Section 3

HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

GESCHICHTE UND DIE
SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN
Marilena Andronico

The Philosopher as Anthropologist

1. Wittgenstein's interest in anthropology was not confined to Frazer's work. He once told Rush Rhees that "the most important thing he gained from talking to Sraffa was an 'anthropological' way of looking at philosophical problems" (Monk 1990, p.261). As in the preface to the *Investigations* he said he was be indebted to Sraffa's criticism "for the most consequential ideas" of the book (PI p.viii), one might conclude that Wittgenstein thought that the most consequential among his new ideas were the product of his new 'anthropological' perspective on the philosophical questions. A special relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy and anthropology has indeed been acknowledged both within Wittgenstein scholarship and by some anthropologists: Bouveresse pointed out that "in a sense, Wittgenstein's work was anthropological through and through" (1975, p.59), and Geertz recognized that "[anthropologists] have, wonder of wonders, been speaking Wittgenstein all along" (1983, p.4). In this paper, I should like to discuss the reasons of Wittgenstein's interest in anthropology, and the analogy he set up between anthropology and philosophy.

2. In addition to (and not far in the text from) the notes on Frazer, the *Big Typescript* contains other references to anthropological work. One of them, belonging to the section *Philosophy*, is especially significant: "Savages have games (that's what we call them, anyway) for which they have no written rules, no inventory of rules. Let's now imagine the activity of an explorer, who travels through the countries of these peoples and takes an inventory of their rules. This is completely analogous to what the philosopher does" (TS213, p.426). From 1932 on, Wittgenstein regarded anthropological research as a model the philosopher ought to imitate. In the same section of the *Big Typescript*, he represents a philosophical question by the metaphor of a society whose rules are not written down and whose members keep getting entangled in confusions and errors of all sorts, while comparing his own philosophical work to the action of one coming along from outside to "create a clear order" among the several activities and the roles such people play (TS213, p.415). However, the analogy is most thoroughly carried out in the *Brown Book*. There, Wittgenstein's own remarks are introduced by way of anthropological fiction, as if the philosopher's reflections on the meaning of the words we ordinarily employ resulted from an anthropologist's observation of people speaking a different language.
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Why does Wittgenstein see the anthropologist as a model for philosophical work? We can find two clear answers to this question. On the one hand, the Brown Book tells us that what we are investigating are several kinds of rules and tables which are employed both in the training and in the practice of different language games; Wittgenstein imagines the situation in which someone visits a tribe and observes their use of signs. For the researcher coming along from outside, the rules and tables are neither instruments of the training nor of the practice of the game, but have the function of natural laws "describing the behaviour" of the people of this tribe. In Wittgenstein's words, "We might say that the table is a record belonging to the natural history of the tribe" (BBB p. 98). The same idea had been expressed in the Big Typescript: "Indeed, the rules of chess could be taken as propositions from the natural history of man. (As the games of animals are described in books on natural history)" (TS213, p.408). Thus, the anthropologist's case provides the philosopher with an example of a descriptive attitude towards rules.

On the other hand, we read in Culture and Value: "If we look at things from an ethnological point of view, does that mean we are saying that philosophy is ethnology? No, it only means that we are taking up a position right outside (weit draussen) so as to be able to see things more objectively" (CV p.37, 1940). Thanks to the external position he occupies, the anthropologist's point of view on the rules of the tribe's language is different from the natives': his is the best standpoint from which to describe what happens when people are employing signs, he can see their use of words, hence the meanings of words. To that extent the philosopher should imitate the anthropologist: he should displace his point of view "right outside", in order to see things more objectively.

3. However, such a picture of anthropological research looks superficial and naive on the face of it. Moreover, it appears to involve a serious error when it is applied to philosophical work: isn't requiring the philosopher to position herself "right outside" just like asking her to jump out of her own skin? The themes of extraneity and the outer viewpoint are, indeed, easily misunderstood. One might think that according to Wittgenstein the anthropologist (and, consequently, the philosopher) could occupy a neutral, super partes standpoint, from which they could record and objectively describe the facts, as if they had access to a view from nowhere. This was not Wittgenstein's idea, as is made clear by the Remarks on The Golden Bough. There, he criticizes the view according to which anthropological understanding of differences could take place, so to speak, in a void; indeed, he makes it clear that "if Frazer's explanations did not in the final analysis appeal to a tendency in ourselves, they would not be really
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explanations" (BFGB, p.238). The anthropologist who finds something deep and sinister in certain practices different from her own is led to reflect on that which gives her grounds for assuming that in these practices something deep and sinister is really expressed (cf. BFGB, p.249); she cannot but reflect on the relation between such practices and the assumptions she is taking for granted, making up her own point of view. The anthropologist is represented by Wittgenstein as forever located in a given perspective: far from keeping him from understanding differences, this is the logical ground for the essentially comparative activity which is his job. The difference between foreign customs and the anthropologist's own is only made visible once the anthropologist recognizes that something in the foreign customs is connected, or could be connected with customs that are his own, locally. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, the anthropologist should look for, or even make up cases similar to a given case (cf. Moore 1959, pp.315-316), with the aim of constructing sequences of examples in which what had once seemed utterly meaningless or preposterous may now appear "natural" or "plausible". That the anthropologist's viewpoint is "external" does not involve that he must give up the system of rules on which his investigations are based; on the contrary, it makes it possible for him to bring it out by contrasting it with the system (the tribe's) he is investigating.

4. In the philosopher's case as well, the demand to locate one's viewpoint "right outside" simply coincides with the indication to look for the proper point of view from which his essentially comparative research is to be carried out: this being the only kind of research allowing the philosopher to bring to light the rules which determine the use of ordinary words without having to give up the point of view of ordinary language. Indeed, the philosopher is not comparing customs but uses of words, both real and (logically) possible - the only method by which we can make the rules stand out which we do in fact follow whenever we employ the words we do in fact employ. Thus Wittgenstein is not demanding that the philosopher gets rid of her own concepts, but that she becomes aware of them. Should we then conclude that there is no difference between the philosopher and the anthropologist? Of course there is a difference. That the philosopher's viewpoint is placed right outside does not entail that "philosophy is ethnology", says Wittgenstein. For the philosopher (but not the anthropologist) is a native of the system of rules he is investigating. Therefore, his work can be characterized as non-empirical and reflexive: it is not part of his job to submit his remarks to the natives' judgment, rather, it is up to him to recognize the several language uses that are brought to light by his analysis. Philosophical problems, says Wittgenstein, "are of course not empiricals prob-
lems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and
that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge
to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new informa-
tion, but by arranging what we have already known."(PI 109) The philosopher,
like any other native of a linguistic community, has acquired his own language
by way of a training allowing him to master a range of techniques that make it
( logically) possible for him to carry out a number of activities, such as counting,
reading, hoping, thinking etc. If, however, he is required to talk about the mean-
ing of 'count', 'read', and so forth, he is no less prone than everybody else to get
entangled in his own language, and equally unable to find his way among the
great variety of rules and circumstances for their application which, however,
he had once acquired in all their subtlety. It is the task of philosophical analysis
to retrieve -i.e. to find and recognize- the proper description of what is going on
when certain words are used. The philosopher-anthropologist Wittgenstein en-
visaged can play both the role of a researcher analyzing a given language use
from a distance, and the role of the native certifying the relevance of such an
analysis.

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Four Types of Causal Explanation

No, this article is not about the traditional quartet of types of causes in philosophy, first, as constant or necessary conjunctions among appearances, second, as Divine intervention or Divine Providence, third, as Aristotle's four kinds of causes, and fourth, as laws, principles, or universals. Nor is it about differences between proximate and basic causes or causes as links in a chain. Nor is it about causal explanation in terms of theories such as hypothesis, deduction, and verification or falsification. Nor does it discuss "covering law theory". But then, what is it about?

This article focuses on four kinds of causal explanation which seem to be most conspicuous in historical and cultural science but which are actually used by scholars and researchers in all fields and which appear to be rather common in everyday life as well. In a sense, we all use and know them, but we rarely think about them. and as philosophers we tend to overlook them so much that an article such as this in its brief and modest way could well be needed to remind us while refreshing our understanding.

The first kind of causal explanation is what I tend to call "differential explanation". It is so simple and obvious that it escapes wide recognition for that very reason, that is, we take it for granted. When something happens which is different from what we expect to happen, it is natural to look for the most important differential factor or variable, and if we think we find it, it is common to call that the cause, primary cause, or major causal factor for the unexpected or undesired result.

If a car unexpectedly coughs, shakes, and stops, a passenger may well wonder "Did we run out of gas?". If we check the gas tank and it is empty, then it is natural to think that the primary cause for the car unexpectedly stopping was lack of gasoline. But while this kind of physical explanation is a type of differential explanation, most people would probably go further and give what might be called a historical, cultural, or even humanist type of differential explanation, to wit: "Someone forgot to buy gasoline!" That is, the physical explanation is subordinated to an explanation based on human behavior or intent, or the lack

of proper behavior or intent.

The next three types of causal explanation while presupposing what we have called differential explanation all emphasize the human role, and all are very prominent in much historical and cultural explanation. If the word "explanation" simply means clarification, then description can also be a form of explanation. A sound answer to a what or how question may be just as "explanatory" as the answer to a why question. But by causal explanation, let us mean more than mere clarification or answer to a what or how question. Let us mean an answer to a why question which will satisfy most reasonable people. Why did the car stop? Physical answer: "Because it lacked fuel." Humanist answer: "Because someone forgot to buy gasoline."

Admittedly, we have limited our understanding of causal explanation here to situations where either the expected did not happen or the unexpected did, but on reflection, I think that almost all readers will admit that this can include the majority of problems, since apart from physical science we rarely ask why something expected to happen did happen. We simply take it for granted. Furthermore, if the answer to a why question is often identical with or very similar to the answer to a how question, as often happens in physical science, there is some suspicion that the answer is not entirely satisfactory as an explanation or causal explanation. This is largely because, an answer which ignores the possibility of human intervention so often ignores the major causal variable as most people, especially in the historical and cultural sciences, understand it.

The second major type of causal explanation for an unexpected result is often called "challenge-response explanation" (which should not be confused with "stimulus-response explanation" which is still employed in aspects of behavioral psychology). Bias has developed against challenge-response explanation in part because the often speculative historian Arnold Toynbee employed it, but in the real world it is ubiquitous and dwarfs the theories of any particular exponent of it. We all employ it, even people who reject free will and self-determinism!

To give an example, let us ask a question which interests virtually all historians and cultural scientists: Why did Rome fall (meaning the Western Roman Empire)? Some scholars insist that the challenge was too strong and no response could have overcome it, that is, as if the challenge were the primary cause. Other scholars, who look at the mediocre emperors in the East and West at the time and their practice of killing their best generals (i.e. Stilicho and Aëtius) think that a proper response, i.e. one which was truly responsible, could have
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defeated the challenge and saved the Empire. A basic causal assumption by the latter group of scholars is that human beings can control social, economic, and physical variables much better if they would use their best understanding in a responsible way.

The third type of causal explanation emphasized in this paper seems to be presupposed by the second type. That is, challenge-response explanation, whether it focuses on the challenge or the response as the major variable for an unexpected or unwanted result, seems to rest on means-end reasoning, something emphasized by John Dewey and which might best be classified as means-end logic. But just as challenge-response explanation should be carefully distinguished from stimulus-response explanation, so means-end logic like human intent itself should be carefully distinguished from appeal to so-called teleology or final causes. Human intent or volition seems to act as an efficient cause in the human mind or brain, whereas alleged purposes in nature or history act as final causes, if they indeed act at all. Means-end reasoning or logic is normally thought of as a mental process and like all processes is thought to force, pressure, or influence. As a cause it has an effect. And as an effect it was forced, pressured, or influenced to happen. Free will in this context would not mean uncaused willing but willing to follow our best understanding, as if all other willing were "slavery to the passions" or the result of ignorance or prejudice. At least in history and cultural science, means-end logic and a reasonable theory of free will are widespread, even if many people in the physical sciences and numerous philosophers are reluctant to accept this approach, which they have so often frowned upon as "mentalism" or "psychologism". But in practice even most opponents use means-end logic and explanation!

Generally speaking, human response to a challenge serves as a means to the end of meeting or overcoming the challenge, and the adequacy of the means or response is often judged both by moral considerations and by its success in triumphing over the challenge. The means or response is seen most commonly as the major causal factor in those challenge-response cases where the challenge is viewed as vulnerable. When the challenge is regarded as incapable of being resisted as if its success or triumph were inevitable or "fated to happen", then responsible behavior and means-end logic tend to be viewed in a radically differ-

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2 For more information on the problems of the Roman Empire see Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, seven volumes, AMS Press: New York, 1974.

ent way. The "wise" response of the defeated is then presumably to adjust, forgive, or somehow acquiesce. The most critical variables tend to be what one means by possibility and probability, how strongly one views human potential to become a significant causal variable, and how one views the respective merits of resistance versus acquiescence.

The fourth major type of causal explanation presupposes all the other three: differential explanation, challenge-response explanation, and means-end explanation. By exposing the frequent inadequacy of traditional physical explanation (not its falsity), it can also perform a prominent role not only in historical, cultural, and humanist science, but in helping to exemplify a certain explanatory superiority in these fields over most law-based and other types of general or idealized physical explanation, a superiority grounded on greater informativeness about a real, non-idealized situation of high current concern to some particular people.

Let us call this approach "extend-the-question explanation" while fully recognizing that it does not include all extensions, but a rather restricted type. As usual, let us start with an example. If a physics professor holds two iron balls, one in each hand, and drops one, and he asks the question "Why did the ball fall?" he may want to hear as an answer "Because of gravity" or "Because of the law of gravitation", but some bright students in the audience particularly if they are historians, humanists, or have done work in the cultural sciences will be inclined to extend the question from "Why did the ball fall?" to "Why did one ball fall and the other not?" or even "Why did one ball fall and the other not, even though both were subject to the law of gravitation?" The natural humanist answer would be: "One ball fell because you let it go, and the other did not because you kept holding on to it for reasons which we do not yet understand." The latter answer includes the simplistic physical answer as largely part of the question or problem, and concentrates on a much more informative answer which focuses on the psychology of the physicist as if he probably intended to drop one and hold onto the other ball and that intent were the most important causal variable, even though we don't yet know why he intended to do what he did.

Since all or virtually all questions which appear to seek a physical or law-based answer are subject to this type of extension, one can easily see how historians, humanists, and those in the cultural sciences can trivialize physical explanation by adding these extensions to their questions. We can trump physical explanations by explaining whatever happens or doesn't happen by the presence or absence of human intervention. Physical laws are idealized in that they only
take a limited number or types of variables into account and never seem to take the possibility of human intervention into account. This limitation means that explanation is always possible based on what has been excluded, especially human behavior. "Why is the iron pole over there rusty?" A physical explanation might well clarify how oxides are formed, but the humanist answer tends to be more informative for most people most of the time: "Because someone left it out in the rain."

Everything which happens in the physical world can be said to happen "because" people failed to intervene to prevent it from happening. And since human beings have vastly increased their power to influence nature in the last few centuries through the introduction and control of water power, steam power, electric power, oil power, and atomic power this kind of humanist explanation seems to be becoming more and more frequent.

But in terms of the larger picture, what and how description are still much more commonly used both in science and everyday life than when attempting to understand, rare, unexpected or other results by means of why explanation. The practical value of questions and answers depends largely on the primary interests and concerns of the people who ask and answer them. To that extent they are "subjective", but this in no way reduces their value for those people. But most people are not deep problem-seekers and are not inclined to try to explain everything or even most things by what people fail to intervene to stop. Such explanation may be possible for almost everything, but it rarely answers what most people especially in the physical sciences are most concerned with. It may seem to them to be a mere artefact of science as a process and as such unrelated to the primary end-goals of science.

The four types of why explanation described above rarely find their way into textbooks because most textbooks prefer to "explain" results which turn out "correctly", clarification which largely or often reduces most why explanation to how description. Explaining why something appears to go wrong naturally seems to focus on variables more than laws and often on what people should or should not have done, but this humanist approach seems to conflict with widely held views that the primary goal of science is to discover laws and that scientific laws are causes, determine causes, or can even replace causes. This divergence in perspective is clear to many scholars in disciplines such as history which concentrate on non-idealized particulars but seems less obvious to people in those fields where generalization and idealization are emphasized more strongly and are placed in a more positive light. Nevertheless, useful ways of explaining odd, unexpected, or undesired results can sometimes be very important or even
crucial, and all scientists, scholars, and philosophers could probably benefit
from more understanding of them. 4

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4 For a more extended treatment of the issues discussed in this paper see the author's
1. Future is no longer what it was

The future is no longer what it was, said Ray Bradbury. I think that some philosophical explanation of this sentence could be useful for history and social sciences.

The future is no longer what it was because future is no longer the only and legitimate heir of that time which has unified the aspirations of men, and which we call history.

Revolutions and ideologies have provided our societies with a set of institutions with such an overarching ethical sense that individuals are relieved of their moral duties. However this set of institutions has not provided an unified meaning for life for all human groups making up our societies. We talk about this substitution of collective ethics for individual ethics by naming it postmodernism, and we relate it to multiculturalism.

Anthropologists talk about a "local knowledge", which corresponds to a "particular future", and sociologists, are worried about the functioning of institutions, about those congregations where individuals gather and they feel solidarity.

In discourses delivered during the Enlightenment we can replace the word "future" with the words "state" and "institutions". Then we realize that the meaning of these discourses does not change, rather it gets clearer. In this way we can confirm that crises of the state, of institutions or even of modern societies can be described as a reprivatization of the future. I think this reprivatization of the institutions and of the 'future' indicates that paleolithic traits are being revived.

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2. The new paleolithic

The transition from paleolithic to neolithic takes place when several factors come together, of which handbooks usually mentions this three: 1) urban settlements, 2) systems of food production and 3) writing.

Ernest Gellner, using Karl Jaspers’ terminology, calls the paleolithic the pre-axial age, and the neolithic the axial age, and he assumes that in the former age there was a marked resemblance to the world we currently know as postmodernism.

I believe the followers analogies can be pointed out:

1) Currently, cities have not disappeared but they are fading, and in some places difference between a rural and urban milieu has been completely erased. An architect such as Le Corbusier still hoped in the period between wars to build 'the city of the future'. However in 1970 another architect, Aldo Rossi, claimed that the task of urbanism was to build 'pieces of cities'.

2) Regarding economy, the greek polis, the Roman empire and later modern nations share an infrastructure by which population became bound to the territory. Such a infrastructure has been maintained until the current welfare state, which in some aspects presents some traits similar to those of the slavery economy (e.g., it manages more than 50% of GDP, it provides housing, food and clothes, in addition to education, health care, infrastructure for transport, pensions, etc.).

Nevertheless, the contemporary welfare state seems unable to endure its own weight, and the principle of change at work in industrial revolution is leading again to the key factor for transition to the postmodern state: reprivatization.

3) There remains the 3rd analogy. The invention of writing enabled societies to store large amounts of information. From that, we can suppose that current incommunication, individualism and rootlessness mean something like reinventing writing.

We can suppose users of writing belong to a tribe like any other. We can suppose they have trouble with internal communications. We can suppose people reading and writing books are a small and irrelevant group from the point of view of economic and political power: because from such a point of view there are now more important non-alphabetic media.

All that not necessarily amount the reinvention of writing but demonstrates its increasing marginality. Moreover, we can declare that today there are so
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many media, so different and so available, which no longer determine the way of life of any tribe, and that each individual shapes his own world.

We can suppose it is almost impossible to say something everybody will understand in the same sense, that is in the correct one. We can suppose that the tower of Babel is falling down again, and we are turning back to the paleololithic lack of a public realm.

3. Cartographic categories

If these analogies are well drawn we can understand why Ray Bradbury asserts that the future is no longer what it was and why Clifford Geertz makes use of so many geographic and spacial metaphors. We can also imagine that the infrastructure of thought has changed and that in the new paleolithic age the spacial categories and schemes will prevail over the temporal ones.

That would oblige us to ask again what does thinking mean ('Was heisst denken') and how are categories determined.

Kant said that 'schemes are determinations of time made a priori according to rules which according to the order of categories refer the following aspects of time: series, content, order, and finally conjunct, all of them related to the totality of possible objects'.

It can happen that the different kinds of reality and ways of expression (genera of being and of saying) are best caught with temporal schemes containing a lot of epic and history, but not by those lacking a sense of history or epic.

Maybe when epic and history are missing, or in insufficient supply, relations among different genera would be better grasped by metaphor and analogy (according to ethic and aesthetic evaluations which serve as acts of the reflecting judgement).

All of this can be expressed also by saying that transcendental deduction of the categories appears now much more insufficient. Perhaps we cannot know whether all genera and categories have been truly and completely discovered, whether or not we lack any, and perhaps we can never reach a perspective that will allow us to know for sure.

Regarding this problem Geertz quotes this passage from the beginning of Philosophical investigations of Wittgenstein:

'Ask to yourselves if our language is complete, if it was before the symbols of chemistry and infinitesimal calculas were added to it, because those are, in-

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6  Kant, 1., 1781-1787, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 184-185, italics of Kant.
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deed, so to speak, the suburbs of our language. (And how many houses are needed before a city starts to be a city?). Our language can be conceived of as an old city: a labyrinth of little square and streets, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from different epochs, and all of them surrounded by a lot of modern districts, straight streets and standard house.\footnote{Wittgenstein, L., 1953, Philosophische untersuchungen, § 18.}

When the great avenues of the city and the highways of history are over, end in order to get other places and to know other things, the means becomes stories and maps of the forest's paths ("Holzwege").

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Max Adlers Stellung im Streit um den Status der Geisteswissenschaften

1. Einführung


Um die grundlegende Absicht Adlers zu erkennen, muß man den Leitfaden seiner Studien über den Marxismus und seiner Arbeit an der eigenen Konzeption finden. Er entwickelte sich aus dem Protest gegen die scientistisch-positivistischen und naturalistischen Interpretationsweisen der Theorie Marx's, verbrei-

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1 L. Kolakowski: *Die Hauptströmungen des Marxismus*, Bd. II, Paris 1975, S 253
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Die sich auf das Erbe der klassischen deutschen Philosophie berufende austromarxistische Konzeption der Umformierung der Marxschen Thöerie löste schon bei den Zeitgenossen viele Kontroversen aus. Der Beurteilungsgegenstand dieses Artikels ist nur die ausgewählte Thematik: die austromarxistische Modifikation der theoretisch-philosophischen Grundsätze des Marxismus, die die Verteidigung des wissenschaftlichen Charakters des Marxismus als einer Geisteswissenschaft umfasste.

2. Der Streit um den theoretischen Status der Geisteswissenschaften

In seiner Arbeit "Kausalität und Teleologie im Streite um die Wissenschaft" (1904) gegen die These von der "Krise des Marxismus" opponierend gab Adler zu, daß im Lichte der Kritik der Neukantianer die theoretischen Grundlagen des Marxismus Umformulierung und Vervollkommnung verlangen. Er bemühte sich an erster Stelle darum, jene Unzulänglichkeiten seiner Theorie zu beseiti-
Ewa Czerwinska


Die Badener Auffassung führe unmittelbar zur Placierung des Marxismus im Rahmen der humanistischen Wissenschaften, die wertbezogen konstituiert waren. Adler betonte zwar die Verdienste der Neukantianer bei der Wiederherstellung der Bedeutung der menschlichen Aktivität und beim Beziehen der menschlichen praktischen Tätigkeit auf die Welt der angenommenen Ziele und Ideale; er konnte jedoch nicht den Gebrauch akzeptieren, den die Neukantianer von der Trennung von Sein und Sollen und von der Ablehnung der kausalen

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Erklärung der gesellschaftlichen Erscheinungen machten. Er sah dabei, daß die Ideen, die Welt der Werte für die Neukantianer Postulate des Verstandes, reines Sollen blieben, und daß die objektive Wirklichkeit nur einen Hintergrund für ihre Theorie bildete.


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die Wissenschaft die Ergebnisse der Erkenntnistheorie nicht rechtskräftig machen kann, weil die epistemologischen Thesen der wissenschaftlichen Reflexion voran gehen.


5 M. Adler: Grundlegung der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, Wien 1964, S 30

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Es erhebt sich die Frage, unter welchen Aspekten die Adlersche Konzeption der Gesellschaftswissenschaft über die Badener Auffassung hinausging? Die Unterschiede liegen, wie es scheint, in einigen grundlegenden Fragen.

1. Im Einverständnis mit der Theorie der Neukantianer, daß die gesellschaftliche Methode die Wertung im gesellschaftlich-historischen Prozeß berücksichtigen soll, teilte Adler jedoch nicht die Ansicht, daß die Untersuchung der humanistischen Tatsachen eine wertende Einstellung ihnen gegenüber verlangt. Gesellschaftliches Sein als Ganzes ist nur eine der Tatsachen.

2. Trotz der Suggestionen der Badener sprach er sich für die Einheit der methodologischen Forschungshaltung in beiden Wissenschaftstypen aus.


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der humanistischen Wissenschaften. Die Naturkunde bedient sich des kausalen Gedächtnisses, die Humanistik, als Wissen über die Zwecke und Werte, ausschließlich des teleologischen. Die Auffassung von Stammler und anderen Neukantianern kritisierte Adler in den Arbeiten "Kausalität und Teleologie im Streite um die Wissenschaft" und "Marxistische Probleme". Er betonte:

a) daß der Grundmangel bei den Neukantianern aus der Nichtberücksichtigung dessen resultierte, daß neben der Existenz der Dinge als Objekte unseres Bewußtseins transzendentale vergesellschaftete Menschen auftreten;


Zusammenfassend: die Aufmerksamkeit verdient Adlers Bemühungen, über Vereinfachungen des Neukantianismus, Revisionsismus, orthodoxen Marxismus

8 M. Adler: Grundlegung ..., op. cit., S 195

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On Tacit History and the Study of Business

Explicit history

The content of history is dependent on the perspective of the historian as well as on the events of the past. Some parts and aspects of a particular past are made visible to us - with the exclusion of others. I therefore coin this kind of study of the past Explicit History. The most important characteristic of Explicit History is that, except the obvious of being articulated, it is dependent on the perspective of the historian.

Three time perspectives

Braudel has made History aware of three time perspectives: History of Events, Social and Economic History, and La Longue Durée. Each gives its own representation of our past, complementary not alternative.

"History of events" - is the most usual time perspective. Here a rather short time span constitutes the unit, the event, even if the period covered is quite extended. A battle, a peace treaty, a new government, or in older times a new king are examples of events. A chronological ordering of a suitable sample of such events results in a narrative where earlier events are conjectured to explain later ones.

"Social and Economic History", is Braudel’s second time perspective where each unit refers to 10 - 20 years. The onset of the Industrial revolution would seem to be a case in point. Another important feature of this time perspective is that new phenomena, e.g. mentalities, become visible.

"La longue durée", finally, is a time perspective where each unit refers to 50 - 200 years. What can characterise a time period of, say 50 years? One of Braudel’s own examples is a climate as opposed to the weather. Here the point that we cannot see the climate until we prolong the period of observation is (once pointed out) both obvious and enlightening.

Three different "histories" are presented in Braudel’s trilogy Civilisation and Capitalism. Braudel has been criticized for not showing the relation between the three time scales. Such critique would seem superficial. Each of the three time perspectives refers to a different phenomenon with its separate geographical area: larger with a long time perspective smaller with a short. A climate has a
larger geographical reference than a temperature measurement or an unusually cold winter. Thus we really have different objects of study and a more relevant critique would be to point at the absence of discussion of the extension and limits of each of the three perspectives.

Here I will attempt a consideration of time perspectives through three examples concerning decision making, the study of law and philosophy of science.

Decision making

Today one of the main foci in the study of Business is decision making. This interest started in the late 1930’s with Chester Barnard who wrote about his extensive experiences as an industrialist. In 1947 Herbert A. Simon’s Administrative Behaviour gave penetration to the idea of decision making as a conception of human behaviour in organisations. Until then the focus had been on the structure of business enterprises. Decision making in contrast focusses on the processes.

It is worth noting that the period around the Second World War saw a tremendous development in various methods, mathematical, statistical and otherwise, to help choose the best course of action in a number of situations connected with the war effort. This gave an impetus to the use of decision making in models of human behaviour. This is important since the model was in no way new - except to the study of business. Simon’s background incidentally was Political Science where the study of a decision taking Parliament and a separate administration has long traditions.

Decision making as a concept furthermore does not differ from utilitarian ethics.

The Study of Law

Whenever a case is tried before a court many legal professions are involved. Court trials, preparations for trials and appeals, settlements outside a court, are the main arenas for the legal profession. Law schools therefore focus on the application of law, on cases, on court procedures, etc. Legal Research accordingly emphasises the interpretation of the law, i.e. studies of individual cases including comparison of cases, etc.

The study of cases shows many similarities with decision making. As far as possible each case is tried and decided on its own merits; to this extent it is treated as the unit and as a whole.

From the point of view of time perspectives both a decision and a case repre-
sent an event - an observation - and thus belong to the perspective "History of events". One important difference has, however, to be observed. In the legal profession precedence means that later cases are directly linked to earlier ones, albeit there is always a need for judgment whether surrounding conditions are the same.

Now, observe a situation where a legislature wants to enact a law aimed at protecting the weak consumer against multinational giants. Naturally the law makers want the law to be as potent as possible so that it really protects the consumers. The main factor withholding strong legislation in favour of the consumer is that too strong a law may preclude trade altogether - which is neither beneficial to the consumer. Here the law maker thus has to strike a balance.

The point of this example is that both the period of observation and the number of situations have to be extended to enable observations of possible interactions and reactions. This is another time perspective than before.

**Decisions once more**

A similar change of time perspective is needed in order to deepen the understanding of decision making. Professional groups, e.g. accountants, engineers, lawyers, medical doctors, etc. at every time have a common understanding about what is a problem, what are the acceptable methods and what are the good solutions. We may use the expression *Carrying ideas* for this common understanding. Such ideas will change only slowly.

There are several reasons for the use of carrying ideas: a praxis is too complex to capture in a few rules, etc. Several professions, e.g. medical doctors, refer overtly to good practice. The carrying ideas give the gestalt of actions - when the action is undertaken. It is easy to think of the necessity of evoking factors which trigger the onset of an action.

To be able to observe these ideas one has to extend the period of observation long enough to include a change in the carrying ideas.

**On paradigms**

It seems pertinent to observe that Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* provides an exemplar of a study in the time perspective Social and Economic History. Together with the focus on the formation of knowledge this perspective made visible several of the most important features of scientific work. Most importantly scientific communities and their paradigms and, of course, the changes of paradigms - the revolutions - were brought to the fore.
We should take note that the time perspective forms the size of the community as well as the scope and depth of the paradigms, which in turn constitute each other.

**Economic History**

Hicks’s *A Theory of Economic History* emphasizes two fundamental legal ideas necessary for trade to be possible.

In a traditional agricultural society, Hicks argues, it is not possible to accept that an individual has a right of ownership to goods he does not need but instead intends to dispose of by selling it. It was only with the ascent of Mediterranean city states concentrating on trade that a change in this very deep going set of ideas was possible.

With the right to an agreement Mediterranean trade likewise provides the example. People entrusting a merchant with capital to be exchanged for say silk or spices far away and in a distant future need to be confident that the deal is honoured on the return of the merchant irrespectively of whether business has proved favourable or not - otherwise there will be no such trade.

Today ideas of this fundamental kind are taken for granted in the Western world. We are so embedded in them that we do not even observe them. That is, not until new experiences such as the problems in today’s Russia or China demonstrate the necessity both of a legal order and of the underlying culture for such a legal system to be possible.

This would seem to be an example of Braudel’s longest time perspective, la longue durée.

**La longue durée**

*Do more profound ideas exist than those forming a paradigm?*

In order to be able to see this it is necessary to turn to the long time perspective, la longue durée. Stephen Toulmin has apparently been doing precisely this in a series of studies: e.g. *Foresight and Understanding, The Discovery of Time* and *Cosmopolis*. The examples in *The Discovery of Time* are obvious, but *Cosmopolis* provides the best case for our present discussion. Here Toulmin argues that there have been two scientific revolutions, first a humanistic during the 16th century and then the scientific during the 17th century. While the 17th century revolution brought forth the well known endeavour for general propositions and a generalized knowledge which has dominated ever since, the humanistic revolution favoured the particular. Toulmin further contends that the ideas concerning the importance of the particular are returning now.
It is obvious that ideas such as these are both more fundamental and also refer to a wider community than paradigms. This example furthermore amply demonstrates the great difficulties to see the ideas into which we are embedded: Is there really a change going on?

When we observe the two different time perspectives, Kuhn and Toulmin become complementary, not alternative. To gain a fuller understanding we need to supplement the paradigms with more profound and fundamental ideas such as those Toulmin unravels. As a consequence the scientific community sharing a paradigm is too small a group to consider and the study must be extended to a larger community.

**Tacit History**

The obvious comment that history does not repeat itself and that history therefore cannot be directly used to predict the future has obscured the much more profound question of whether and if so how the past influences the present. If such influence is at play, it works whether it is included in an Explicit History or not. One important point in the present context is that if we accept that the past influences the present in important ways then this influence of the past has to be included in our descriptions, models, theories, etc in order to make the present understandable.

Let us use *Tacit History* as an expression for the past which influences the present - whether it is observed or not. Tacit history then is not dependent of the perspective of an historian, nor of any articulation. However, it presents two urgent problems about how to

1. make Tacit history visible
2. include Tacit history into our knowledge.

Most of the Study of Business is a-chronological, i.e. the various phenomena and relations are thought to be possible to explain and understand without recourse to the past. Tacit history is therefore an important complement to the Study of Business. Obviously Tacit history becomes Explicit History the moment it is made visible. Equally obvious is that visibility is not enough. The past and its influence has to be included into our knowledge - which is not trivial. However, even before elaborate theories have evolved some insights can be gained by observing e.g. traditions, human memories and ideas as well as artefacts which are examples of sediments which influence all our activities - business activities not the least.

The first step to make Tacit History visible in new situations is to work with
Explicit History from several perspectives. Economic History and History of Technology unwittingly (?) gives precedence to its own subject, i.e. either economic or technological factors seem to lead the development. It is as though the focus on Economics or Technology (or for that matter any particular aspect) implies the choice of a super star. The lesson to be drawn for Tacit History is that a study concerning one subject (e.g. economic development) will have to use available Explicit History of the others as well (i.e. in this example History of Technology).

An evident example of Tacit history and its importance is obtained from the development of the Swedish railways, which were drawn straight along the country without regard for earlier settlement and urbanization. As a result the time of travel from Stockholm to Malmö was considerably shortened and some towns were expanded or even founded. Still, however, the older towns which were bypassed by the railway kept their importance. No wonder that the motorways in this century followed earlier patterns of roads and urban agglomerations. Such examples of the existence and influence of artefacts are both obvious and abundant. The problem is how to include these "facts" into coherent models of business and society. Today railway commuting in Stockholm is said to need a "third track" just across Riddarholmen - one of Stockholm's oldest parts and of great importance in the history of Sweden. The epistemological point is that an inclusion of Tacit History will force a reappraisal of the core of the analysis, viz. the concept of rationality: Is this a problem of transportation or of the development of Stockholm, or of Sweden?

Stephen Toulmin's *Foresight and Understanding* provides several examples of ideas, e.g. the ideals of natural order. These ideas belong to the most fundamental and long standing beliefs and ideas of mankind that will stay with us and influence large parts of science for a long time whether they are observed or not. Ideas such as these will have a different and broader influence than Kuhn's paradigms and scientific community. Different time perspectives in Explicit History would thus seem to signify different Tacit Histories.

A comparison with ethnocentricity and the ways to overcome it by diving into other cultures might be helpful when we try to understand how one can possibly catch the Tacit History into which one is embedded. A similar approach may be to try to find relevant Tacit History from Explicit History in a number of disciplines.

Probably the best example of inclusion of Tacit History is in the development of human heredity and genetics. Here we also have the added insight that grown up humans have obtained also traits of a different kind through socializa-
tion processes. Studies of how individuals and groups of individuals are influenced by the past therefore have to be performed in more than one discipline.

Neo Classical Economics

Economics can be characterized as focussing on one aspect of human affairs, viz. resources. Received Neo Classical Economic theory starts from the conception that the most fundamental activity in this respect is choice among available opportunities. Following this it is natural to think of economics as husbanding with scarce resources (Arrow p 17).

One implicit consequence of this conception is that either the existence of resources is taken for granted or the creation of resources is conceived of as a choice. Neither position seems satisfactory. Rather, economics might have the aim to study the formation, organization and use of resources.

Then, however, several time perspectives have to be employed. The use of resources mentioned above belongs to the history of events (cf decision making). The organisation of resources, e.g. a merger between two industrial firms usually takes time and involves actions as well as reactions of various kinds from many actors, so that both a longer time perspective and a larger area are needed.

Today some observers maintain that Sweden is beset by structural imbalances originating from an oversized welfare program and an oversized public sector. This notion is claimed to be evident from the present manifestations of the Swedish economy and the inadequacy of the counter measures which have been undertaken. This may very well be true but it has to be studied in an appropriate and longer time perspective.

The situation becomes still more complex when the formation of resources, e.g. transformation of energy into usable forms is considered. Such a transformation involves developments in technology and in most cases new scientific results as well. Here it would seem obvious that we have to deal also with la longue durée.

Parts of these problems are studied in institutional economics but to make this tacit history visible and include it into Neo Classical Economics would certainly transform economics. From the point of view of philosophy of science such an endeavour would furthermore belong to la longue durée.
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Desire and Necessity in 'Lordship and Bondage'

Hegel's earlier reflections on thwarted desire in connection with love, sex, and procreation in his Frankfurt and Jena sketches led him to his concepts of desire and recognition in 'Lordship and Bondage.' Out of his youthful preoccupations, evolved a model of conflicting desires, one which essentially relates satisfaction and destruction, pleasure and freedom, in a mutually exclusive way. I argue that Hegel imported a model of conflicting desires into 'Lordship and Bondage' to explain the emergence of Self-consciousness. On his explanation, certain historical subjects had to act on certain desires that precluded them from satisfying equally compelling desires. Tensions and crises resulted, which brought them to a first reflective awareness that their culture had instilled in them desires that were irresolvably in conflict. Out of these historical conflicts, emerged a more reflective form of thought. I conclude that Hegel's explanation of the transition to Self-consciousness in 'Lordship and Bondage' anticipates and supplements his later, fuller account of the same event in the Spirit chapter, in which he similarly relies on a model of action and irreconcilable conflict to explain the transition in a moral context.

'Lordship and Bondage' moves along many shifting planes of analysis at once. Among the various planes, we get a psychological account of humans' desire for integration and the disintegration of their ability to understand their desires as unified and integrated. Desire thus appears in Hegel's analysis as that which gives rise to the human drive for wholeness and unity. But when we ask which desires, among many human desires and their characteristic expressions, are the relevant manifestations of this deeper desire for unity, we immediately encounter a problem. The demands of Hegel's project force him to use language that is deliberately ambiguous and abstract, in order to distill the concept of desire down to its absolute essentials, from the accidental details that undergo modification to fit various historical contexts in which desire gets mani-

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Thus, we can't hope to specify which desires historically manifested this deeper desire for unity by jumping right into the middle of his mature analysis.

What led Hegel to his concept of desire in 'Lordship and Bondage,' I believe, were his earlier reflections on thwarted desire in connection with love, sex, and procreation. I'll extract from an earlier Frankfurt sketch a model of mutually unsatisfiable desires that influenced his concept of desire in the Phenomenology. The importance of this model, I'll argue, is that it's at the root of his explanation of the emergence of Self-consciousness, which takes as its starting point what humans desire. Moreover, I'll argue that this explanation in 'Lordship and Bondage' anticipates and complements his later, fuller explanation of the same event in "Ethical Action," in which he similarly relies on a model of action and irreconcilable conflict to explain the transition to Self-consciousness in a moral context.

Already by the time of the "Love" essay the young Hegel had developed a preoccupation with domination and submission, freedom and enslavement, pleasure and pain, in the matter of life and desire, and had begun working through these issues in connection with actions and agents' experiences of conflict. The subject of love in the essay naturally leads on to the subject of sexual desire, and, in turn, to marriage and conception. Hegel speaks euphorically of desire as it manifests itself in love, and its physical aspect, as a process of humans striving to exceed their natural limitations and isolating individuality through a living union with a beloved. Exhibiting strong Epicurean influences, Hegel describes this feeling of love, and its physical fulfillment, as one which allows the lover to transcend his isolated, narrow perspective and achieve a broader perspective that is compatible with mental freedom.

By the time of the Phenomenology, however, desire for unity appears as a strictly hypothetical, abstract ideal, which is, in principle, unsatisfiable even in successful love. Pivotal to changing his mind, I believe, was his observation in "Love" that love is symptomatic of a deeper, underlying desire for im m o r -

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tality. He writes, "But loves strives to ... annul this possibility of separation as a mere abstract possibility, to unite even the mortal element and to make it immortal." (pp.305-6) The lovers' obsessive longing for an absolute union stems from their desire for immortality, an impossible absolute, which is a prime manifestation of the wrong-headed attitude toward death. What makes desire for total integration problematic in the matter of exclusive love, is that it fosters in the lovers a subversive attitude toward death that is opposed to correct Epicurean doctrine. And this fear of death later appears in 'Lordship and Bondage' as appended to an enslaved mentality.

Hegel's misgivings about love in this earlier essay led him to the germ of what's inherently contradictory in the master/slave relation. Tensions and crises result from the psychological attitude that comprehends the failure to achieve complete and permanent union with a loved one. For desire for unity in love leads to two choices, either complete surrender, or the cancellation of the other's independence in "complete union." (p.306) The first alternative leads to disturbing implications for free will and mental freedom. The metaphorical analogue of abject slavery in the matter of love is a failed attempt to possess the object of desire wholly, which leads to the most debasing reaction to thwarted desire: jealousy and psychological slavery to the beloved. The love that satisfied a person at one time, ceases to do so when his "raging," festering obsession with the independence and uniqueness of a lover degrades him and poisons whatever pleasure he once derived from his love. Hegel describes this violent emotion using the martial language of war, "The hostility in a loveless assault does injury to the loving heart itself." [p.306] His terminology of domination and subjugation, drawn from this martial metaphor, is used in a purely metaphorical sense to convey the notion of psychological imprisonment. For a conception of a genuinely free, independent person satisfying his desire for true union by relinquishing his freedom to another leads to contradiction.

The alternative to complete surrender is equally unsatisfying. The destruction of another's independence will appear later in 'Lordship and Bondage' as a "trial by death," involving the animal instinct to risk or preserve life literally in a fight to the death. The analogue of fighting and risking life in the psychological domain is the destruction of pleasure and happiness in struggling to cancel the other's independence through a violent collision, psychological or physical. At the most literal, physical level, this deeper desire for absolute union manifests itself as sexual desire for a complete and lasting interpenetration. For in sexual union, Hegel writes, "Consciousness of a separate self disappears, and all distinction between the lovers annulled." [p.307] Lucretius gives an example
of such an impossible union that is thwarted by the physical facts, in which two lovers strain to achieve complete fusion by holding each other as close as their bodies will allow; they literally try to crawl inside each other. In their frantic attempt to attain absolute union, the lovers’ pleasure becomes so intense that at a violent, explosive moment it turns into pain, and they tear at each others’ flesh in frustration. The conflation of sexual pleasure and violence is clearly intended to show that the latter cancels out what the former tried to achieve. Their deeper desire for complete union reveals its essentially contradictory nature by engendering an action that relates satisfaction and destruction, pleasure and freedom, in a mutually exclusive way.

This earlier model of inherently unsatisfiable desires essentially defines the basic model that Hegel transferred over to "Lordship and Bondage." He imports this notion of desire, as something inherently contradictory, into his explanation of the transition to Self-consciousness. He understands this transition as a historical development that emerged in early Greek culture, out of a context of irresolvable conflict. By locating the transition to Self-consciousness within a historical period that got superseded, Hegel avoids conveying the bizarre impression that everyone had to risk their life in battle, fear for their life, or work as a slave as a necessary condition of attaining Self-consciousness.

Hegel culls his paradigms of this development from literary texts written roughly around the time that he dates the event, in the transition from the Homeric epics up to the Aeschylean and Sophoclean tragedies. In the Homeric epics, we find desire for integration and recognition expressed in its purest, most exaggerated form in the one-on-one martial combats on the plains of Troy [PhG §§179-183]. What made the Homeric hero’s desire for affirmative signs and material tokens of his status and worth similar in form and intention to desire for absolute union in connection with love, was his desire to exceed the finite limitations of Nature and attain an immortal name. To attain immortality was a strictly hypothetical possibility, but the battle was a practical sphere in which mortals could parlay their dreaded death into a kind of self-affirming ac-

7 Forster, M. N. ibid. Forster identifies the historical referent of "Force and the Understanding" as early Greek culture, 5th Century, B. C., and "Lordship and Bondage" as the later stages of Greek and Roman culture; and the referents of "Ethical Order" and Ethical Action" as, similarly, the early Greek city states at their height, followed by their collapse in later Greco-Roman history.
tivity that would overcome the harshness of their Fate. These bloody fights for prestige and power, these "trials by death," provided a forum in which a warrior could gamble his life, and in exchange, trade up to everlasting fame. By winning a reputation for valor, he trumped the Spirits of death and unnaturally extended his life by attaining an immortality through song. For the memory of the dead hero lived on long after his death in the songs of the Muses, a collective memory transmitted through many future generations of his community.

What made the warrior's desire for recognition inherently unsatisfiable, is linked to the previous examples of thwarted desire in love and recreation. The terms "enslavement," "domination," and "fights to the death" now take on their literal meanings associated with bloody historical battles and conflicts between martial and moral adversaries. Although the pagan Lord, the aristocratic warrior, is characterized as someone who does not fear death and who is, thus, prepared to risk life; paradoxically, his willingness to risk life demonstrates that he is too fettered to his corporeal existence. His desire to accomplish deeds redounding to his everlasting glory was fueled by his fear of death, a fear of being deprived of his uniqueness, individuality, and further pleasures in life. Even the exemplary warrior, Achilles, confessed that he would rather be a slave to a man on earth than king over all of Hades [Ody. 11.488-491]. Achilles' confession exemplifies the contradiction inherent in his desire for arete, which forced him to choose between two equally undesirable options: fatal collision or abject subjection. His desire functioned as a self-assertive, life-affirming force that freed him from the terror of death, and unnaturally extended his life through the immortality of song. But acting on this desire precluded him from satisfying an equally compelling desire for survival and a long and happy home life. The horrors of the first alternative made the ignoble, second option, a long but diminished life of a slave, look attractive even to a great war hero. Conventional Greek morality supported the first desire, but the heroic code itself, which glorified staking one's life in a fight to almost certain death, was irresolvably in conflict with other equally-valid desires.

Crises and conflicts resulted from acting on a heroic code which required the hero to satisfy his desire for recognition one-sidedly, to the exclusion of other compelling desires. An element of necessity forced him to satisfy his desire in irrevocable fights to the death, rather than through a more constructive means. The kind of necessity involved was not as strong as the biological necessity we encountered in connection with love and urges to procreate, over which an agent has little control, and from which it is almost impossible to free oneself. However, the element of necessity was such that an individual would be posi-
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...tively harmed if he failed to satisfy his desire for arete, not merely benefited if he succeeded. The meaningful standard for judging Homeric man's true identity and worth required him to secure societal legitimation and recognition through his martial efforts. Those who shrank from risking their lives as proof of their martial prowess were still considered persons, but were not recognized as fully realized human beings [PhG §187]. By withdrawing from the arena where glory is won, they had to forego universal validation of their identity, status, and worth in the eyes of their community. The community was an autonomous, enduring institution invested with the power to invest the hero's deeds with the enduring reality that was denied to him in his brief, mortal life.

These irresolvable conflicts between desires were symptomatic of deeper contradictions and tensions underlying the Greeks' community and system of values. In the Greeks' own literature, we already see signs of their growing awareness of the contradictions in their community's prescriptions; for instance, in Achilles' brooding speech on the worthlessness of war [II. 9.318-312]. Hegel thinks this awareness is what ultimately led to the collapse of their uncritical acceptance of the conventional desires, norms, and values that their community instilled in them. His explanation in 'Lordship and Bondage,' involving conflicts between desires and cultural values in general, anticipates his richer explanation in the Spirit chapter of the same event. In this narrower context, he invokes specifically mortal conflicts to explain the Greeks' transition from unreflective moral intentions to critical moral reflection. I've explained elsewhere at greater length how this explanation relies on the mechanisms of practical action and irresolvable conflicts to explain what led the Greeks to abandon their unthinking acceptance of their community's values, and to adopt a more reflective form of thought.8

Hegel's broader and less-developed explanation in "Lordship and Bondage," may be seen as a fragment of this richer account in the later Spirit chapter. Similarly, he invokes crisis situations involving irreconcilable clashes between desires to explain what brought the Greeks to a first critical awareness that they possessed irresolvably conflicting desires and, ultimately, to abandon their unreflective identification with the community that created and sustained such desires. This led to a disintegration of their ability to see their desires as unified and integrated, which led them to experience their own desires as impediments to their social and psychological integration. Out of this situation of alienation and fragmentation, emerged the higher order, secondary desire to attain

8 Hahn, Susan. (1995), "Value Conflicts and Belief Revision in Hegel's Phenomenology," CLIO, 24, n.4
coherence or unity among their first order desires, a higher order desire that Hegel calls "Self-consciousness" \( \textit{PhG} \) §167.

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Synthesis and Social Reality: Philosophy and Sociology in Hegel’s Critique of Kant

Recent discussions of Hegel have focused on the nature of his idealism, and especially on its relation to Kant’s transcendental idealism. Some writers see Hegel’s idealism as a development of Kant’s idealism. Others think that what is distinctive of Hegel’s idealism has little to do with Kant. Another problem is that some have claimed that Hegel is in some sense a realist. Though again others have denied this. In this note I sketch a “sociological” interpretation of Hegel’s idealism, but my aim is not to contribute to Kant-Hegel scholarship. I cannot present or even consider the formidable exegetical details for the reading I give, and therefore ask you to take it as worth thinking about for any light it sheds on the problems just mentioned, and their relevance to current discussions treating of rule-following and understanding in the social sciences.

1. Hegel's Critique of Kant's Idealism

18th century philosophers misrepresented social reality by assimilating it to nature and then talking about it as though it were merely part of nature. In a bold but essentially misguided way Kant attempted to avoid this error by his distinction, based on Lèibniz, between phenomena and things in themselves. Kant thought that what makes nature "nature" is the fact of its being phenomena, that is, as something looked at from "outside". When human action is seen from the outside only, it is converted into phenomena. Granted this dichotomy, or parallelism, it distorts natural science because it implies that behind the phenomena of nature there is a reality which is also spirit, and this is the foundation of the mystical view of nature, which instead of treating natural phenomena as concrete things deserving of study for their own sake, treat them as a kind of "veil" concealing a spiritual reality. The other way, however, is to treat both the objects of the natural and social sciences as spectacle, as Hume did in his Study of History - if history is spectacle then it is phenomena, it is nature, because "nature" for Kant is an epistemological term which means "things seen as spectacle" - from the outside only.
Hegel refused to approach social reality purely by way of nature, that is, from the spectator's point of view. In addition to seeing Kant's system as hide-bound by a natural science methodology and an obscure "noumenalism", in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy in the chapter on Kant he also described Kant's philosophy as "subjective" (subjectiv) and "personal" (persönlich). These features of Kant's system according to Hegel cut it off from the possibility of bridging the gap between subjectivity and objectivity.

This problem was solved for Kant, according to certain writers who were influenced by Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, by Kant's introduction of "rules" and "rules for the application of rules" which were said to constitute the Empirical Schematism and the Categories of the Understanding respectively. Walsh was the first to make such a claim. He said of rules that they "by their very nature have interpersonal validity" (1966: 195) and claimed that Kant's position on rules was "identical in all respects with that of Wittgenstein" (197). This is controversial, especially in light of Schwyzer's very convincing argument that Wittgenstein's notion of "public" criteria of rule-following is exactly what Kant's theory lacks, and needs, and that Kant's notion of rule-following is basically Cartesian, locked into a first-person perspective from which there is no escaping (1990: 113-161).

Although Kant uses the subject as a "ground" of unity in the world, the underlying subjective unity is according to Hegel "finite" (endlich) or "psychological" (or, in the de-psychologized B-Edition of the first Critique, "formal" or "empty") and the subject itself is constituted only through its own individual synthesizing activities. The Kantian model is "individualistic" because the unity of things encountered in experience is "reducible" to the manifold of intuitions out of which it is synthesized. Hegel's counter doctrine is that the "unity" of the world inheres in an intelligible realm which confers structure upon it. Perception is not merely a matter of sensation. In this Hegel could agree with Kant. But Hegel differs radically in thinking that the nonsensible component of perception, which converts it from a mere sense impression, belonging to the inner world, into a perception of a thing or event, belongs to an "objec-

1 Bennett also makes this sort of claim. He says that, for Wittgenstein, "conceptual" means "rule-governed" and avers that Kant's "working use" of "concept" is "thoroughly Wittgensteinian" (1966: 54 ff). Wolff was another 1960's commentator who used Wittgenstein's conception of rule-following to explain Kantian "mental processes" (1963: 129 ff). Wolff was so impressed with his own Wittgensteinian rule-following interpretation of Kant that he declared the one-over-many problem of concept-grasp finally resolved.
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tive" realm, which he regarded as social. We as individuals "discover" this realm through socialization. This involves learning to react to and grasp "objec-
tive" relations that are "already there" as, in another context, Gellner has noted (1959: 498). At times it may even seem forced upon us. In any case, we do not unilaterally or individually "create" the world through private acts of Kantian synthesis.

By calling Kant's idealism "subjective" Hegel's point was not that Kant was a phenomenalist or a Berkeleyian. Some writers, like Bird (1987), have ques-
tioned recent phenomenalist readings of Kant (eg, by Strawson) and have sought to defend Kant from Hegel by finding the latter guilty of the same mis-
reading. But Hegel's claim that Kant's idealism is subjective is based on another ground altogether. Hegel applied this label to describe Kant's emphasis on the synthesizing subject to explain the unity and structure of consciousness. Stern is surely right to say that Hegel's fundamental objection to Kant's idealism is that it is "subjective" in this sense (1990: 107ff).

2. Hegel's Doctrine of Internal Relations

It is principally in his two Logics that Hegel develops his own theory of objective idealism or (what I would call) "social realism". He claims more than once that we are driven towards "objective" idealism and a "realist" account of universals when we seek to explain the possibility of the development of con-
sciousness from its lowest levels of awareness to "objective" knowledge. We do this, he thinks, by postulating the existence of an "intelligible realm" which al-
loows us to escape from the fragmented and confused world of immediate sen-
sory experience. It is Hegel's considered view that this intelligible world is not merely an abstract social structure but a process whereby concrete actions of individuals merge and form sequences. These sequences are "logical" sequences behind which we can find "logical" relations. On Hegel's account there is an internal relation between logical sequence and temporal sequence, and the sequence by which one event leads to another in time is in some way the same as the "necessary" sequence by which one thing leads to another in a non-tem-

2 Bradley puts it that "we escape from ideas and from universals by reference to the real, which appears in perception" (1928: 69). Hegel claims that we escape from the immediacy of perception by entering the world of concepts and ideas. Durkheim saw it both ways: "simply because he is social, man is therefore double ... for there really are two sources of life that are different and virtually antagonistic in which we participate simultaneously" (quoted in Lukes 1973: 507).
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temporal logical series. When social actions are viewed from the outside, as mere phenomena, on the other hand, there are no "necessary" connections at all, no relations, only constant conjunctions that can hardly be called "sequences" at all.

It is basic sociology that sequences of behaviour that are manifestations of internal or "social" relations become "visible" only through participant observation and may remain unnoticed or hidden when viewed purely from the spectator's observational point of view. This is not to say that everything in practice or an institution will always be transparent to everyone. Often what a participant "knows" will come down to simple know-how that may just be "habits" (as Wittgenstein noted) that enable people to carry on with confidence (as people handle the grammatical intricacies of their native language before they are exposed to grammatical theory). But behind these unreflective habits, in the case of speech behaviour, it is the storehouse of social forms that we call language (and not merely parole) that makes communication possible. These social forms are the ground of all social life and their interrelations are the foundation of all connectedness and intelligibility in the social field.

Consider the following example: it is a logical consequence of being tagged "out" in American baseball that you must leave the playing field. The "must" in "you must leave the field" uttered by the referee is not merely a moral or a social injunction internal to the game. It is a logical consequence of being tagged with the ball when the player is off-base. If this is denied, and if it is maintained that temporal sequence and logical implication have nothing to do with each other, it becomes impossible to say about any event, "given A, B must have happened". As we watch the game we can see the logic of the actions unfolding from within the stream of collective ideas that make them possible. These "ideal constructions" in terms of which we think have an outward manifestation. Still it can be difficult for the culturally ignorant (and quite impossible for the unsozialized solitary) to separate the sequences that are the outward manifestations of them from mere chance conjunctions or imagined and projected patterns of behaviour. The reason is not difficult to fathom. The difference between chance conjunctions and rule-governed (or social) sequences is that the latter have something standing "behind" them as it were, which gives sense to them by relating them in logically or conceptually necessary ways that participants recognize and know.  

The problem of how we grasp these social sequences as "unities" is related to what Smith (1989:163, 169) calls the "linkage problem" which is about the relationship between social forms and the mental acts whose contents they are.

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When Hegel said that history consists of empirical events that are the outward expression of thoughts he meant collective thoughts, and these collective thoughts behind the outward events he thought of as a chain of logically connected concepts. Critics who blame Hegel for thinking that there are "necessary" connections in history either misunderstand him or else they are thinking of history as phenomena. Historical social reality, according to Hegel, has an "inside" (not to be confounded with the merely psychological) in addition to an outside and these are bound together by logical or "conceptual" relations. This sociological insight, which Kant never really developed, and may not have seen, was "rediscovered" by Durkheim and, in a different way, by Wittgenstein (see this author's comments: 1989, 1994). In essence the latter's treatment of the "publicity" of meaning and knowledge comes to this: if language is to exist (a) there must be behavioural correlates of meaning, and (b) these must be sufficient to enable those hearing a speaker to grasp the meaning in question. These two epistemic conditions allow for the possibility of "symbolic" interaction. And it is precisely this symbolic interaction (or speech) that Durkheim regarded as the sui generis "synthesis" that makes collective ideas and thereby social reality "possible". Kant's model does not allow for this possibility.

When Hegel repudiated the Kantian bifurcation of phenomena and things in themselves he put into practice his own warning that we must not suppose ideas to exist only in the minds of concrete individuals. If collective representations were not "independent" of individual people's thinking them, there would not be any "people" at all, because there would be no social reality, no society, and thus no socially constituted selves. Nor would there be "nature" in any strict sense, because those ideas are the logical framework within which alone a world of nature and natural science is possible. The "patterns" and sequences that we see are not the result of any Kantian imposition of forms through the activity of individual synthesis. They are manifestations of intrinsic unities that are given collectively and pre-exist individual apprehension of them. If Kant had grasped his own idea firmly Hegel thinks he would have seen that phenomena and things in themselves are but two aspects of a larger whole. And he would also have seen that in order to appreciate the difference between brute and social facts we must approach this distinction from the internal, participatory side, and not merely as an external observer.

Allison claims that Kant did see this connection and that his distinction between phenomena and things in themselves merely marks two ways in which they may be considered at the "metalevel" of philosophical reflection (1983: 16).
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With hindsight we can now see that Kant's model is profoundly social. He seems to have had a theoretical model of private rule-followers somehow correlated with a world of individually synthesized brute facts. Yet he needed that brute world as a social world for his ethics. He required a "moral community" in which people would recognize in themselves and others a shared kingdom of ends. Yet there was little foundation laid for that social world in the first Critique.

What makes Hegel's critique of Kantian idealism important is that modern philosophy is dominated, I submit, by the same sort of empiricist epistemology that Hegel alleges we find in Kant. When I read the works of contemporary and recent analytical philosophers, admiring them deeply and learning from them more than I can hope to acknowledge, I find myself constantly visited by the thought that their accounts of knowledge not only debase the existence of social reality, but are actually inconsistent with there being any such thing. The core of good sense in Hegel's social realism is that self and society are synthetic unities which cannot be reduced to collections of self-subsistent phenomena out of which they are built. And it is a mistake to treat these social unities as if they were spun by private synthesizing individuals out of discrete phenomena in this enormously non-interactional

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Wittgenstein against Explanation in Philosophy
and in the 'Kulturwissenschaften'

Wittgenstein's attitude towards explaining is still a matter of dispute and disagreement.¹ Some authors connect it with his supposedly general 'anti-scientific' and 'anti-theoretical' inclinations, whereas others claim that Wittgenstein had in fact nothing against explanations as such, but he was only against 'philosophical' explanations; still others think that Wittgenstein was even more tolerant, rejecting not all philosophical explaining, but only some particular kinds of explanations, for instance those based on 'hidden' entities.

The aim of this paper is to show that (i) Wittgenstein really rejected explanations in general, both in philosophy and in the Kulturwissenschaften, and that (ii) he had a common reason for his rejection, namely that he considered explaining to be an empirical enterprise which could never give relevant answers to the non-empirical problems that both philosophy and the Kulturwissenschaften are always interested in.

Wittgenstein, of course, doesn't say explicitly that explaining is an empirical enterprise, but he systematically associates it with such things as hypothesis (PU, §109), conjecture (Z, §447), theories (PU, §109), discovering what is 'hidden' (PU, §126), discovering mechanisms, formulating laws and predicting (LCA, III, §8), looking for causes and making experiments (LCA, III, §11) and confirmation by experience (LCA, III, §27,28). Two fragments are particularly telling. One is PU, §109, where Wittgenstein says that "Die Erfahrung, 'daß sich das oder das denken lasse, entgegen unserm Vorurteil' - was immer das heißen mag - konnte uns nicht interessieren", i.e. "Es darf nicht Hypothetisches in unserer Betrachtungen sein", and, consequently, that "Alle Erklärung muß fort, und nur Beschreibung an ihre Stelle treten". It is clear that his reason for rejecting explanations is here that "Die Probleme werden gelöst, nicht durch Beibringen neuer Erfahrung, sondern durch Zusammenstellung des längst Bekannten" (ibidem), which underlines his way of seeing: explaining is an ac-

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tivity based on experience and finding of new data, whereas philosophy should stick to description and to examination of the 'workings' of language; its problems "werden durch eine Einsicht in das Arbeiten unserer Sprache gelöst" (ibidem).

The second fragment, which is often neglected, is very short but surprisingly explicit: "Jede Erklärung ist eine Hypothese", Wittgenstein claims, and, like any hypothesis, it is "zu unsicher" (BFGB, 1967, p.236). As based on hypothesis, any explanation is, of course, an empirical enterprise and Wittgenstein seems to suggest that the standard meaning of 'explanation' implies the requirement of "agreeing with experience" (LCA, II, §39).

One could easily be shocked by the very categorical character of the dic-tum "Jede Erklärung ist eine Hypothese" - is this mere overstatement or does it prove some sort of commitment to a very narrow view of explaining, for instance to the hypothetical-deductive model of explaining? Neither is the case, I think. What we have in fact here is a typical grammatical remark which only reminds us the normal use of 'to explain'. We generally apply this expression in cases in which there is an ex-planation which is not self-explanatory, so that we have to find an explanation for it, i.e. to find something new (about causes, origins, mechanisms, processes, laws etc.) which accounts for 'what happened'. In such cases, we feel that we don't know enough about reality and therefore we cannot understand it; and we thus try to 'complete' the picture we have by adding new facts with a supposed explanatory power, which means that we engage in conjecturing. But this feeling is wrong: "Das bloße Beschreiben ist so schwer weil man glaubt, zum Verständnis der Tatsachen diese ergänzen zu müssen. Es ist, als sähe man eine Leinwand mit verstreuten Farbflecken, und sagte: so wie sie da sind, sind sie unverständlich; sinnvoll werden sie erst, wenn man sie sich zu einer Gestalt ergänzt. - Während ich sagen will: Hier ist das Ganze. (Wenn du es ergänzt, verfälschst du es.)" -BPP, vol.I, §257. What Wittgenstein criticizes here is precisely the "Tendenz, zu erklären, statt bloß zu beschreiben" (BPP, vol.I, §256), and his argument is that explanation, in opposition to mere description, implies 'completing' the facts by making hypotheses about the 'pattern' of events, about how things happened, what made them happen etc. But that amounts to saying that explaining is an empirical enterprise by which we try to say more than we actually know about facts.

Now, what philosophy and the Kulturwissenschaften have in common is that they are never interested in empirical matters. The main feature of a philosophical problem is "daß sich hier eine Verwirrung in Form einer Frage äußert, die
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diese Verwirrung nicht anerkennen" (PG, I, §141). Thus, philosophical problems are confusions or misunderstandings (PU, §109,120), they have the general form "Ich kenne mich nicht aus" (PU, §123) and are the result of our being entangled in our own rules: "Dieses Verfängen in unsern Regeln ist, was wir verstehen, d.h. übersehen wollen" (PU, §125). Philosophical problems are conceptual, not empirical - "Diese sind freilich keine empirischen" (PU, §109) - and this explains why philosophy is possible before any 'discoveries': "Philosophie könnte man auch nennen, was vor allen neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen möglich ist" (PU, §126). Since empirical research is philosophically irrelevant, any empirical enterprise is doomed to failure in philosophy, and it is precisely the confusion between non-empirical (conceptual) and empirical (factual) enterprise that constituted the main root of old-fashioned, wrong-headed metaphysics: "Philosophische Untersuchungen: begriffliche Untersuchungen. Das Wesentliche der Metaphysik: daß sie den Unterschied zwischen sachlichen und begrifflichen Untersuchungen verwischt" (Z, §458). Since philosophical questions refer to concepts, philosophical investigations should only deal with concepts: "Deine Fragen beziehen sich auf Wörter; so muß ich von Wörtern reden" (PU, §120). This also explains the 'grammatical' character of these investigations, which aim only at conceptual clarification: "Unsere Betrachtung ist daher eine grammatische. Und diese Betrachtung bringt Licht in unser Problem, indem sie Mißverständnisse wegräumt" (PU, §90). Consequently, it is not a matter of contingencies that there are no explanations in this field, for grammatical elements are precisely what remains after all explaining has been abandoned (BPP, vol. I, §432); it is only after 'doing away with all explanation' that we really enter the field of philosophy.

In a way, when we are trying to understand art we are also dealing with conceptual problems, because we want to clarify the meaning of 'beautiful', 'fine', 'right' (as in the case of 'right architectural proportions') etc. - LCA, I, §5-36.

But the main thing is that, when interested in art and culture, we focus upon cultured taste, style, tradition, aesthetic appreciation (LCA, I, §18-31), and here again we don't deal with empirical matters. We are interested neither in facts (e.g., in aesthetic reactions - LCA, III, §11), nor in causes or mechanisms (LCA, II, §17-36) but only in reasons. Wittgenstein was convinced that the main question of Aesthetics "was not 'Do you like this?', but 'Why do you like this?'" and, of course, "To ask 'Why is this beautiful?' is not to ask for a causal explanation" (Moore, 1955, p.18-19). As Moore reports, when speaking about Wittgenstein's lectures, "What Aesthetics tries to do, he said, is to give reasons, e.g. for having this word rather than that in a particular place in a poem, or for having this mu-
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sical phrase rather than that in a particular place in music" (Moore, 1955, p.19). Understanding art is thus a matter of reasons and ideals; or, reasons and ideals are not empirical items, but normative ones, and therefore cannot be explained - they can only be described: "Reasons, he said, in Aesthetics, are of the nature of further descriptions" (Moore, 1955, p.19).

Wittgenstein insists that the only thing one can do, in order to solve aesthetic puzzles, is some sort of "grouping together of certain cases" (LCA, IV, §2) or, in music, some sort of "arrangement of certain musical figures" (LCA, III, §9); but such operations like grouping, arranging, comparing are in fact similar to the conceptual investigations we do in philosophy, not to the empirical ones in science. We are not interested here in 'new' findings which would account for 'what happened' and we don't look for an explanans; we only try to get a better picture of what we already know, of the similarities and differences between the cases involved.

On the other hand, Wittgenstein was aware that understanding art is not always a matter of normativity; for instance, "When we talk of a Symphony of Beethoven we don't talk about correctness" (LCA, I, §23). In many cases, understanding implies connecting what we are interested in (for instance, 'expressiveness') with a culture or a form of life. Is this an opportunity for explaining? Not at all. Features like 'expressiveness' are connected with the whole culture ("Was gehört also dazu? Eine Kultur, möchte man sagen" - Z, §164), and a whole culture is not the kind of particular item which could be singled out and used as explanans. Aesthetic appreciation is diverse and connected with the whole diversity of "arts and crafts"; it is simply impossible to explain it, for "I would have - to say what appreciation is - e.g. to explain such an enormous wart as arts and crafts" (LCA, I, §21). Since "What belongs to a language game is a whole culture" (LCA, I, §26), in order to explain 'cultured taste', 'tradition' or 'beauty' one has to describe whole different cultures (ibidem) and even whole "ways of living" (LCA, I, §35). Even the task of describing is here too difficult (LCA, I, §20), but the task of explaining, i.e. of singling out particular items which play the role of an explanans, is impossible.

Wittgenstein also insisted that religious matters are not empirical matters and that religious commitments are not opinions which could be explained by relating them to experience (LCA, p.54,57). Religious beliefs "are not treated as historical, empirical, propositions" and in this field "we don't talk about hypothesis" because empirical data are here "no evidence at all" (LCA, p.57). For instance, (it is stressed again and again in the Vermischte Bemerkungen) the question of empirical truth is irrelevant to Christianity. Religious commitments
are deep disquietudes (Beunruhigungen) deeply connected with the whole of human life; they cannot be explained, in the proper sense of the word, because explaining them would imply taking into account the whole life or a whole form of life. Once again, what can be done is only describing: "Nur beschreiben kann man hier und sagen: so ist das menschliche Leben" (BFGB, p.236). Exactly like in philosophy, where insatisfaction disappears by our seeing more, in order to understand religious matters we have to give up explaining and 'put together' what we already know (BFGB, p.235).

Thus, as philosophy and the Kulturwissenschaften never deal with empirical matters, explanation (as empirical enterprise) is here simply irrelevant; it is also impossible in principle, because one never can, in these fields, single out an explanans. Understanding should be then based here on description.

Now, some authors would perhaps say that, precisely because Wittgenstein took 'explanation' as 'empirical explanation', he never rejected explaining in general, but only some particular forms of factual explanation. Even Baker and Hacker seem to be attracted by such an idea, when they suggest that philosophy "explains by description whereas science explains by hypothesis" (Baker, Hacker, 1980, p.490).

Such an interpretation is unacceptable first of all because there is no textual evidence to support it. Wittgenstein constantly opposed description to explanation - PU, §109,126,654; BBB, p.39,117; Z, §220; BPP, vol.I, §22 - and he never presented the former as a variant of the latter.

But there is a deeper argument. Wittgenstein's dictum "Jede Erklärung ist eine Hypothese" shows that explaining is a particular kind of language game, in which one finds 'new' elements (causes, mechanisms, laws or 'hidden' entities) which supposedly account for 'what happened'; in such a game, we provide information about 'what must have been going on' or about 'what must have been behind', i.e. we try to capture a reality that we have never perceived (BPP, vol.I, §256). In this attempt, we are bound to make hypotheses and therefore to say more than we know.

On the contrary, describing is a language game in which we don't advance theses (PU, §128) and we stick to what we already know (PU, §126,127); here we don't make hypotheses, we don't 'complete' the facts - we only 'judge the geography' as it now is (BGM, IV, §52). Thus, describing cannot be seen as a kind of explaining; in a way, it is rather its opposite.

There is a strong temptation to consider the übersichtliche Darstellung (which Wittgenstein insisted upon) as a special case of explanation, because it helps us understand the philosophical difficulties; we think that what helps us
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understand must be a kind of explaining. But it is pretty clear that Wittgenstein had a different opinion. He stressed that philosophical problems disappear not through explaining, but by our seeing more (BGM, II, §85) and he similarly emphasized that the understanding of religious commitments is based on seeing the relevant connections: "Diese übersichtliche Darstellung vermittelt das Verständnis, welches eben darin besteht, daß wir die Zusammenhänge sehen" (BFGB, p.241). It is no accident that Wittgenstein talked about 'Darstellung' and not about 'Erklärung': he was convinced that, in philosophy and in the Kulturwissenschaften, understanding is reached not by explaining, but through a clear and conspicuous view which dissolves the problems and eliminates Beunruhigungen.

But it is also true that Wittgenstein sometimes uses the expression "begriffliche Erklärung" (e.g., BPP, vol.II, §381). Did he accept conceptual explanations, as opposed to the empirical ones? Hardly. As some authors show (von Savigny, 1989, p.386), Wittgenstein often uses erklären in the sense of to clarify. And there is little doubt, I think, that "begriffliche Erklärung" should be interpreted not as 'conceptual explanation', but as 'conceptual clarification', because only in this way can we account for the thesis that grammar "beschreibt nur, aber erklärt in keiner Weise, den Gebrauch der Zeichen" (PU, §496). A "begriffliche Erklärung" is a grammatical enterprise, and since grammar never explains, this enterprise must be one of clarifying, not of explaining.

A final objection would be that PU §496 does not reject conceptual explanations, but only the claim that philosophy should explain the use of words. But as long as meaning is use, if grammar does not explain use, it does not explain meaning either, i.e. it does not explain concepts - therefore, there are no conceptual explanations; and this creates no problem, because "there is nothing to explain": we already know what concepts mean, even if we make confusions when philosophising.

Similarly, we know what 'beauty', 'taste', 'tradition' or 'religious belief' means; we know how these words are used and how judgements in aesthetic matters are being justified. We only make confusions when trying to 'explain' what we know. For it is impossible here to play the game of explaining; on the contrary, playing the game of describing and clarifying is both possible and useful.

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Wittgenstein's Sense of History

It seems scarcely possible to find any apparent and direct utterances to history, any explanatory theories of history in Wittgenstein's works. But it is too hasty to conclude that Wittgenstein is blind to all arguments about history. He spoke history. One of many facets of his philosophy is, I dare say, historical philosophy. In fact he neither wrote the world history of mankind nor described a progress of mechanical conflicts of nations and religions. So, he is not a historian from traditional viewpoint point of history in Europe whose subject matter is nations and religions. Nevertheless, I insist that his thinking is directed to history. He says, "What we are supplying are remarks on the natural history of human beings"(PI,415). It can be supposed that he aimed at the way of treating the natural life of human beings as cultural history. He was "not doing natural science; nor yet natural history"(PI,25). What he wished was the understanding of activities of human beings (not of lions) from the intelligible and cultural point. Linguistic criticism was his tactics because his study of history, I think, was not construction of historical theories but linguistic clarification of our historical understanding. At any rate, the domain of his interest was cultural history. The subject matter of political history is confrontations and struggles of the powers, but the subject matter of cultural history is human beings and human lives.

1-1 At first, we must confirm how the word 'culture' is understood generally and what Wittgenstein's viewpoint is. Culture is human activities and their products, and it is spirits that give them values of their own. What distinguishes the formation of an artistic style from the technical development of cars is the fact that a spirit plays a part in it. Even if the earlier culture might become a heap of rubble and finally a heap of ashes, Wittgenstein says, "but spirits will hover over the ashes"(CV,p.3). Culture is a sort of practice, the originative activity and in the long run nothing but the working to express human value by some means. Thus our remarks on culture link with remarks on our language. Wittgenstein says, "A culture is like a big organization which assigns each of its members a place where he can work in the spirit of the whole"(CV,p.6). This sentence suggests that a culture is a living and spiritual organism, not a mechanical system, and that a culture is a whole of different types of linguistic, of symbolic activities, namely a language-game. "What belongs to a language-game is a whole of a culture"(LCA,P.8).
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1-2 What culture demands is personality, individuality or originality. "Every artist has been influenced by others and shows traces of that influence in his works; but his significance for us is nothing but his personality"(CV,p23). With regard to this, whether science, literature or art are of no matter. The universal validity is of no sense for cultures. Whether universal or not is not concerned in existence of a culture. Culture postulates no universal standard, desires for nothing universal and common and so, stands above the opposition and the conflicts. We say, "Beautiful!" listening to a Symphony of Beethoven, and we say again, "Beautiful!" looking up a Gothic Cathedral. What does this symphony have in common with this cathedral? Or, should we have a dispute which is more beautiful? Wittgenstein's viewpoint to the subject of universal validity is given in his argument of 'obeying the rule'. Any of language-game is formed with a class of rules, and each class of rules might have universal validness and be followed of necessity. But the author of Philosophical Investigations says, "The application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules"(PI,98). It is self-evident that the creativity of culture implies the expression of personality.

1-3 Significance of multiplicity, variety and fluidity of cultures is obvious as well. The personal spirit hates to wear a uniform. Because culture refuses the unified systematization. A culture eliminates the restriction and regulation by any universal power, and cut off the dependence on something ready-made and something given. It also will be expected to threaten and to break through boundaries of usual, entirely similar and stable everyday life, and so, to add new values to human lives. Here especially, we must emphasize that the life of a culture owes its vital force to something peculiar, heterogeneous or even abnormal which it contains. This multiplicity of cultures, however, "is not something fixed, given once for all", but new types of cultures" come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten"(PI,23). This piece of scenery can be seen, for example, in the case of the change in mathematics. The formation of a new culture is a change of the way of thinking, the way of viewing things and the way of speaking, which comes to a change of the way of living, namely of a form of life after all. This change is naturally free from any external compulsion and limitation. The formation of a culture is spontaneous. "We decide spontaneously on a new language-game"(RFM,p.236). A culture is a stage on which a free spirit plays a drama.

2-1 Then, how does Wittgenstein grasp the changing process of culture? Traditionally the world history was tried to understand by the concept ‘development’, but ‘development’ has no position in his philosophy. The thought of development of history premises a belief, that the world moves forward the End

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the eschatology. The Enlightenment in 18th century called in the idea 'progress' to understand the development of the world history on the rational principle. The history became independent of the religion. The 'progress' of history implies 'being independent of traditional things' and 'looking forward to a bright future'. 'Modern' science was expected to be its basis. The progress of modern science and technology is not the development of the organism which is natural and spontaneous, but the progress of mechanistic products which is artificial and technical. The idea of the scientific progress like this was extended from the progress of the knowledge to the progress of society, history and human beings. It became fully convinced that mankind could change and reform its history intentionally as he could transform, deform and reconstruct the nature. And so, Wittgenstein says, "Our civilization is characterized by the word 'progress'." and "Typically it constructs. It is occupied with building an ever more complicated structure"(CV,p.7). But does this progress have the end? What is the end of our civilization? Its end is vague and questionable, if any. Wittgenstein is doubtful about understanding the world history by the idea of progress. "When we think of the world's future, we always mean the destination it will reach if it keeps going in the direction we can see it going in now; it does not occur to us that its path is not a straight line but a curve, constantly changing direction"(CV,p.3). There is no reason why the progress or the development are presupposed in history. The progress which is observable as a matter of fact is limited in the domain of technologies and material lives. This is nothing but a blind and endless progress, and we can not find any progress in cultures and values. All of the project to grasp history by the idea of progress are usually based on a human reasons convenience, security or relief from pain. 'Progress' is nothing but the name of the form of a civilization which 'builds an ever more complicated structure'. Wittgenstein refuses the idea of the teleological understanding of history. He says, "You can not lead people to what is good" because what is good is also divine", and the good is outside the space of facts"(CV,p.3). The end of the world is what can not be said.

2-2 The idea that the study of history is the research for 'causality' of historical phenomena also seems to be wide spread among people who have interest in history. This idea is a scientific expression of the traditional urge to find necessity in the development of history. But the study of cultural history is not chronological description of events, so it is a misdirected work to research objective connections of 'cause and effect'. As Spengler points out, such a handling of history would be nothing but "a piece of 'natural science' in disguise". And necessity of historical events can never be warranted by arranging them on
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a scheme of 'causes' or 'effects'. Wittgenstein says, "Who knows the laws according to which society develops? I am quite sure they are a closed book even to the cleverest of men"(CV,p.60). According to his Tractatus, everything happens as it happens and all happening is accidental in the world, so the law of causality is what can not be said. At any rate he says, "There is nothing more stupid than the chatter about cause and effect in history books"(CV,p.62). What is questioned in history is not the causal relation of facts which appear at this or that time but the significance of their appearing.

2-3 It would, therefore, be said that history is unscientific or anti-scientific. History does not demand 'exactness'. It can not do it. What is the 'exact' understanding of cultures? A boundary of the Romanesque architecture to the Gothic one is not so sharp but blurred and indistinct. Even though we knew exactly, calculatedly a change of things which happened in history, how could we say we understood its historical significance? Wittgenstein does not think that all sorts of cultures are understood reasonably. He was opposed to the concept of some ideal exactitude given a priori in particular. "At different times we have different ideals of exactitude; and none of them is supreme"(CV,p.37). What we call exactness is a 'yardstick' which we ourselves are to lay down according to our goal. A well known expression of our wishes for the absolute exact is Cartesian slogan, 'clare et distincte', which leads to the idea that exact understanding is only possible if we sweep away everything doubtful from our mind. What can not be doubted, here, can be the ultimate foundation given a priori. And so, "we feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena" and had "to understand the basis, or essence, of everything empirical"(PL,89-90). An urge to demand 'exactness' in historical descriptions of culture will be of 'the bewitchment of our intelligence', of an intellectual disease which comes from linguistic 'illusions'. We misunderstand the role of the ideal in our language"(PL,100).

3-1 We have seen as to Wittgenstein's view of history that he avoids the ideas of development, causal necessity, scientific exactness, etc. Then how does he understand the meaning of history? I wish to pay attention to his saying first of all, "The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose"(PL,127). Assembling data is the fundamental procedure for empirical science and historical research. His considerations "could not be scientific ones". He says, "we may not advance any kind of theory." • • • We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place"(PL,109). Description here is meant to be arrangement and comparison. His idea is under the influence of Spengler's morphology of culture in this point. Wittgenstein's philosophy usually takes the way of comparing forms of linguistic activities. Its
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purpose is to throw light on the facts of our language by way of not only by similarities, but also dissimilarities" (Pl,130). The concept 'family resemblance' cited from Spengler's book is for this purpose and useful in giving prominence to personality, multiplicity and changeableness of language-games, that is, of cultural styles. However, Spengler understood the conception of style to be the expression of soul (the Apollinien, the Faustian etc.) and the ideal which doesn't lose any of its dignity"(CV,p.27).

3-2 To arrange and to compare things is to clarify their relationships and to see them in a new way. As we often meet with, what looks the same has some different aspects; e.g. "The cock calls the hens by crowing" and "The crowing set the hens in motion by some kind of physical causation"(Pl,493). The appearance of a culture is motivated by the discovery of a new aspect i.e. a new way we look at things. "What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory but of a fertile new point of view"(CV,p.18). To understand things historically is so, to command a clear view of their relationships and to describe them in a way we could never see before. And this perspicuous understanding of history consists in 'seeing connections' which means making new connections of linguistic activities and creating the concept of these connections. According to Wittgenstein, those who can produce 'a real history of the discoveries' are the artist who captures the world sub specie aeterni, the thinker who represents all the interrelations between things and the epic poet who experiences and hence describes the progress of culture as an epic. But he says, no one will be there. '•••'CV,p.9).

3-3 There can be no doubt that Wittgenstein's interest in history was stimulated by his consciousness of crisis of the intellectual world of the West. What he feared is that "science and industry, and their progress might turn out to be the most enduring thing in the modern world"(CV,p.63). He is supposed to have a view that "the age of science and technology is the beginning of the end for humanity", and that "the idea of great progress is a delusion"(CV,p.56). His criticism against the modern civilization could be condensed into two points. The one is that it is absolutely for technological science. But "there is nothing good or desirable about scientific knowledge"(CV,p.56). The other point is that it is a 'life's mould' which forces human cultures and human lives into a ready-made scheme. One problem is that the shape of the Jewish life does not fit into the European mould and that "they are experienced as a sort of disease, and anomy"(CV,p.20). This note is written in 1931. The significance of historical considerations in Wittgenstein's philosophy consists in his intention to cure our
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civilization of these diseases, and his way was to get a clear view of problems of the age with ascetical unmoved spirit and so, to erase them.

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Rationalism in the Social Sciences:

The Reality of Historical Laws

The distinction discussed in this paper concerns the status of social laws and social kinds with a particular stress on history. One can take laws and kinds as real (realist position), or reject them altogether (eliminativist position) or accept them as useful instruments (instrumentalism). I shall argue that this division corresponds to the differentiation marked by great currents of thought in the social sciences: realist currents of both historicism and positivism, popperian eliminativism and the theory of ideal types as proposed by Max Weber with its instrumentalist overtones. It seems to me that the Weberian instrumentalism is on the right track. At the end of the paper I briefly raise the issue of late Wittgenstein’s philosophy: it seems to belong together with Weber.

1. Realism

Consider first the realistic stance. Realists agree on ontology, but widely diverge on the epistemology of the issue. The original “historicists” were realists about laws (or forces or tendencies) in history endorsing at the same time a curious epistemology: history, linguistics, jurisprudence and economy were seen as based not on rational theoretical foundations but on concrete historical examples. As claimed by Ranke, history alone, not abstract philosophy, could provide a guide to the ultimate questions of human concern. He mantained that history can never have the unity of a philosophical system but is not without inner connection, there are “tendencies” in history and “leading ideas of an age”. Ranke and the other members of the “historical school” searched for laws of social and historical development which linked the social phenomena with the whole life of nations as a manifestation of their peculiar “spirit”. Nations possessed the characteristics of an individuality to an even higher degree than persons. The positivists, on the other hand, mantained that sociology, like physics is a branch of knowledge which aims to explain and predict events, with the help of theories and universal laws (which it tries to discover). When we speak of success in physics we have in mind the success of its predictions, then we assume that success in sociology would likewise consist in the corroboration of predictions with the help of laws. Comte, Mill, Spencer argued in a just such
way but also some neopositivists like Neurath and Hempel. The fundamental assumption of realism as seen here is that social reality is governed by some regularities and laws which are deterministic and the discover of which is the goal of history or of the other social sciences. They could present an evolutive nature and we understand them only by means of observation and empathy without theorising and causal explanations (in the case of historicism) or we explain them with the hypothetical-deductive method of inquiry, for positivists.

2. Eliminativism

Popper's eliminativism starts with a staunch opposition to the historicist variant of realism. In his view historicism is a combination of utopistic, holistic and romantical concepts applied to the social science (a mixture of classical positivism with the idealistic assumptions of the historical school). This is the first attempt of an analytical philosopher to deal with the social sciences that do not presume its reduction to the natural science model of explanation. According to Popper, the thesis of historicism may be divided into two groups: 1) the antinaturalistic (corresponding roughly to classical historicism), and 2) the naturalistic (related to classical positivism). He rejects the organicistic theory of society and holism, contained in the antinaturalistic claims and sustains the possibility of small scale social experimentation, which makes generalisations possible. Therefore, the search for general laws is justified also in the social sciences with the important exception of history. For Popper we have to search for social laws to be able to explain change, and we have to adopt a nominalistic approach and to look to social institutions as instruments that grow up spontaneously - they are constructs not essences. Naturalistic historicism was deeply influenced with social changes and the development of evolutionary theory in biology which postulated change in the natural world too. But is a law of evolution possible? Popper refutes it because the evolution of life on the Earth and of human society is a unique historical event, it cannot be described by a law but only with singular historical hypothesis, therefore predictions are impossible. The explanation of individual events is specific to history and it needs a causal explanation but no related laws are to be found in historical explanation they may be so trivial that we need not mention them and rarely notice them. There are theories of sociology, for example, which the historian presupposes. But he uses them as a rule without being aware of them, they fall outside the historian's scope. He doesn't use them as universal laws to test his specific hypotheses, but they are implicit in his terminology. Universal law and specific
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events are together necessary for any causal explanation, but outside the theoretical sciences (like economical theory) universal laws arise little interest. Historian's lack of interest in universal laws puts them in a difficult position. In theoretical science laws act as centers of interest to which observations are related, or as points of view from which observations are made. In history the universal laws, which for the most part are trivial and used unconsciously, cannot fulfill this function. Therefore, the solution is to write the history which interests us from a selective point of view. But as a rule these historical "approaches" or "points of view" cannot be tested, and apparent confirmations are therefore of no value the only criteria to evaluate them is their fertility. Popper calls this approach, if it cannot be formulated as a testable hypothesis, an historical interpretation. This gives us an image of history as an epistemologicalaly poor activity which cannot be considered a science because it is not possible to formulate laws and to test them.

3. Instrumentalism

The instrumentalism of laws and kinds in social science is identified by Max Weber in two axioms: 1) reality is composed of infinite facts and factors 2) every historical event is only one set of alternatives that happened to occur but did not have to. Understanding is, therefore, based on selection, human analysis is finite while its object, "reality" is infinite. The historian's question is not only what happened but also what did not happen and why. History hasn't an immanent order it needs human intellect and empirical verification. Science means causal explanation with its logic of enquiry that is common to all science - it needs empirical regularities and general concepts (laws or ideal types) but causality doesn't presuppose a unified model of explanation - all events could be explained from different points of view with different empirical rules. There are two conditions of objectivity in the social sciences: they are avaluative based on cultural values but without judgments and explicative based on causal explanation of individual events with instrumental nomological knowledge that must be empirically tested. Ideal types are a one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and the synthesis of a great many concrete individual phenomena into a unified analytical construct. If we trace a cultural phenomenon like capitalism or Judaism, place and time are hard to determine; there is a variety of other institutional and attitudinal facets. If we want to be able to operate a causal analysis we need the ideal type which is an auxiliary construct that helps to orient oneself to the proposed research. According to Watkins; Weber, in his
early formulation of ideal types meant a holistic interpretation "an a priori word picture" and "a simplification from detail that emphasises the essential traits of a situation considered as a whole ". For Watkins an understanding of a complex social situation is always derived from a knowledge of the dispositions, beliefs, and relationships of individuals. Thus; Weber modified it later in an individualistic sense that poses hypothetical actors and their rational behaviour in a simplified situation, isolated from disturbing factors. With individualistic ideal types, we start with individuals' dispositions, information, and relationships, and work outwards to the unintended consequences of their interaction. The explanation is, therefore an inverted causal one - a theleological explanation based on individual purposes. With purpose oriented rationality it becomes possible to understand the behaviour of individual acting subjects and to reject the dichotomy of explanation and understanding held by Dilthey and later historicism. For Weber history like the other social sciences is a science - it provides causal explanations, it has a nomological knowledge provided by ideal types but this knowledge isn't its purpose (as in the natural sciences) but only an instrument. The purpose of social sciences is the rational or rationally commissured explanation of individual events selected by their cultural relevance. The value of these models isn't only in their fertility but also in their empirical verificativeness based on concrete events that took place.

4. Conclusion

Weber's interpretation provides history with the status of scientificity that Popper explicitly denied and historicists and positivists didn't achieve with their associated difficulties to prove the reality of historical "forces" or "laws" that could provide history with the status of a science. Weber made this possible by considering the priority of discovery of causal mechanisms and not of laws that, since reality is infinite, are infinite in number 100. Laws in social sciences (including history) are mere tools that could be substituted or falsified according empirical evidence or fertility. I think that this must satisfy the popperians and the latest philosophy of science which today poses the main accent on causality. Now, where is Wittgenstein's place in our trichotomy? His famous dictum that essence is created by grammar is not eliminativist, it rather points in the direction of instrumentalism. Forms of life lived or at least accessible to the historian and the attendant grammatical structures determine what counts as essential, very much in the spirit of Weber. The parallel is clear and is worth further investigation.
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Neuere mathematische Modelle der Kulturrevolution

Die quantitative Soziodynamik, eine neue Disziplin gesellschaftlicher Entwicklungen, gestattet, die Evolution unserer Kultur in einem völlig neuen Licht darzustellen. Dieser Artikel erörtert, an Hand eines soziodynamischen Modells, einige damit verbundene philosophische, kulturelle und methodologische Probleme.

1. Gesellschaftsdynamik in traditionellen und modernen Theorien


Nach dem Zusammenbruch des klassischen, statischen wissenschaftlichen Weltbildes änderte sich plötzlich in den sechziger Jahre die Situation. Die Erforschung zeitlicher Veränderungen von biologischen Systemen durch neue Versionen der Evolutionsgleichungen trat in den Vordergrund. Diesem Trend folgte die Nutzen- und Spieltheorie in den siebziger Jahren, als sie sich zur dy-


2. Ist die Evolution die Dynamik kultureller Konfliktlösungen?

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3. Empirische Grundlagen: Präferenzen, Bewertungen und Konfliktlösen


Hier genau spielen Konflikte und ihre Lösungen die entscheidende Rolle. Denn: Konflikte sind immer offene, oft chaotisch instabile Alternativen zwischen den Werten von möglichen Alternativen und ihren erwarteten

4. Die Rolle der Subkulturen in der Mikroevolution


Die evolutionäre Sozio- und Kultur dynamik beginnt also mit der Mikroevolution in Subkulturen; sie setzt sich durch Aggregation in der Makroevolution von ganzen Bevölkerungen durch Aggregation fort, ähnlich wie in Arrows und Sens Kollektiver Wahltheorie, in Harsanyis Ethik oder wie sich die Makroökonomie aus der Wirtschaft des Markts, der Mikroökonomie, herleitet.

Da man kulturelle Tradition nicht mit Vererbung gleichsetzen kann, wird der Begriff der Nation hier nicht gebraucht. Statt dessen haben wir es hier mit be-
stimmten empirischen Szenarios, mit Mini- oder Makrobevölkerungen zu tun, die ein bestimmtes geographisches Umfeld (Umggebung), gemeinsame Kommunikation und Geschichte besitzen.

5. Partizipation mit den anderen

6. Konfliktlösungen beeinflussen oder kanalisieren die kulturelle Evolutionen

Probleme und Konflikte zu lösen und die Gesellschaft bis zur nächsten Störung und der nächsten Konfliktlösung relativ stabil zu halten und zukünftige Risiken zu reduzieren, enthüllt sich als ein geheimer psychologischer und sogar genetischer Attraktor in den Individuen jeder langlebigen Kultur. Nach Allais stimmt er tatsächlich bis zu 90% mit unser genetisch verankerten Risikoscheu überein. Damit haben wir unsere passive Zuschauerrolle in der kulturellen Evolution verloren und eine neue aktive Mündigkeit und Verantwortung in demokratischen Gesellschaften erreicht. Allerdings sind wir nie gegen katastrophale Zufälle, z.B. weltweite Umweltverschmutzung, kosmische Unfälle etc. gefeit. Wir stehen, nach Gould, daher der Evolution insgesamt wie einer großen Lotterie gegenüber (Abschn. 9, (2), (8) und (9)).

7. Die Gedächtnisfunktion und Geschichte


Evolutionäres Konfliktelösen hat sozusagen ein neues Konzept der
"Geschichte" in die Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften eingeführt, denn optimes Konfliktlösen muss "Geschichte konservierend" sein.

8. Der dynamische Aspekt der Evolutionsgleichungen


Kulturelle Konflikte optimal zu lösen heißt natürlich nicht, das egoistisch Beste sich auszuwählen, sondern das unter den gegebenen Umständen, mit Rücksicht auf die anderen, was ja "altrüstisch" wörtlich heißt, die beste Lösung für alle zu finden. Man nennt dies auch, Pareto-optimale Lösungen für alle Beteiligten zu errechnen. Aber optimale Lösungen können auch zyklisch-peri- odischer Natur sein, wie die unangenehmen Wirtschaftszyklen oder die angenehmeren Stile der Kunst oder der Mode (Leinfellner).

9. Appendix: Ein formales Modell der gesellschaftlichen Evolution

Den zeitabhängigen (dt) kontinuierlichen Fluss gesellschaftlicher und kul-
Neuere mathematische Modelle der Kulturrevolution
tureller evolutionärer Trajektorien drückt hier eine einfache Form der Eigen-
Schusterschen Evolutionsgleichung (1) aus:

\[ (1) \, \frac{dx^i}{dt} = (Z^i \cdot R^i) x^i + \sum s_{ik} x^k \]

Die Matrixversion beschreibt den kulturellen Zustand zu einer bestimmten Zeit t der Evolution folgendermaßen:

\[ \ldots y_1, \ldots, y_j, \ldots, y_n, \ldots \]

\[ x_1^i \, a_{11}, \ldots, a_{1j}, \ldots, a_{1n} \]

\[ x_2^i \, a_{21}, \ldots, a_{2j}, \ldots, a_{2n} \]

\[ x_i^i \, a_{il}, \ldots, a_{ij}, \ldots, a_{in} \]

\[ x_m^i \, a_{m1}, \ldots, a_{mj}, \ldots, a_{mn} \]

Jede Reihe und Kolonne formuliert hier eine "evolutionäre Lotterie" (Prospekt). So für das erste Individuum 1:

\[ (2) \, L_1 = y_1^i a_{11}, \ldots, y_j^i a_{1j}, \ldots, y_n^i a_{1n} \]

\[ Z^i \] bezeichnet in (1) den Prozentsatz der Abarten:

\[ (3) \, Z^i = A^i \cdot Q^i \text{ zur Zeit } t_{i+1} \]

\( A^i \) ist die Entstehungsrate von Gesellschaftsformen, \( Q^i \) ein Qualitätsfaktor. Der Prozentsatz der zufälligen Innovationen ist: \( A^i(1-Q^i) \).

\( R^i \) in (1) repräsentiert die Abnahme einer kulturellen Gesellschaftsform \( G^i \) innerhalb der Subkultur oder der ganzen Gesellschaft mit:

\[ (4) \, R^i = D^i + K^i \]

\( D^i \) drückt nun die Rate des Verschwindens einer kulturellen Gesellschaftsform \( G^i \) aus, \( K \) eine Konstante.

\[ (5) \, s_{ik} \text{ in (1) zeigt die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer zufälligen Rückbildung von einer veränderten (mutierten) Gesellschaftsform } L^k \text{ zu } L_i \text{ an (}\text{L}^k \text{ zu } L^i\text{). Damit präzisiert sich die Evolutionsdynamik:} \]

\[ (6) \, A^i \cdot Q^i > Z^i \text{ ist der durchschnittliche Wachstumsüberschuss derjenigen Gesellschaftsformen oder Konfliktlösungen, die sich evolutionär weiterentwickeln.} \]

\[ (7) \, \text{Umgekehrt zeigt: } i^i Q^i < Z^i \text{ an, dass eine Gesellschaftsform abnimmt, z.B. ihre Kanalisierung ein Misserfolg ist.} \]
Der wert- bzw. nutzentheoretische Aspekt der gesellschaftlichen Evolution.

Die Evolutionsdynamik, präferentiell und psychologisch (genetisch) gesehen, in der Matrix Form lautet:

\[(8) \ W^i = A^i - Z^i \]

ist der Vermehrungsüberschuss (Wachstumsüberschuss) einer kulturellen Gesellschaftsform \(i\). Ihr erwarteter Nutzen (Wert) kann aus der Wertmatrix entnommen werden und ist für jedes Individuum der einer Lotterie \(u(L^i) = \sum x_i a_{ij}\).

\[(9) W^{i*} = \text{bezeichnet den durchschnittlichen, mittleren Vermehrungsüberschuss aller kulturellen Gesellschaftsformen, mathematisch ausgedrückt: aller Lotterien. Ihr durchschnittlicher, mittlerer Erwartungsnutzen ist der aller in der Wertmatrix aufgeführten Lotterien } (L) = \sum \sum x_i a_{ij} y_j.\]

Man kann nun z.B. generelle Entscheidungsregeln (konfliktlösende Regeln) formulieren:

\[(10) \text{Generelle Default-Regeln für Konfliktlösungen, wenn Risikoaversion dominiert:}\]

\[(11) \text{Wenn vorteilhafte Zufallseinwirkungen vorliegen und/oder günstige gesellschaftliche Eingriffe erfolgten, und}\]

\[(12) \text{W}^i \geq W^{i*} \text{ist, dann wird die Gesellschaftsform } G^i \text{ dominieren, kurz die Oberhand "gewinnen" und damit relativ stabil werden. Sie wird sich gegen zufällige Abarten in geringer Zahl erfolgreich erwähnen können, kurz: ist evolutionär stabil nach Maynard Smith's Matrizenmethode.}\]

\[(13) \text{Wenn (12) nicht zutrifft, und wenn grosse Zufallseinwirkungen sich ereignen und/oder schädigende gesellschaftliche Eingriffe (->) erfolgen, kann dies zum Zusammenbruch der Gesellschaftsform } G^i \text{ führen oder möglicherweise chaotische gesellschaftliche Zustände hervorrufen. Das drückt die folgende Ungleichung aus:}\]

\[(14) \text{Wenn } W^i < W^{i*} \text{ zutrifft, dann wird die Gesellschaftsform } G^i \text{ instabil.}\]

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Culture, Class and the modern State

Bertrand Russell, in his "History of Western Philosophy", refers to a theme that informs the whole of European political and legal development:

The ancient world found an end to anarchy in the Roman Empire, but the Roman Empire was a brute fact, not an idea. The Catholic world sought an end to anarchy in the Church, which was an idea, but was never adequately embodied in fact. Neither the ancient nor the medieval solution was satisfactory - the one because it could not be idealized, the other because it could not be actualized. (p 482)

He may have added that it is dilemmas like the first that give rise to myths and dilemmas like the second that give rise to fictions. Is it possible, in other words, to reconcile man as a political being and thus the citizen of a state with man as a moral being and thus a citizen of the world? Is it possible to reconcile social movement with social judgment? Is the state, seen broadly as any autonomous political community, the subject or the object of law, seen broadly as any sanctioned moral code?

We are in fact faced by two competing concepts of the state: the tribal versus the moral or the material versus the formal. The first is based on a common experience, the latter on a common idea. The basic thesis proposed here is that the state empowers people while the law relates them - that the state implies a material community, the law a formal community and that their interaction should be seen in those terms. What is basically at issue is the dichotomy law and order or, on the international level, peace and security. The British philosopher Michael Oakeshott formulated the problem more elegantly by classifying states as being either partnerships or corporations. (Cf also Weber’s distinction between communal and associative social relationships, p 136.) A partnership is based on the idea that the part determines the whole, while a corporation is based on the idea that the whole determines the part. A partnership thus has a material premiss, a corporation a formal one. One could say, in the terms of Russell, that a partnership stresses the real at the expense of the ideal, while a corporation does the reverse. Ultimately the first implies a common culture, the latter a common class, if we see culture as the material adapted in terms of the formal and class as the formal adapted in terms of the material. In this sense we
can see culture as a codified system of control over the environment and class as a codified system of value and code of conduct.

For the sake of this analysis it is submitted that these two realities (ie power and principle) dominated western development in two broad dialectically related periods:

1. The period of Roman Imperialism from the last century before Christ ie +-30 BC to the founding of the Holy Roman Empire in the tenth century after Christ ie +- 962 AD.
2. The period of European Absolutism from the birth of the Holy Roman Empire to the collapse of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires in the twentieth Century ie +- 1920 AD.

In trying to assess the contribution of Rome to political development we are struck by its ability to mobilise and integrate disparate communities. Rome conquered and ruled purely in terms of power but a power that operated in terms of precedence and loyalty and thus in a crude sense openly. The authority of the father, the magistrate and the emperor created a system of stark simplicity and material transparency.

The decisive consideration was however that to the Roman authority or the state created law and not the other way round. The state was natural and not rational and law thus material and not formal. The Romans never developed a systematic constitutional or international law system since the state was at all times the subject and not the object of law (Hinsley p 161). Roman law was a system of acting to protect interests and not planning to realise values. Law was started in terms of the acting subject and thus tended to be solipsistic and imperialistic, individually as well as socially. The male Roman citizen was the focus at the expense of the child, the wife, the slave or the foreigner. Rome was the source as well as the goal of law in a practical but never in an ideological sense. To the Roman, law was codified power - law could thus organise power, but not create it.

Power could only be created by gaining control over your environment, natural as well as social, ie in terms of an agreed culture. The law reflected this control, it did not create or confront it. This was even more true after Justinian codified the law. The law was used as an instrument of policy by the state to maintain order and not an independent force that could call the state to order. Justinian wanted to revive the Roman Empire but to the extent that is was not possible he tried to perpetuate its influence intellectually. The Roman Empire reappeared as an idea but an idea that repeated rather than completed its unity. Formal unity merely sanctioned material unity.
The Roman Empire had always been "a conglomerate rather than a uniform blueprint" (Watson p 100) and its universality was thus always mythical, if we see myth as a formal projection of the material. The formal sanctified the material. Cryptically put the people created the state and the state created the law. Rome thus established a political hegemony based on a loose cultural identity. Justinian's Institutes illustrates this approach very well.

This was the approach of the Roman Empire from its formal establishment by Caesar Augustus in 31 BC to the final division between the Eastern and the Western Empire by the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire by Otto the Great in 962 AD. During this whole period, both before and after its conversion to Christianity, the Empire tried to turn a political community into a moral community even to the extent of giving divine status to the Emperor. In the Eastern half of the Empire the Emperor in fact became head of the Church while in the West the Pope at least partly, derived his authority from the Emperor, albeit in terms of myth. The moral was thus sanctioned by the political and law derived from the state. (Cf in this regard the "Donation of Constantine")

Above all it was a system in terms of which content determined form, the traditional determined the ideological and precedence determined coherence. The basic dilemma of this approach was perhaps best expressed by Kelsen (Kelsen p 387) "The ego and the tu can be conceived only if our philosophy proceeds from the objective world within which both exist as parts, and neither of them as 'sovereign' centers of the whole. Similarly, the idea of the equality of all States can be maintained only if we base our interpretation of legal phenomena on the primacy of international law. The states can be considered as equal only if they are not presupposed to be sovereign."

The Roman approach was thus subjective and as such essentially solipsistic. The premiss was material and the strategy cultural.

This Mediterranean tribal system was transformed into a European moral system in the course of the 10th century which maintained itself right into the 20th century. The premiss became formal and diplomats and treaties displaced soldiers and empires.

The Papacy, by recognising the Holy Roman Empire as a protector of the Church, initially in the person of Charlemagne and finally in the person of Otto the Great and his successors, turned the State from an instrument of power into an instrument of ideology. An instrument of movement was changed into an instrument of judgement and thus was created the fiction of the just state instead of the myth of the powerful state. Culture as a codified system of experience
was displaced by class as a codified system of value. The Romans developed a system of cultural hegemony that implied imperialism, continental Europe a system of class hegemony that implied absolutism. Europe tried for almost a thousand years to turn a moral community into a political community. The Roman error was repeated in reverse and the solopsistic was followed by the tautological: "If there were an objectively recognizable justice there would be no positive law and hence no state: for it would not be necessary to coerce people to be happy" (Kelsen, p 13). Henceforth law created the state. Europe was based on a moral hegemony linked to loose class identity. The result was fiction in terms of which the formal determines the material. Europe achieved moral unity but never material unity.

Just like the Roman Empire developed around a common culture so Europe developed around a common faith. Under the direction of the Church, at first rigidly but later more loosely, there developed a class of rulers out of this faith that shared not only a common code of conduct but also a common sense of the divinely sanctioned nature of their responsibilities. All political power was divinely ordained and the Divine Right of Kings transformed this moral absolutism into political absolutism. Not the people but God was the source of power and this created a sense of loyalty that transcended political boundaries and enabled adjustments to be made to boundaries and alliances to suit dynastic requirements.

Europe was a big republic that depended on a social contract not between ruler and ruled but between ruler and ruler. One dynasty after another tried to gain hegemonic control over this system, but every time the formal prohibitions proved stronger than the material aspirations. European aristocracy thus never succeeded in transforming a common moral commitment into a common political commitment. This did not mean, of course, that the material was suppressed but only that it usually marched under false colours.

The tribal state was thus turned into the moral state. The state became the object of law and it proceeded to clothe itself in the garments of religion and morality as understood by the ruling class from the Crusades, through the Wars of Religion to the Wars of Colonialism. Until the French Revolution started unleashing the forces of materialism again morality thus sanctioned not only the ruling class itself but also its political agenda. According to the doctrine of the just war a just war required both a legitimate source of power as well as a legitimate goal of power, and the Divine Right of Kings supplied both. It is this consideration that gave the system its tautological character and enabled it to maintain both its effectivity as well as its legitimacy.
Treaties determined the distribution of power but then treaties between parties with interlocking interest and values. Law was thus the basis of the state but a law that related states rather than confronted them (Hinsley p 174). The moral and the political reinforced one another (Watson p 188) It is in this sense that Grotius constructed his system that tried to combine, what Watson calls, the regulatory with the ethical. One could see this system as representative of the whole European system in its attempt to ensure order without hegemony which could be realised only in terms of contract. The European system was in fact defined in a successive series of treaties that adjusted borders and alliances in terms of dynastic considerations and the balance of power: Westphalia, Utrecht, Vienna and Versailles defined and sanctioned states and their interaction.

This whole system was only possible because throughout this period, i.e. from the tenth to the twentieth century, one class, sharing common religious and moral convictions, played the decisive role that it did. One of the most eloquent defenders of this whole vision was Hugo Grotius. Stressing, by his own admission, the formal at the expense of the material, he reflected a world that was as alienated from the subjective as the Romans were alienated from the objective. The "Pax Romana" doctrine was followed by the "Pacta Sunt servanda" doctrine and the Roman conflation of the subjective and the objective (Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem) was followed by the European reverse conflation (Pacta sunt servanda rebus sic stantibus). Both approaches, in trying to demarcate the borderline between the moral and the political only succeeded in truncating or decapitating them. To Justinian law was meant to serve the state, to Grotius the state was meant to serve law. To the first law was about the victor to the latter law was about the victim: This latter approach is reflected in Grotius’ "De Jure Belli ac Pacis". Justinian aimed at conquest and war, Grotius at conversion and peace.

The solution to this problem, to my mind, resides in recognising that what is at issue here is what Ryle called a category mistake. If we look carefully at the two clusters of concepts analyzed here it becomes clear that the one refers to facts or clusters of facts, the other to relations. The first in concerned with identity, the second with equality. The one is concerned with the identity of facts, the second with the organisation of facts. The problem with Justinian was that he organised facts in terms of their identity (i.e. History) while the problem with Grotius was that he identified facts in terms of their organization (i.e. Reason).

Most of the conflict in the modern world stems from assigning formal value to culture and material interest to class rather than the other way round. The result is that culture was projected in class terms and class in cultural terms.
Identity became superiority and equality became uniformity. Russell presented the problem underlying this confusion in a philosophical context:

Philosophy, throughout its history, has consisted of two parts inharmoniously blended: on the one hand a theory as to the nature of the world, on the other an ethical or political doctrine as to the best way of living. The failure to separate these two with sufficient clarity has been a source of much confused thinking. Philosophers, from Plato to William James, have allowed their opinions as to the constitution of the universe to be influenced by the desire for edification: knowing, as they supposed, what beliefs would make men virtuous, they have invented arguments, often very sophistical, to prove that these beliefs are true.

References


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Der Pluralismus der Lebensformen -
ein Konflikt der WelTBilder


Aber sind wir dann nicht in der Lage, Überzeugungen früherer Generationen etwa über die Entstehung der Welt und die gesetzmäßige Verknüpfung ihrer Ereignisse als "falsch" nachzuweisen? Offensichtlich nur unter der Voraussetzung, daß wir solche Gründe für die Falschheit derartiger Überzeugungen anführen können, "die wir für Gründe halten" (OC 599). Doch was ein "gute[r] Grund" ist, sagt uns wiederum unsere Physik (OC 608). Entsprechend ist die Praxisbewährung des Vertrauens in die Physik wiederum vom gesamten Erfahrungssystem abhängig. Stehen uns aber nur interne Gründe zur Verfügung, um die Falschheit anderer Überzeugungen nachzuweisen, dann "sagt [dies in der Tat] gar nichts" (OC 599). Daß wir der Physik in unserem Leben "trauen", ist demnach nicht wirklich zu begründen, so daß wir um die

Wahrheit der Physik nicht wissen, sondern in einem - allerdings - nichtpsychologischen Sinne an sie glauben bzw. ihr "trauen".

Ist die Wahrheit unseres physikalischen Weltbildes eine Sache des Glaubens, dann gilt dies auch für unser Urteil über die "Falschheit" einer anderen, nichtphysikalischen Wirklichkeitserklärung wie der Orakelbefragung (OC 609). Und ein Weltbild-Glaube, in dem "Menschen ... im Traum auf den Mond versetzt" würden, läßt sich nur durch solche gegenteiligen Tatsachen widerlegen, für die die Möglichkeit des Irrtums ausschließt (OC 667) - was jedoch keine Widerlegung wäre, weil derartige "Tatsachen" den Rahmen dessen vorgeben, was ausschließlich im eigenen Weltbildglauben eine "Tatsache" ist. Der Rekurs auf sie kann dann für fremde Weltbilder keinerlei Widerlegungskraft haben.

**Der Weltbildkonflikt und die Aporien seiner Auflösung**


Die scheinbare Konfliktneutralität des religiösen Sprachspiels

Konfliktneutral scheint dagegen jenes Verhältnis zu sein, das für Wittgenstein zwischen dem christlich-religiösen und dem nichtreligiösen Sprachspiel besteht. Im Zentrum seiner "Vorlesungen über den religiösen


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The Ontology of History and Culture

The mastery of a natural language is universally regarded as the minimal mark of the cultural. But there is very little in the way of an analysis of what that signifies about the respective structures and properties of the different "worlds" of culture and nature. Some, of course, have held that there is no difference between these worlds, that the apparent difference is the mere shadow of a façon de parler by which we mislead ourselves. This is almost never said explicitly about the entire range of culturally distinctive phenomena, primarily, I suppose, because there is no satisfactory analysis of language that anyone can now provide that is restricted to whatever terms may be judged adequate for describing and explaining fundamental physical processes. Wherever the effort is made, it is limited to showing that the mental must be no more than a subset of physical phenomena, meaning by that, that, somehow, the cultural is either reducible to the mental or is in some way supervenient on it. There are also those who believe that there are no mental phenomena at all, that any such conjecture is simply delusive—a fortiori, that the cultural is a delusion as well.

I think we must take a kindly and patient attitude to all those who think along these lines, for, after all, they continue to speak in a way that is essentially indistinguishable from that of the rest of us—descriptively, interpretively, explanatorily—except that they protest that that is not the way things really are. There is no harm, then, in attempting an analysis of the cultural world as if it were "actual" and "real," against the day (indeinitely postponed) on which the entire "folk-theoretic" idiom will be successfully dismissed or reduced to a mere convenience.

The moment you make such a generous (or patronizing) adjustment, you realize that you have placed yourself in philosophical jeopardy. For every effort to understand the cultural in its own terms suddenly strikes the eye as remarkably primitive. If we take that as a warning against hurrying to champion any substantive thesis on which, of course, there is bound to be much dispute and division, we may still fall back to a number of surprisingly robust directives that any genuinely promising analysis would be bound to honor. Such directives are modest enough, but not altogether vacuous. Try these:
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(I) the cultural is emergent—in a *sui generis* way—from the phenomena of the physical and biological world;
(II) the cultural is, as such, inseparable from, complexly embedded in, the phenomena of the physical and biological world;
(III) emergent as they are, cultural phenomena possess properties that are not shared by the phenomena of the physical and biological world;
(IV) cultural entities and phenomena exist, are real, and possess real properties, including properties assignable entirely within the physical and biological world;
(V) cultural and natural phenomena exist in the same world and causally interact with one another;
(VI) mental phenomena may take subcultural, precultural, and prehuman forms, and cultural phenomena need not possess mental properties at all, though their existence presupposes the suitable agency of entities that are both culturally and mentally apt for their production.

I do not regard these six theorems as bland in the least. After all, they preclude reductionism, supervenience, eliminationism, dualism, nativism, functionism, and any supposed equivalence between the mind/body problem and the nature/culture problem. There is, therefore, a large gain there for very little labor. Still, taken together, they omit any mention of the defining feature of the cultural itself. Also, how we should understand the conceptual complexities cultural phenomena introduce could well keep professional philosophers busily occupied for a long time. I regard the items of my tally as no more than the minima for any reasonable consensus on what the analysis of the cultural should yield, but, even that is open to dispute.

The simplest and most direct way that I know to give a fair impression of the novelty of my intended account is to contrast it (however briefly) with Brentano’s well-known distinction between the mental and the physical. I intend the contrast as a convenience only, though I cannot hide the fact that to favor it would, inevitably, call into doubt both Brentano’s account of the mental and Husserl’s account of the subjective. If you bear in mind my initial postulate that linguistic mastery is the locus of whatever is paradigmatic regarding the cultural, you will find it reasonable to add to the tally I’ve given something like the following item:

(VII) whatever among living organisms is deemed mental but precultural or subcultural cannot but be modeled,
The Ontology of History and Culture

anthropomorphically, in accord with the culturally formed paradigms of mental life.

For example, we speak of what a lion, stalking an eland, "intends" and "perceives," and of course we speak similarly of alert prelinguistic infants. But if you consider the import of item (vii) in the context of the rest of the tally, then you must see that the distinguishing features of cultural phenomena cannot be derived in any way from the precultural or subcultural forms of the mental, and that there cannot be a hierarchical (or privileged) ordering of the cognitive powers of any putatively disjoint forms of subjectivity. The first consequence calls into doubt Brentano's objectivism; the second, Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. I mention these penny distinctions, as I say, in order to feature what I take to be sui generis in the cultural.

I should say that all and only cultural phenomena are Intentional and historicized and, as a result, intrinsically interpretable. That is the thesis I wish to explore. I count among cultural phenomena the following particularly: persons or selves or subjects as opposed to the members of Homo sapiens, artworks, actions, institutions, words and sentences, traditions, and histories and the like. There is an enormous labor invited in saying even so little, that bears on the ontology of cultural entities—notably with regard to their individuation and conditions for numerical identity and reidentification and with regard to how to conceive the relationship between their natural and cultural features. I cannot do justice to these puzzles here, but I acknowledge that whatever we allege affords an objective description, analysis, interpretation, or explanation of cultural phenomena will be profoundly affected by our answers regarding these matters. For example, the objective standing of competing interpretations of particular literary pieces—as in such very different theories as those offered by Monroe Beardsley, E.D. Hirsch, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Roland Barthes—will, ineluctably, be a function of their respective notions of the fixity of literary works, their boundaries and conditions of identity, and what may be said to be found in them or to be merely imputed to them.

I must forego pursuing these matters, but it is hardly because they count as a detour. I offer instead an overly brief summary of what (over many years) I have found to be most defensible in ontological terms, which bears directly on the explication of the distinguishing marks of the cultural. I say, that, ontologically, all and only cultural entities

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1 See, for a fuller account, Joseph Margolis, Interpretation Radical But Not Unruly: The New Puzzle of the Arts and History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
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(a) are tokens-of-types,
(b) are embodied in, and emergent with respect to, natural entities,
(c) have histories rather than natures, or have natures that are histories, or simply are histories,
(d) possess Intentional attributes incarnate in their natural attributes.

I don't for a moment deny that these are controversial and disputable claims. They are also not entirely explicit, since I've cast them in terms of certain terms of art that are not entirely familiar. But I don't wish to quarrel about them here. I offer them primarily in the way of a promissory note, in order to begin to show the coherence and plausibility of what I have to say about the marks of the cultural that I have already mentioned: viz., Intentionality, historicity, and interpretability. I want to clarify these last notions primarily, in order to suggest certain radical possibilities that they harbor that go directly contrary to the leading tendencies in the analysis of natural phenomena and contrary (as well) to the standard treatment of intentionality (in Brentano and Husserl). My thought is that the general tendency (for instance, in Anglo-American analytic philosophy) to suppress the intentional (as in W.V. Quine and Donald Davidson) or to domesticate it (as in John Searle and Daniel Dennett) has to do with vindicating the conceptual priority and adequacy of what, in recent years, has come to be called naturalism or philosophical "naturalizing."

If a robust form of cultural relativism were admitted—for instance, along the lines of my initial tally and, now, in accord with what I have just offered as the ontological oddities of the cultural—then the standard view of the relationship between nature and culture (a fortiori, between the mental and the physical) cannot be right, and philosophy must have taken a distinctly wrong turn. That, ultimately, is the subversive purpose of my analysis: to point the way to that wrong turn and to urge us to retrace our steps. Locally, philosophical naturalism would (thereupon) be defeated, as well as the usual canonical constraints on interpreting ourselves, our histories, our art.

Now, I think the pivot of the required strategy lies within a very small compass. I myself believe that everything of importance bearing on the ontology, epistemology, logic, and methodology of the cultural can be effectively drawn from the analysis of predication and reference in natural language. Again, I cannot here make good the required effort. But I have found that what the analysis of reference yields (which is genuinely novel and

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philosophically powerful) may be caught up in the following heterodox claims:

(1) that the cultural cannot be derived or generated from the solipsistic (which defeats Brentano and Husserl);
(2) that predicative and referential success in natural language cannot be accounted for except in terms of the collective practices of actual societies (which defeats objectivism and naturalism);
(3) that the conditions of individuation entail the conditions of identity vis-à-vis all natural and cultural entities, but that the conditions of identity merely presuppose the conditions of individuation for any particular entities; and that the fixity of numerical identity does not entail any fixity of individuated natures (which defeats all forms of essentialism and extensionalism);

and

(4) that whatever is intrinsically interpretable is such in virtue of the evolving history of its encompassing culture and that, as a result, the cultural is always incompletely determinate though determinable in alternative ways (which precludes the adequacy of any merely bivalent model of objective claims).

These are extraordinarily powerful, subversive options opposed to the dominant themes of Western philosophy. I cannot demonstrate, here, that they are the correct conclusions to draw from a proper review of what we should mean by the cultural. But they are viable and coherent, and I myself believe they challenge in more than a fair way all the canons of the profession. They are certainly part of the prize of the labor I have in mind. You see, of course, that I cannot provide much more than a menu of systematically connected options.

I single out, therefore, the marks of the cultural that hold this entire conceptual program together. To begin with: I think it extraordinary that the classic theories of intentionality should have taken a solipsistic and ahistorical form. If, as I say, the paradigm of the mental and the subjective is the linguistic--or, better, accords with the notion that, among humans, thinking takes a linguistic form--then, if we simply equate the Intentional with what is culturally significant or significative, the form of the Intentional (the paradigm of the human world) cannot fail to be structured in a collective and historicized way.

To put the point naively, if you ask yourself what any run of actual discourse means, you cannot rightly answer if you do not consult the consensual practices of the living society in which such discourse functions (where consensus is not criterial, where divergent and even opposed interpretations may be defended,
and where assignable meanings may change in a disciplined way with changes in the evolving experience of an encompassing society). I take all that to be implicated in the objective standing of predication and reference and to be generalizable from such practices to the whole of human culture.

If so, then, of course, meanings (if you allow the nominalization) cannot be confined to the mental in the solipsistic sense and cannot be fixed either algorithmically or in any way restricted by a bivalent logic. That is what I signify by the device of capitalizing the term "Intentionality." The *Intentional*, I say, is whatever is significative (significant, meaningful, semiotic, symbolic, representational, expressive, rhetorical, stylistic, traditional, institutional, rulelike, or intended in Brentano's or Husserl's way), ranging over the linguistic or "lingual" collective practices of a society. (By "lingual," I may say, I mean to designate those practices that presuppose linguistic mastery but are not themselves forms of speech: the ballet, for instance, traditional forms of courtship, the relevance of speech itself in terms of an enveloping *Lebensform*).

Curiously, the most developed sense of the Intentional--in the sense I intend--appears in the work of a figure like Gadamer (that is, among those who are sympathetic with the work of the post-Heideggerean hermeneuts); but it is curious that phenomenology has not been much disposed to reorient its own account of intentionality along these lines. The reason is clear and important for any appreciation of what the admission of the cultural entails: namely that

(I) cultural entities are artefacts of the changing history of a culture;

and, as a consequence,

(II) the Intentional "nature" of any cultural entity (person, artwork, action, history) changes as a result of being interpreted in any responsible continuum of interpretation; alternatively, the Intentional milieu of interpretation changes as an artefact of ongoing interpretations.

Interpretive objectivity, therefore, cannot fail to be consensual in a radical sense altogether opposed to canonical notions of objectivity in the physical sciences. By historicity, therefore, I understand that feature of human thought or work or action (paradigmatically, linguistic or lingual) in virtue of which its "objective" Intentional structure can be determined only in terms of an encompassing society's Intentional practices. (I should have been tempted to speak, here, in terms of Wittgenstein's notion of a *Lebensform*; but, of course, Wittgenstein tended to think of the human *Lebensform* in the singular, holistically, without much in the way of determinacy, and in a decidedly
ahistorical way. I oppose all that.)

Historicity, therefore, signifies the historied contingency of the Intentional structure of thought and work or action, or of what is produced or done or effected by such thought or work, as a result of a society's ongoing life. From this I think it follows that

(III) objectivity, neutrality, validity, legitimation, realism, and the like are themselves artefacts of a historicized consensus;

hence, that

(IV) there cannot be any uniquely or ideally correct interpretation of any intrinsically interpretable entity or phenomenon.

I remind you once again that, by "consensus," I mean the actual viable collective life of an Intentionally apt society viewed as the medium in which its criteria of truth and rightness and the like are effectively such—not any such criteria themselves. Historicity, we may now say, is the temporal career of Intentionality; Intentionality is the collective import of the phenomena of a cultural world consensually determined in accord with its even changing history. Hence, by interpretability, I mean no more than the intrinsically Intentional structure of cultural phenomena viewed reflexively by an aggregate of competent selves made apt for interpretation by having internalized the linguistic and lingual skills of their native society. Alternatively put, human selves or subjects possess collective "natures" or shared histories, are Intentionally structured, are not natural-kind entities, are self-interpreting, and are altered in historicized ways by their own Intentional and interpretive activities and those of other selves.

If you grant that much, then I think you cannot deny that

(V) general predicables (or properties) are themselves Intentional posits consensually supported and objective only consensually;

and, as a result, that

(VI) the physical or natural sciences are themselves abstractions from within some set of Intentionally structured disciplines.

The upshot is that, on the argument, the human sciences cannot count on the natural sciences as providing a paradigm of objectivity for their own work--

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because the natural sciences cannot be anything but human sciences restricted under some suitable constraint: namely, a constraint under which, although predicables are Intentional posits, they need not be posited as themselves Intentional in structure. There is no paradox there. There appear to be at hand subsets of viable predicates that may be applied to physical nature without being construed as Intentional in structure. So Intentionality appears at two distinct moments in our efforts to understand ourselves and our world: first, as the intrinsic structure of our own cultural world; second, as one of the constituting conditions on which any objective discourse proves to be meaningful at all. Correspondingly, interpretation appears at the same junctures: first, as the work of understanding ourselves by means of alternative horizontal perspectives—in accord with, consensually, we determine the meaning of our world; second, as the work of understanding our world and our effort to do so—in accord with which, consensually, we determine how best to mark off what is objective in a non-Intentionalized world and in the human world.

I think there are additional findings that these distinctions lead us to, but I can only mention them for the sake of provocation and further analysis. First of all,

(VII) cognizing subjects and cognized objects are artefacts of history; alternatively put, there can be no principled disjunction between realism and idealism;

and

(VIII) there can be no principled way in which to disallow a relativistic account of the human and natural sciences, or a relativistic account of objective truth-claims.

These are immense promissory notes, of course. But their principal charm lies in sketching a way of reclaiming a large and neglected part of philosophical work without producing utter chaos and without refusing to limn a new direction for our future inquiries.

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Wittgenstein, Sociology and the
Transcendental Perspective

Wittgenstein has been read by several commentators as a sociologist of knowledge. There are undeniable similarities between remarks he makes and claims made by Karl Mannheim, for example. A further strength of the sociologically-oriented reading is that Wittgenstein clearly attaches importance to the fact that concepts are used in a context of community-wide agreement. Nevertheless, this reading should be rejected. It misunderstands Wittgenstein's concerns, concerns which would not be served by general theses about the preconditions of meaningful discourse. Wittgenstein seeks instead to expose particular forms of explanatory over-kill. I illustrate this by showing how Wittgenstein's emphasis on agreement in judgments points not to the conditioning of thought by its socio-historical background but to the unreality of the need for a philosophical account of our general agreement in our use of concepts. I would suggest that Wittgenstein's attitude to notions such as that of the Transcendental Perspective is similarly tangential. Rather than directly challenging its intelligibility (after the fashion of Mannheim), Wittgenstein wishes to show that the philosophical confusions which its postulation is to solve result from misunderstandings. Wittgenstein attacks its relevance rather than its coherence.

Thomas Nagel takes the later work of Wittgenstein to imply 'that nothing can make sense which purports to reach beyond the outer bounds of human experience and life' (Nagel 1986 p105). The thesis that a Transcendental Perspective is an impossibility could be defended on any number of different bases. According to some commentators, its basis in the work of Wittgenstein is a sociology of knowledge, according to which thought is essentially conditioned by the socio-historical context in which it arises. Although the substantive starting-point of the sociology of knowledge is Marx, it is in the work of Karl Mannheim, and especially that of his 'German period' (1920-33), that this

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1 Earlier drafts from which this paper derives were much improved by the comments of Renford Bambrough, Stanley Cavell, Maureen Eckersley, John Fletcher, Jane Heal, Richard Kilminster, and Ori Simchen.
standpoint has received its most philosophically-pertinent treatment.

When Mannheim criticises 'philosophy' he attacks a specific set of mutually-consistent, but ungrounded, attitudes (Mannheim 1952 p152), in particular, belief in 'the autonomy of theory' (p94) and in '[t]he fiction of the isolated and self-sufficient individual' (1929 p25). According to Mannheim, this philosophical picture fails to account for the manner in which the concepts with which we think (and consequently our thoughts too) are conditioned by our socio-historical setting (p238):

The philosophy of the philosophising individual is never strictly his own product but always the reflection of a supra-individual psychic and intellectual position.
Mannheim 1952 p113

Our thought is moulded by a host of 'non-theoretical factors' which remain invisible as long as we take our thoughts at face value, on the level of 'immanent meaning'. '[N]one of us stands in a supra-temporal vacuum of disembodied truths' (p148) and we must examine the social and historical context within which utterances are made if we are to fathom their meaning:

The false idea of a detached, impersonal point of view must be replaced by the ideal of an essentially human point of view which is within the limits of a human perspective.
Mannheim 1929 pp266-67

While in no way querying the legitimacy of the sociology of knowledge, I wish to suggest that using the sociology of knowledge as a key to understanding Wittgenstein is a mistake, despite the superficial similarities. Sociologically-minded critics of Wittgenstein attack him for failures which are only failures if one assumes that he is groping towards a sociological approach and these 'failures' should instead give us reason to think that Wittgenstein neither participates in nor advocates a sociology of knowledge. For example, Mannheim argues that a corollary of thought's social determination is its historical variability (Mannheim 1952 p171):

Inasmuch as man is a creature living primarily in history and society, the 'existence' that surrounds him is never 'existence as such', but is always a concrete historical form of social existence.
Mannheim 1929 p174

By assuming that Wittgenstein's approach and Mannheimian approaches are fundamentally similar, the 'totally a-historical atmosphere' (Gellner 1959 p171)
of Wittgensteinian philosophy suggests that he failed to appreciate what his own arguments reveal:

What is odd is that Wittgenstein’s obvious interest in the sociology of knowledge, expressed in his analysis of forms of life, should have failed to extend to an historical approach.
Easton 1983 p138

This points us in the direction of an even more incongruous characteristic of Wittgenstein’s sociology of knowledge, namely, its non-empirical approach. As Bloor despairingly insists, ‘if we are going to describe, then let us describe, if we are going to look and see, then let us really look and see’ (Bloor 1983 p183). On occasion (cf., e.g., LCA 8, 11 and BLB 134), Wittgenstein gestures towards the importance of describing the culture within which a language game is played. But these cases stand out from a general pattern which is strongly ‘non-empirical’, in that Wittgenstein repeatedly stresses that ‘we know at the start all the facts we need to know’ (Moore 1954-55 p323). If Wittgenstein is viewed as an advocate of a sociology of knowledge, it seems we must see him as incompetent one.

Bloor admits that his interpretation may not fit the exact contours of Wittgenstein’s thought but promotes his interpretation on the grounds that it explains several of its more prominent features (1992 p281). It is indeed to the credit of the sociological reading of Wittgenstein that it explains his frequent references to a life-context broader than which is typically referred to in philosophical debate and provides an explanation of why Wittgenstein opposes philosophical theories which consider meaning in isolation from that life-context. Explaining such features is an objective which most commentators on Wittgenstein feel the need to attain. Paul Boghossian, for example, has suggested that we can only make sense of what he calls ‘the obvious constitutive and transcendental pretensions’ of Wittgenstein’s reflections on meaning if we read into those reflections claims such as ‘that a certain measure of agreement in communal responses is a pre-condition of meaning’ (Boghossian 1989 p544 n66, p543). Such a claim would also give the sociological reading some bite. I wish to suggest, however, that certain over-simplifications here transform Wittgenstein’s ‘reminders’ into a superficially-powerful theory. These over-simplifications and the desire to attribute such a theory to Wittgenstein arise from a misunderstanding of his concerns.

The thesis that Boghossian formulates suggests that it will provide criteria by reference to which we will be able to identify ‘intelligible discourse’ or ‘meaningful judgment’. But are the concepts in our ‘explanation’ neatly defined?
How much 'agreement' does intelligible discourse require? And what kind of 'attunement' is necessary for meaningful judgments? Our problem is that the patterns of agreement in reaction which are necessary for the use of a concept are too intimately related to those concepts for these patterns to be seen as 'conditions of possibility' for those or any other concepts. Rather, they are criteria of identity of these concepts and more or less irrelevant to other concepts. Consider Wittgenstein's remarks on our agreement in colour judgments:

Does it make sense to say that people generally agree in their judgments of colour? What would it be like for them not to? -One man would say a flower was red which another called blue, and so on. -But what right should we have to call these people's words 'red' and 'blue' our 'colour-words'? . . . Is the language-game which they learn still such as we call the use of 'names of colour'?

PI p226

Wittgenstein rejects the claim that, without certain patterns of agreement, particular concepts could not be used. If such patterns did not exist, the 'colour concepts' that would be used might play such different roles that we would simply regard them as different concepts:

There is such a thing as colour-blindness and there are ways of establishing it. There is in general complete agreement in the judgments of colours made by those who have been diagnosed normal. This characterizes the concept of a judgment of colour. There is in general no such agreement over the question whether an expression of feeling is genuine or not.

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Wittgenstein asks us to envisage what it would be like were agreement more or less widespread than it actually is. If we rarely agreed in our judgments concerning 'colour', what kind of things could one say using a 'colour' judgment? If we agreed in our judgments concerning 'feelings' to the same extent as we agree in our colour-judgments, what kind of things could one say using a 'feeling' judgment? Consider how different human relations would be if our assessments of the genuineness of emotional responses were the subject of as little controversy as our judgments concerning colours. Could people lie under such circumstances? If the genuineness of our emotional responses was something available for all to see, they would not lie because they would not expect anyone to be deceived by their acting in a way not corresponding to their
feelings. In such a world of emotional 'openness', the whole conception of 'feelings' which 'lie behind' our actions would seem inappropriate. Would we say these people had feelings?

The extent of agreement is not the fundamental consideration. Rather where, when and with whom we expect agreement affects how we think of the judgments we are making and their component concepts. If the conditions we label 'normal' for a particular judgment overlap with those we call 'normal conditions for colour judgments', the concepts involved are probably visual concepts. If, however, there is no overlap, the concept is almost certainly not visual. A colour is available for all to see if light conditions are normal, unlike the genuineness of a person's emotional responses, because not everybody knows him as well as I do or you do or his mother does. Being new in town is a reason for someone's not knowing what the locals think but not for not knowing what colour their clothes are. Thus how we agree is a crucial element in the identity of the judgments we are making. If there were no possibility of disagreement in aesthetic judgments, 'art and the criticism of art would not have their special importance nor elicit their own forms of distrust and of gratitude' (Cavell 1976 p94). That level of agreement would be unacceptable with colours and with many instances of what we would call 'judgments'. So much so that some would question whether aesthetic judgments are judgments, or would say that they are not judgments 'in the same sense as' colour judgments, say.

'Agreement' presents itself as the kind of neat concept that might serve us well in constructing a general thesis regarding the 'preconditions of thought'. But the forms of 'agreement' that are relevant in the multitude of different cases are sufficiently heterogeneous to drain any general thesis of content. It is only when one stops to examine some of the less obvious cases and listen for the tell-tale idiom of over-generalisation ('not in the same sense as', etc.) that one begins to notice the ragged edges of apparently pristine claims like 'beneath any kind of meaningful judgment there must be . . .'. The kind of agreement one 'demands' of intelligible discourse depends totally on which kind of discourse it is and there is no general category, 'Agreement', that will allow us to delimit the meaningful 'kind' of judgment from the 'meaningless kind'.

Wittgenstein's real target in the remarks discussed is an explanatory over-kill which makes philosophical theorizing appear necessary. We seek an explanation of our general agreement in colour judgments without contemplating with any degree of seriousness what a lack of agreement would be like. Wittgenstein's suggestion is that a 'rival colour system' would not be a colour system so the attempt to explain our agreement regarding colour
judgments is an attempt to explain our agreement twice over. 'Granted that we would not have anything like our colour system without there being general agreement in our responses to colour judgments, why do we all agree in our responses to colour judgments?'

I would suggest that Wittgenstein's opposition to the 'Transcendental Perspective' will be similarly tangential. It will not be an effort to show that such a perspective is unintelligible but to show that its relevance is an illusion. The Rational Ego which occupies the Transcendental Perspective is already beset by all kinds of problems. ('How does it perceive or act on the physical world?') It and other philosophical constructs survive not by achieving internal coherence but by standing opposed to other even more obviously flawed positions. Thus pointing out another incoherence in the concept of a Rational Ego is not what we need and is not, I would suggest, Wittgenstein's contribution.

As with the philosophical project of explanation of our agreement in judgments, Wittgenstein's assault on the intelligibility of the Transcendental Perspective will be far more indirect. Wittgenstein endeavors to starve that Perspective of support. He attempts to show that when we feel we must be able to adopt such a view if we are to make sense of our own thinking, we have misunderstood. As Cora Diamond (1982 and 1991) and Warren Goldfarb (1983 and undated) have suggested, Wittgenstein wishes to show that such fictions are not demanded by our ordinary ways of thinking. In attacking philosophical fantasies, what is being 'assaulted' is unreal, is an illusion with a multitude of different sources. For Wittgenstein, to ask whether one might adopt the Transcendental Perspective and still be capable of Intelligible Thought is to ask questions about the essential relations between a set of illusions in which we believe because of our misapprehensions. In all these cases, all one can do is undermine the particular temptations to embrace those illusions. Wittgenstein starves such entities of the support our misunderstandings provide, rather than somehow refuting or 'disproving' them on the grounds of their being incompatible with well-founded theories of Judgment, Meaning or Thought.

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Isaac Nevo

Cracks in the Iron Cage: Instrumental Rationality and Reflective Equilibrium

Much that goes on in the contemporary "discourse of modernity" is governed by a narrative of tragic *hubris* and subsequent calamity. Modernity, it is often suggested, had sealed its own fate by replacing transcendence with presence as the ultimate basis of cognitive and practical justification. Its "Copernican revolution" had turned sour when reason proved itself to be incapable of providing a viable basis for ultimate justification. The Enlightenment had encouraged a scientific perspective, which ultimately undermined its own emancipatory claims. Consequently, the pursuit of truth had turned itself into a positivist pursuit of foundationless science, justified merely by its technological advantages; morality disintegrated into a non-cognitive discipline in pursuit of "emotive" expression; the beautiful degenerated into a pure matter of taste. At a societal level, enlightened modernity expected the rationalization of society to result in moral autonomy and political emancipation. Instead, reification became the predominant feature of rationalized society, which turned into a set of arbitrary mechanisms serving the interests of power. The modern appeal to reason had come to be seen as a Faustian pact, where a short term disenchantment was bought at the price of an all-encompassing totalitarianism.

The *locus classicus* of this line of reasoning is the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. ¹ Horkheimer and Adorno interpreted the defeat of enlightened modernity at the hands of its fascist opponents as the self-destruction of the Enlightenment itself. They took the reversal of its emancipatory hopes to be a product of reason itself, albeit, a product of reason's "darker side." Hence, socially enlightened thinking could no longer confine itself to the positivities of scientific theory, but had to become a self-reflective Critical Theory, articulating the social consequences of positive science, the conditions that make it possible, and the kind of discourse needed to elude its consequences.

Critical Theory's tangled web of enlightened self-incrimination proceeds, thus, on the basis of several assumptions: (1) within the limits of positive empir-

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critical theory, reason appears to have purely an instrumental capacity. Hence within these limits, the social manifestation of reason appears to be inescapably technological and bureaucratic. However, (II) reason has a foundational side to it as well, where positive claims are assessed for their "transcending quality and relation to truth." (DE: XIII). Furthermore, the emancipatory claims of enlightened modernity depend on this foundational capacity of reason. Unfortunately, (III) there is a conflict between these two functions of rationality. The intellectual and social manifestations of positive, instrumental rationality leave no room for what the foundational and critical side of reason requires, namely, the free and autonomous individual. There is, thus, a weakness in the "modern theoretical faculty" (DE: XIII), and it is this weakness that makes the rise of despotism possible. Thus, rationalization and repression are two sides of a single coin: "The fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant" (DE: 3).

My aim in this paper is to focus on the argument implicit in premise (i) above, namely, that societal rationalization necessarily leads to reification, because practical reason is, from the scientific viewpoint which delimits such rationalization, purely an instrumental capacity, incapable of justifying higher ends or values. Premise (i) is a critical rendering of Weber's account of modernization in terms of instrumental rationalization, an account which proceeds from the assumption that reason simply is an instrumental capacity. I shall attempt to assess the adequacy of premise (I) above by looking into Weber's argument. I argue that Weberian inferences from the purely instrumental character of practical reason to its "silence" on matters of values, and hence to the purely instrumental character of societal rationalization, are invalid. It follows that premise (i), as well as the "tragic" narrative of modernity that rests on it, are also inadequate, for in both, Weber's argument is taken by reductio, i.e., its validity is accepted while the paradoxical nature of its conclusion is taken as grounds for rejecting the instrumentalist conception of rationality.

On Weber's account, scientific rationality offers a welcome conception of a disenchanted world. However, the rationalization of society, begun by modern Capitalism, is likely to result in "mechanized petrification," rather than in any form of utopian emancipation. Despite his pessimism, Weber did not share the tragic viewpoint mentioned above. He saw the virtue of integrity in welcoming the "disenchantment of the world" and took it for no "legitimation crisis" of any kind. Nevertheless, his pessimism served as a basis for other proponents of that viewpoint, who saw no virtue in the sobriety of a disenchantment that seemed to

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eliminate the emancipatory capacity of reason altogether, and lead to the blindly pragmatized thought characteristic of modern Capitalism. Thus, reason itself came to be question in what I would like to argue is a philosophically unwarranted argument.

Reduced to a nutshell, Weber’s pessimism concerning the “iron cage” of rationalized, modern capitalism is best captured in the following schematic argument:

(I) Reason is purely a cognitive-instrumental capacity; there is no teleological rationality, capable of passing judgment on the ultimate ends, or values, of human conduct.
(II) Processes of social modernization are processes of rationalization in the following sense of the term: modernization involves the progressive differentiation of social roles and division of labor which make organized society function as a set of rationally describable mechanisms.

Hence:

(III) If modernization is to continue, it will not consist in subordinating societal means to more rational ends, but rather in deploying more effective means for the achievement of arbitrary ends, determined solely by the interests of political and economic powers.

Thus, Instrumental rationalization in the service of power is likely to become a societal end-in-itself, rather than a means in pursuing an independently rational way of life.

On this account, rationalization does not lead to the Enlightenment’s dream of universal rational emancipation, nor to any other “increase” in spiritual or cultural values. Rather, it leads to the very opposite of what the Enlightenment had hoped for. Society at large becomes a system of instrumentalities - an economic and political mechanism - to which all spheres of life are progressively subordinated. Philosophically speaking, Weber’s account conjoins a Humean skepticism with respect to value-rationality, with a functionalist view of modernization as determined by increased technical rationality in the functioning of social institutions. These two premises are implicit in Weber’s predictions concerning the mechanistic "petrification" of modern society.

Weber’s account of the Protestant origins of capitalism is a special case of the above argument. Protestantism led into modern capitalism as a rationalized system of market economy by turning profit-making into a religious duty and an
end in itself. However, the wells of ascetic motivation soon dried up, and capitalism re-established itself as an independent social mechanism, no longer in need of spiritual foundations. In *The Protestant Ethic* Weber goes on to describe this “iron cage” of modern capitalism in the following terms:

No one knows who will live in this cage in the future . . . For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: “Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.” (PESC: 182).

Similar processes of “spiritual” decline through rationalized progress and modernization are described by Weber as pertaining to other cultural fields as well. Science, in particular, is already rationalized to the point that its own foundations are called into question. But just as capitalism survives the decline of ascetic Protestantism, scientific disenchantment can survive the breakdown of its metaphysical foundations. As Weber puts it: “Science has created this cosmos of natural causality and has seemed unable to answer with certainty the question of its own ultimate presuppositions. Nevertheless science, in the name of ‘intellectual integrity,’ has come forward with the claim of representing the only possible form of a reasoned view of the world.”3 As this formulation shows, Weber saw it as a matter of integrity that science should be accepted on the same naturalized basis it advocates elsewhere. Thus, Neither science nor capitalism stood in need of any spiritual support, though in the case of science Weber saw that as a virtue rather than a vice.

Following Horkheimer and Adorno, contemporary Critical Theorists have challenged the philosophical premise of Weber’s argument to the effect that reason is purely an instrumental capacity, without special “interests” or values of its own. They did so, moreover, not merely in terms of the truth or falsity of Weber’s rejection of teleological notions of rationality, but also in terms of the consistency of that thesis with Weber’s own conception of rationalization, which they persist in conceiving in rationalist (rather than functionalist) terms (as if it were necessarily related to a teleological conception of reason). The purpose of such an analysis is to reduce Weber’s argument to the alleged absurdity of implying both emancipation and reification as consequences of rationalization. Such an analysis, leads back from Weber’s positive account of practical

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reason as purely an instrumental capacity to a Critical Theory of such an instrumentalist view as itself a symptom of Enlightenment's self-destruction. Thus, for example, Wellmer (following Habermas) argues the following:

The paradox that "rationalization" connotes both emancipation and reification at the same time, remains unresolved in Weber's theory. This paradox, of course, can arise only because for Weber "rationality" and "rationalization" are not only analytical or descriptive categories . . . but because they have an irreducible normative connotation which links them up with a more emphatic and comprehensive idea of reason . . . 4

Wellmer goes on to explain that Weber's conception of instrumental rationality is incompatible with his own idea of "rational knowledge" as constituting a cognitive "disenchantment of the world." The notion of such disenchantment, he argues, is internally linked to notions of disillusionment and enlightenment which contain an irreducibly normative evaluation of truth and knowledge as the ultimate ends of humanity. Hence, Weber's account is paradoxical in so far as it is wedded to the incompatible doctrines of cognitive disenchantment and instrumental rationality. It tacitly uses an "emphatic" notion of rationality as an irreducibly normative affirmation of "disenchantment" to justify processes of technical rationalization, in science as well as society, that would ultimately undermine the emphatic notion that justifies them. What remains unclear, however, is whether the "emphatic" notion of reason is genuinely contained in Weber's conception of disenchantment, or only in Wellmer's. For Weber, scientific disenchantment seemed to be a special case of technical rationalization, not an "irreducibly normative" justification of it.

Wellmer's analysis does not challenge the validity of Weber's argument. Unlike Weber himself, he takes it by reductio. Rejecting the conclusion, he goes on to reject Weber's philosophical premise, namely, that practical rationality is purely instrumental, invoking a Habermasian "communicative rationality," as an alternative conception. Here, I would like to offer another approach to Weber's predicament which does not have to resort to such burdensome metaphysical constructions. The problem in Weber's account does not lie, so I shall argue, merely with the soundness of his argument. Rather, the problem lies with its validity. Its premises do not imply its conclusion without further as-

sumptions, and consequently, Weber's despairing pessimism cannot be made to rest on the philosophical basis that was given to it.

Recall Weber's conclusion. It is that societal modernization, if it is to continue, could only take the form of increasing technical rationality, not that of an increase in the rationality of our values themselves. But are these really the only alternatives? Reason may not be able to "tell" us what ends to pursue, for there is, indeed, no purely rational or objective determination of ultimate values taken in isolation from one another. But rational deliberation may well be able to "tell" us more than just how to achieve our given ends, for it may also be able to "tell" us how some values, or ends, are to be justified in the context of others, and how the whole system of values and beliefs, in which rational deliberation always takes place, can be brought to a state of internal coherence.

Weber seems to assume that values are distinct and discreet entities that have to be taken one by one. But given an irreducible plurality of cultural values, and given that these values are inseparably inter-twined with one another, as well as with other attitudes and judgments, there remains a role for cognitive-instrumental reason to play in bringing the whole system of such values and attitudes into a state of coherence. Thus, it may be said that Weber's inference is invalid without the further assumption that was just spelled out, namely, that values stand to be justified only on an individual basis, and that no "increase in value" is to be gained unless it is gained in the form of securing an isolated justification for each distinct value apart from all others. The latter assumption - we may call it the assumption of value-atomism - is the main culprit in producing cultural pessimism on the basis of Humean skepticism.

The alternative between rationalization as an increase in technical rationality and rationalization as an increase in value is not exhaustive. The intermediate possibility is that of rationalization as an increase in the internal coherence of the overall system of values and beliefs. It is a philosophical mistake to believe that values can (and therefore, must) stand the test of reason individually and discreetly, and it is this belief in value-atomism that blinds moral thinkers to the possibility of justifying values by appealing to the internal coherence of the system in which they are embedded. Indeed, values are always part of a system, a network of inter-related judgments, attitudes, and beliefs, which face the "tribunal" of rational justification as a "corporate body" and not one by one. It is, thus, true that no substantive faculty of reason is available for the justification of isolated values and norms, and no value by itself is more or less rational than any other. It is equally true, however, that no such faculty is called for, where the task of rendering coherent our web of values and beliefs is concerned. At
the level of normative theory, rationalization is a matter of finding reflective
equilibrium in our systems of considered judgments, and for this task, instru-
mental rationality, with its judgments of coherence and consistency, is quite
sufficient.

One may imagine the following Adorno-esque answer to the above argu-
ment. The appeal to coherence in justifying value-rationality presupposes that
coherence is purely a "subjective," intra-theoretical, matter. On this assumption,
the appearance of theoretical contradictions is purely the "responsibility" of the
"subject" of theoretical discourse, rather than its "object." However, in social
theory contradictions have to be accepted as something "real" that cannot be re-
solved by purely theoretical means. Contradiction is also a feature of the "ob-
ject" of social theory, namely, society itself, with all its conflicts and struggles.
Hence, no theory in the social sciences is adequate to its "object," if it tries to
resolve contradictions purely at the level of theory. In other words, coherence in
social theory is theoretically adequate only if it is matched by a similar coher-
ence in the "object," i.e., in social life itself. Objective coherence, however, re-
quires an objective principle, a telos, around which societal conflicts are to be
overcome. Thus, the appeal to "subjective" coherence cannot constitute an ade-
quate account of value rationality, for in order to be adequate to its "object," the
appeal to coherence presupposes an objective value rationality prior to achiev-
ing coherence in theory.

On this account, the attempt to resolve conflicts intra-theoretically, and to
take such resolution as a form of value-rationalization, is just another form of
positivism. Such an appeal to coherence presupposes the priority of the episte-
ological over the ontological, which in social theory amounts to the assimila-
tion of the social sciences, along with their peculiar "object," to the natural sci-
ences, whose "object" does not show a similar tendency to conflict and contra-
diction. Thus, holism and the appeal to coherence are merely an extension of
the positivist attempt to eliminate objective values by reducing the social to the
natural.

In response to this argument, adapted from Adorno's case against Popper, I
shall pass over the difficult doctrines of the "real contradiction," and the re-
quired "adequacy" of theory to its "object." Obviously, within the Hegelian
framework which utilizes these notions, the objectivity and rationality of values
is presupposed, and it is, rather, the epistemological viewpoint of modernity that
counts as problematic. The point I wish to emphasize is that the charge of posi-
tivism, i.e., the attempt to assimilate holism, or the appeal to coherence, to
modernity's appeal to subjective certainties and immediate presence, is not go-
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...ing to stick even on these grounds. Coherence-based holism rightly conceives itself as an anti-positivist doctrine, and the attempt to force it to a positivist corner is an attempt to obscure the middle ground such holism represents. It is a middle ground between the modern rejection of objective, teleological values, on the one hand, and the narrower, positivist, reduction of values to matters of non-cognitive expression. The middle ground in question is that while values have a role to play in our whole web of judgment and belief, and are consequently not pure matters of emotive expression, they need not be recognized as "fixed points" of ultimate justification, permanently resting outside of the context of human action and deliberation, either. Once the holistic nature of reasoning is taken account of, there remains no room for a dualism of fact and value. Reflective equilibrium could thus serve as both a viable alternative within philosophy, and a basis for a reformist agenda in the critique of modernity.

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Foucault, Historical Time,
and the Origin of Man

In Michel Foucault's *Les Mots et les Choses* (1966) one confronts the limits of understanding his notion of history, or "archaeology," and its relation to historical time. How does archaeology reveal the historicity of the modern relation between linear, continuous, irreversible, chronological time and History without repeating the terms of the relation?¹ What is the difference between 'archaeological time' and historical time?

Archaeology stipulates that history, which is thought in the present, is not ahistorical, and the present in relation to linear historical time is not without a 'history'; the historical present and the presence of History must have originated in some past. Yet archaeology denies the possibility of locating the past origin of History in chronological historical time. Nevertheless, my question concerns the possibility of temporalizing the 'origin' of the difference between archaeology and history after the archaeological critique of linear historical time based on the continuous succession of presence.² Hence archaeology and history are not different degrees of a single manifestation within a quantitative spectrum of historiography: the history of history is not part of one and the same time continuum.

The temporal nature of the 'virtual' difference between archaeology and history within the modern era constitutes a great frontier for philosophical inquiry.³ For the archaeologist, the 'origin' of the unmasterable difference between the two theoretical fields (archaeology and history) entails a different re-

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¹ My definition of historicity is based on a chiasmic structure: historicity is irreducible to 1.) any representation of time in the history of philosophy and 2.) any mode of temporalization which determines the condition of a 'history.' Historicity is the event-like variable which determines the permutations of the chiasmus of the history of time (Heraclitus to Heidegger) and the temporal structure of history (cyclical, linear, discontinuous, genealogical etc.). Hence what is the ontological structures which determine the nature of finitude for historicity beyond any philosophy of history and any intuition of time? How does historicity relate to time, space, being, death, the origin, and history?

² Again, what is archaeological time if it can not be determined by theories of temporality which privilege a locus of presence by which the three dimensions of time intersect in their possible intuitive configurations?

³ By virtual we mean that history carries its own virtually 'historical' origin within itself because in the modern era, history is no longer determined by a transcendental origin of time (God, the birth of the cosmos, etc.).
lution to time, the truth of the 'historical nature of man's being,' the finitude of
man (death), and the limits of man's thought in the present (the modern age). For archaeology, the figure of Man appeared for the first time with the modern
era. Ultimately, the structure and practice of history was effected by the birth
of Man. Foucault states,

Far from leading back, or even merely pointing, towards a peak-
whether real or virtual- of identity, far from indicating the moment
of the Same at which the dispersion of the Other has not yet come
into play, the original in man is that which articulates him from the
very outset upon something other than himself; it is that introduces
into his experience contents and forms older than him, which he
cannot master; it is that which, by binding him to multiple,
intersecting, often mutually irreducible chronologies, scatters him
through time and pinions him at the centre of the duration of things.
Paradoxically, the original, in man, does not herald the time of his
birth, or the most ancient kernel of his experience: it links him to
that which does not have the same time as himself; and it sets free
in him everything that is not contemporaneous with him; it indicates
ceaselessly, and in an ever-renewed proliferation, that thing began
long before him, and that for this very reason, and since his experi-
ence is wholly constituted and limited by things, no one can ever
assign him an origin.

In the modern conception of history, the origin is not the distant birth of
Western Man. The origin has a new function. Man constitutes the origin itself;
the site of the origin is Man. Ontologically speaking, Man gives being
(existence) to the origin. However the origin is exterior to history even though
Man constitutes the flux of possibilities in which the phantom of the origin
makes itself present in time. As a result, the conditions by which history func-
tions in the modern age indicate a double structure of Man: he is the origin of
History because his own 'historical' origination lies outside of his consciousness
of time.

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4 The birth of Man as an 'empirical and transcendental object' in the modern episteme
is the central thesis of Les Mots et Les Choses. Archaeology, however, does not
imply by this assertion that physical, empirical human beings came about two
centuries ago. Rather the epistemological relation between our modern scientific
assumptions and the history of Man, with which we are familiar today, is the effect
of a recent transformation. For a closer look at the problem of Man in Foucault's

5 Foucault, The Order of Things, 331.
Paradoxically, Man bears some relation to the origin of History even though the condition of possibility of Man is his historicity (Greek, Christian, Modern etc.). In the modern era, the being of Man is fundamentally historical. Archaeology, however, indicates that the essential notion of the 'historical nature' (as the only nature) of Man is the effect of historicity; the very possibility of equating Man’s being with epochs of historical finitude is the product of an archaeological rupture. For archaeology, Man as the being of History was born even though the event of his origination is not visible in historical time. The modern form of history, on the other hand, assumes that the exclusion of the origin of History from cosmic time makes possible the origination of Man's being in historical time, i.e. epochal Man. However, archaeology's representation of the historicity of the 'historical nature' of Man dissolves the possibility of a true origin of the natural historicity of the being of Man within History; 'historical man' has no origin even though he is the origin of History.

In the modern age, the origin of History is visible in the being of man because man’s being is equated with historicity and not because the History of the different faces of Man is determined by a transcendental origin of time. This suggests that being (existence in general) is not the effect of the great cause known as time. For being can throw off the weight of truth deemed to it by time; being tears open the question of how it grounds itself without the truth of an origin. Being uses history to compensate for the evacuation of meaning when it is detached from a founding origin. Meaning reemerges when time liquidates its own origin and dissipates into history. The meaning of History is the meaning of the loss of transcendental meaning incurred by the exclusion of the origin of time from history. Yet the question of historical meaning transforms when the "virtual" origin of History poses a problem to the being of Man, whose essence is considered 'historical' in the modern era.

Because Man constitutes the origin, time can flow historically. Thus Man can situate himself in relation to the flux of time. Man makes visible his relationship with time through the image of History. History is a picture whose frame is the 'origin.' But as a frame, the origin can never be contained within the image of the history of Man; the origin encloses history in the void of its own finite space which Man hollows out infinitely. Yet the origin of Man is the

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6 To reiterate, one must keep separate the being of Man from the being of History to comprehend how archaeology historicizes the relations between being, Man, and History in the modern era in distinction to being, God, and history in the classical era.
'other' of History; moreover, it is beyond the category of the inhuman or pre-human, i.e. the "Pre-Historic," which still relates to the history of Man's being. The 'other' is the exclusion of Man's origin from history, while the excluded origin makes History the interminable witness of the being of Man. Once the being of Man is expressed by the flow of time in history, Man commences the quest for his impossible origin. Man fails to realize that the negation of his origin is the condition of possibility for historical time to determine his being. The impossibility of the origin of History, however, is the condition of possibility for the equation of Man's being with historicity. Historicity, in turn, makes possible the origin of the 'history of Man' even though Man, himself, no longer has an origin in history.7

With the advent of the modern era, the being of Man is structured by a specific ontological contradiction. Man occupies two places at once. On the one hand, he lies in the future of the flow of time; he occupies a referent which constitutes an 'endpoint' from where he can see himself (his past selves) flow in time through the vessel of History. On the other hand, Man nullifies the possibility for time to end; he thwarts time's potential termination by using history to manufacture the infinite density of his origin and thus all the possibilities of the 'beginning' of his flow in time. Hence Man is the destined effect of his becoming in historical time and the becoming of time in History.

However in the modern era, the infinite density of the historical origin of Man destroys the possibility for Man to describe the finite origin of History without sacrificing the historicity of his being and its relationship with non-original, linear time. Man speaks about history but does so from a present, which will be a part of history; the historical truth of history will become history in so far as the perpetual origination of the truth of History is never present in and of itself. Consequently, Man can never take the place of an infinite God, who determines being from the standpoint of an eternal scheme. Then again, Man infinitely replaces the possibility of being determined in his totality by virtue of the temporal indeterminacy of the historicity of the essence of his 'historical being.'8 The undying fact that things came before him in time

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7 To repeat, what is the 'temporal' nature of historicity if it is caught in a web of paradoxes concerning how one historicizes the 'modern' ensemble of relations between time, history, Man, and the origin without repeating any of those terms? What is historicity?

8 One must imagine an asymmetry within the epistemological function of the concept of the infinite when differentiating the modern episteme's (Man's) relation to time from the classical episteme's (God's) non-relation to time; modern historical epistemology, itself, is the 'historic' effect of this asymmetry. Archaeology tries to
makes the being of Man an infinite question; yet his being is a perennial question which he tries to resolve through his finite relationship with History. Things of the past existed at one time only because they show up in the a priori space of historical time where the being of Man has been inscribed prior to any past: all things in time are visible by way of history whose image is offered by the mirror of Man. Time flows through Man at a certain point as Man scatters himself at every point in History.

Paradoxically, the scintillation of the figure of Man through out history allows 'historical man' to make time submit to his knowledge at a particular moment in history. Time is subjugated to the theocentric eternity of Man's being even though time determines the anthropomorphic history of his finitude (Greek, Christian, Modern, etc.). Ironically, time structures history so that a finite identity of man emerges in time; but Man needs an identity prior to his first utterance of the truth of time's determination of his finitude. This constitutes the paradox of the becoming of historical man in time and the becoming of the truth of the becoming of time itself, which allows Man to speak the truth of his 'historical' identity at a point in time.

Man is the ground of the entirety of history even though the determination of the truth of his being continues to unfold in time and thus continues to become 'historical.' One must consider an indeterminate 'becoming' of the possibility of the 'being' of the 'history of Man' in its totality, which serves as the atemporal ground for the determined flow of time in history (i.e. transition of finite epochs). However, the 'temporal becoming' of the possibility of the flow of time in history is irreducible to historical time and the movement of physical time; furthermore it can not be conflated with archaeology and its relationship with time.

determine the historicity of effects, which ensue from this asymmetry. Man is the object of history and the transcendental origin of history, which allows the modern concept of history to appear in the form that it does- a non-originating process of origination. However the great problematic of the function of infinity in modern historical epistemology is too massive for the scope of this article.

In other words, how does Man constitute the foundation of becoming that takes the form of history when History at any given time determines the being of Man even though his being announces itself as the foundation of becoming (history); this massive paradox in some senses goes straight to the root of the question of being versus becoming. However this great philosophical problem exceeds the boundaries of this investigation.

This statement is not redundant even if it appears as such: the terms - 'temporal becoming of possibility' and 'historical time' - are not coterminus. Consequently, do we have to consider another order of temporality beneath historical time, which determines the historicity of the history of Man from without historical time?
Foucault, Historical Time, and the Origin of Man

Again the limit of understanding the difference between archaeology’s relation to time and historical time presents itself. Even though archaeology occupies a place next to the field of history, among the "human sciences" in the modern age, archaeology generates a series of reversals and mutations within the present epistemological conditions of history. Therefore archaeology's place in historical time becomes problematic because the concept of 'archaeological time' has yet to be determined: archaeological time is a 'future' theory of historical time when historical time is asymmetrically determined by the three dimensions of time and not the successive accumulation of one dimension- the past.

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Arbeit, Technik, Sprache:
Die Bedeutung von “Tacit Knowledge” in der experimentellen Physik

Einleitung

Ich arbeite gemeinsam mit Jörg Markowitsch und Allan Janik an einer Fallstudie in der experimentellen Physik, welche am Institut für Ionenphysik in Innsbruck und am Institut für Allgemeine Physik in Wien durchgeführt wird. In dieser Fallstudie untersuchen wir das praktische Wissen, das experimentelle Physiker und Physikerinnen im Labor benötigen, sowie dessen Aneignung und Vermittlung. In dieser Studie geht es also nicht um physikalische Theorien, sondern primär um die Arbeit im Labor, das heißt den Umgang mit komplexer Maschinerie, welcher eine Voraussetzung ist, um überhaupt physikalische Daten produzieren zu können. Es gibt bereits einige Untersuchungen, die sogenannten Laborstudien im Rahmen der SSK (Sociology of Scientific Knowledge), in denen die Tätigkeit des Wissenschaftlers im Labor untersucht wird. In diesen Laborstudien geht es aber zumeist um die Konstruktion naturwissenschaftlichen Wissens und nicht - wie bei uns - um praktische Fertigkeiten.

Praktisches Wissen und Sprache: Michael Polanyi und Ludwig Wittgenstein

Entgegen dem wissenschaftlichen Objektivitätsideal versucht Polanyi zu zeigen, daß Wissen nicht von der Person des Wissenden losgelöst werden kann. Diese Gebundenheit an die Person bedeutet aber, daß jegliche Form von Wissen nicht zur Gänze explizit formulierbar ist, sondern auch einen impliziten Anteil hat. Polanyi spricht dabei von "tacit" bzw. "personal knowledge"\(^1\), wobei es ihm insbesondere darum geht, die Bedeutung dieser Form von Wissen in der Wissenschaft aufzuzeigen.


Wittgenstein geht insofern über Polanyi hinaus, als er die Trennung zwi-

\(^2\) Polanyi, M. 1985 Implizites Wissen, Frankfurt am Main S. 24.
schen dem Sagbaren und dem UnsaGBaren, die er im "Tractatus" selbst noch
durchgeführt hat, in seinem späteren Werk aufgibt, indem er sozusagen das
Unaussprechliche bzw. Unausgesprochene in die Sprache integriert. Sprache
sind nicht mehr bloße Wörter, sondern Wörter verbunden mit Handlungen. Erst
in diesen "Sprachspielen" bekommt die Sprache Bedeutung und wird letztlich
zur Lebensform. Durch die Betrachtung der Alltagssprache wird also für
Wittgenstein die Unterscheidung zwischen explizit und implizit sinnlos. Sie ist
nur in Hinblick auf die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache von Bedeutung, um
die es Wittgenstein im "Tractatus" gegangen ist und auf der auch Polanyis
Begriff des impliziten Wissens beruht.

Selbst den Regelbegriff löst Wittgenstein von der Explikation. Er weist zwar
immer wieder auf die Bedeutung des Erkennens von Gleichmäßigkeiten hin,
zeigt aber zugleich, daß diese Gleichmäßigkeiten nicht von der Handlung
isoliert und in einen Regelkodex gebracht werden können, da "der Regel fol-
gen' eine Praxis" 3 ist. Bereits die Frage nach der Regel ist mitunter sinnlos:
"Wie soll ich also die Regel bestimmen nach der es spielt? Er weiß sie selbst
nicht. - Oder richtiger: Was soll der Ausdruck 'Regel, nach welcher er vorgeht'
hier noch besagen?" 4 Mit diesem Regelbegriff kann Wittgenstein die Nicht-
Transzendierbarkeit von Beispielen aufzeigen, was gerade in Hinblick auf die
Wissensvermittlung von grundlegender Bedeutung ist.

Wittgensteins Sprachausfassung führt letztlich zu einer neuen
Erkenntnistheorie. Ebenso wie Sprache notwendig mit Handlung verbunden ist,
kann auch Wissen nicht von Handlung losgelöst werden. Damit wendet sich
Wittgenstein gegen die Theorie: "[...] das Ende aber ist nicht, daß uns gewisse
Sätze unmittelbar als wahr einleuchten [...], sondern unser Handeln." 5 Im Alltag
ist aber wahrscheinlich die Praxis leichter zu akzeptieren als in der
Wissenschaft, in der Polanyi praktisches Wissen erst mühevoll verteidigen und
beweisen muß.

Zur Methode

Da es in dieser Fallstudie um praktisches Wissen geht, muß auch eine
Untersuchung dieses Wissens von praktischer Erfahrung, d.h. hier den unter-
schiedlichen Lern- und Lehrerfahrungen bei der Arbeit im Labor, ausgehen. Mit
Hilfe der soziologischen Untersuchungsmethoden der teilnehmenden

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3 PU 202.
4 PU 82.
5 ÜG 204.
Beobachtung und des Interviews versuchten wir, solche Erfahrungen zu sammeln.

Die Interviews wurden nicht so sehr nach quantitativen als vielmehr nach qualitativen Gesichtspunkten ausgewertet. Dabei erschien uns der Ansatz bei Problemen besonders interessant, da über praktisches Wissen erst reflektiert wird, wenn Probleme auftreten. Im folgenden sollen zwei Problembereiche anhand von Zitaten aus verschiedenen Interviews kurz dargestellt werden.

**Von der physikalischen Theorie in die experimentelle Praxis**

Der Beginn der Arbeit im Labor wird von den meisten Diplomanden als eine einschneidende Wende in ihrem Studium erlebt. Zuvor haben sie hauptsächlich theoretische Prüfungen absolviert, die mit der praktischen Arbeit im Labor nichts zu tun haben. Ein erfahrener Physiker beschreibt diese Situation folgendermaßen:

Ich habe das Gefühl, daß das eine ganz andere Arbeit ist als das, was man vorher im Studium macht; und daß die Leute überhaupt nicht wissen, was auf sie zukommt im Rahmen der Diplomarbeit, damit meine ich übergeordnet im Rahmen dessen, was man dann später als Physiker tut, wenn man eben forscht.

Die Studenten haben vor ihrer Diplomarbeit zwar auch Praktika absolviert. Aber die sind - wie obiger Physiker meint - mit der Arbeit im Labor nicht zu vergleichen:


Ein anderer Physiker meint, daß viele Leute gerade durch ihre theoretischen Vorstellungen von der praktischen Arbeit im Labor enttäuscht werden:
Von der Theorie wird sicher der Eindruck vermittelt, daß physikalische Systeme exakt vorhersehbar sind [...] viele Leute, die mit theoretischen Vorstellungen daherkommen, meinen: Man wähle die Anfangsbedingungen so und das Ergebnis ist so. Daß die dann vielleicht im ersten Moment von den Experimenten hier enttäuscht sind.

Von einer solchen Enttäuschung am Beginn der Arbeit im Labor erzählen mehrere DiplomandInnen. Die Arbeit im Labor kann aber - vor allem rückblickend betrachtet - durchaus als positiv angesehen werden, wie dies hier ein Dissertant schildert:


Dieser Dissertant bringt hier anhand eines anschaulichen Beispiels zum Ausdruck, daß es im Labor weniger um die Anhäufung von neuem Wissen geht als vielmehr um die "Verzahnung" von Wissen. Dieses Herstellen von Verbindungen gelingt ihm erst durch das praktische Tun und ist mit einer neuen Form der Begriffsbildung verbunden, die er vom theoretischen Lernen her nicht kennt:

Im Labor tun sich einfach die ganzen Bilder, die du lernst, oder theoretischen Sätze verbinden; die wachsen zusammen; weil du von da was brauchst, von da etwas brauchst und brauchen tust du das eigentlich für etwas Drittes. [...] Und da muß ich das und das berücksichtigen, beim anderen muß ich das mehr überlegen, wie das da ist usw. Da wächst das dann zusammen. [...] Die Begriffe werden weiter, weil sie zusammenwachsen. - Das ist paradox.

Ein anderer Physiker zeigt am Beispiel "Vakuum", was dieser Begriff aus rein theoretischer Sicht bedeutet und was dieser Begriff für ihn als Experimentalphysiker bedeutet:

Ein Vakuum ist ein theoretischer Begriff, den ich einfach in Zahlen ausdrücke mit einer gewissen Dichte. [...] Was das aber wirklich bedeutet und was das ist, das muß man vielleicht im Labor erfahren,
Arbeit, Technik, Sprache

weil man muß mit dem ja arbeiten, man muß ja Vakuum produzieren, man muß wissen, welche Schwierigkeiten man hat. Das hat mit dem Theoretischen eigentlich nicht so viel zu tun.

Sein Begriff von Vakuum beinhaltet sehr konkrete Vorstellungen, die sich auf die Arbeit im Labor beziehen. Er verbindet mit diesem Begriff alles, was er tun muß, um ein Vakuum zu produzieren. Der theoretische Begriff "Vakuum" ist hingegen eine reine Definition, ein bloßer Formalismus, der mit der greifbaren Wirklichkeit in keinem unmittelbaren Zusammenhang steht und daher für die tatsächliche Produktion von Vakuum nicht viel nützt.

Vermittlung von implizitem Wissen im Labor

In folgender Äußerung wird die Problematik bei der Vermittlung von implizitem Wissen sehr direkt angesprochen:

Gerade das haben wir gestern mit unserem Betreuer diskutiert: für ihn sind manche Sachen schon so in Fleisch und Blut übergegangen, daß er gar nicht mehr genau weiß, was ist das Grundlegende, was ist das, was einer, der sich noch nicht auskennt, als erstes hören muß.

Ein Wissen, das "in Fleisch und Blut übergegangen" ist, kann nicht jederzeit zergliedert und sprachlich genau dargestellt werden. Ein solches Wissen ist überhaupt nicht primär sprachlicher Natur, sondern vielmehr ein Wissen mit dem Körper, was gerade in dieser Metapher sehr deutlich zum Ausdruck kommt. Es bedarf daher einer eigenständigen Anstrengung, sich einem solchen Wissen sprachlich anzunähern.

Eine Diplomandin erkennt, daß gerade Erfahrenere oft die Apparatur geschickt bedienen, ohne daß sie genau sagen können, was sie tun:

Der O. ist jetzt in einem Erfahrungsstadium, wo er nicht mehr überlegt: "Warum steigt das genau so viel an", oder "Warum steigt es heute mehr an und das letzte Mal ist es weniger angestiegen?" Das überlegt er sich nicht, nicht wirklich, weil er das nicht braucht. D.h. für ihn ist nur wichtig: der ist dort, der Druck und das paßt mir nicht. Und dann zu erklären, warum ist der dort, warum paßt mir das nicht, das erfordert dann wieder eine Beschäftigung mit der Materie an sich und auch mit diesen Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten.
Hier kommt deutlich zum Ausdruck, daß Geschick bei der Arbeit an der Apparatur und die Fähigkeit, diese Tätigkeit sprachlich zu beschreiben, zwei unterschiedliche Fähigkeiten sind. Es mag zwar für einen Diplomanden sehr hilfreich sein, wenn sein Betreuer die Fähigkeit besitzt, eine möglichst genaue Beschreibung seiner Tätigkeit zu geben, da gerade Anfänger oft den Wunsch nach möglichst genauen Anweisungen haben. Aber für die Tätigkeit selber ist die Versprachlichung nicht erforderlich, wie dies obige Diplomandin folgendermaßen auf den Punkt bringt: "Bei der Arbeit an der Apparatur selbst ist die Versprachlichung nicht relevant. Sie bringt nur zur Vermittlung was."

Aber selbst wenn sich ein Betreuer um möglichst genaue Erklärungen bemüht, gibt es doch Bereiche, die prinzipiell sehr schwer sprachlich faßbar sind. Gerade das "Ausprobieren", das ein wesentlicher Teil bei der Arbeit an der Apparatur ist, läßt sich nicht exakt beschreiben:


Auch ein Dissertant hat erfahren, daß es oft überhaupt nicht möglich ist, genaue Erklärungen in Form eines "Kochrezeptes" zu geben:

Es gibt verschiedene Sachen, die man verändern kann und dafür kann man kein Kochrezept hergeben, weil das kein definierter Zustand ist. [...] Das ist einfach bis zu einem bestimmten Grad Erfahrung und Herumprobieren, weil man manchmal nicht weiß wie es passiert. [...] Man kann nur die Richtung vorgeben.

Die Arbeit an der Apparatur ist auch mit einem Wissen verbunden, das auf vielfältiges Sinneserfahrungen beruht. Mehrere erzählen, daß man sich an bestimmte Einstellungen "herantasten" muß, daß man bestimmte Anzeigen im Auge behalten muß, daß man anhand von Geräuschen Fehlerquellen an der Apparatur erkennen kann, und ein erfahrener Physiker meint sogar, daß selbst das Riechen wichtig sein kann - manchmal sogar wichtiger als das Hören:


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Do Parents still have Intentions
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In the traditional picture (Cf. Langeveld, 1946; Kant, 1964) education was conceived as a relation between the adult and the person being educated which has as specific aim the adulthood of the person being educated. The influence adults exert on children will bring them to the point where they can take up for themselves what was called a dignified life-project. Adults, being the representation of what is objectively good, are in the position to do that, i.e. to educate. Adulthood will show itself by being in authority over oneself, i.e. being able to bind oneself to what one has imposed on oneself, being able to maintain steady relationships both morally and practically and not being handed over to other people’s judgments. Adulthood will issue in being able to put oneself under a higher authority, i.e. accepting responsibility to a moral order and thus being free in obedience to it. The child on the other hand is helpless in a moral sense. He/she doesn’t know what is good and therefore cannot take up responsibility yet. That, so it is claimed, will be provided by the adult. The child begs for his guidance. Only if the adult decides what should be done concerning the child, will he/she be able to reach adulthood. In the heart of this concept of education one finds the intention of the educator, it is that, that makes an activity ‘educational’. And what the educator undertakes can only be justified as education in as far as it aims and contributes to adulthood, to the autonomy of the youth.

For more than one reason this kind of justification of parental authority has lost its attraction. The emphasis is now more on the individual (see Ch. Taylor, 1991), on looking for one’s own values, on trying to change society toward more tolerance, toward more pluralism, toward ... well almost to ‘anything goes’ as long as it was not harmful for one’s fellow human beings. And as society is characterized by ethical and religious pluralism, it is also argued that parents are no longer morally justified in initiating their children into a particular way of life. Educators can only indicate possible positions on such matters, to do otherwise is to harm the child. In this context it is not only less clear what parents’ intentions concerning their children still can be, in a more positive way some authors will argue that they have to refrain from ‘filling in’ a particular kind of good life (see for instance Wringer, 1994). Thus the frame of reference used by parents to justify their decisions seems to have considerably altered.
Do Parents still have Intentions and how do we know?

One of the basic criticisms of the Enlightenment tradition, particularly concerning the transparency of the subject to himself, deals with the denial of the subject's having intentions. What is meant by this is not that the subject doesn't have an aim in doing what he does, but that he is not an authoritative knower of his own intentions, that his intentions are imputed to him by others and coloured by their historical and socio-economic situatedness. Though few go as far as Foucault in such a radical bracketing of the subject, it is nevertheless argued by quite a number of authors that the subject is neither the originator of meaning nor of his (so-called) 'own intentions'. The radical and ultimate consequence of this insight for education is the disappearance of the project of education.

But is this really the case? Does the view that the societal consensus has disappeared implies that parental authority has lost every justification or in what way do we have to conceive it differently? And does it follow from the acceptance of the fact that the subject is not the originator of meaning nor of his intentions, that the concept of intention can be something like 'that which happens to the subject'?

In Wittgenstein's writings we will look for a general frame of reference to start answering these questions.¹

Generally, Wittgenstein neither advocates a position of pure inwardness nor of pure outwardness with regard to meaning. The community of language speakers forms the warrant for the consistency of meaning. Analogously the meaning of an action can be indicated using also the 'third person perspective'. And within the context of actions, 'intention' finds its proper place.

Wittgenstein indicates that human actions are voluntary (Cf. Z, #587, 594, 599) and that our attitude towards human behaviour is of a different kind than our attitude towards also unpredictable machines or wild animals. There is furthermore no need to speak of an explicitly articulated intention in order be able to speak of 'the intention of our activities'. This position avoids two kinds of problems. If what precedes our intentional activities is in itself an act of intending of the actor, then the danger of a 'regressus ad infinitum' appears. But if what precedes an intentional activity is something passive, a happening or circumstance, or state of affairs, then the difference between 'what actors do' and what is 'done to them', the difference between 'one's actions' and what 'one undergoes' disappears.

One speaks of intentions if one deals with descriptions of purposes or ends, of what one plans, and also if one indicates those things that are regarded as de-

¹ For an elaboration of the Wittgensteinian position as relevant to education, see my earlier studies Smeyers, 1992 and also Smeyers. 1995.
sirable by an actor. It is according to Wittgenstein not meaningful to ask oneself to search what one's intention is (Cf. PI, # 247) and intentions themselves, different from their expressions, are furthermore neither true nor false. Being part of a broader context is essential:

"An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions. If the technique of chess did not exist I could not intend to play a game of chess. In so far as I do intend the construction of a sentence in advance, that is made possible by the fact that I can speak the language in question" (PI, # 337).

One can differentiate between intentions which are made explicit from those which stay implicit, and between actions done for some other purpose from those that are embedded in institutions (etc.) and more distinctions are possible (Cf. Z, # 49). In normal circumstances the intention I attribute to my actions will be the same as other people's ascriptions.

In educational situations one can speak of 'intention' in several mentioned meanings. Though the intention that is explicitly stated has been the focus particular of educators, it is in my opinion the embeddedness which is most relevant. In what I do it will become clear what I stand for, the things I value and the way I go on and 'follow a rule'. This does not imply that one has reflected upon it, nor does it imply that if I reflect upon it, I can take a stance outside of our language-and-the-world. It means that the things I do cannot be considered as random activities which are just 'done' by me without knowing of them or indulging in them. Concerning education this implies that whether we consciously aim at it or not, we in a way always behave in an 'intentional' way. It is therefore important to make of what one is doing in education the focus of one's reflection, important to realise that in our dealings with children, be it at home or at school, 'the empty place of values' is filled in, in a particular way. 'Good reasons' for this acting have their place within a frame-work of 'good reasons for us'. And though not unchangeable, the way this is done will be in continuance with the past, with what I cared for and valued yesterday and thus entails a 'prescription' for future behaviour.

There is no point in romanticising education as it was in the good old days nor in trying to restore the past. Though the feeling of belonging to a family or to a community was probably much stronger in the past than it is now, there were also other sides to this life such as the fact that members were often prevented from exploring the broader life. Where else to start than from what one can witness these days, which means for myself as we find parenthood in the Western world.
Do Parents still have Intentions and how do we know?

First, it is still the case that people have children and given the means of anti-conception and the changed laws to liberalize abortion, it must be assumed that most people deliberately plan to have them. Second, most children are raised by at least one of their parents and the majority are still raised by both of them. Given that, something like an 'educational practice' is still very likely to occur. How can it be characterized?

Giving birth manifests one's willingness to enter into a relationship with the child one is carrying. And what is the case for that particular mother will generally also hold good for the father. For a number of people the particular period in their life they are willing to have a baby will be the result of deliberation and planning, but such is not necessary. Indeed in what they do humans always make clear what they want, in contrast to things which are just happening to them. Having decided to raise children brings with it a number of duties, more generally: being prepared to care for them. At first sight all of this seems uncontroversial. Problems will arise when decisions have to be made concerning for instance the amount of time or money to be spent on children. Again this will generally not be problematical with regard to the fulfilment of the basic level of human needs, but it will be more so when what is at stake is what is needed for personal development, well-being and human flourishing. This raises the question of how much an adult wants to be a parent, and how he or she conceives the parental role, including 'for how long'?

That a number of options are open does not imply that anything goes. Pace existentialism and certain nihilistic kinds of post-modernism, because human beings are what they are (i.e. humans), human flourishing seems to imply certain things. Gaita stresses the importance of virtues, not in terms of skills but analogous to craftsmanship (see Gaita, 1991, p. 88). Here morality is necessarily instrumental to human needs without ever being reduced to them. This Aristotelian thought is relevant to the determination of the aims of education. Though individual and cultural plasticity is fairly large, not everything can be brought in accordance with our nature.

This seems to point also at what is the necessary limitation of the structure of the family. The acceptance of pluralism at the level of society cannot be simply duplicated at the family level. To care for one's children means among other things to care for what they care for, and this will set limits to what is acceptable. It is difficult to love what is radically opposed to what one believes in, but it is hardly possible to live with what one hates. I stressed the limitation that is brought with this living close to each other (as opposed to apart together). It is possible that this will cause a problem for the child depending upon the kind of
basic beliefs the parents hold and the extent to which they regard them as indisputable. But that is a fair price to be paid for a life in which not everything is the same, a practice in which a child is embedded in which not all is indifferent. Some means-end reasoning, some manipulation may be part of the context of giving meaning to life. Children cannot be taught everything rationally (Cf. Macmillan, 1984) and it is indeed not possible to stay indifferent to everything children do without neglecting them.

Given the lack of societal consensus concerning what is valuable, it is therefore perhaps now more than before important that parents make clear and talk about what is for them worth living for and why that is so. It is not inconceivable that without that we will even faster end up in a society where the value dimension has disappeared or at least is strongly diminished (Cf. Frankfurt, 1992). It is important to stress that the justification for the initiation into particular values relies entirely upon what parents have found valuable themselves. Parents are necessarily limited to offer to their children by who they are themselves - something that might be called 'tragic'. To ask for a justification beyond this point, is to enter a circular debate. But it goes without saying that together with making explicit the adherence to particular beliefs, parents must be careful to indicate also that other alternatives are possible, but that these do not appeal to them. Making explicit what one stands for will be the response to keep the process of valuing ongoing.

How can parents not care about what their children care for, for the values they live by, they whom they so deeply love, without their own lives being fraudulent? The tension this creates between their own autonomy and the envisaged autonomy for their children makes it a difficult, but also a particularly worthwhile human experience. As far as I can see this has not altered, but the certainty parents once thought they possessed, has been brought to the true proportions of the groundlessness of what can be believed in. Parents will not envisage a precise future for their children. Such an intention has probably rightly disappeared. But that does not mean that they think that what they do is all the same, they are probably more than before convinced of the fact that what they mean and do for their children makes a real difference.²

² I would like to thank Prof. C.J.B. Macmillan for numerous critical comments and suggestions on previous versions of this paper and also for his help with the correct English wording of my thoughts.
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Sprachspiele und Religion


Welche Stellung hat die Religion im Spätwerk Wittgensteins? Hat er die Unterscheidung zwischen Sagbarem und Unsagbarem, was die religiöse Sprache betrifft, beibehalten? Im Spätwerk wird die Auffassung verworfen, daß die Sprache nur dann einen Sinn hat, wenn sie Sachverhalte in der Welt abbildet. Es gibt eine Vielfalt von Sprachfunktionen außer der Beschreibung von Tatsachen. Die Abbildtheorie der Bedeutung wird durch eine Sprachauffassung ersetzt, in der der Sprachspielbegriff eine zentrale Rolle spielt. Es gibt nach Wittgenstein unzählige Sprachspiele, d.h. Sprachbereiche, die mit verschiedenen außersprachlichen Aktivitäten verbunden sind und durch gewisse Regeln bestimmt werden. Auch die Sprache mit allen damit verwobenen Tätigkeiten wird von Wittgenstein "das Sprachspiel" genannt (PU 7). Es handelt sich um

1 Vortrag über Ethik, S. 18.
Sprachspiele und Religion

einen flexiblen Begriff, der so wie "Lebensform" oder "Bedeutung" nicht exakt definiert wird. Es ist durchaus im Sinne Wittgensteins von einem Sprachspiel zu sprechen, das die Sätze der Physik zur Grundlage hat, im Gegensatz zu einem Sprachspiel von Mitgliedern einer primitiven Gesellschaft, oder auch von einem wissenschaftlichen, ethischen, ästhetischen oder einem religiösen Sprachspiel. Mit dem Sprachspielbegriff ist der Begriff der Lebensform eng verbunden. Wir können ihn als eine Gesamtbezeichnung für die Sprache und für alle Tätigkeiten betrachten, die mit ihr zusammenhängen, im weitesten Sinne also für eine ganze Kultur mit allen ihren Manifestationen, die eine Gruppe oder das Mitglied einer Gruppe charakterisiert.


Die Sprachspieleauflistung im Wittgensteinschen Spätwerk wurde von Religionsphilosophen aufgegriffen, um ein besseres Verständnis der religiösen
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4 Nielsen (1967).
zeigen, daß das, was als widersprüchlich erscheint, in Wirklichkeit nicht wider-
sprüchlich oder inkohärent ist. Das zeigt nach Nielsens, daß die logischen
Prinzipien auch für die religiöse Sprache oder Lebensform gelten. Nach ihm ist
es also möglich, die religiöse Sprache zu verstehen und ihre Sätze zu kritisieren,
ohne an der religiösen Lebensform teilzunehmen.

Dieser Position Nielsens können folgende Überlegungen entgegengesetzt
werden: Es gibt bestimmt eine Zahl von Wörtern und Ausdrücken, die dem re-
ligiösen und anderen Sprachspielen gemeinsam sind. Der Punkt ist aber, daß ein
Wort wie "Existenz", wenn man von der Existenz Gottes spricht, im religiösen
Sprachspiel einen anderen Gebrauch als z.B. im Sprachspiel über physikalische
Gegenstände hat. Wenn man die Frage nach der Existenz Gottes als eine
Hypothese betrachtet, die durch empirische Tatsachen bestätigt oder widerlegt
werden kann, wendet man auf das religiöse Sprachspiel die Regeln eines an-
deren Sprachspiels an. Am Beispiel des Glaubens an das Letzte Gericht bemerkt
Wittgenstein, daß jemand, der daran nicht glaubt, dem Gläubigen nicht wider-
spricht (LCA S. 53ff). Um einander zu widersprechen, müßten der Gläubige
und der Ungläubige dasselbe mit dem Ausdruck "Letztes Gericht" meinen. Das
ist aber nicht der Fall. In einem gewissen Sinn versteht der Ungläubige zwar die
Wörter, die diesen Glauben ausdrücken, wenn er bereits über die christliche
Lehre informiert ist. Dieses Verständnis reicht aber nicht, um zu behaupten, daß
er dasselbe meint. Das ist so, weil das Verständnis dieses Ausdrucks nur durch
Einbeziehung des ganzen Sprachspiels möglich ist, zu dem er gehört. Dabei
muß man das religiöse Sprachspiel nicht bloß intellektuell zu verstehen ver-
suchen, sondern die damit verbundene religiöse Lebensform teilen oder min-
destens eine positive Einstellung zu ihr haben. Man kann den Sinn des Satzes
"Ich glaube an das Letzte Gericht" nur vom Standpunkt des religiösen
Sprachspiels aus verstehen. Der Ungläubige, der von einem anderen
Sprachspiel ausgehend "Ich glaube nicht an das Letzte Gericht" sagt, hat kein
Kriterium, das für beide Sprachspiele gilt, um sich zu entscheiden, ob er dasselbe
wie der Gläubige meint oder nicht. Der Ungläubige kann nach Wittgenstein nicht einmal sagen, ob er den Gläubigen versteht oder nicht ver-
steht.5

Nielsens, der schon zugibt, daß die Kriterien des Gebrauchs von "Gott" in-
nerhalb des religiösen Sprachspiels bestimmt werden, besteht trotzdem auf der
Möglichkeit einer Kritik von außen. Er kann aber nicht zeigen, daß es ein über-
greifendes Kriterium für die Anwendung von Ausdrücken gibt, die auch in an-

5 Ein Mensch, der seinen Glauben verloren hat, kann die religiöse Sprache verstehen, 
obwohl er die religiöse Lebensform verwirft. Siehe Winch (1977), S. 203-204.


Sprachspiele und Religion

Sprachspiel oder der Lebensform zu untersuchen (PU S. 542). So gesehen interpretieren Phillips, Winch oder Malcolm das Wittgensteinsche Werk richtig, wenn sie vom Fehlen eines äußeren Standpunkts zur Beurteilung von Sprachspielen sprechen.⁸


Wittgensteinsche Werk nicht ausgeschlossen wird. Wittgenstein wendet sich im Spätwerk gegen die Suche nach Gründen für die Sprachspiele außerhalb der Lebensform. Er bekämpft metaphysische Grundlagen, aber er läßt die Möglichkeit offen, daß es andere, nicht-rationale Grundlagen, wie den Glauben, gibt.


**Literatur**


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"Finding our feet with them"

Clifford Geertz' interpretierende Anthropologie


"Die Entwicklung einer [...] Politik, die nicht auf primordialem Konsens [...] beruht, sondern auf Respekt vor dem Gegner [...], scheint mir eine Hauptaufgabe unserer Zeit zu sein. Und die Anthropologie mit ihrem Sinn für das Partikulare, das Detail, die Besonderheit, kann hierbei vielleicht eine hilfreiche Rolle spielen" (Geertz 1994, 403).

Die Anthropologie soll "eine Weise der Diskussion, des Redens über diese Probleme anbieten" (Geertz 1994, 393), die dem jeweiligen Thema gerecht wird. Mit dieser Stellungnahme öffnet sich das Spektrum der für Geertz' anthropologischen Ansatz - und für die Anthropologie allgemein - zentralen methodologischen Fragen: Was soll man unter einer >angemessenen Weise des Redens< verstehen? Wie können fremde Lebensweisen (anthropologisch) erschlossen werden? Und wie kann das Erschlossene in Form von ethnographischen Berichten mitgeteilt werden?
Ingrid Weber

Im ersten Kapitel der Sammlung seiner wichtigsten Forschungsbeiträge der
sechziger und frühen siebziger Jahre (Geertz 1973; vgl. aber auch Geertz 1976)
stellt Geertz in dem ihm eigenen metaphorischen Stil seinen anthropologischen
Ansatz vor.

Auf der Basis eines im weiten Sinne semiotisch gefaßten Kulturbegriffs en-
twickelt er seine Forschungsmethode als ein interpretierendes Verfahren der
*ichten Beschreibung* (thick description).

"Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in
webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those
webs, and the analysis of it therefore not an experimental science in
search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning" (Geertz
1973, 5).

Geertz betrachtet Kultur als Text im Sinne eines Bedeutungsgewebes, eines
Systems von Symbolen, mit dessen Hilfe Menschen ihr soziales Verhalten
strukturieren und diese Struktur durch ihr Handeln mitteilen. Für die andere
Seite - den Ethnographen oder jede andere Person, die eine fremde Kultur zu er-
schließen versucht - bedeutet das, daß Kultur als "acted document" (Geertz
1973, 10) durch Interpretation zugänglich ist.

Um auf eines der zentralen Probleme der anthropologischen Arbeit
hinzuzweisen, zitiert Geertz eine Passage aus Ludwig Wittgensteins
*Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, was Geertz' Nähe sowohl zur dialogischen
Philosophie als auch zu Wittgensteins eigenwilligem Stil dokumentiert:

"Wir sagen auch von einem Menschen, er sei uns durchsichtig.
Aber es ist für diese Betrachtung wichtig, daß ein Mensch für einen
anderen ein völliges Rätsel sein kann. Das erfährt man, wenn man in
ein fremdes Land mit gänzlich fremden Traditionen kommt; und
zwar auch dann, wenn man die Sprache des Landes beherrscht. Man
versteht die Menschen nicht. (Und nicht darum, weil man nicht

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1 Diesen Ausdruck hat er von Gilbert Ryle (1971a; 1971b) übernommen und dadurch
erst bekannt gemacht. An einem von Ryles Beispielen, in dem es um Zwinkern,
Blinzeln, Zwinkern-Parodieren und Zwinkern-Üben geht, verdeutlicht Geertz (1973,
5ff), was er unter dichter Beschreibung versteht. Diese verschiedenen Handlungen
könne man, so Geertz, nur dann voneinander unterscheiden, wenn man nicht in
physikalischer Weise das von außen Wahrnehmbare darstelle, sondern die
Bewegungsabläufe *in ihrer Bedeutung für die ausführenden Individuen* beschreibe.
Diese kann der Anthropologe mit Hilfe von Aussagen der ausführenden Individuen -
das heißt mit Hilfe von Informanten - und über seine eigenen Beobachtungen der
handelnden Personen ermitteln.
"Finding our feet with them"

weiß, was sie zu sich selber sprechen.) Wir können uns nicht in sie
finden" (PU II, xi, 223).2

Dieses Sich-Einfinden, das Geertz für die wichtigste Tätigkeit des
Anthropologen hält, versteht er nicht im Sinne eines Empathie-Konzeptes äl
terer ethnologischer Ansätze als Einfühlen in oder Nachahmen von fremden
Lebensweisen (Geertz 1973, 13), sondern als Deutung des Handelns, so wie die
Handelnden selbst es verstehen ("our formulations of other people's symbol
systems must be actor-oriented" (Geertz 1973, 13)). Um sich einfinden zu kön-
nen, müßt der Anthropologe mit den Anderen >ins Gespräch kommen<:

"We are seeking, in the widened sense of the term in which it en-
compasses very much more than talk, to converse with them"
(Geertz 1973, 13).

Wie dabei nun allerdings genau zu verfahren ist, wird nicht systematisch
dargestellt. Daß es sich um eine oft unbefriedigende Tätigkeit handelt ("an un-
nerving business which never more than distantly succeeds" (Geertz 1973, 13)),
kann man sich leicht vorstellen. Darüber hinaus überläßt Geertz diejenigen, die
sich seinen Ansatz erschließen wollen, der gleichen undankbaren Aufgabe, die
er selbst auch zu erfüllen versucht: Das interpretierende Sich-Einfinden kann
lediglich anhand der einzelnen Forschungsbeispiele nachvollzogen werden.
Das macht es einigermaßen schwierig, sich unter einer anthropologischen
Perspektive etwas vorzustellen, die irgendwo zwischen Innen und Außen, zwi-
schen Teilnehmen und Beobachten, zu liegen scheint.3 Die Interpretation kul-
tureller >Texte< macht diese zum Objekt; die Person, die zu deuten versucht, ist
nicht selbst in das betreffende Bedeutungsgewebe >eingespinnen<. Gleichzeitig soll die Interpretation sich an den Deutungen orientieren, die die
Handelnden selbst ihren Lebensweisen zuschreiben.

Für den Anthropologen oder den Ethnographen schließt sich an die Frage,
wie man fremde Lebensweisen oder andere Symbolsysteme erschließen kann,

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2 Geertz zitiert aus der englischen Übersetzung. Dort lautet der letzte Satz, auf den er
sich im folgenden bezieht, um die Tätigkeit des Anthropologen zu charakterisieren,
"We cannot find our feet with them". Dieses Zitat von Wittgenstein fügt sich so
vollkommen in Geertz' Darstellungsweise ein, daß man es für seinen eigenen Text
halten könnte.

3 Richard Bell deutet diesen anthropologischen Standort als Perspektive "from inside
one's self" (Bell 1984, 309) und versucht, davon ausgehend Wittgensteins
"Bemerkungen über Frazer's The Golden Bough" als Kritik aus der Position einer
"analogy of self-understanding" (Bell 1984, 301) zu beschreiben. Ob eine solche
Weise des Redens über Geertz' - und über Wittgensteins - Anthropologie jenen
>gerecht wird<, um es mit Geertz' Worten auszudrücken, bliebe gesondert zu
diskutieren.
Ingrid Weber
das Problem der >Angemessenheit< der Darstellung an. Wie kann der Ethnograph das Erschlossene in einem Text fixieren? Geertz ist sich des Umstandes bewußt, daß ethnographische Beschreibungen Repräsentationen von Repräsentationen sind, Darstellungen zweiter oder sogar dritter Ordnung: Der Forscher hält das fest, was Angehörige durch ihre Handlungspraxis oder durch die Beschreibung ihrer Handlungspraxis ausdrücken. Darüber hinaus ist die Person, die den ethnographischen Text verfaßt, in gewisser Hinsicht selbst im Text enthalten. Forschungsberichte enthalten keine wahren Aussagen über eine objektivierbare Realität, sondern Interpretationen der Wirklichkeit:

"The pretense of looking at the world directly, as though through a one-way screen, [...] is itself a rhetorical strategy, a mode of persuasion" (Geertz 1988, 141).

Die ethnographische Darstellung muß, um glaubwürdig zu sein, das Beobachtete anschaulich beschreiben - was den literarischen Charakter ausmacht, der an Geertz' Beiträgen deutlich wird - und gleichzeitig dem Anspruch auf Wissenschaftlichkeit genügen:

"Ethnographers need to convince us [...] not merely that they themselves have truly 'been there', but that had we been there we should have seen what they saw, felt what they felt, concluded what they concluded" (Geertz 1988, 16).


Obwohl er den dialogischen Hintergrund seiner interpretierenden Anthropologie nicht deutlich genug herausstellt und einzigen methodologischen Fragen ausweicht, hat Geertz mit der Hinwendung zu Kultur als einem System von Symbolen und der Betonung der ethnographischen Arbeit als inter-


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Are there Natural Laws of Language

Newton's laws of motion as stated in his treatise on mechanics, of 1687, are the classical examples of natural laws. They have deeply influenced the theoretical efforts in most sciences of more modern times, including of 20'th century linguistics.

In order to approach the problem of understanding the nature of this influence I should like to begin by making a few remarks about the relationship between the Newtonian laws and the experimental bases upon which they rest. To this end I want you to consider the first law of motion which Newton took over from Galileo and which states that a body remains in its state of rest or uniform rectilinear motion unless it is made to change this state by forces impressed upon it.¹

The experimental justification of this law was given by Galileo's famous experiment with the sloping plane.²

A solid body is moving without friction on a plane surface which is tilted at a certain angle relative to the ground. We assume that where the experiment is being carried out the ground is flat and horizontal. Furthermore we assume that the tilt angle is initially constant. Later we will change it.

Suppose now that we observe the body on the tilted plane at a moment when it is freely moving uphill at a certain speed. We find that the speed diminishes.

Now, without changing the tilt angle, let the body be freely moving downhill at some speed. In this case we find that the body increases its speed.

In our second experiment we decrease the angle of tilt of the plane.

Having done so we repeat the two observations we have just made, i. e. the one in which the body is moving uphill at a certain speed, and the one in which the body is moving downhill at some speed. Again we find that speed diminishes in the uphill case, although less rapidly with the smaller tilt angle, and that it increases its speed in the downhill case, only less rapidly under this condition also. With the tilt angle reduced the downward pull exerted by the weight of the

¹ For this interpretation I am relying on the 1986 facsimile reedition of C. V. L. Chartier's 1927 translation into Swedish of Newton's original text in Latin.
body is also reduced.

Finally, we carry out the experiment with the plane 'tilted' in such a way that it comes to lie in parallel with the flat ground. What was previously uphill is now the direction toward the right, we may assume, while the previously downhill direction is now the direction toward the left.

Whether the body be moving at some definite speed toward the left or toward the right, we see that it neither increases nor diminishes its speed, but continues to move - with no change of speed. (Remember there is no friction!)

When no force was acting on the body, owing to its neither having to move uphill nor downhill its state of motion was unaffected.

As I said initially I wanted to make a few remarks about the relationship between the Newtonian laws of Nature and the experimental bases upon which they rest. One of my remarks is that Galileo's experiment on the sloping plane is a paradigm demonstration of the meaning of Newton's first law of motion. This meaning can of course not be formally deduced or computed from the wording of the law but consists so-to-speak in the doing of Galileo's experiment. The paradigm experiment is the meaning and the justification of the law in the sense that understanding the law is to know the relevant experiment.

Rather than giving a 'picture of nature', Newton's Principia suggests recipes for handling the phenomena of nature to diverse ends. And the paradigm experiments are constitutive of the meaning of the whole theory.

The application of Newton's mechanics in our practical lives therefore involves adapting the natural conditions so as to create the conditions which are required in order for the paradigm experiments to work "according to the book", so to speak. If for instance in some application I want to make a body move with uniform, rectilinear motion I must eliminate all forces including friction that might interfere with the motion in question. In so far as our way of life depends on the use of machines our natural environment thus has to be correspondingly adapted.3

I

The idea that language is governed by natural laws is not new in linguistics. It was entertained by many linguists of the comparativist movement of the early nineteenth century. For instance, the founding fathers of the movement, Franz Bopp, and the two brothers von Schlegel tended to think of language as a kind

3 This point has been particularly well developed by Pär Segerdahl in Linguistics and language.
of living organism which would necessarily go through the successive natural phases of childhood, youth, maturity, and old age in order to finally dissolve and die. The indoeuropean proto-language was supposed to have reached maturity and perfection already in prehistoric times whereupon its division into the various daughter languages (Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, proto-Germanic, etc.) had set in. A sentence in the proto-language was thought, in this rather romanticist conception, to have been built out of words which in their turn were constructed from univocal referential and/or relational elements called "roots". The idea that the 'decay' which manifested itself in the surviving indoeuropean languages could not have started before or during the acme of the proto-language had the character of a natural law that could not be disobeyed in the study of the histories of these languages.4

After some seven or eight decades into the nineteenth century the Neogrammaraman school of linguistics managed to rid itself of this naturalist assumption and declared programmatically as a rule of method that all historical change in language was to be explained in terms of the operation of exceptionless sound laws which had their ground in the physiological and psychological conditions of speech production. In fact, language was taken to be speech production. The discovery of the sound laws came to be the discovery of the causes of the successive changes that had taken place in the various languages in the course of history. To many linguists of this period the sound laws were actually considered to be natural laws of language.

Gradually it was realised, however, that the sound laws, rather than being any laws of nature were better understood as summary, formulaic statements of systematic phonological similarities between the vocabularies of the various languages involved. Rather than 'causing' anything these formulaic correspondence rules had themselves to be explained as being due to causes that were somehow operative in language.

The so-called structuralism of F. de Saussure, though having its roots in neogrammarian historical-comparative linguistics, especially in the descriptivism of this school, emphasised the logical priority and autonomy of the so-called synchronic aspect of language and of the factual use of linguistic forms of expression as being the sufficient ground for their 'correctness'. The historical origin of a word or phrase was irrelevant to understanding its meaning and its

place in the current synchronic language system. Linguistics was to be descriptive rather than normative.

Saussure came close to suggesting the existence of timeless principles of language change with his comparison of language history with a game of chess, but he does not seem to have developed these ideas in any further detail.

After Saussure, Chomsky has been the most eloquent proponent of the program to search for natural laws of language. Thus in his *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* and in several later writings Chomsky advances the theory of *Universal Grammar* according to which every human being is born with a genetically wired-in capacity for language acquisition which supposedly contains a mechanism that makes the growing child automatically internalize the linguistically most perfect grammar of the language of his linguistic environment. The rules of the universal grammar are principles by which a linguist or a child who is (respectively, explicitly or intuitively) formulating the generative grammar of some language may select the linguistically best path to follow in situations where the data of the investigation allow several choices between possible alternative rule formulations.

According to Chomsky, universal grammar summarises The Theory of Language (i.e. of any language) and the discovery of the principles embodied in this grammar is therefore the most important task for contemporary linguistics.

In Chomsky's research both the grammars of individual languages and the General Theory of Language are formal mathematical constructions. This is an important fact with many consequences for the generativist notion of natural language.

For instance, in the generativist view the data of a language are the forms of linguistic expression, primarily sentences, that the language student may encounter.

The linguist is supposed to concentrate his efforts on the *grammatical* sentences. The proper grammar should generate *all and only* the grammatical sentences, i.e., it should admit all the grammatical sentences as possible outputs but block all expressions which are not grammatical.

This idea entails a problem with respect to the factual occurrence of *ungrammatical* sentences in the speech of real, living people: If the speakers employ their internalized grammars when they speak, and if the grammars only generate grammatical sentences as they by definition should, then how is it that

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ungrammatical sentences can occur at all?

The generativists tend to answer this question in two steps. First they appeal to Chomsky's distinction between competence and performance. Grammatical errors, and hence, ungrammatical sentences only occur, if Chomsky is right, in linguistic performance, i.e., in the use of grammar by individual speakers in concrete situations.

Competence, on the other hand, is the internalized grammar of the ideal native speaker. This competence manifests itself as grammatical intuition. This seems to explain the existence of ungrammaticalness in the linguist's data. But one further problem remains: How is the linguist who does not yet know the full grammar of the language he is studying - how is he to separate the grammatical from the ungrammatical data?

Chomsky has sometimes said that a generative grammar expresses the ideal native speaker's intrinsic linguistic competence and most generativists take this to mean that a linguist who is also a native speaker of a language may consult his grammatical intuition to find the data necessary for the investigation of his own language, i.e., to avail himself of a sufficiently rich store of grammatical examples of this language.

I.e., the problem of the existence of ungrammatical linguistic data is solved by the linguist's primarily working with his own grammatical intuition which is thought to reflect genuine competence and hence also to reflect the actual, internalized grammar.

When setting down a rule of syntax, for example, a generative linguist will usually support the validity of the rule by exhibiting grammatical sentences which accord with the rule together, perhaps, with ungrammatical sentences which are in illuminating disagreement with the proposed rule. The grammaticalness or ungrammaticalness of these 'data' is established by relying on the linguists' grammatical intuition.

II

Recently the research methods of generative grammarians have come under attack on account of the disturbing lack of naturalness of their examples. It is moreover felt that this unnaturalness is connected with the general lack of interest of the generativists' in linguistic performance. Typical generativist syntax examples such as The ball was hit by a boy do not seem to be natural language examples because one is hard put to imagining unconstrued speech situations where they would occur naturally.

This criticism is often based on the feeling that the central fact of language is
the actual use of forms of linguistic expression in real life situations by real, living people.

From such a use point of view the method of procedure looks as if the generative grammarian is in actual fact himself inventing the data upon which he bases his investigation. In doing so he appeals not to some arcane internalized grammatical intuition which is available only to his own introspection but to his own sense of grammatical correctness as developed by himself through his own study of grammar, starting with his learning to read and write in kindergarten and continuing through possible foreign language studies in college and perhaps at the university level. He is projecting his sense of grammatical propriety into his own language research.

I believe that this conclusion is essentially correct and that it shows that Chomsky style generative grammar has got stuck in a logical impasse.

I also believe that a basic reason for this sad state of affairs is that Chomsky has attempted to construct his theory of language on the model of Newton's principles of natural philosophy.

In the spirit of the scientific optimism of the sixties Chomsky and his followers have overlooked the intrinsic dependence of the principles of any Newtonian type of theory on its experimental bases and of the ensuing necessity to arrange reality so as to be adapted to the conditions required for the paradigm experiments to work properly.

They did not sufficiently consider that a Newtonian type of theory is not a description of reality but a system of recipes for analysing, synthesising and generally manipulating the facts of reality. If everything in reality has already been thus adapted, the theory may of course be said to describe this 'reality', otherwise not.

One may perhaps regard the linguistic examples of grammar as being analogous to the experiments of Newtonian physics. In both cases things have to be prepared and arranged so as to fit the purposes of the investigator.

To give Chomsky's scientific grammar the status of a true description of the language it generates, it is necessary to make all speakers of the language always speak and write in a perfectly grammatical fashion.

Chomsky's science of language presupposes in other words that grammar be normative.

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