheinungsabhängigkeiten bekunden.\footnote{Husserl 1976, 113.}

The allegedly essential opposition of the properties accessible to ‘sensual imaginatio’ and those accessible to ‘physical intellectio’ is thus not a consequence of applying a method of inquiry which shows us how the world really is, but a product of abstraction from experience.\footnote{Husserl 1952, 183-184.}

‘Constitution’ is one of those concepts which have been interpreted as indications of metaphysical idealism in transcendental phenomenology. Husserl however did not mean that objects in the real world would in a manner or another depend on our subjective acts. Rather, his contention was that our experience of an entire object involves several steps of constitution, each of which is responsible for the bestowal of certain senses on the purported object.\footnote{Husserl 1950, 161-162.} In this theory, a meaningful perception is made possible by the sense-giving activities of our minds, in virtue of which pure sensory matter is ‘animated’ with sense. Possessing senseless matter does not yet count as perceiving anything since perception is always perception of something, that is, of a more or less meaningful object, were it just a pattern of colour. By the sense-bestowing activity, the experience of the purported object is constituted layer by layer, as it were; “the appearing of the colour, the sound, and so every quality of the object” is rendered possible by the constituting subjectivity.\footnote{Husserl 1976, 191-196, 225-229.} The experience of sensual qualities functions as the most primordial layer of perceptual constitution in the sense that such an experience is a necessary part of perception, whereas the experience of other qualities is not. In addition however, Husserl describes a perceived physical object as being constituted as a temporal entity; next as an entity with spatial characteristics; next as a material entity having substantial unity;\footnote{Ibid., 344-353.} next as a thing in the ‘primordial sphere of ownness’;\footnote{Husserl 1950, 124-130.} next as a thing...
in the intersubjective world;\textsuperscript{13} next as a cultural object; next as an entity characterized by our particular practical interests;\textsuperscript{14} etc. Finally, the whole network of references making up the so-called concrete life-world is involved in a perception of an object which is thus interpreted according to senses characteristic to each step of constitution.\textsuperscript{15}

It is worth noticing that Husserl here ignores the difference of objectivity according to which primary and secondary qualities traditionally are conceived. As can be seen in Husserl’s account, the constitution of primary qualities presupposes the constitution of secondary qualities. The order of constitution is not a temporal order, but an order of ‘founding’: what is founded can subsist only when connected with something else. An experience of value, for instance, cannot occur but together with the perception of an entity which can be conceived valuable. Presupposing cultural and practical understanding, such an experience belongs to the highest level of constitution.\textsuperscript{16} In Husserl’s account, there is thus an important disanalogy between the experience of value and the experience of a secondary quality in that the latter is located at the basic level of constitution while the former can be accomplished only in the possession of higher-order senses.

Later, influenced by Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world, Husserl viewed the hierarchy of constitution from a different vantage-point, placing now special emphasis on the idea of the life-world as an always pregiven horizon:

\textit{Die Lebenswelt ist […] für uns, in ihr wach Lebenden, immer schon da, im voraus für uns seidend, ‘Boden’ für alle, ob theoretische oder außertheoretische Praxis. Die Welt ist uns, den wachen, den immerzu irgendwie praktisch interessierten Subjekten, nicht gelegentlich einmal, sondern immer und notwendig als Universalfeld aller wirklich und möglichen Praxis, als Horizont vorgegeben.}\textsuperscript{17}

This phenomenal context is the necessary point of departure of the scientific approach which ignores both the purely sensual strata and the subjective, intersubjective, higher-order layers of sense attributed to the cultural thing - and produces an abstract conception of its object. An entity so conceived is the ‘true thing’ of science. However, it can figure only in the abstract image and cannot

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 149-156.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 159-163.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 162-163.
\textsuperscript{16} Husserl 1976, 266.
\textsuperscript{17} Husserl 1954, 145.
\end{flushleft}
thus determine what counts as real or objective in the practical-cultural context of the life-world. Husserl argues that since natural sciences attain their picture of the world first by means of abstraction, idealization and induction starting from the concrete life-world, the scientific picture is a higher-order construction founded on everyday evidence and objectivity.18

Due to the idea of abstraction from concrete experience, primary qualities can be adequately conceived without reference to a certain mode of subjective sensibility. Geometrical shapes, for example, are products of abstraction from intuitive, perceived shapes, and are thus to be conceived in an abstract manner, without reference to anything concrete. A product of abstraction, this kind of objectivity however is based on the life-world and is thus phenomenologically on a par with other kinds of life-world objectivities, e.g. those pertaining to values. Even if abstract properties and theoretical entities can be conceived without subjective reference, they cannot be conceived without reference to certain higher-order rules, namely, logical, mathemathical or scientific principles, laws and theories.19

Given that there is a plurality of life-worlds each of which is relative to a specific community, truth and objectivity as they are understood in a certain life-world must be relative to the community whose life-world it is.20 This seems to contradict the view that the only adequate sense in which we can speak of truth is expressed by stating that what is true is true for all beings. In *Krisis* nonetheless, Husserl rejected such a view and held that what is meant by saying that something is true is that it is affirmed relative to the practises and projects which make up the horizon of the affirmation.21 It is however important to notice that since this horizon generally functions as a non-thematic background it can be assumed that the relativity of truth is usually not observed.22 Everyday truth is conceived as absolute, and the relativity of truth is revealed first by a reflective grasp of the life-world. Accordingly, even if phenomenological analysis shows that a property is affirmed as objective in virtue of certain background practices to which its affirmation thus is relative, the objectivity of the property is not considered relative by those who share the practices without reflecting on them.

From a Heideggerian perspective, the question of whether a property really

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21 Soffer 161.
22 Ibid.
exists or not - or whether its existence is relative or absolute - would be a symptom of a deficiency in one's relation to the world.\textsuperscript{23} In our existence in the network of assignments which make up the phenomenon of the world, we are so absorbed in our practices that we do not stop and make such questions. First as the practical relation is disturbed we switch over to a theoretical attitude in which entities are objectified:

Im Sichenthalten von allen Herstellen, Hantieren, u.dgl. legt sich das Besorgen in den jetzt noch einzig verbleibenden Modus des In-Seins, in das Nur-noch-verweilen bei... \textit{Auf dem Grunde} dieser Seinsart zur Welt, die das innerweltlich begegnende Seiende nur noch in seinem puren \textit{Aussehen} (eidos) begegnen läßt, und als Modus dieser Seinsart ist ein ausdrückliches Hinsehen auf das so Begegnende möglich.\textsuperscript{24}

Phenomenologically, this passage describes the birth of object. For nothing appears to us as an object before it is objectified by theoretical reflection. As far as we are absorbed in our concrete practices there are neither objective nor subjective properties; such distinctions arise first as we begin with our abstructive activities. Nevertheless, there are things really in the world in the sense that they encounter us in our practices - and they do so as heavy, beautiful, cruel, etc. Taking an act to be bad indicates neither a philosophical belief that there are certain objective properties nor a naive attitude which has to be philosophically corrected. Rather, it is a feature of our concrete being-in-the-world that things are experienced as encountering us with certain qualities. If this is what is meant by defining objectivity as the feature of something of being there waiting to be experienced, then the idea of objective values can be conciled with a profoundly phenomenological view. In that view, reality is an everyday phenomenon, and every attempt to establish a reality of a more fundamental sort behind the veil of appearance is mythological.\textsuperscript{25}

References


\textsuperscript{23} Heidegger 1986, 61.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Cf. Husserl 1976, 114.
Secondary Qualities, Objectivity, and Our Experience of Value


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The Moral 'Ought' and the Unthinkable

Anscombe's famous essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" was an inspiration for two schools of naturalism. Neo-Aristotelian naturalists were inspired by her suggestion that contemporary ethics requires an account of human nature, virtue and flourishing. Scientifically-oriented naturalists were inspired by her claim that moral philosophy should be put to one side until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology. These two schools have something in common. Both aim at putting moral beliefs and attitudes on a par with other (non-moral) beliefs and attitudes as far as possible, thus rescuing our moral attitudes from accusations of subjectivism. Both aim at throwing explanatory light on why we act and think in the ways we do. Naturalism of either sort is appealing to anyone convinced that moral attitudes are more than mere expressions of feeling, and who seek to have an intellectually clear account of the moral dimension of their lives.

One of the major challenges facing naturalism (of either sort) to provide an account of moral normativity. For our purposes here, normativity refers to the existence of a gap between what agents actually do and what they ought to do. It is a common fact of life that agents meet or fail to meet norms of behavior. Normativity itself is not specific to morality: there is also a gap between what one believes and what one ought to believe in non-moral contexts. Usually the nature of normativity in these contexts is thought less mysterious than in the moral case. Both Neo-Aristotelian and empirical naturalism's have the goal of removing an air of mystery surrounding moral normativity by assimilating it to non-moral models whenever possible.

Transgressions of moral prohibitions highlight a specific feature of moral normativity. In all societies, there are some acts which seem to automatically qualify as cases of falling short of a norm of behavior. These acts are forbidden or 'unthinkable'. Unlike epistemic normativity, the performance of these acts expresses more than a contingent error in judgment, and evokes strong

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1 Kekes gives some graphic examples of transgressive acts which evoke disgust: "The experiences include eating faeces, disemboweling a person, drinking pus, being splattered with someone's brain, the sight and smell of putrifying corpses, the spectacle of extreme torture, such as dismembering live humans with a chainsaw, or immersion in excrement." [433] The list is not complete: one can add necrophilia, bestiality, incest, rape and so on.
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sentiments of fear, anxiety or disgust. These actions are unthinkable, not relative to the shape of an individual agent's will or character, but unthinkable for all persons within a certain cultural context. Within any society, there exists a class of acts considered unnatural, and the agent who performs them irrational and monstrous. My question is whether the naturalism's Anscombe inspired are equipped to give an intellectually satisfying of this striking dimension of moral life.

We are tempted to judge serious transgressions as 'morally wrong', and say that agent 'morally ought' not to do them. Anscombe criticized these uses of 'ought' and 'wrong' in judgments of behavior as incoherent. These uses have become incoherent because their intelligibility depended on a religious framework (of divine law) which has since disappeared. Within that framework, actions are deemed right (wrong) if they conform (fail to conform) with a relevant law of a divine legislator. Obedience to divine laws sometimes required agents to radically transcend their own personal desires and interests; failure to comply placed a condemning verdict (identified with divine judgment) on one's action. Although both the concept of a legislator and divine laws have left us, the usage of morally 'ought' and morally 'wrong' still survive, though now devoid of sense. To use them now, she claims, is akin to using the notion of 'criminal' after criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten.

The incoherence of morally 'ought' is highlighted by exposing its redundancy in certain cases. If someone has already understood an act as vulgar, base and repugnant, as not in keeping with human dignity, what sense does it have to add that he 'morally ought' not to have done it, or that it is 'morally wrong'? This additional comment would have made sense back in the divine law context: there it makes sense to ask whether an act is, besides being vulgar and base, in conformity with divine law. It could in principle be the case that a base and repugnant act is actually in accordance with divine law (i.e. the case of Abraham and Isaac), and thereby acceptable. But once the divine law context is removed, the additional comment becomes redundant. In most cases, it will be clear simply from the description of an action whether it falls short of our expectations. An act described as 'punishing those known to be innocent' will invariably be judged as unjust. The additional comment that, besides being unjust, it is 'morally wrong' adds nothing more than psychological force and rhetorical emphasis to the initial judgment. Anscombe therefore recommends that we use less dramatic notions and phrases (unjust, base, dishonest, showing poor judgment or a lack of discretion, etc.) when we judge actions to fall short
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of norms of behavior. We make it clear by describing those actions in those less dramatic ways that they do not fail to conform to a divine law, but fail to fit within a picture of a good human life.

There seems at first sight something wrong with the recommendation if one tries to apply it to the case of moral prohibitions against bestiality, necrophilia, or incest. Here the weaker terms offered to characterize 'falling short of the mark' appear as understatements: most people would probably be repelled by a description of rape as showing poor judgment only, and there are some human actions so unspeakable that a characterization of them as 'unjust' seems tepid. In the context of the performance of the unthinkable, Anscombe's strategy seems itself morally suspect, like a program to desensitize people's attitudes towards evil. Does the sheer magnitude of evil in certain cases drive us back to those outmoded concepts of 'morally wrong' and 'morally ought', and their suggestion of a super-human verdict placed on human actions? Does the transgression of a prohibition provoke us to use stronger terms in our judgments, which only make sense within a divine law conception of morality?

Anscombe would probably reply that we do have stronger concepts like 'monstrous', 'wicked', or 'abominable' at our disposal. These make it clear that such acts are not to be done, without bringing in 'moral ought', 'moral wrong' and the divine law framework upon which they depend. Judgments in which these appear are based in turn -- like judgments on less bad ones -- on what properly belongs in a picture of the good life. Such acts, like other bad ones, don't fit in the picture. But what is it about these acts that makes them ir-reconcilable with that picture? The two naturalism's often reply to this question by conceptualizing unthinkable acts as expressions of vice or as forms of harm.

Neither conceptualization is entirely satisfactory. In the first case, the transgressive act is conceived as an expression of the bad character of the perpetrator. We say there is something dreadfully wrong with him. Anyone who can bring himself to do something like that must be sick or twisted inside. According to some philosophers, this is where the story ends: the terrible act is an expression of the twisted will that made it possible for an agent to do what he did. Having a will like that is not reconcilable with the good life. Such an analysis, however, does not pick up all the resonances associated with disturbing acts of severe transgression. What is upsetting about the performance of such acts is not reducible to talk about the kind of deviant will which makes them possible. The reference to the will and character of the perpetrator will not provide full insight into what is so terrible about such acts, though it may go some way in giving the psychological possibility conditions for doing them.
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It is tempting to see what is additionally terrible about such acts as the harm that is committed against victims or the suffering experienced by them. Some moral transgressions, committed against persons who are aware of what is happening to them, seem to fit this analysis. We would then say such acts are 'fall short of the mark', not only because they reflect volitional characters people shouldn't have, but because they inflict pain or destruction on other agents, something which one shouldn't do. These acts would then be understood as (extreme) cases of injustice: they contravene the right of agents not to be physically or psychologically harmed by others. Perhaps the case of mutilating someone with a chainsaw can be understood as unjust on the basis of harm, no differently than the lesser harms agents can inflict on one another. But other moral transgressions seem much less connected to possible harm inflicted on agents. Certain ways of treating a corpse seem very objectionable, though the corpse obviously feels nothing; it is no less objectionable when no one else may be psychologically affected it, i.e. where one mutilates corpses in the privacy of one's own home. The same holds for rape performed secretly under anesthetic or a case of incest where the victim has no psychical harm in the future. These are acts seem wrong independent of the harm they cause. There is a possible analogy here with food prohibitions against drinking pus or eating excrement. It is possible that consuming such things does not cause us physical harm (it could end up strengthening our immune system rather than undermining it). But it is very unlikely that people would consume such things because they come to learn that they are harmless. We avoid such things whether they do us physical harm or not. In this light, the abomination of working over someone with a chainsaw may not be based on harm and suffering either. It is not the harm alone which makes this act grossly unacceptable: it is the unsettling vision of human flesh being torn to shreds, being reduced to bits of sheer material. The vision would disturb us no less if we were told the agent was (for genetic reasons) incapable of feeling pain and (for personal reasons) agreed to have this done to him.2

If the above makes sense, it leads to a striking conclusion: the very worst sorts of human acts are ones which seem to elude fundamental moral terms like vice and harm. We can condemn them as 'monstrous' or 'abominable', but it is

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2 "What makes human sacrifice something deep and sinister anyway? Is it only the suffering of the victim that impresses us in this way? All manner of diseases bring just as much suffering and do not make this impression. No, this deep and sinister aspect is not obvious just from learning the history of the external action, but we impute it from an experience in ourselves". L. Wittgenstein, 16e.
not entirely clear how to understand the kind of threat or danger such acts pose. Part of the problem is that the threat posed by a moral transgression of a prohibition seems to be greater than a threat to the lives or interests of the individuals involved as perpetrators or victims. More seems to be at stake when a child is forced by an adult to commit indecent acts than the possible psychic harm to the child or the moral character of the adult. What is this 'more'? In the divine law framework had resources to conceptualize this 'more': these acts, besides showing twisted characters and harming people, ran contrary to the laws of conduct prescribed by God.

Perhaps another (secular) account of moral transgressions and the judgments we make about them is available. In this account, serious transgressions are 'abominable', not because they fly in the face of God's demands, but in evoking a situation where civilized life as we know it simply vanishes: "The direct object of deep disgust . . . is still not some particular form of serious harm, but the violations of moral taboos that open up the prospect of barbarism" (Kekes). A society reduced to barbarism would undoubtedly be harmful to individuals, but that is not all that is threatening about it. Transgressions confront us with the contingency (and possible dissolution) of the entire framework of human distinctions and meanings, moral and otherwise. Nor are transgressions vices, in conflict with some particular element of a good human life; they bring us face to face with the termination of a recognizably human life as such. The performance of unthinkable acts give us some small inkling of the horror of a life where anything is permitted to happen, a foretaste of the 'state of nature', the chaos and meaninglessness of a world where nothing is unthinkable. Perhaps the world evoked by transgression is fictional: it is beyond possible human experience. It is the image of barbarism from within the perspective of civilization. But that image can give us a strong taste of the all-too-real fragility of civilized life, and the terror linked to its potential dissolution.

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The Moral 'Ought' and the Unthinkable.


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Artificial Life and Ethics

1. Introduction

The connection between ethics and Artificial Life (AL) research as it stands today does not concern the ethical status of robots or other artificial creatures, but the clarification of ethically highly relevant concepts such as "life" and "consciousness".

After giving a brief introduction to the field of AL, in which the connection between AL and Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the similarity of philosophical questions raised within them is stressed, I will discuss the connection between AL and ethics, focusing upon how AL can clarify concepts that are of central interest in ethical debates. The role AL can play in clarifying ethical relevant concepts will be illustrated by an example.

2. Artificial Life

"Artificial Life is the study of man-made systems that exhibit behaviors characteristic of natural living systems" (Langton 1988: 1). Life on earth, the traditional object of biology, is based on carbon-chain chemistry. Theoretical biology has long been faced with the fact that we know of only one type of life, and, consequently, we have difficulties in deriving general principles of life from this single example. AL tries to generate alternative life-forms ("life-as-it-could-be" (Langton 1988: 2)) by simulation or synthesis.1 This is done in order to improve and to broaden our understanding of what life is and to understand the organizational principles underlying the dynamics of living systems. Life is seen as a property that emerges from the interaction of a great number of simple non-living parts. "It is this ... local determination of behavior that AL employs in its primary methodological approach to the generation of life-like behaviors" (Langton 1988: 3).

1 Artificially producing life (in the sense of artificial insemination or genetic engineering), does not belong to the realm of AL and therefore is of no interest in this study.
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The typical experiment carried out by an AL researcher occurs neither in vivo nor in vitro, but in silico (i.e., in a computer). Simple-structured entities react to local situations in their environment, including encounters with other entities. The global behavior that emerges within a population of entities is studied. There are no rules in the system that dictate this global behavior.2

An early example of AL research in silico is the "Game of Life"—a formal system that very clearly demonstrates how global patterns arise as the result of simple local interactions.3 "Life" can very easily be implemented on digital computers and it has already found its way into the Journal of Philosophy (Dennett 1991); there it served to emphasize the importance of choosing the right level of analysis in looking for patterns in complex systems.

From the preceding, it should already be evident that there is a close interrelationship of AL and AI4 (Sober 1992; Godfrey-Smith 1994): both are trying to understand complex phenomena (life/intelligence) in the natural world. Both preferably use digital computers as tools ("weak AL/AI") or even try to create new forms of life/intelligence in digital computers ("strong AL/AI").5 By using bottom-up methods, AL/AI tries to avoid vitalism/dualism: it is only the interaction of (simple) entities that gives rise to life/intelligence within this framework. Most of today's AL/AI researchers are not satisfied with solely behavioral (Turing test-like) criteria for life/intelligence: the structure of the system and the organization of the mechanisms under consideration matter.6

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2 Some "real world-robots" (rather than simulations of robots) are created, but to this day even the best of them do not exhibit behavior that could be called more than "insect-like". Besides computers and robots, another means of AL research is chemistry (e.g., the self-assembly and self-replication of macromolecules), but the main medium of AL is the computer, because computers are available to everybody today. 

3 On a large square lattice each square "cell" may be either ON or OFF. The state of each cell in the following time step is determined as a function of its own state and the states of its eight neighbors. Depending on the starting configuration, there can arise global patterns as a result of the local rules. The patterns are usually visualized by indicating ON (OFF) cells as black (white).

4 For reasons of brevity, let "AI" in this context denote not only classical (symbolic) AI, but also other parts of cognitive science that are concerned with computer simulations, in particular, connectionism.

5 Here I will concern myself primarily with "weak AL/AI" (i.e., AL/AI-variants that regard computers as tools for simulation, but that do not consider computers as part of the subject matter of AL/AI). There are very few AL researchers who claim to create "real" life in their computers or with their robots (cf. Moravec (1988) as an example for "strong AL").

6 For example, today's AL/AI researcher keeps the fact that living systems are highly distributed in mind. This is the lesson we learned from the comparison of classical AI and connectionist models: adaptation, generalization, and graceful degradation.
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One might regard AL as a variant of AI that takes into consideration the importance of incorporating the agent's body and the interaction with an environment into the simulation (or creation) of life and intelligence.  

3. Bringing Together Artificial Life and Ethics

The goal of AL research is to account for the emergence of life, consciousness, and persons considering only bottom-up processes, without any reference to supernatural influences.

If one claims a special status for human life within the context of ethical debates, one has to "make reference to some essentially human characteristic or characteristics, other than that is merely bodily human life, such as consciousness, or the ability to experience pleasurable states" (Kuhse 1987: 14). By adopting this approach, AL could argue for or against a special status for humans while avoiding both of the sources of errors most often found in ethical debates on this topic: an inappropriate appeal to authority (whether religious teachings or social norms) or an unjustified speciesism (this "speciesism" extends to include the broader carbon-based chauvinism). It may turn out in the course of research in AL and related fields that consciousness is not restricted to members of the species Homo sapiens; hence, consciousness could not serve as a distinctly "human characteristic". Perhaps primates, future robots, or Martians that will visit us in the future will be seen to possess consciousness, too.

Even today, results of AL research may help us to answer classical questions in bioethics, such as "What is the relationship, over time, of the biological/psychological/social processes which block or facilitate the emergence of persons?" (Stahl 1980: 286). This is, because AL studies biological processes commonly regarded as definitive for "persons" (e.g., "life" and "consciousness"). Today's criteria for "life" (esp. metabolism and reproduction) stem mainly from theoretical biology, which we may regard both as a forerunner and as a part of AL.

In modeling processes that exhibit phenomena commonly linked to life, we gain in our understanding of what the important features of life are (e.g., the dynamical behavior of living systems, or the necessary preconditions for life).

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7 *are properties of distributed* (e.g., connectionist) systems.

Issues of adaptation (e.g., evolution, development, and learning) become important, and AL/AI enables us to explore the relationship between nature (i.e., genetic determination) and nurture (i.e., environmental influences encompassing both molecular interactions in genetic regulatory networks and social interactions).
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This may in the future enable us to develop better criteria than we have today in determining the demarcation points corresponding to the beginning and the end of life. Modeling life-related processes such as consciousness may help us—together with appropriate principles (e.g., "no consciousness, no responsibility")—to delimit concepts such as "responsibility". Dichotomies such as natural/artificial or nature/nurture, also important in ethical debates, may be either sharpened or discovered to be no longer tenable.

Due to the close interrelationship of AL and AI, ethical questions arising in AI are also relevant for AL. In comparison, problems of the moral status of robots are not very urgent at present: even the most advanced robots do not appear particularly life-like and do not have any significant impact on society beyond that associated with other tools or machines. Any "practical" relevant connections between AL and ethics are still restricted to the realm of science fiction, starting with moral dilemmas in the robot's world and extending to phantasies about the future in a world where the human race has been swept away "by the tide of cultural change, usurped by its own artificial progeny" (Moravec 1988: 1). Today, conscious robots serve at best as objects of thought experiments.

4. An Example of Artificial Life Research

Consciousness is generally regarded as a necessary prerequisite for possessing moral status: it enables organisms to experience pleasure and pain. Recent research in cognitive science and related fields has produced various conceptions of consciousness. As an example within AL research, Gerald Edelman's "Biological Theory of Consciousness" shows how a biologically-motivated model of consciousness could enable us to ascribe consciousness, and, therefore, moral status to humans, animals and artefacts. If we could determine the

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8 Consider the potential problem of the incorrect usage of AI expert systems leading to disastrous consequences, or the question, whether AI research is a proper goal at all in light of the fact that a considerable amount of its funding comes from military sources (cf. Forrester and Morrison (1994) for these and further questions).

9 For example, imagine an emergency room robot that continually monitors patients and switches on and off the necessary life support machines. One night this robot confronts the dilemma that there are two patients who need immediate use of a respirator, yet, only one respirator is available (this scenario is due to Lekka-Kowalik, 1993).

10 Although Edelman makes the restriction "that there will be severe (but not unique) constraints on the design of any artefact that is supposed to acquire conscious behavior" (Edelman 1989: 32f., my emphasis), he presently works on the design of
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anatomical bases and functional role of consciousness in humans, and could demonstrate that animals possess similar structures and functions, this would provide additional grounds for the belief that they, too, are conscious" (Edelman 1989: 23).

Edelman's theory of consciousness is based upon his "Theory of Neuronal Group Selection",\(^{11}\) by which he intends to reconcile the complexity of the central nervous system with its rapid emergence both phylogenetically during evolution and somatically during development (Edelman 1989: 43). In great detail, Edelman elaborates his theory of consciousness as an extension of the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection and presents possible anatomical bases of elements within his consciousness model. Edelman claims to have identified the mechanisms and functions that must exist for "primary consciousness" (see below) to arise (Edelman 1989: 99 f.): "The mechanisms and functions include (1) neuronal group selection leading to perceptual categorization and memory; (2) a self-nonself distinction reflecting values already given as part of the phenotype by the evolutionary emergence of the brain-stem, endocrine, and limbic systems mediating adaptive homeostasis; (3) a cortical-hippocampal-basal ganglia system for categorization of successive events and for concept formation; and (4) an ongoing interaction between the two systems in items 2 and 3, leading to a conceptually based special memory system for value matched to past categories.

... Of utmost significance is (5) a set of reentrant connections between this special memory system and the cortical systems dedicated to present perceptual categorization. The functioning of these key reentrant connections provides the sufficient conditions for the appearance of primary consciousness."

According to Edelman's theory, "primary consciousness" is a process that binds together different sensory modalities and inputs to construct a scene. This scene includes sensory experiences encompassing a short temporal interval. It aids in abstracting, organizing and lending salience to the environment. Indirect (neuroanatomical and behavioral) tests for this kind of consciousness let us

\(^{11}\) According to the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, a large number of variant neuronal groups are produced in the early developmental stage of an organism. This process is subjected to epigenetic influences and governed by morphoregulatory molecules interacting with neuronal surfaces. The production of diversity results in the formation of primary neuronal repertoires. Experiential selection then leads to the formation of secondary repertoires by differential amplification of synaptic populations, now driven by behavior and experience. At last, the coordination of different maps in accordance with external stimuli is accomplished by reentry, the parallel signaling between separate neuronal groups occurring along large numbers of ordered anatomical connections in a bidirectional and recursive fashion.
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ascribe it to most mammals and some birds. "Higher order consciousness" leads
to capabilities allowing the anticipation of future states and planned behavior
(Edelman 1989: 191 f.). This sort of consciousness incorporates linguistic abili-
ties and is, as far as we know, confined to human beings.

Edelman’s analysis of consciousness may give us sufficient criteria to use in
ascribing "primary consciousness" to beings other than humans, and, therefore,
in assessing their ability to suffer, an important issue within practical ethics.

5. Conclusion

AL research focuses on computer simulations and models of processes that
are closely tied to life, as I described in the above consciousness model. AL
provides no moral systems per se, but it can assist ethics in providing a vocabu-
larly within which moral questions can be intelligently discussed.

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Wittgenstein and the "New Man"

No one can speak the truth; if he has still not mastered himself. He cannot speak it; -- but not because he is not clever enough yet. The truth can be spoken only by someone who is already at home in it; not by someone who still lives in falsehood and reaches out from falsehood towards truth on just one occasion.¹

Nothing is so difficult as not deceiving oneself.²

I read such passages not so much as biographical notations about Wittgenstein, although they certainly are that, but rather as living exhortations. They tell us: Be honest -- and it is not easy! There is an honesty that is easy; easy and deceptive in that it can lead us to suppose we are what we are not: honest people. The discipline of truth, within which Wittgenstein struggled, points to the painful fact that more often than not we either do not see what is right in front of us or we misunderstand it. Besides this, it is important to keep in mind, that as observers of the world around us, we rarely see ourselves. We quite often fail to see our lives clearly or we misunderstand them, and there is the rub: we then see our obscurity or misunderstanding not as an obscurity or a misunderstanding but rather as a reality. We are the only species on the face of the earth that can have existential misunderstandings: that is, that can be living, walking, misunderstandings. Reality seen through a misunderstanding is certainly an illusion and truth, where it can gain admittance, is certainly illusion shattering: that admission, however, is not unconditional. It requires, as Wittgenstein understood, a receptive life, a receptive soul, which is at home in it. This last, I take it, requires an existential commitment, an existential recognition to the effect that nothing is more important than the truth. Wittgenstein's life, I put to you, embodies just such a recognition and commitment.

I, now, want to look briefly at two other lives, one fictional and the other actual, where such recognition and commitment to truth was lacking. As examples of this latter type of neglect I will take Rakitin, a fledgling determinist, from The Brothers Karamazov and Margaret Mead, a cultural determinist, from Anthropology. Here is how Dostoevsky depicts Rakitin:

² Ibid., 34e.
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He had a restless and covetous heart. He was fully aware of his considerable abilities, but in his conceit he nervously exaggerated them. He knew for certain that he would become a figure of some sort, but Alyosha, who was very attached to him, was tormented that his friend Rakitin was dishonest and was decidedly unaware of it; that on the contrary, knowing he wouldn’t steal money from the table, he ultimately considered himself a man of the highest integrity. Here neither Alyosha nor anyone else could do anything.3

And, in an assessment made later in the novel by Mitya, we learn this about Rakitin:

And Rakitin doesn’t like God, oof, how he doesn’t!4

It is this description, given by Dostoevsky, which leads Mitya to say

Alyosha, this science! The new man will come, I quite understand that ... and yet, I'm sorry for God!”5

My concern, now, is with this Rakitin, the paradigm of the new man, who is dishonest and decidedly unaware of it and who dislikes God. Rakitin, perceiving himself to be honest, effortlessly honest, unlike Wittgenstein, did not feel the need to strive for truth in order to make his home in it because he was under the illusion he was already there. This, I take it, is essential: the new man who is coming is under the illusion of honesty even when, or especially when, he is being dishonest.

Dostoevsky, at any rate, goes on in his novel to reveal Rakitin’s dishonesty. We may very well think that Rakitin is only a fictional character, and to suppose that there are people such as he in reality is rather far fetched. Even so, I have long had it fixed in my mind that Dostoevsky is an existential pathologist. I will explain what I mean by this. Instead of studying bacteria and viruses, as did the pathologist, Dostoevsky studied thought and character: as it is the consistency with which bacteria and viruses act over the ages that enabled us to diagnose disease, so, Dostoevsky looked at thought and character as constant in their pathology and this enabled him to diagnose psychological and spiritual sickness. Thus Dostoevsky shows how the ideas we hold, as well as the ideas which hold us, manifest themselves in our conduct, our very lives. Here, what is called for is the art of showing us to ourselves. That is, in this arena, the arena

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4 Ibid., 589.
5 Ibid., 589.
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of the sane, I can even say the arena of the particularly sane, no one else can cure us. What has been done to us has been done by ourselves, and if it is to be undone we are the only ones that can undo it. We, however, as a rule, are quite proud of our handiwork, our existence. Here is where the art comes in. The artist shows us as we are, not how we think we are. O. K. Bouwsma once said that "Dostoevsky's characters were ideas wearing clothes" and that, I want to suggest, is precisely what human beings are. Further, we are not always aware of what idea is acting out its pathology in our lives.

My question, at any rate, is this: Is the existential pathology that we find in Rakitin, in fact, reflected in lives over the ages? I hold that it is. I hold that it is the case that the new man is no longer coming but that he is here now and in abundance. Well, let's look. Let's follow the pathology of this type into the present day. For my example I will take Margaret Mead, a cultural determinist, not unlike Rakitin. Mead, at age 23, was sent by Boas, of Columbia University, to study the Samoans in 1925. The aim of Mead's study was adolescent Samoan girls. The adolescent years were considered part of our human nature: every human being had to pass through puberty on the way to adulthood. Further, and here is the key, it was believed that the frustrations and psychological stress teenagers suffered in this period were also a reflection of our nature. The long and short of it was that Mead went to Samoa for nine months and upon her return she wrote Coming of Age in Samoa in which she reveals her findings that young Samoan girls do not suffer psychological stress nor frustration when they pass through puberty for essentially two reasons. The first being that Samoan girls are taught, through very loose family arrangements, to not care for anyone deeply. The second being that young Samoan girls were expected to have several lovers prior to marrying and settling down. In short, our culture created the frustrations and stresses in our teenagers by raising them in close families and teaching them that promiscuity was wrong.

I hope you see the birth of the "sexual revolution" in all of this, because that is what it was and Mead was its spokesperson. Americans were given a picture of the romantic Samoan Islands where healthy teenagers casually fornicated their way into responsible adults as "cocks crowed negligently." Margaret had discovered, as it were, as had Rakitin, that that's why others think and act; because of the environment and not because "they have souls or are some sort of image or likeness." So, Margaret went to Samoa, discovered there was no God, and announced to the world a new age of freedom no longer restricted

6 Ibid., 589.
by religious, moral, or political teachings. She then announced the new perspective through which we were to understand ourselves:

Realizing that our own ways are not humanly inevitable nor god ordained, but are the fruit of a long and turbulent history, we may well examine in turn all of our institutions, thrown into strong relief against the history of other civilizations, and weighing them in the balance, be not afraid to find them wanting.\(^7\)

The problem, of course, was that none of it was true. Mead did go to Samoa in 1925 and she did write *Coming of Age in Samoa*; only what she wrote about the Samoans was not the case. Young Samoan girls find the passage through puberty as frustrating and psychologically stressful as the girls of any other culture. Further, their relationship to their families is not casual, and promiscuity is neither expected nor condoned. As the Samoans became literate and as Mead's book grew in popularity and was read by even the Samoans, they were amazed! They were not as they found themselves depicted in the book and implored Mead to correct her account: which she never did. I do not wish to go into this deeply, I only want to compare Mead to Dostoevsky's description of Rakitin who, I take it, represents the "new man." That is, it is clear that Mead was intelligent, made a career, was ambitious, and disliked God. The essential question is this: was she, like Rakitin, "dishonest and decidedly unaware of it"?

Here is what Derek Freeman says on this subject in his book on Mead:

As I have documented in Chapters 9 to 18, many of the assertions appearing in Mead's depiction of Samoa are fundamentally in error, and some of them preposterously false.\(^8\)

I want to stress here that Freeman has found *factually* claims to be false and is compelled to understand this. That is, how could such flawed reporting come from someone as highly respected as Mead? Freeman, at any rate, goes on:

Some Samoans who have read *Coming of Age in Samoa* react, as Shore reports, with anger and the insistence 'that Mead lied.' This however, is an interpretation that I have no hesitation in dismissing.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa* (New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1961), 223.

\(^8\) Derek Freeman, *Margaret Mead and Samoa* (New York: Viking Penguin books, 1985), 288.

\(^9\) Ibid., 288.
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Isn't that interesting? Mead's book is made up out of whole cloth, and Freeman dismisses the allegation that she is lying. What Freeman dismisses, I am certain, is the idea that Mead was aware of her dishonesty, that she was, at any time, an overt liar. I am certain of this, because for the next several pages he gives explanations that could account for her "falsity" without her knowing she was being false. Materialists must be true believers questioning all positions except their own; their own they see as written on tablets of stone. Here is what Freeman says:

Thus as Kroeber declared, "the important thing about anthropology is not the science but an attitude of mind." 10

Here, you notice Freeman, himself an anthropologist, holds to the view that "cultural determinism" was not a science but rather an "attitude of mind". In short, by the time Mead went to Samoa she had become a product of her environment: the ideology of Franz Boas and Columbia!

Granted all of this, we must admit that Mead was a young woman who was caught up in heady stuff. Even so, how are to look at the falsity of her account? Here is what Freeman says:

We are thus confronted with an instructive example of how, as evidence is sought to substantiate a cherished doctrine, the deeply held beliefs of those involved may lead them unwittingly in error. 11

To bring this up to date, a year or two after the publication of Freeman's book, I asked Ashley Montagu, a noted anthropologist, who was also a student of Boas, whether he felt that Freeman's history might not work to divest anthropology of its credibility. His response was, "Of course not. Margaret only wrote what she observed in Samoa during the time she was there. What came before or after has no bearing on that." If we believe that, we are true believers in the sense of Hoffer's book of that title.

In the case I have examined, the pathology seems to be constant from Rakitin to Mead, including several others. That is, there is no evidence of a lie, but all sorts of evidence that these were "dishonest people and decidedly unaware of it." These representatives of a materialist pathology had embraced an ideology in place of truth: something which the love of truth can protect us from doing. When those who have placed their faith in ideology instead of truth read authors such as Wittgenstein and Dostoevsky, they sense their misplaced faith is

10 Ibid., 282.
11 Ibid., 292.
made of stuff that cannot tolerate even the most casual scrutiny. An existential lie is one which makes liars of us all, "even though we would not take the money left on the table." Solzhenitsyn put it this way:

Ideology - that is what gives evil doing its long-sought justification and gives the evildoer the necessary steadfastness and determination. That is the social theory which helps to make his acts seem good instead of bad in his own and others' eyes, so that he won't hear reproaches and curses but will receive praise and honors.\(^{12}\)

Those of us who have read Derek Freeman's book *Margaret Mead in Samoa* may very well think, despite Freeman's denial of such a claim, that Mead had to be blatantly dishonest. If she was not aware of it as a young woman, brilliant as she was when she wrote the seminal book, surely she realized her dishonesty in her later years. "Why else," we are forced to ask, "did she not accept the overt evidence that her findings were false?" I, too, have puzzled over this question, and I find no evidence to support the proposition that she ever perceived the truth and tried to obscure or hide it. It may very well be that something of the sort which Voegelin calls an intellectual swindle did take place. But if it did, its import was hidden even from Mead, leaving her, ironically, as much its victim as its perpetrator. She died a true ideologue. The tragedy was that she exited this earth neither understanding her fellow human beings, her culture, nor herself. In our age, such an existential calamity is a commonplace.

It strikes me now that even though I could have begun with this thought, and perhaps did, I certainly ought end with it. Here it is: *The unexamined life is not worth living* is a truth incomprehensible to people who live such a life.

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Ethics, Science and the Physician's Oath

A Critical Analysis

Introduction: Valuation and Evaluation

Moral values as the basis of our moral judgements are, in my view, our ethical idealizations as regards human attitudes and actions. As moral "subjects", we direct our attitudes and actions towards the "objects" of our values, namely individuals (including ourselves), the society, human species, individuals of the nonhuman nature, and the biosphere as a whole. On this subjectivist view and as opposed not only to objectivism but also to relativism and emotionalism in ethics, our moral values are linguistically exteriorizable or "objectifiable" - they are our wishes or desires on human action which can be expressed, discussed, criticized, modified, redefined. And to be worth considering, they must be defensible on "ethical grounds", however diverse these may be among a given group of discussants (Örs, Y. 1993).

Ethics include both a cognitive and a volitional component (Reichenbach, H. 1966) or descriptive and prescriptive/valuational arguments (Örs, Y. To be published); and when we examine moral judgements critically at what we might call the philosophical level, we analyse the valuations in hand rather than defend one. Such a critical and logical operation may thus be called an evaluation. And although we may not readily draw a clearcut demarcation line between the two in not a few cases of ethical inquiry, we may at least be cautious in deciding at what level we find ourselves at a given stage of such inquiry. In this presentation, I shall do both and thus discuss the issues involved from a subjective-moral as well as permissibly objective-ethical standpoint.

Science, Medical Activity and the Concept of Oath

The Society for Health and Human Values in the United States has defined medicine as "the most humane of the sciences and the most scientific of the humanities". Both parts of this motto-like expression have apparently been formulated with good intentions. As must be the case in general as regards such expressions, however, they do not seem to stand on sound methodological
grounds. First, in the foremost, "basic" sense of the term, "science" is an activity devoted to the explanation of the world of phenomena through the production of a systematic network of propositions. The latter as a whole form the body of (scientific) laws and is called scientific knowledge; it is produced in the light of conceptual structures called (scientific) theories. Every single "basic science" from physics to sociology has its own ontological domain corresponding to a certain level organization in the world: from subatomic particles and the phenomena of energy to human societies and social institutions. The existence of what we call interdisciplinary areas such as physicochemistry, molecular psychobiology or sociobiology shows us that there are no clearcut demarcation lines between different sciences and this, in turn, depends on the complex rationality between the different levels of ontological/empirical organization in nature. And given its first and foremost aim of securing health and preventing disease phenomena, and intervening with the latter with the aim of restoring the former, medicine is certainly not a basic science. In our time different sciences, indeed all the sciences directly or indirectly related to man at one or more levels of his organisation, have become the essential requirement or necessary condition of medical activity, although the former does not certainly comprise the latter's sufficient conditions such as "the art of medicine" or "medical ethics".

As for the second point in the above good-willed definition, and first of all, the term "humanities" is in principle used in a comprehensive and unjustifiably complex or mixed sense. Thus, it includes such methodologically "irreconcilable" fields as (human) psychology and sociology as basic sciences on the one hand and anthropology, philosophy, history, linguistics and literature on the other, each of which forms, in my view, a different set in its own (either with a close or distant/indirect methodological relation with basic sciences). Secondly in this context, the expected "humaneness" and the scientific quality of medicine are closely, or even inseparably interrelated but different or dissimilar aspects of medical activity.

"Oath", the third main term in this section, can best be treated, perhaps, comparatively with "code". The latter has derived from the Latin word codex, originally meaning "trunk of a tree, split block of wood, tablet of wood covered with wax on which the ancients wrote"; also "a book, a writing," and with its semantics relevant to our context here, "a set of rules for or standards of professional practices or behavior set up by an organized group and usually reinforced by certain police and punitive powers of the group against nonconfirming members" (Webster's 1981). Term "oath", of Anglo-Saxon origin, is (a) "a solemn, usually formal calling upon God or a god to witness to the truth of what
one says or to witness to the fact that one sincerely intends to do what one says:" and (b) "a usually formal affirmation made solemn by being coupled with the invocation of something viewed as sacred or of something highly revered" (Webster's 1981). Historically speaking, one might be inclined to say that oaths must in principle be older texts, while codes are more recent formulations. This would be an oversimplification, however, in the face of such texts as medical parts of the Code of Hamurabi.

Uncritical Analyses of the Traditional Oath

What I mean in this context by the term "traditional oath" is mainly the text known as the Hippocratic Oath which has apparently become a blueprint for different formulations of similar texts later on. Those writers and medical thinkers, and apparently a great majority of the medical circles together with the rest of the society in principle, evidently take the main points of this text for granted. What the noncritical defenders as a rule do is, in my terminology, a descriptive, "passive", uncritical analysis of these points with an insistence on their validity in the present world. Qualified as "exalted" by one of these writers (Göksel, F.A. 1981), the following "moral principles" are mentioned in such analyses (Örs, Y. 1992): high moral authorities being held witnesses of and representing sanctity (Göksel, F.A. 1981; Lichtenthaler, Ch. 1980); respect for human life and the acknowledgement of its sanctity (Göksel, F.A. 1981; Lichtenthaler, Ch. 1980); respect for chastity, dignity and individuality (Göksel, F.A. 1981; Lichtenthaler, Ch. 1980; Knight, J.A. 1981); confidentiality (Göksel, F.A. 1981; Lichtenthaler, Ch. 1980); universality (Göksel, F.A. 1981); and the affirmation of accountability (Knight, J.A. 1981) and of "sanction" (Göksel, F.A. 1981).

Taken as such or in the abstract, such high-sounding principles may in general deserve our respect and approval. Considered in the context of their overall formulation, emphases, and style, however, their traditional consideration evidently lacks the critical attitude of our time which we should expectedly find in the social, political, philosophical and other treatment of allegedly important texts in any area of human life.

The Physician's Oath in a Historical Perspective

Contrary to what is generally believed to be the case, I think, the text known as the Hippocratic Oath is not the oldest one of its kind in history; nor is it the best, I believe, from a moral point of view. The Oath of Imhotep, statesman, ar-
chitect, astrologer, and physician at the time of the third dynasty in Ancient Egypt (about 2,500 years before Hippocrates), contains certain basic points not found in the traditionally Hippocratic texts (Örs, Y. 1992). That the candidate "shall give his care gratuitously to the needy, and never demand a payment beyond the limits of his service" (Riad, N. 1955) is the most conspicuous one among these points. We may give other examples from other physician's oaths as regards significant or meaningful points not found in the traditional oaths and the original Hippocratic text (Örs, Y. 1992): diligence in the pursuit of knowledge as mentioned in an Islamic pledge (Ashoor, A.A. 1984) for instance, or respect for the lives of other living beings as we find in the oath of the ancient Hindu physician (Gordon, B.L. 1945).

We could justifiably find points of agreement between the Hippocratic approach to medical practice on the one hand and the text of "his" oath on the other. The observational aspect of what is called the Hippocratic teaching, for instance, which is based on a rational approach to the patient's problems, is ethically linked to him/her as the recognition of the concrete human being. And given the means at the disposal of Hippocrates, and his followers in centuries later, a cautious attitude to the patient would be more closely related to an individual-oriented moral guidance, reconcilable with the principle, "respect for (the individual's) life" (Örs, Y. 1994a) As for the points of disagreement, and using the latter word in the sense of "non- inferrable" rather than "necessarily opposing", the origin of the Hippocratic text must be sought for, to a large extent, elsewhere than the name to which it has traditionally been attached. It may be interesting to learn in this context that the Hippocratic Oath, although it is possibly one of the "genuine" works of Hippocrates (Adams, F. 1946) is in reality not the expression of an absolute standard of medical conduct but a Pythagorean manifesto; this is exemplified, historically speaking, in such expressions as giving no deadly medicine to any one if asked, not giving to a woman a pessary to produce abortion, and "with purity and with holiness I will pass my life and practice my Art" (Vanderpool, H.Y. 1981-1982).

The so-called Geneva Declaration: Guidelines or "Categorical Imperatives"?

The World Medical Association (located in France) is a corporation preparing texts on morally important issues in different areas of medical activity and on the socially oriented health problems. Generally speaking, these are known either as statements, or declarations which are named after the city where the
World Medical Assembly, apparently the general assembly of the Association, has convened and prepared a particular text on a specific moral issue: statements on Fetal Tissue Transplantation, and Animal Use in Biomedical Research, the Helsinki Declaration concerning "Recommendations guiding physicians in biomedical research involving human subjects", or the International Code of Medical Ethics as regards the Duties of Physicians in General. The text most relevant to our present context, the Declaration of Geneva, is a combination of ten items or rules concerning the physician's expected basic attitude towards his patient (Örs, Y. 1992). Already adopted in 1948 by the second general assembly of the Association, it was amended twice in later World Medical Assemblies. As far as I know, versions of this text are "in force" in different parts of the world as the profession's "solemn oath or pledge" (Örs, Y. 1992).

A comparative study of this text with the Hippocratic Oath will show, I think, that the former can justifiably be seen, at bottom, as a modern version of the latter (Örs, Y. 1992). Other things being equal or similarities apart, however, the modern text does have certain characteristics or peculiarities of its own. As must be clear from the title of this chapter, I find these "characteristics" basically negative as they are reflected in the general understanding, approach, style, wording and similar aspects of the text. Stated quite briefly, I think that the points put forward in it appear to me to be direct injunctions, orders, commands, whereby medical doctors are apparently taken to be subjects of an authority or authoritarian organization, which will accept no challenge or disobedience to its status. This attitude is at its highest in the opening clause. The medical graduate of today or the physician of tomorrow is forced -we cannot say "expected" with any justification- to undertake a promise as a result of which his/her whole life is going to be a "sacrifice" in the performance of his/her career. Although the latter term is not used in the text, it is semantically there, because one is expected "to consecrate one's life to the service of humanity." Combined with the mention of the phrase "the noble traditions of the medical profession" later on in the text, reminding us of the deified "golden age" or the "glorious past," the medical person becomes, in my view, "a noble servant."

Functionally speaking, every oath is expected to be binding at the ethical or moral level, appealing in the last analysis to the individual's conscience. I think that an oath forcing rather than inviting the individuals of a professional group is, ethically indefensible and socially unjustifiable. In my understanding of the present situation in general, and in the last analysis, it would be, and indeed it is, no more than a formality reinforced by the official graduation ceremonies in
medical faculties. What we might perhaps call the strict "legal" approach and style inherent in the Declaration of Geneva could perhaps be understandable and "forgiveable" if it were a code rather than a text with an expected function of pledge or promise.

The Original Text and its "Modern" Derivatives Considered Critically

As in the case of every pledge and promise, what is linguistically expressed in an oath is a one-sided and one-directional utterance stemming from one person or group of persons and directed to another one or a group. Whether we find it justifiable or not, it is in the very nature of a promise in general. To call this a "social contract" or an "agreement" (Göksel, F.A. 1981) is a blatant definitional-semantic mistake. The doer is actively involved in the act of promise and responsible to an apparently passive receiver. To turn the original oath text into a sort of convention by adopting it to the present-day physician-patient relation and then call it "The Hippocratic Contract" (Rosalki J. 1993) is, by comparison, a less undefensible stance. If those who interpret the oath as a contract have in their minds a guarantee offered to medical graduates by the group of receivers, potentially the whole mankind, they must realize that in its restricted context the related text would have other aspects to be considered such as physician's rights!

Whether an oath is indeed necessary for medical graduates in the contemporary world (Örs, Y. 1992) appears to be a debatable point. What is actually needed, from both an educational and a professional point of view, is the recognition of the significance of a "good" teaching in medical ethics (Kuçuradi, I. 1993), however this qualification may differ among thinkers, teachers, and the medical community at large. At all events, the point most pertinent in this context seems to be twofold.

On the one hand, and both symbolically and so far as its content is concerned, we cannot certainly expect the oath to be a text in which all the main ethical issues in modern medicine can be mentioned (Akinoluk-Pelin, S. 1994). But we should definitely see the great insufficiencies in the traditionally formulated oaths. Given the radical scientific, technical, sociopolitical, legal and perhaps other developments which have evidently affected all the human societies, what medicoethical relevance could any passage in the related texts possibly have? In the case of clinical research, where the informed, free, express and specific consent of the experimental subject is now considered indispensable? So far as the increasing role and participation of the patient is concerned? In the case of pre-
ventive measures at the medicosocial level such as genetic screening, smallpox vaccination, or the fluoridation of the drinking water? Or whenever the rights of the individuals of other species are taken into account in animal experiments? (Ors, Y. 1994.b)

Secondly, the content of the traditional oath with its principles (or rules) of conduct has been devoted to the patient-physician relationship, with the total exclusion of those aspects of medical activity other than therapeutic medicine (Ors, Y. 1992). In the case of the original text, this state of affairs seems to be "pardonnable", to a lesser extent though, I think, in the light of our historical perspective considered above. When we consider the contemporary texts as its "modern" derivatives, however, how could we justifiably appreciate the total omission of basic sciences and scientific research in general in medical activity, the preventive and social aspects of medicine, and the essential problems of medical education? I mention these methodological points here at the expense of a seeming repetition - these certainly imply those or similar moral or ethical issues of modern medicine enumerated in the preceding paragraph.

Generally speaking, a critical evaluation of the achievements and developments in any field, whether from a philosophical or other point of view, would always be totally opposed to the uncritical acceptance of an original work of a great "historical" figure. The case of the Hippocratic Oath appears to be a prime example in this regard, possibly because of the atavistic traditionality inherent in the medical profession.

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Metaphor as a Means to Enhance the Understanding of Risk

Issue and Problem

Some misunderstanding and confusion is often inevitable, at least temporarily, in exchanges of views about such intangibles as risk. The problem to be dealt with in this paper is the fact that too often different parties discussing risk and associated phenomena never really understand each other. Even worse, they may not realize that they do not possess the understanding they believe they share.

A Pragmatic Approach

The title of one of the modern philosophical treatises on metaphors, "Metaphors We Live By"\(^1\) indicates what aspect of this phenomenon is of most interest for the purpose of the present paper, namely that metaphors are something both essential and existential. Hence, in considering their usefulness for improving our understanding of risk, attention should in the first place be given to the ways people apply metaphors in their everyday language when dealing with risk.

As has been pointed out in a recent paper on contextual aspects of knowledge\(^2\), it is then necessary to realize that the important characteristic of language with respect to metaphors is its descriptive rather than its explicative function. On this basis a metaphor may perform its function by establishing a relationship between phenomena which otherwise seem to be incompatible when regarded from their separate, mutually exclusive, points of view. A metaphor is based on elements of the structural or topological pattern of the respective phenomena, enabling them to be recognized in the metaphor\(^2\).

Another way of expressing this function of a metaphor is to refer to a transition from literal incongruence to metaphorical congruence between two seman-

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\(^1\) Lakoff G., Johnson M. 1980 Metaphors We Live By, University of Chicago Press

\(^2\) Gärdenfors P. "Mental representation, conceptual spaces and metaphors", To appear in Philosophy of Science
tics fields. The "transfer of meaning" by metaphor, according originally to Aristotle, can be compared to a move or shift in the "logical distance".

At least in the early stages of its formation a metaphor consists of two parts: the proper, literal term or "the real thing", and the metaphoric term or "the image". Together they may form an entity. The imaginary parts of some verbal metaphors certainly lose their mental connection with their origin and become practically petrified. Pictorial metaphors usually preserve the image portion forever, as most people find it hard to suppress completely the figurative impression and interpretation. For a metaphor to act as a link or go-between in the sense indicated it is nevertheless assumed to be necessary for it to be able to exhibit a duplex nature.

A Psychological Dimension

Clearly, a philosophical approach to metaphors like the one outlined above cannot turn its back on the psychology of this phenomenon when treated as a process. A mental model of a metaphor will be unable to explain its contextual role if the human element is left out.

Conversely, the actual use of metaphors can be explained with reference to people's needs and wishes. It can be argued that we use metaphors not only because this helps us to convey our messages but also because it relieves us of problems associated with more direct references to sensitive issues. Sometimes metaphors are used to cope with complexities or simply for convenience in order not to become involved in assessment of values. Insight into this psychological aspect of metaphors should in principle lead to suggestions about how to improve the understanding of non-technical aspects of risk.

There is one group of metaphors which seems to be particularly popular among representatives of technology and industry, namely those referring to military phenomena. In the nuclear field, for instance, safety against dispersal of radioactivity is assured in terms of "defence in depth". Similarly, the difference between precision and exactness is explained with reference to bullets hitting a target at a shooting range, forming a so-called "group". Both these cases are examples of metaphors that may fail to be understood by women.

Related to metaphors referring to positive and prestigious values are those that signify power, strength, and other virtues. The very word "power" is a metaphor in this sense, for instance in connections like "powerful" computers.

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"Robust" is another similar attribute indicating a positive value applied to, for instance, control systems in order to make them appear in a favourable light.

Metaphors which are used in order to avoid becoming involved in delicate distinctions between different phenomena can be found in children's language. During an early period of developing their linguistic abilities children may call all four-legged animals dogs. This should not be taken as a sign of retarded development but rather a skilful use of metaphors in order to be able to deal with complexities.

Even adults use metaphors for similar purposes. Comparing a computer with a tool is one example. It is true that from a certain point of view, and with a limited perspective in mind, a computer is in fact a tool. Problems arise, however, when a computer is considered a tool from several points of view which do not take into account its implications when it comes, for instance, to representing knowledge.

There is a danger that visual metaphors modelled on insufficiently elaborated concepts may change into symbols which lack insignia that are clear enough to make the symbolism understood. For Christians the symbols for the Evangelists often bear no understandable relationship to the respective personalities. This does not matter, because the symbols function as signs only. In the everyday language of symbols created in our age, however, these symbols may be deceptive. For instance, the symbols for political parties in some countries intended for illiterate voters do not tell people with different empirical background very much about the opinions or programmes of the parties. Likewise the animal characters symbolizing each year in the Chinese calendar do not always correspond to what we think with our background of the allegorical traditions in the Western civilization.

An example of a mixed audial and tacitly visual metaphor is the following one. In the opera "The Marriage of Figaro" one of the women wants to express the opinion that having a love affair is not a prerogative of the man in the marriage. She does so by hinting at the metaphor of putting horns on her husband but hesitates to use such words. Instead the horns in the orchestra fill in with some tunes which otherwise would be quite out of the musical context.

In this category of essentially non-verbal, non-visual metaphors one should also include metaphors which, lacking a better term, could be called behavioural. An example of metaphorical behaviour in the field of knowledge representation is the performance of oracles and of jesters. The metaphorical implication

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4 Sonnek G. *Personal communication*, Österreichisches Forschungszentrum Seibersdorf

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of these arbitrarily chosen examples can be said to be contained in the fashionable saying in these contexts that "the medium is the message".

Manners and "how to behave" can also have metaphoric implication beyond their verbal, visual or symbolic expressions. "Keeping a poker face" is not just showing indifference but is a metaphor for being composed.

Finally, sensual metaphors can be found in clothes and the ways we dress. The metaphors of dressing may refer to both the individual and the prevailing ideas about life. Clothes express messages which go beyond symbols and signals about relationships between the wearer and the world. Texture and pattern in combination with style can enhance the personality and underline the roles we want to play. Our way of dressing may metaphorically express our attitudes, for instance "dressing up" and "dressing down".

Most of the metaphors of clothing appear to be visual, but to some extent they are tactile. Even if we do not always feel the tactile qualities of a fabric or a fur with our hands we may perceive them quite clearly from previous experience. Taking such metaphoric values into account, most people may appear to be living metaphors, whether dressed or naked. Often this is unconscious, but sometimes we realize and acknowledge the metaphorical value of our appearance, namely at masquerades and carnivals permitting otherwise hidden messages or expressions of our personalities to be exhibited.

**Metaphor as Conjunction**

To safeguard against release and dispersal of radioactivity from components in nuclear reactors in Sweden, there is a system of physical barriers within the reactor stations. In case one such barrier is breached or breaks down, the next barrier is supposed to serve as protection against further dispersal of radioactivity. This system of barriers is said to form a so-called "defence-in-depth", employing a military metaphor.

In fact, this protection is not a case of "defence-in-depth". It relies on just one barrier, the pressure vessel. Once the vessel fails, one has to consider the battle lost, to enlist another military metaphor. It is worth noticing that this case of accident, or rather catastrophe, is not unimportant from the point of view of risk and safety assessment. On the contrary, while the probability calculated for pressure vessel failure is low, its consequences may be enormous and disastrous, making this risk the worst of all conceivable cases of failure of nuclear reactors of the type in question.

Incidentally, there is another military metaphor which sometimes serves to
support claims of the protective power of pressure vessel steel, namely armour plate. It is true that the types of steel in pressure vessels and armour for warships both belong to the same category with respect to chemical composition and properties in general; because of their heavy sections they are manufactured in the same kinds of special mills. Forces, however, due to internal pressure and impact of shells, respectively, cannot be compared on the same fracture mechanical basis. Hence, the metaphorical characterization of pressure vessels with reference to armour plate is not justified on technical grounds.

Furthermore, there is another discrepancy between the military concept of "defence-in-depth" and its metaphorical application to the protection against dispersal of radioactivity from nuclear reactors which warrants some consideration. When people think of radioactivity dispersal, they are likely to draw inferences based on metaphorical relationships to more common phenomena of a similar kind. The case of understanding electricity has been studied in order to explain why people arrive at different inferences depending upon the underlying analogies to electricity in terms of either flow of water or movement of a crowd of people. It could be demonstrated that the solving of problems about different arrangements of resistors depended on the metaphorical application of these two analogies.

The same remark about the danger of not observing the full implications of expressions for the intentions of efforts to protect against radioactivity can be made about the use of myths in certain instances. For the transport of spent nuclear fuel from Swedish reactors, a specially designed ship is used. This ship has been given the name "Sigyn", which refers to an old myth or saga in the Icelandic tradition. Sigyn was the wife of an evil man called Loki, who was punished for his deeds by being fastened to a cliff, and above him was placed a poisonous snake who could drop his venom upon Loki. Sigyn wanted to protect her husband from the venom, and therefore she held a bowl under the snake, in order to prevent the venom from dropping on Loki.

So far, the saga seems to provide an adequate relationship to the purpose of the ship. A closer look at the rest of the saga, however, shows that the story tells about circumstances which do not recommend a scheme like Sigyn's bowl for assuring nuclear safety. The following citation from a standard translation of the saga indicates that Loki is not the very best analogy for those who are to be protected from radioactivity; nor are the consequences of an inevitable inter-

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5 Johnson M. 1987 *The Body in the Mind*, University of Chicago Press

6 *The Poetic Edda* 1962, Translated by L.M. Hollander, University of Texas Press, Austin
ruption of the protection procedure, by analogy with Sigyn's method, especially comforting:

'The gods bound Loki with the guts of his son Nari; but his son Narfi became a wolf. Skuthi took a venomous serpent and hung it above Loki's face so that its poison dropped on him. Loki's wife Sigyn, sat by him and held a bowl under the poison, and she carried it out whenever it was full; but meanwhile the poison dropped on Loki. Then he writhed so fearfully that all the earth shook: men call this "earthquakes" nowadays.'

A Recommendation

The wide variety of metaphors in the present review illustrates the point made earlier about the existential character of this phenomenon. The success of cultivating metaphors in order to enhance understanding therefore depends on the ability to address people with varying intelligence and different experiential backgrounds. This is true not least when dealing with scientists who are inclined to see only the descriptive function of language. Being unaware of the metaphorical nature of both thought and language they do not realize that part of a concept may be hidden because the focus of the metaphor is limited to certain aspects of the concept in question.

To philosophers analysing problems of knowledge from the point of view of linguistic representation this dilemma is, of course, not new. In philosophical terms this is a question of interpersonal communication and mutual understanding. As expressed in the treatise referred to above (1), mutual understanding between people who do not share the same culture, knowledge, values and assumptions is possible only through the negotiation of meaning. What is then needed is, among other things, a talent for finding the right metaphor to communicate the relevant parts of unshared experiences or to highlight the shared experiences while de-emphasizing the others. The crucial skill is metaphorical imagination.

In view of the fact that the lack of understanding has developed into a stalemate it appears that there is a need for help from the outside by specialists on communication through metaphors. Fortunately, there are people who are particularly well suited for this task: authors and poets as well as literary scholars.

In order to avoid misinterpretation of this suggestion it should be added that these specialists on metaphors should neither create nor introduce new metaphors, nor should they play a decorative role of supplying quotations from Alice in Wonderland or Shakespeare. Their efforts should be directed towards elici-
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ting the implication of metaphors in use, with the aim of making the users of metaphors aware of the issue as a whole. In the same sense as metaphors should be considered rather as a process than purely as a concept, awareness of them is not like a pill that can be taken once and for ever. Cultivating metaphors requires constant, dedicated and laborious but creative effort.

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