Section 1

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE

WITTGENSTEIN UND DIE PHILOSOPHIE DER KULTUR
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The Logical Necessity of World-Pictures in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*

One of the central themes of Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* is that we act and think on the basis of certain propositions that are impossible to doubt. Wittgenstein characterizes the "logical role" (OC 136) of these propositions in a number of ways: they "stand fast" for us (OC 144); they are the "inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false" (OC 94); they are the hard "river-bed" that functions as a channel for our thoughts and inquiries (OC 96, 97); they are the "hinges" on which our doubts and questions turn (OC 341, 343). Some of these bedrock propositions are personal ("My name is L.W.", "OC 328), some are about objects in one's environment ("Cats do not grow on trees", OC 282), others about one's body ("I have five fingers and two hands", OC 157), others about mathematical truths ("12 x 12 = 144", OC 447), and others still concern remembered facts ("I have never been in Bulgaria", OC 269). Wittgenstein calls the set of these propositions "picture" (OC 209), "world-picture" (OC 93-5, 162, 167, 233) or "life" (OC 117, 559). I shall refer to these propositions as "fundamental propositions" (for short "FP"), and shall call the set of all fundamental propositions held at a given time "world-picture".

I start out by characterizing the logical role that FPs are supposed to play for our system of verification and justification. In section II I discuss Wittgenstein's claim that FPs cannot be doubted. I contrast the two main interpretations of this claim - a conventionalist reading, and a naturalist reading. In section III I develop an account of the logical necessity of FPs that draws both from the conventionalist and the naturalist interpretation. This account allows to reconcile two apparently conflicting characteristics of FPs, viz. their impossibility of being doubted and their being contingent truths.

I. The Logical Role of Fundamental Propositions

Although FPs look like empirical propositions, they function as something by which we scrutinize and judge other empirical propositions. They have "the character of a rule" (OC 494). The role of FPs within our system of knowledge "is like that of rules of a game" (OC 95, 309). And since it is a mistake to think of the canonical form of a rule as being a conditional imperative, Wittgenstein
notes: "the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules" (OC 95). What are FPs a rule for? Wittgenstein calls them "postulates" or "rule[s] of testing" (OC 321, 98) other sentences. The characteristic of a postulate is that it serves as the prerequisite of an argument or investigation without being part of it. I read Wittgenstein as saying that FPs are the fixed points in our understanding of the environment. They make up the framework in which questioning, checking, investigating, and proving makes sense. Refusing to take FPs for granted amounts to rejecting "our whole system of verification" (OC 279).

FPs are fundamental in the sense that one cannot play the respective language-game to which they are fundamental, unless one accepts them without question. It is not that we don't have enough time to investigate everything and so must take these propositions on trust (OC 343, 150); rather, if we set out to investigate them, we shall find ourselves in an infinite regress because we shall never come up with a reason upon which we are entitled to say that it admits no further investigation. Wittgenstein writes: "I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say "can trust something")" (OC 509; cf. 115, 493). Although it is clear that On Certainty promotes some kind of coherentist or at least holistic position, it is not easy to specify this position. Some passages suggest that coherence is a presupposition for the meaning of sentences (OC 432), others suggest that what is meant is a version of a coherence theory of justification. I shall concentrate on the second reading of the claim that our knowledge forms a system, or world-picture.

There is no clear borderline between fundamental and other empirical propositions; rather, the use of a proposition determines whether it is considered as standing fast or whether it is subject to verification. One and the same proposition can function as a FP in one language-game, and can be subject to investigation in another language-game (OC 98). Wittgenstein compares FPs to a river-bed in which ordinary empirical propositions flow; but, he says, it may happen "that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid" (OC 96). An example of a "hard" proposition that has become "fluid" is: "No human being has ever been on the moon" (OC 108).

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1 In "The Metaphysics of Wittgenstein's On Certainty" (Philosophical Investigations 8, 1985, pp. 81–119) J. Cook wrongly assumes that, on Wittgenstein's view, a FP can be defined independently of the context in which it is employed.
II. The Impossibility of Doubt

FPs, Wittgenstein declares, are "isolated from doubt" (OC 87); they are "shunted onto an unused siding" (OC 210) where they cannot be doubted. The denial of FPs would "plunge everything into chaos" (OC 613). Seriously questioning FPs would not amount to asking whether an empirical proposition is true, false, or probable, but whether to accept or engage in methods by which empirical propositions that can be tested are tested. And since we cannot decide not to accept the "system of verification" that we always use, the denial of FPs is unintelligible. They are too deeply entrenched in our thought and behaviour for us to be able to choose whether or not to participate in them.

The question I want to explore here is, why exactly FP are logically impossible to doubt. In other words, what does the logical necessity of indubitable FPs consist in? Two competing responses can be found in the literature - conventionalism and naturalism.

According to an (austere) naturalist reading\(^2\), we can imagine alternative world-pictures, but we cannot really understand them. Alternative sets of FPs are unintelligible, although not logically contradictory. When we attempt to look at these alternatives in detail, and to trace out their consequences, we are lead to abandon more and more of our own familiar world, and the ways of thinking about it upon which our understanding rests. The following passage supports this reading:

I might [...] interrogate someone who said that the earth did not exist before his birth, in order to find out which of my convictions he was at odds with. And then it might be that he was contradicting my fundamental attitudes that were how it was, and if I should have to put up with it (OC 238).

FPs are logically necessary since they are quasi-transcendental principles of our understanding. This is also the reason why alternative sets of bedrock propositions wouldn't be intelligible to us. If, nevertheless, I started doubting my FPs, two things would happen: (a) others would regard me as mentally demented (OC 257), and (b) "the foundation of all judging would be taken away from me" (OC 614). So much for the naturalist reading of logical necessity.

According to an (austere) conventionalist reading\(^3\), on the other hand, the

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\(^3\) Cf. M. Dummett "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics" (*Philosophical Review*
reason FPs are too deeply entrenched in our thinking as to be subject to coherent doubt stems from the fact that we have decided to accept them as certain beyond doubt. FPs are fundamental by convention, not because they play an essential role for our understanding. Nothing, in principle, keeps us from deciding to adopt an alternative world-picture. The epistemic specialness of the FPs constituting our world-picture is thus not inherent to these propositions. The conventionalist notion of logical necessity is supported by passages such as this: "Sure evidence is what we accept as sure" (OC 196).

On the conventionalist reading, Wittgenstein’s world-pictures resemble Kuhn’s paradigms. Paradigms set the frame for questions in scientific inquiry and determine the range of possible answers. As a result of growth of the body of scientific knowledge, paradigms tend to "wear out" after some time. "Revolutions" in science consist in overthrowing established paradigms, and accepting new ones. Regarding On Certainty one might say: before a world-picture has "worn out", it seems unavailable to serious questioning. Such doubts "would not tie in with anything in my life" (OC 117). "Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite" (OC 93) and I don’t possess a system "within which this doubt might exist" (OC 247). However, once enough recalcitrant evidence has accumulated, doubts concerning our present world-picture are not only intelligible but rational.

III. Contingency and Certainty

Both conventionalism and naturalism run up against problems when explaining the notion of FP as characterized in On Certainty. While naturalism can account for the numerous passages in which Wittgenstein declares FPs as indubitable, it’s unable to explain the contingency of FPs. (Austere) conventionalism, on the other hand, renders FPs contingent, but doesn’t seem to square well with the alleged indubitability and certainty of FPs. In the remainder of the paper, I shall argue for an interpretation of world-picture that combines aspects of conventionalism and naturalism.

In OC 613, Wittgenstein suggests that not all FPs are equally certain, but that they vary regarding the certainty attached to them. He writes:

If the water over the gas freezes, of course I shall be astonished as can be, but I shall assume some factor I don’t know of, and perhaps

leave the matter to physicists to judge. But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N., whom I have known for years? Here a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos.

Wittgenstein seems to say that only the denial of certain FPs undermines our intelligibility of the world, whereas other - less central - propositions can be questioned, without forcing us to abandon the foundation of all judging. In section 232 of On Certainty, Wittgenstein goes even further by claiming that the denial of every single element of our world-picture is intelligible. What is impossible, is the denial of all FPs at once. The pertinent passage reads:

"We could doubt every single one of these facts, but we could not doubt them a 11". Wouldn't it be more correct to say: "we do not doubt them a 11". Our not doubting them all is simply our manner of judging, and therefore of acting.4

The idea that some other-worldly possibilities are perfectly intelligible isn't only more intuitively plausible than the (austere) naturalist reading of FPs as quasi-transcendental principles; it also allows to account for the contingency of FPs. Wittgenstein makes quite clear that denying FPs doesn't involve a logical contradiction, and that FPs don't represent necessary truths. FPs may change over time. Propositions that used to be bedrock, such as "No human being has ever been on the moon" (OC 108), are today falsifyable. Now, if the denial of FPs were, in principle, inconceivable, as the (austere) naturalist interpretation suggests, we wouldn't be able to recognize them as contingent. In other words, if alternative world-pictures were impossible to understand, we would have no basis for assuming that the FPs we hold on to could be false.

Unlike naturalism, conventionalism is capable of accounting for FPs as being contingent truths. However, the conventionalist interpretation of FPs cannot explain the epistemic specialness of FPs. If FPs were certain, simply in virtue of us having decided to take them for granted, it wouldn't be understandable why we cannot adopt a radically different world-picture. Conventionalism is compatible with global scepticism regarding FPs. But, as we saw above, Wittgenstein is at pains showing that radical other-worldly possibilities undermine our understanding.

Let me conclude. Conventionalism and naturalism should be regarded as

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4 I assume that Wittgenstein lets the interlocutor say something which is his own view, viz. that it is, for whatever reason, impossible to question all of one's FPs at once.
complementary positions. Conventionalism is right in emphasizing that world-pictures are not necessarily true, but rests on a contingent decision. Naturalism, on the other hand, is right in stressing that once one has become accustomed to a world-picture, it is inconceivable to imagine oneself adopting a radically different set of bedrock propositions. The difference between conventionalism and naturalism is ultimately a difference in perspective. Conventionalism explains how world-pictures become entrenched, whereas naturalism explains their epistemic role for our system of knowledge once they are entrenched.

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Wittgenstein's Interest in Augustine

Why does Wittgenstein care about Augustine? Why does Philosophical Investigations start with the citation and criticism of Augustine's remarks about language-learning? The 1933 Big Typescript begins, as does The Blue Book, with a direct criticism of the thesis that understanding is a mental event. If criticizing that mentalist thesis so as to arrive at a counterthesis is the aim, then why Augustine? Does it matter that he held the view about language-learning that Wittgenstein is concerned to engage?

No doubt "one of the tasks of Philosophical Investigations is to show how [Augustine's picture of language] leads to error and confusion."¹ Philosophical Investigations does seek to wean us from "a paradigm that bedevils our reflections on meaning."² But to say only that is to cast Wittgenstein as concerned simply to remedy an intellectual mistake. This overlooks the moral urgencies of the text that are evident in the engagement with Augustine.

Augustine's Confessions is one of the most authoritative conversion narratives in Western culture. Its only competitors for depth and range of influence are Plato's Republic, the conversions of the Gospels and Acts, Descartes' Meditations, and Marx's narratives of class consciousness. Wittgenstein called the Confessions "possibly, the most serious book ever written."³ Malcolm reports that Wittgenstein "told me he decided to begin his Investigations with a quotation from the Confessions not because he couldn't find the conception expressed in that quotation stated as well by other philosophers, but because the conception must be important if so great a mind held it."⁴

What then does Wittgenstein mean in noting the greatness of Augustine's mind? How is Augustine's greatness connected with his thoughts about language?

The Confessions depicts a conversion out of empty arbitrariness and into

² Ibid., p. 97.
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self-unity, charity, and continence. Augustine dwells at length on his pride, lustfulness, and perversity throughout his childhood and young adulthood. As an infant, the immediate demands of his body bring about bodily motions that are more simple behaviors than human actions. “[I]n those days,“ Augustine tells us, “all I knew was how to suck, and how to lie still when my body sensed comfort or cry when it felt pain“ (I, 6, 25). As he grows up, the pleasures that he pursues become more multifarious and wilder, but equally effective in determining his behavior. “For as I grew to manhood I was inflamed with desire for a surfeit of hell’s pleasures. Foolhardy as I was, I ran wild with lust that was manifold and rank“ (II, 1, 43).

Augustine’s pursuit of bodily pleasures leads him to repress his capacity for acknowledging any higher realities, above all God. “I was unable to conceive of any but material realities“ (V, 11, 106). He remains caught in servitude, a form of bondage wrought by his own will upon itself.

I was held fast, not in fetters clamped upon me by another, but by my own will, which had the strength of iron chains. ...For my will was perverse and lust had grown from it, and when I gave in to lust habit was born, and when I did not resist the habit it became a necessity. These were the links which together formed what I have called my chain, and it held me fast in the duress of servitude (VIII, 5, 164).

After his conversion it is, for Augustine, entirely different. His actions come now to be shaped by a “new will which had come to life in me and made me wish to serve you freely and enjoy you, my God, who are our only certain joy“ (VIII, 6, 164). Augustine achieves a unity of the self with itself, as it is coherently housed in divinely ordained cultural routines of continence and charity. “Truly it is by continence that we are made as one and regain that unity of self which we lost by falling apart in the search for a variety of pleasures“ (X, 29, 233).

This conversion, this reorientation of the will, is achieved through grace. “For, whatever powers [a man] has, did they not come to him by gift?“ (VII, 21, 155; citing I Cor. 4:7). Here is the scene of its completion.

I seized [Paul’s Epistles] ...and in silence I read the first passage on

5 Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1961), Book I, Section, 6, p. 25. All references to this work will be to this edition and will be given in the text by Book number, Section number, and page number.
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which my eyes fell: ‘Not in revelling and drunkenness, not in lust and wantonness, not in quarrels and rivalries. Rather, arm yourselves with the Lord Jesus Christ; spend no more thought on nature and nature’s appetites’ [Rom. 13: 13-14]. I had no wish to read more and no need to do so. For in an instant, as I came to the end of the sentence, it was as though the light of confidence flooded into my heart and all the darkness of doubt was dispelled (VIII, 12, 178).

This picture of conversion is enormously attractive to Wittgenstein. It offers escape from a life dominated by arbitrary passion. It offers a model of the overcoming of prideful self-assertiveness (“The edifice of your pride has to be dismantled” [CV, 26e]) without abasement. One’s actions will henceforth express who one is as a creature of God.

The language-learning scene in the Confessions is then of interest because it is there that this later conversion is first dimly in preparation. Augustine thanks God for both his ability to think conceptually and for a consequent openness to both language-learning and conversion.

[My understandings of the sensible world] must have been in my mind even before I learned them, though not present to my memory. ...It must have been that they were already in my memory, hidden away in its deeper recesses....

...If for a short space of time, I cease to give them my attention, they sink back and recede again into the more remote cells of my memory, so that I have to think them out again, like a fresh set of facts, if I am to know them. ...[O]nce they have been dispersed, I have to collect them again, and this is the derivation of the word cogitare, which means to think or to collect one’s thoughts. (X, 10-11, 217-9)

That is, within the human person there are both conceptual archetypes and the power to use them to form propositions. These archetypes and this power are gifts of God, not products of sensory processes. Thinking is the recalling and use of these archetypes. It involves a collection of the self and its contents, an achievement of coherent unity out of chaos. To exercise this power is already to bear possibilities of conversion.

The power of thought that is exercised in language-learning emerges here as a scintilla animae, a spark in the soul that is “a trace of the single unseen Being from whom it was derived” (I, 20, 40). To exercise this power is to make use of God’s gift. It is the presence within language learning of a power of thinking that is itself latently a power of conversion that attracts Wittgenstein’s interest,
and it is Augustine's sense of the presence of this power, and his account of its subsequent flowering into conversion, that makes his mind, to Wittgenstein, great.

But is Augustine's conversion genuine and exemplary? Does Augustine succeed in describing his route from infancy to conversion? There are reasons to be suspicious of Augustine's account of his development.

It is unpersuasive that desire should disappear after conversion in the way that Augustine claims it has. Normatively, it is not clear that a conversion to continence and charity is necessary for elevated humanity. The very life of a person seems to disappear, once it is imagined as no longer inflected by desire. This is reflected in the tendency of the protagonist of the Confessions to disappear as a presence after the conversion in Book VIII.

Wittgenstein noted the arbitrariness and inhumanity of Augustine's account of continence as a necessity of faithfulness. In reaction to M. O'C. Drury's surprise that Egyptian religious sculptures show a god with an erect phallus, Wittgenstein replied,

Why in the world shouldn't they have regarded with awe and reverence that act by which the human race is perpetuated? Not every religion has to have St. Augustine's attitude to sex. Why, even in our culture marriages are celebrated in a church; everyone present knows what is going to happen that night, but that doesn't prevent it being a religious ceremony. 6

Desires tend to linger, whatever joys in God's presence may be possible, and their lingering seems to have something to do with what we are. Augustine's claim to have accomplished an elevating conversion seems too inhuman and too intellectualistic, in relying initially on an isolate power to conceptualize the objects of experience.

Yet a conversion something like Augustine's continues to attract Wittgenstein's interest. ("What is good is also divine. ...Only something supernatural can express the Supernatural." [CV, 3e]) There is a wish for a wedding of spontaneity to the expression and achievement of value. The possibility of conversion must have something to do with a spontaneity within that makes language learning possible, but less intellectualistically. The natural thing to do then is to investigate that mental activity.

This investigation of mental activity in language-learning is the opening move of Philosophical Investigations, as its protagonist undertakes to scrutinize

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and refigure the possibilities of conversion that are latent within it. “These words, it seems to me [,so scheint es mir‘], give us a particular picture of the essence of human language“ (PI, §1; emphasis added).

It is easy to see how Augustine’s picture of language-learning arises. In positing a divinely given mental activity underlying language-learning, it upholds the species-specificity of language. It seems to capture the crucial aboutness of language, that at least some words can be used to sort and classify things.

Yet the picture is not the right one. It offers no account of “the remaining kinds of word“ (PI, §1), words unlike “table,“ “chair“ and “bread.“ It represents our ability to classify objects as a matter of archetypes within that await only triggers by experience, rather than as part of a course of development that involves entering into cultural repertoires. Hence it casts our conceptual consciousness as more fixed and thinglike than flexible and enabled by culture.

So Augustine’s picture of the learning of language is not the right picture; his account of conversion not the right account. We can point to a use of language for which Augustine’s account is altogether unsuitable, scene in which a word is used significantly, but not as the expression of any inner archetype.

Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked “five red apples“. He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked “apples“; then he looks up the word “red“ in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers--I assume that he knows them by heart [,er weiss sie auswendig‘: outwardly, by rote]--up to the word “five“ and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.----It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words (PI, §1).

“Five“ is not the name of a Platonically subsistent number. It is, instead, an expression that is used within a primitive cultural routine. Hence Augustine’s account of conversion rests on a misrepresentation of our linguistic abilities.

Crucially, however, the aspiration for a route from an inner power and toward conversion does not disappear. It is not enough just to say that we have this word “five“ and certain routines of using it. Something in us wishes to know how we have that word and those routines, and further what possibilities of development are therein open to us. A voice--one of the voices of the protagonist, a voice occurring within the protagonist’s consciousness, not without--intrudes, interrupts the criticism of Augustine’s picture, in order to demand some picture in its place, some account of our power. “‘But how does he know
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where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to do with the word ‘five’?" (PL, §1). The thought that there just are routines of cultural activity is not one that it is easy to rest with, without an account of them.

There then arises in the text an internal dialectic, an unending critical conversation within the protagonist, between two voices that are equally its own: a voice that demands a ground for, an account of, “the way one operates with words,” of how one is so much as able to do this at all, and of the possibilities of development and conversion that are open to a being possessed of that power; and a voice of rebuke or repudiation, a voice that rejects any explanatory account of our power as intellectualistic and as insensitive to the torturous entanglements of conceptual consciousness with cultural routines, a voice that seeks not mastery, but silent charity and peace, but a voice that in this seeking exercises the very power for which the first voice demands an account, a voice that cannot in the energies of its repudiations uphold the view that cultural routines are mere natural happenstances that we do not actively make, a voice that hence acknowledges despite itself the existence of an inner spontaneity or power.

*Philosophical Investigations* is the dramatic enactment of this conversation between these two voices that remain entangled with one another, unendingly and inconclusively, within the consciousness of the protagonist. This protagonist seeks a route toward conversion and a doctrine that would describe that route: the first voice enters its proposals. But this protagonist is also aware of the enabling power of cultural routines themselves for conceptual consciousness, in providing more than mere triggers for a fixed inner power: the second voice enters its rebukes. Yet, in entering these rebukes, the presence of some spontaneity within is implicitly acknowledged, and the aspiration to conversion is given room to assert itself. Ongoing struggles with temptation and for self-understanding (including sometimes an overlying suppression of such struggles) as an intentional being involved in linguistic and cultural practices are, on this text’s showing, a central part of what it is to be a person.

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Relativism and the Wittgensteinian Picture of Language

Relativism\(^1\) is undoubtedly an issue which invokes widespread interest in contemporary thinking. For one thing, relativity of knowledge, ways of conceptualization and reasoning are supposed to be an important feature of the 'post-modern' predicament in which we find ourselves. It is also a question which concerns not only philosophy but a broad area of social science as well. I would even venture to say that the sociology of knowledge as a discipline or social constructionism as an approach exist on the very assumption of relativism - and it is also an unavoidable question in studying other cultures. In the heavy discussion between relativists and anti-relativists both parties offer rather convincing arguments. The ever-present problem in these debates is that, on one hand, we obviously have things we may call the 'facts of nature', that we ourselves and also the world around us are similar everywhere in many respects; and on the other, we also have the undeniable fact of cognitive diversity. Any position taken up in the relativist-antirelativist debate must account for both points.

It is an interesting question as to whether Wittgenstein was a relativist; or, to be more precise, whether we can reach any relativistic conclusion from his work. His writings certainly resemble to those of a relativist; at any rate he does not give the impression of a bigoted universalist who defends universal truths on the basis of universal rationality or reason. Besides this impression, I think it is also in fact possible to crystallize from his work a serious philosophical argument in favour of relativism. As Wittgenstein is notorious for approaching everything through questions of language, it is not surprising that this argument operates on a certain picture of language as well.

Let us begin the discussion with another picture of language - the one which is offered by the quotation from Augustine in the first paragraph of the *Philosophical Investigations*. This picture is based on the idea that what constitutes meaning is a sort of one-one correspondence between the elements of language and elements of the world. Whether the elements in the world are objects, sets of things, properties or facts; and whether the word-world connection is that of

\(^1\) The following discussion will be limited to cognitive relativism, and thus questions of moral relativism do not form the subject of this paper.
naming, referring or picturing, does not concern us here. What is important is that in the end there is a direct connection between the meaning of a sentence and its truth-conditions.

How does the Augustinian picture of language relate to relativism? Let us take a putative case of relativism: two different cultures or two historical periods with different views. If members of both cultures or periods share at least a part of their world, and are thus able to refer to the same things, then - at least in the realm of their common reference - relativism is not a viable possibility if we accept the Augustinian picture. If meaning and truth-conditions are directly connected, we cannot have two statements with the same meaning and yet with different truth-values. The proper translation of true statements from one culture results in true statements in the other as well. On the other hand - and this is equally important - if meaning is constituted by a straightforward word-world connection, then members of different cultures or periods in fact do share the same world. I think it is rather implausible to assume that there can be two groups of people who hold views that are so remote from each other that they could not have any common point of reference. To use Wittgenstein's words, 'that rain, that thunderstorm, the phase of the moon, the changing of the seasons, the similarities and differences between animals and people, the phenomena of birth, death and of sexual life' are things which every person perceives around him to be obvious (BFGB). They might not be able to talk about everything, but surely they can talk about something; quite a lot of things, in fact.

In short, this picture of language suggests we all live in the same world and our words are hooked up to elements of this world. Therefore, if we say something about it that is true, we all say basically the same thing, even if we put it in different forms or language - good translation shows they are all alike. Consequently, in this approach relativism is either trivial or merely apparent.

We saw that the Augustinian picture of language leads to an anti-relativist conclusion, in which case we might wonder whether the alternative picture offered by Wittgenstein can be used to support relativism. In what follows I will argue that the answer to this question is positive.

The characteristic feature of the Augustinian picture was that what constituted meaning was a straightforward connection between words and the world. There is also a word-world connection in the Wittgensteinian picture, and this is not at all surprising, as quite a large part of our language, especially that which is relevant to questions of cognitive relativism, serves to describe the world. But this connection is by no means straightforward; rather, it is based on several holistic structures.
The long discussion of ostensive definitions in the *Investigations* is designed
to show that words are not associated with objects in themselves, but only in the
context of a language-game. To expose the metaphysical counterpart of this
idea somewhat, things do not have properties in themselves, but only through
the role they play in our activities. Only in conjunction with the rest of the
mechanism is a break-lever a break-lever, and 'separated from its support it is
not even a lever; it may be anything or nothing' (PI 6). Only in the context of
the rules of chess is a particular piece of wood a king, and even such simple
things as names of colours or numerals need a place in a language-game, a 'post
at which we station' them (PI 29) in order to mean anything. This is the first
kind of holism: properties are based on roles, meaningfulness presupposes a
whole language-game.

I shall only briefly refer to the second kind of holism. It emerges from the
'anti-private' considerations: not only is it the case that a word needs a home, a
language-game, but this game has to be played publicly, by several people, sev-
eral times.

There is also a third kind of holism, sometimes known as 'anthropological
holism', which states that the system of our language-games is embedded in the
whole of our linguistic and non-linguistic activities; and which in turn, is based
on the natural history of humans and their environment. A form of life underlies
our language-games. We started with words, and we have finally arrived at the
world, but we saw that the link is not direct; the word is put in the context of a
language-game, the language-game into practice, and the practice is enclosed by
the world.

How does the Wittgensteinian picture of language relate to relativism? Mem-
bers of different cultures, even though they have an identical natural his-
tory, do not necessarily evolve the same system of language-games. If we want
to compare their views about, say, stars or diseases, we cannot simply go and
check what one says about them and what the other says. First, we have to in-
vestigate carefully the language-games which give a home to these words, and
as language-games are embedded in a form of life, this investigation might end
up with a thorough inquiry into the whole culture concerned. Here, the idea of
translation as a means of comparison seems to be somewhat overstated. The

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2 This idea serves as a basis for criticism of the simple-object theory of the *Tractatus*.
3 There is an ambiguity in the notion of a 'form of life'. The question surrounds
whether it refers to cultures or to the natural history of mankind, and accordingly,
whether it can be used in the plural or only in the singular. Whatever Wittgenstein's
intention was, by saying that a form of life underlies our language-games, I wish to
embrace both interpretations, as there is enough support for them in his writings.
simplest example of translation is, I think, literary translation. Of course, we do not usually translate idioms literally. In case of sayings or proverbs it is customary not to give the literary equivalent, but, so to speak, another saying which makes the same point. The larger the minimal unit of translation (whose parts are not translations of parts of the other expression), the more reluctant we become to call it a 'translation'. If we try to map a language-game to another language which is very dissimilar, the minimal unit can be of considerable size. The technique of interpretation suggested by this picture - exploring a language-game with its possible ties to the cultural background or natural environment - is well illustrated in anthropological works. One can recall, for example, the way in which Malinowski translates one simple sentence from the Trobrianders' language into English in four pages, making references to characteristics of the whole culture or psychology or geographical feeling or customs of the natives.4

To make a somewhat convincing case for relativism, a certain kind of incommensurability must be argued for. If two different claims about something can be compared face-to-face, then one of them at most can be true, no matter what is the picture of language to which we are committed. Relativists, therefore, often quote examples of incommensurability in order to support their position. This, however, immediately evokes the rejoinder that if it is possible to describe the putatively incommensurable opinion so that it is intelligible to us, it cannot be so very incommensurable.

What the relativist needs, therefore, is the sort of incommensurability which makes intra-cultural description and understanding possible, but does not allow for direct comparison - and this is exactly what the Wittgensteinian holistic picture of language offers. We are able to learn very different language-games than those of our own, because language-games are all played by human beings; but then we are engaged in a different practice and we relate differently to the world. As there is no justification for language-games, one or the other culture is just as good as our own.

There are some remarks in Wittgenstein's writings to the effect that nature puts some constrains on our conceptualization of it, but I do not think that these statements would place him anywhere in the relativist-antirelativist debate.5 It is rather unlikely that any group of people would consider water to be just the

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same substance as air, with higher humidity perhaps, but equally breathable. Even if they did, they would probably learn quite quickly that it was a mistake. To subscribe to this, however, does not modify one's views about relativism. Here again we have to call to mind what Wittgenstein says about language and about how words mean. In the Augustinian picture of language and the world, some things are similar in certain respects; and so, observing this similarity, we call them by the same name. Here is the similarity and there is the name based upon it; the presence of the former explains or justifies the use of the latter. In the Wittgensteinian picture, however, what is common to all red things is simply that they are red. There is no more to discover for nothing is hidden. There are no properties (similarities) in the world, only in the context of language-games. Meaning is use and that is all. But does this mean that nature has nothing to say here? 'Indeed she has - but she makes herself audible in another way' (Z 364). Therefore, it is a bit misleading to say that, according to Wittgenstein, there is some choice as to what to call a similarity, but there are some constraints, such as in the case of grouping birds together as we do on the basis that they all lay eggs (thereby excluding bats but including cassowaries), or calling everything which flies by the same name (this time including bats and excluding cassowaries). For this suggests that we use more basic properties which are in fact present in the world as a basis for our concepts, only we have the freedom to chose which ones. I do not think this fits into the Wittgensteinian picture of language.

In summary, the thorough anti-realism of Wittgenstein - no similarities to the world, only through language - and the holistic structures on which meaning is based together make it possible to defend relativism. What is even more interesting is that I think the confrontation with the Augustinian picture shows that these two things - anti-realism and a certain kind of holism - are essential to make a case for relativism. That anti-realism is important is rather obvious; holism, on the other hand, is needed if we want to avoid problems which stem from incommensurability.

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6 Here I express a disagreement once again, this time with Cyril Barrett's position as it is put forward in his book *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*, Basil Blackwell 1991. Chap. 7.
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Playing by Wittgenstein's Rules

I.

Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following are resoundingly skeptical. We should not be inclined to infer from this, however, that Wittgenstein was a skeptic about rule-following. Rather, his concern rests with many traditional conceptions of meaning and how they are too firmly rooted in the notion that to mean something is to be in accord with preestablished rules. Wittgenstein's concern lies not with being skeptical about how we follow rules, but with how many theories of meaning misappropriate a legitimacy to rules for which that phenomenon cannot account. And, furthermore, how that misappropriation is linked to misconceptions about rules. Thus, his skepticism cannot be properly formulated as rule-following skepticism, but rather as traditional-theories-of-meaning-skepticism.

The central fact of Wittgenstein's concerns are the conceptual realism of Plato's and Frege's ilk, and the representationalism of Locke and other empiricists. For Plato and Frege, to be in accord with a rule is not determined by the formulation of the rule, but rather by what is meant by the rule. Accord with a rule is fixed not by the individual meanings of the words which express the rule, but by a proper grasping of "the meaning" as an object distinct from those words. For Locke, and indeed much of the British empiricist tradition, to mean something is to be in accord with a rule by applying the correct term to its corresponding idea. The meaning of a term on this view is the idea it represents, and the rules of meaning are broken insofar as words and ideas are confused (or when words are applied to extensions which do not exist).

Reading these accounts of meaning, we might be struck by the question that Wittgenstein's interlocutor asks, namely, "'But how can a rule show me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule'". (§198) Wittgenstein rephrases this problem in his own words: "This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, be-

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1 But, this seems to be the perfunctory view. Philosophers from Kripke to Putnam, Dummett to Straw, if not many others, attribute rule-following skepticism to Wittgenstein. As I will argue, this is not the right way to look at Wittgenstein's work.
cause every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here’.§(201) The above question and the paradox it generates are indicative of a form of rule-following skepticism: if rules can be made out to accord or discord with any application, then rules do not do what we presume them to do; therefore, either (a) rules are powerless, or (b) they simply do not exist. (a) Is an epistemological claim, and if true, then representationalism collapses; (b) is an ontological claim, and if true, then conceptual realism collapses.

Though Wittgenstein is not adverse to pointing out the pitfalls of conceptual realism and representationalism, it would be erroneous to attribute the above form of skepticism to him. This is clear from his remarks that this brand of skepticism "is not what we ought to say"(§198) and that "there is a misunderstanding here”.§(201) These remarks implicitly grant that the rule-skeptic is seeing a deep point, although it has not been quite properly formulated. In fact, such a brand of skepticism would be incoherent because it presumes the very legitimacy of rules in purporting to call into question the authenticity of rules!

Like so often with skepticism, the putative problem here is one which cannot even be regarded as meaningful. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein pointed to this ubiquitous skeptical confusion when he wrote, "Skepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt only can exist where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said ". (6.51) Having explicitly acknowledged the skeptic’s paradox, Wittgenstein would not allow himself to fall victim to the same sort of confusion. Therefore, in the above elucidated sense of skepticism, Wittgenstein is not a skeptic.

II.

A further and more troublesome mistake the rule-following skeptic makes is to conflate "following rules" for "providing interpretations". On Wittgenstein's view, the problem about rule-following is misformulated when the skeptic argues that on some interpretation any act can be made to accord with a rule. The problem here is not with rules, but rather with an improper conception of how interpretation functions. What the skeptic suggests "is not what we ought to say, but rather: any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning".§(198) The focus of Wittgenstein’s concern thus shifts from the inter-
locutor's skepticism about rules to a misconception about interpretation. Rules by themselves cannot guarantee that they will be followed one way rather than another. A rule by itself cannot provide its own justification. The skeptic rightly identifies this problem, but he misidentifies the source, namely, interpretation. Wittgenstein points to this confusion at §201: "Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation." If this were the problem of rule-following, it stands to follow that no rule would be followed in the same fashion. But, this is an empirically indefensible claim, and, "What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation". (§201)

The skeptic thinks that if and only if we can provide the right interpretation of a rule can we then know that we are correctly following the rule. Moreover, if we cannot provide the right interpretation, or even justify ourselves in preferring one interpretation over another, then the skeptic maintains we must concede his dismal conclusions. But, following a rule cannot be a matter of interpreting a rule correctly because an interpretation by itself can provide no more foundation than can a rule. The problem with the rule-following skeptic thus becomes manifold because he substitutes interpretations for rules. And, if we "restrict the term 'interpretation' to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another", this manifold problem becomes explicit.(§201) As a rule could always, in principle, be justified by a further rule, so an interpretation could always be justified by a further interpretation. In the end, no rules would be followed and no interpretations could be proffered. "It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it".(§201) Now, not only is the skeptic proposing meaningless difficulties, but what he takes to be the only solution to those difficulties generates an infinite regress.

III.

We have seen why rule-following skepticism is, on the one hand, incoherent, and on the other, why the ostensible solution to that skepticism results in a regress. So, how do we follow rules? Wittgenstein suggests that "there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying a rule' and 'going against it' in actual cases".(§201) Unless we get clear on this notion of "grasping", however, there is little explanatory virtue in such a response.
What is the connection between a rule and its being followed? Rules do not, so to speak, lead us by the hand, nor do they always clearly demarcate a path which we are to follow (§172-173). Grammatical rules are particularly problematic for these very reasons. Furthermore, Wittgenstein denies the possibility of a rule's being "in our head", so to speak, as if it were a calculus or a picture by which we could always check our application of a rule. As if we had, for example, an "internal" mental table against which we could check a decision to apply a rule in "this" situation rather than "that" situation. Such a mental picture theory poses two problems.

First, it reintroduces a regress problem because a mental picture or calculus is always subject to further verification. Such mental states would be redundant because, even if they did exist, they alone could not guarantee that the rule was being correctly applied: it would always be subject to a further mental picture, ad infinitum. If final justification in applying a rule a certain way is wanted, then drawing the line at one mental picture (rather than a "deeper" one) is entirely arbitrary.

Secondly, it reintroduces an interpretation problem. Even if mental pictures did accompany our applications of rules, how could that fact alone guarantee that the rule was being correctly applied? This criticism is consistent with Wittgenstein's claims that a Martian, or anybody else, might interpret a picture of a man walking up a hill with a stick as a man sliding downhill, or that, even if "God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of". (II, p. 217) Just as the mental picture theory of meaning is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for knowing what a word means, a picture of the application of a rule, a mental calculus or table, could also not be necessary nor sufficient conditions for following rules.

Now, without appealing to skepticism per se, Wittgenstein has dealt devastating blows against epistemological rule-following theories like representationalism, and ontological rule-following theories like conceptual realism. But now, there appears to be no foundation upon which Wittgenstein can build a positive account of how it is we follow rules. But, this is exactly consistent with Wittgenstein's project: the fact is, there is no foundation upon which rule-following is grounded. As has been argued, there could be no such thing! There could be no internal nor external calculus to consult in applying a rule; and, following a rule is not the result of interpretation. "When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly." (§219)

At first glance, there appears to be little philosophical import to Wittgenstein's thesis. Moreover, if following a rule is something we do blindly, then
what counts as criteria for deviance? Does it not follow from Wittgenstein’s view that I can answer the question, "Why did you follow the arrow pointing to the left to the right instead?" with "This is simply what I do"? (§217) Might I not be playing a different language game when I take "plus" to mean "quus"? Or are we, as Michael Dummett suggests, "free to choose to accept or reject" the rules as we please? I will proffer a cursory solution to these troublesome questions by way of a deeper look at Wittgenstein’s comments in regards to behavior.

IV.

Wittgenstein makes a distinction between the description of a rule and the expression of a rule, and in this distinction lies the key to understanding what rule-following amounts to for Wittgenstein. I will refer to the description of a rule as the descriptive content, and to the expression of a rule as the normative, or prescriptive, content. Whereas the descriptive content only makes sense if it is "to be understood symbolically", the normative content requires a further step, namely, showing that we behave, i.e. follow, a rule in a certain way. (§219)

What a rule does as a normative operator is distinct from what a rule is. We can describe rules without prescribing rules. Moreover, to be familiar with the descriptive content of a rule is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for following a rule. Wittgenstein makes this explicit in the Blue Book, "For remember that in general we don’t use language according to strict rules— it hasn’t been taught us by means of strict rules, either...In practice we very rarely use language as such a calculus. For not only do we not think of the rules of usage—of definitions, etc., --while using language, but when we are asked to give such rules, in most cases we aren’t able to do so". (p. 25) This point is made again in the Investigations at §54:

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2 Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Harvard University Press, 1982: pg. 9f. Therein the following case is set-up. The symbol ‘+’ is grasped by most to denote the mathematical function of addition. Now, the skeptic might reply to a computation that we’ve never before done that “plus” (+) might mean some other function “quus” (#) which is defined as (x # y) = (x + y), if x, y < n; otherwise = 5. If there is nothing in our heads and nothing in the use of the rule itself that guarantees that “plus” does not mean “quus”, then “Who is to say that this is not the function I previously meant by ‘+’?”


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The rule may be an aid in teaching the game. The learner is told and given practice in applying it. -- Or it is an instrument of the game itself. -- Or a rule is employed neither in the teaching nor in the game itself; nor is it set down in a list of rules. One learns the game by watching how others play. But we say that it is played according to such-and-such rules because an observer can read these rules off from the practice of the game -- like a natural law governing the play.

What this points to is the fact that I can, for example, play the game of chess, i.e., play by the rules of the game of chess, and yet never have a clear formulation (description) of what those rules are. In other words, to know the normative content of a rule is distinct from what it means to know the descriptive content of a rule. I show that I know how to follow a rule, i.e. how I behave towards it, even though I might not be able to say what that rule is. Furthermore, even if I accompany my showing with words, i.e., "Here I make this move like this", it does not follow from this that I have said the descriptive content of the rule which I was following. I have merely proffered a verbal expression.

The descriptive content of a rule can be given as a calculus, as a table, or as a sign, viz., symbolically. But, "...what has the expression of a rule -- say a sign-post -- got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here?" (§198) Knowing the descriptive content of a rule, e.g. a sign-post, cannot be sufficient for making me act on the rule because, again, I can always interpret that descriptive content in any number of ways. How I react to that descriptive content, i.e., how I express my behavior in reaction to the descriptive content, determines the normative role of the rule. Thus, the connection between a rule and its expression is that "I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it". (Ibid)

Wittgenstein is not here endorsing a strict kind of behaviorism. 4 Rather, his line of thought in regards to rule-following is closely akin to what he has to say about sensation terms and pain related behavior. First-person pain, properly

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4 Wittgenstein explicitly rejects behaviorism. At §308 he writes against the behaviorist model because it holds that we cannot meaningfully talk of internal processes and states, and it thus "leaves their nature undecided" thereby committing "us to a particular way of looking at the matter...so we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them". (my italics) A full rejection of Wittgenstein's incompatibility with behaviorism would require a much longer version of this paper. For an excellent discussion of this topic, see "Knowledge of Other Minds" by Norman Malcolm in, George Pitcher, ed., Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations.
speaking, is not a private experience; rather, we demonstrate our pain states through our expressions, outbursts, contortions, etc. The connection of a rule and its normative force is analogous to the connection between a name, like "pain", and the thing named, pain. This is illustrated at §244: "...how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?--of the word "pain" for example?...words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior". What follows this is most significant: "...the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it" (my italics)(ibid.) This coincides with what Wittgenstein has to say about following a rule. The expression of the rule, that is, the manner in which we behave in following it, replaces the description of the rule. The symbolization of a rule is "really a mythological description of a rule",(§219) but the expression of the rule, i.e., the act, demonstrates the normative force of the rule. I replace the descriptive content of a rule--in fact, I might not even know what that content is--by behaving in a certain way, just as a child replaces the description of pain--which he may not even know--by behaving with pain related outbursts.

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Hume, Wittgenstein and the Certainty of Culture

"One would appear ridiculous, who would say, that 'tis only probable the sun will rise to-morrow, or that all men must dye; tho' 'tis plain we have no further assurance of these facts, than what experience affords us."1 I chose this statement from Hume's *Treatise* as an introductory illustration of the thesis I would like to put forward in this paper. The thesis is this: there is a very substantial overlap between the philosophy of Hume and Wittgenstein, which concerns some of the most fundamental components of their thoughts on the role culture plays in stabilising society.2 By reconstructing Hume's and Wittgenstein's conceptions of culture, I hope to add some strokes to the philosophical portraits under revision nowadays by new directions of scholarship.

I will discuss two aspects of the similarity:
1.) the structural aspect.
2.) the conceptual aspect.

This will be followed by a description of Wittgenstein's and Hume's concept of culture and by an evaluation of the general tendency of the two philosophical ventures. Methodologically I will not insist on a one to one confrontation of the relevant passages of the two philosophers, but will try to establish the similarity by way of using their ideas in a complementary fashion.

1. The structural symmetry is a point quite evident and I will only touch upon it very briefly. I claim that both Hume and Wittgenstein followed a philosophical route that started out with epistemological and logical problems, at a certain point reached universal scepticism and finally arrived at the realm of socio-moral problems. Both of them reached this final part of their project via considerations about human nature.

Wittgenstein's development is very tellingly reflected by the following three quotations collected by K. S. Johannessen, and representing consecutive phases of Wittgenstein's thought:

"logic must take care of itself",

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2 I owe a lot to Peter Jones's writings on Hume and Wittgenstein. See his Jones, P., 1976, and Jones, P., 1982.
"language must speak for itself".
"the practice has to speak for itself." 3

Although these were collected as statements of what Wittgenstein took as the final point of justification, that is to say of "what has to go unexplained", I think they also mirror the subsequent turns of his philosophical interest. Apparently even in his very late notes collected under the title On Certainty Wittgenstein was engaged in epistemological questions, but it is obvious when we collate this text with Culture and Value that by that time he was already much more interested in ordinary human social behaviour.

In the first book of the Treatise Hume also passes through the usual phases of the sceptical problem, but as a result of the dramatic climax at the end of Book I, his interest thereafter turns to human passions and morals.

2. With rare exceptions, only recent research revealed the common denominator of their thought which in my opinion is mistakenly labelled as conservative. Provisionally, instead of conservative, I shall call this element - perhaps less elegantly - a "custom- and community-based" social philosophy. In both cases this philosophy is supported by a critical philosophical anthropology and concludes in a form of cultural or epoch-criticism.

In what follows I shall concentrate on what I call the "custom- and community-based" social philosophy by way of analysing a group of related concepts: language, custom, trust and authority. They as a general framework determine the identity, use and value of several other related concepts, such as convention, tradition, training, practise, institution, form of life, loyalty, allegiance, promise, etc. They are the hinges upon which the door turns. 4

Language. "In like manner /i.e. as private property/ are languages gradually establish'd by human conventions..." 5, says Hume and adds: "it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it." No doubt the Humean concept of the evolution of language is comparable to the Wittgensteinian concept represented by the metaphor of an old town 6. This concept of convention has nothing to do with reason, but means unreflected, almost instinctual "rule-following". Convention is a necessary device to make life easier for "a primary being to which one grants instinct, but not racionacion" 7

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3 quoted by Johannessen, Kjell S., 1988, 359.
4 Cf OC, 341, 343.
6 PI. § 18.
7 OC 475.
Custom. In a monograph on Hume's Philosophy of Common Life Donald Livingston successfully showed the failures of the generally accepted view of Hume as the philosopher of sceptical rationality. He argued in favour of another possible interpretation of Hume, which regards his concept of common life as the core of his philosophy. At another place I tried to point out that it is not common life, but custom which Hume returns to so often. Hume's basic assumption is that "custom... is the great guide of human life." He describes it very simply: "we call every thing CUSTOM, which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion..." Custom, "to which I attribute all belief and reasoning" is useful to explain the logical problem of cause and effect it also helps to understand how social institutions such as language or private property can be brought to life. In general, this is the category which bridges epistemology and moral philosophy in the Humean system. It is not a proof against the sceptical argument, it is only a defence of the practical significance and indispensability of certainty for human thought generally.

Rudolf Haller and I. C.Nyíri have shown how far Wittgenstein incorporated the concepts of custom, institution, "Lebensform" and authority into his philosophical teaching. Wittgenstein thought that in ordinary life most of the time we live on the instinctual level, and our actual behaviour is not much more than unreflected "rule-following" due to our very nature. The importance of the category of practice in Wittgenstein's thought has also been pointed out. This term serves as a synonym for custom. If we have a look at the use of the term practice in On Certainty, we shall see it also acts as a check on doubt "...if anyone were to doubt it /i.e. the table's still being there when no one sees it/, how would his doubt come out in practice?"

Authority and trust. Custom, however, would not be enough for man to create or even to learn language. The insight into the "animal" nature of man enables our authors to assume the existence of such pre-rational human attitudes as the respect for authority and trust. Both Hume and Wittgenstein arrive at these notions via their struggles with epistemological doubt, but they use them as building blocks in their social and moral philosophy, as well. While it is ob-

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8 Livingston, D., 1984
10 Hume, D., 1975, 1989., 44.
15 OC 120.
vious that in Wittgensteinian epistemology doubt is limited, Wittgenstein-scholarship only gradually made it clear how far Wittgenstein widened up the applicability of this insight to make it applicable to a socio-moral discourse. In his view the success of human communication and the certainty - a concept also used in a polysemantic way - of social relations depend on our trusting one another. In the first person singular he confesses: "I learned an enormous amount and accepted it on human authority, and then I found some things confirmed or disconfirmed by my own experience."\(^{16}\) and asks: "Must I not begin to trust somewhere?".\(^{17}\) But then comes the question "What can I rely on?", and the implacable reply: "I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something".\(^{18}\) The relevance of these statements was very clearly pointed out by Peter Winch when he wrote: "On Certainty...turns the table on Hobbes by showing that the conception of reason requires as its background precisely a community in which there is such trust and agreement."\(^{19}\)

It was of course Hume who first turned the table on Hobbes. His whole philosophical enterprise was part of an endeavour of a group of Scottish writers to refute Hobbes’s picture of human society as a civil war of all against all. Although not naive, Hume chose the attitude of trust as a kind of "secular a priori" instead of the Hobbesian "suspicion" as a starting point. Annette Baier has shown that Hume offers a view of man which emphasises "the more generous and noble intercourse of friendship and good offices", which he construes as a matter of spontaneous service responded to by 'return in the same manner".\(^{20}\) In his analysis of promises, Hume very delicately describes how "I learn to count on a service from another, although he bears me no real kindness".\(^{21}\) As a result of this explication he arrives at the conclusion, that "promises are a most ingenious social invention, and trust in those who have given us promises is a complex and sophisticated achievement".\(^{22}\)

Yet, and very much in line with Wittgenstein, trust for Hume requires another virtue: authority.\(^{23}\) In Hume's vocabulary authority is surrounded by

\(^{16}\) OC 161.
\(^{17}\) OC 150. On Wittgenstein and trust, see Hertzberg, L., 1988.
\(^{18}\) OC 509.
\(^{19}\) Winch, P., 1991., 233
\(^{21}\) ibid. 521.
\(^{22}\) Baier, A.; 1986, 246.
\(^{23}\) An important dissimilarity between Hume's and Wittgenstein's position is the latter's constant play on words, introducing a metaphysical dimension into his discussions. See for example the following paragraph for his use of the concept of authority: "But mightn't a higher authority assure me that I don't know the truth? So that I had
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corcepts like obedience, allegiance, loyalty and deference. Allegiance is a "political and civil duty" comparable to "the natural duty of ... fidelity." 24 In his opinion authority is an indispensable prerequisite of social peace, without which there can be no stability of ranks and status, and therefore no order: "liberty is the perfection of civil society; but still authority must be acknowledged essential to its very existence." 25

This is the point where culture comes into the picture with Hume. He holds it firmly that "well-educated youth redouble the instances of respect and deference to their elders". 26 It is no wonder that one of the central issues in the Scottish Enlightenment was the problem of politeness, an early equivalent of our term culture. In spite of his sense of cultural relativism, Hume was certain that "the male sex, among a polite people, discover their authority in a more generous, though not a less evident manner; by civility, by respect, by complaisance, and, in a word gallantry." 27

Perhaps gallantry is not exactly what Wittgenstein strives for. I am still inclined to read Culture and Value in the Humean manner, where culture is taken as a kind of social cement. This is evident from the definition he gives: "Culture is an observance (Ordensregel). Or at least it presupposes an observance." 28 Culture, viewed in this light is indeed as much of a closed, if not stable system, as a language-game: it has very definite, even if not always easily recognisable or attainable rules, and being cultured means the ability to follow these rules. Culture is our "whole system of verification" 29, something which we acquire by inheritance, a "Wissenskörper" 30 that is founded on belief (trust), and which assures that "we belong to a community that is bound together by science and education". 31 Culture points out the individual's place in the social mechanism, thereby stabilising the whole system: "A culture is like a big organization which assigns each of its members a place where he can work in the spirit of the whole." 32

3. If we we accept the above arguments, cultural (and even philosophical) scepticism will be a rebellion against the community and regarded by Wittgen-

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27 ibid. 133.
28 CV, p. 83.
29 OC 279.
30 OC 288.
31 OC 298.
32 CV, p. 6.
stein as insanity. Yet it is equally clear that Wittgenstein's cultural- and epoch-criticism is originally not a political manifesto: his so-called conservatism is a reasonable answer to his epistemological problems, to the fact that human knowledge is embedded in language, which is itself a human convention and presupposes a whole system of references in interpersonal human relations.

As I said before, I would not regard this attitude, his philosophical project, conservative in a political sense of the word. Rather I would suggest another outdated concept of Scottish moral philosophy, moderation. This is a term which they inherited from the classical authors, and which Hume used to fight the two extremes of his epoch, superstition and enthusiasm. I would not exclude the possibility of looking at Wittgenstein's therapeutic attempt as a Humean enterprise to cool down overheated (and often political) illusions by returning to such ancient concepts as prudence and self-command. In this enterprise the certainty of culture was to play a crucial role.

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Colours of Thought

Wittgenstein on emotions and their dependence on culture

Ludwig Wittgenstein was emotionally, according to stories, e.g., about his time as a teacher in Kirchberg, rather a confused person. In what follows the aim is, however, not to take a biographical trip to Wittgenstein’s life. What will be made in this paper is the analysis of Wittgenstein’s remarks concerning emotions. These remarks are compiled especially under the title Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I & 2.

There are two interesting points worth to note. First, after publication of collections referred it has been clear that the philosophy of mind was a central topic for Wittgenstein.¹ This has sometimes been neglected when concentrating on his remarks on the philosophy of language and, e.g., on mathematics.

Second, in a recent discussion of emotions it has been pointed out that the intentional nature of emotions guarantees their cognitive one.² This is commonly explained, as Brentano who’s statement in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint the notion is based on, so that a phenomenon to be an emotion has to have an object. We are afraid of p (e.g., of getting a criticism of our philosophical ideas) or glad to p (e.g., to be in a position to write an article of our philosophical ideas). The intentionality means that our mental phenomena have a connection to the reality, via beliefs, judgments, evaluations and thoughts. This a link between mind and the extramental world implies that the latter has effects in us (the word "mind" is used technically here, any commitments with different solutions of the mind-body are not made, except against the eliminative materialism that is implicitly rejected when using words like "mental" and "mind"³). There seems to be an interact between mind and world


³ A lucid introduction to the materialism is Churchland 1988, Matter and
so that we both formate the world and live in this formation, as Wittgenstein claims: "Though the ether is filled with vibrations the world is dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is light." This is revealed in the fact that in different cultures there are different variations of emotions as well as there are different views about, say, a snow. Eskimos have dozens of determinations of the snow whereas in Sahara there are not many variations of it. In Wittgenstein’s remarks this is explained in a term of a form of life.

Remarks made above are needed in an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s idea on emotions. Before sketching it out it is useful to make some general descriptions concerning the nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind.

Wittgenstein’s idea here is a following one. In *PU II*, xiv and *BPP1* § 1039 he maintains in a peculiar way to him that there is in a circle of psychology a conceptual confusion. What is demanded for solution is that the grammatical remarks have to be made. The proper task philosophy of psychology has is to get a light for conceptual troubles and for achieving this it has to analyze psychological term as such as used in an every-day talk. This is not an easy job to do because of the conceptual confusion.5

This sort of a project differs from an old psychological one in which the introspection has a central role. The criticism Wittgenstein expounds here is understandable in the light of his famous private language argument. Wittgenstein wants to construe, against the method based on introspection, a taxonomy that he baptizes "the genealogical tree of psychological phenomena." This is made by asking how different concepts are used in different language games. For it is not the aim of the philosophy of psychology to build a new theory but make a clarification of what is already known. Wittgenstein does not want to advocate a new theory of the psychology but to make remarks on the framework of the folk psychology. According to his view it is typical of a scientific theory to explain whereas the philosophical study tries to describe.

It is the distinction between explanation and description that makes it rather difficult to understand Wittgenstein’s intentions. Concerning psychological matters we usually think about states and phenomenons. Now, Wittgenstein tells us to abandon this presupposition. When he asks provocatively "need I myself have a cow in order to be able to doubt whether someone else has one" he

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4 *PU* II, vii.
5 *BPP1* § 62
6 *BPP1* § 895.
7 *BPP1* § 152.
means that in the philosophical analysis we are not in need of phenomena but of concepts. In a philosophical respect it is not interesting whether there are, e.g., the nervous system and the brains or not ⁹ What is interesting in the philosophical respect is the use of words.

Dealing with the use of language Wittgenstein seems to look after an autonomy of emotional words in relation to other psychological words. This is made especially by rejecting William James' theory of emotions and so called psycho-physical parallelism. Wittgenstein criticizes James view by saying that it reduces emotions to sensations. ¹⁰ Against the psycho-physical parallelism he argues that it is based on the primitive use of the language. The mistaken assumption is, according to Wittgenstein, that the rejection of psycho-physical parallelism implies a view according to which a soul is an entity. ¹¹ This inference is a false one in the light of PU I § 664 in which Wittgenstein makes a famous distinction between "surface grammar" and "depth grammar." It is fairly correct to say "sorrow is felt in soul." ¹² This does not imply, however, in the meaning of the depth grammatic, that a sorrow has a place. ¹³

According to Wittgenstein, emotions are either directed or undirected. ¹⁴ This does not, however, mean that the object of an emotion would be a cause of an emotion. ¹⁵ This is an interesting view because some recent theories of emotions hold a different perspective to the subject. ¹⁶ The idea according to which an object of an emotion is not its cause means that Wittgenstein regards emotions as strategies of behaviour that reveals our attitude to the extrametral world. ¹⁷ Wittgenstein's influence on the recent discussion has been quite strong but his opinion seems to differ from the general view concerning emotions and objects and is nearer to, suprisingly, e.g., Sartre’s one in here (with different intentions, of course). According to Sartre emotions are intentional strategies that magically change a world. ¹⁸

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8 See also BPP 1 § 153.
9 BPP 1 § 1063
10 BPP 1 §§ 727,728,729 BPP 2 §§ 321, 323.
11 BPP 1 § 906.
12 BPP 1 § 438.
13 BPP 1 § 836
14 BPP 2 § 148
15 idem
16 The idea of an object as an cause of an emotion is present, e.g., in Gorden 1987, The Structure of Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
17 BPP 1 § 836, BPP 2 § 148.

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Wittgenstein put his view as follows: "An emotion has duration; it has no place; it has characteristic 'undergoings' and thoughts; it has a characteristic expression which one would use in miming it. Talking under particular circumstances, and what ever else corresponds to that is thinking. Emotions colour thoughts." In the citation, the last sentence is an interesting one. To make it clearer it is useful to ask, what does Wittgenstein mean when speaking of thinking and thoughts. According to his view, by the utterance "thinking" one does not refer to the one phenomenon but to the language game used in a certain form of life of which so called family resemblance is typical. This mean that there is not any phenomenon behind the language but when thinking, one uses the language in which the word thinking has a meaning. One feature of the use is the emotional one. This use means that our thoughts may have a colour.

In Wittgenstein's philosophy the idea of colours of thought was not fully developed. This is seen, e.g., in the fact that in his remarks on colours the idea is neglected. I think that this rather metaphorical idea may be interpreted correctly in the light of three ideas. These ideas are "seeing this way or that," the idea of colour-blind and the idea of paradigms. When having an emotion a person sees the object in some way. (This does not imply that Wittgenstein expounds here a judgment theory of emotions because for him they are also affective phenomena.) A person who is not capable of emotive is like a colour-blind person in an art exhibition. What a person is lacking of are ordinary concepts. These concept, for their part, are learned when learning paradigms construing a bridge between language and experience. Wittgenstein says: "'Grief' describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, in the weave of our life." This pattern, called also a paradigm, is learned in participating in a form of life. Wittgenstein explains this in a following way: "...how does he

19 BPP1 § 836
21 BPP1 § 836, BPP2 §§ 148, 153.
22 BF
23 BPP1 § 27
24 BPP1 §§ 168, 170, 182, 198, 202, 205, 206; BPP2 §§ 571, 478.
25 On different feelings see, e.g., PU II, vi; BPP1 §§ 32, 95, 122, 125, 334, 335, 351, 382-400, 698, 959.
26 BF § 13
27 PU II, i.
28 PU I §§ 50, 51, 55, 57, 215, 300, 385.

37
learn the words 'A lump of sugar, please' - i.e. the expression of a wish?! ...Well - the grown-ups may perform before the child, may pronounce the word...,- but now the child must imitate that...After such-and-such language games have been taught it, then on such-and-such occasions it use the words that the grown-ups spoke in such cases."^29

The grown-ups are representatives of a culture. The culture is, for its part, however, a form of life typical of human beings. The culture has, according to Wittgenstein, a biological basis, but characteristic of a culture is what man makes by his Geist.\(^30\) The biological basis is, however a pre-linguistic one\(^31\) A crocodile does not hope because it is not a part of its form of life but man hopes.\(^32\) This seems to imply that some phenomenon are "created" in a language. This does not mean that Wittgenstein would be an idealist. What does it mean is that there are different semantical stages in the language which are based on but not possible to reduct to the world or biology. The language is as natural as walking by two feets.^33 Therefore, it seems correct to interpret Wittgenstein's ideas so that they are constructivistic.

There is, according to Wittgenstein, the picture of the world behind of the culture. The picture of the culture is an inherited background against which one make a distinction between true and false.\(^34\) When speaking of emotions it should be taken in to an account three factors, then. The biological basis of emotions (that we are animals), the form of life (that we live in a culture by using language) and the picture of world (that is presupposed in a culture and mirrored by it). If we are asking "what should we do with our feelings" Wittgenstein give us a piece of advice according to which all these elements should be reflected. His own view, it seems to me, was quite a conservative one because he did not believe in our possibilities to transcend our language. In the end of Tractatus there are his famous words about the silence we should have. In recent discussion on emotions it has been found it necessary to analyze which kind of emotions are appropriate. From the Wittgenteinian point of view this implies the analyze of the culture and the picture of world. This means that, against the Wittgenstein, however, we should be silent of the things we can talk and discuss about the topics which are outside the border-line of the language according to Wittgenstein.

^29\( BPP1 \) § 163.
^30\( BPP2 \) § 14
^31\( BPP1 \) § 916
^32\( BPP2 \) § 16. On the emotions of animals see \( PU \) II.i.
^33\( BPP2 \) § 435
^34\( UG \) § 94
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Spuren Augustins bei Wittgenstein

Wittgensteins Hinweise auf Augustinus sind kein philosophiegeschichtliches Ornament.\(^1\) Sie scheinen mir Ausdruck einer Denkauffinität, die durch die folgenden Überlegungen in zwei Schritten erläutert wird. Der Nachhall augustinischer Einsichten bei Wittgenstein zeigt sich 1) im 'Denken der Erinnerung' und 2) am Zusammenhang von 'Zeit und Erinnerung'.

1) Erinnerung


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\(^2\) Erarbeitet hat sie sich Augustinus in erster Linie in Buch X der Confessiones.
\(^3\) Vgl. Augustinus, De ordine II,2,6.
\(^4\) PB, aaO, 81.
\(^6\) Vgl. PB, ebda., 82/83.


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7 Was Erinnern selbst ist, dient Augustinus der Beantwortung der Frage, 'was er liest, wenn er Gott liebt'. Vgl. Kreuzer, J., 1995 a, PULCHRITUDO - Vom Erkennen Gottes bei Augustin. Bemerkungen zu den Büchern IX,X und XI der Confessiones, München: Fink.
8 PB, aaO, 84.
9 "(A)d res praesentes memoria pertine(t)." (Augustinus, De trinitate XIV,11,14)
12 Confessiones X,16,25.
13 Vgl. PU, Teil II, xiii, aaO, 579.
griff der Vergangenheit ordnen läßt. 14 Erinnern kommt nicht als 'innerer Vorgang' zu einer 'äußeren Information' noch 'hinzu'. "Was wir leugnen, ist, daß das Bild vom innern Vorgang uns die richtige Idee von der Verwendung des Wortes "erinnern" gibt. (...) Warum soll ich denn leugnen, daß ein geistiger Vorgang da ist?! Nur heißt "Es hat in mir der geistige Vorgang der Erinnerung an .... stattgefunden" nichts andres als: "Ich habe mich jetzt an .... erinnert". Den geistigen Vorgang leugnen, hießc, das Erinnern leugnen; leugnen, daß irgend jemand sich je an etwas erinnert." 15 Der 'geistige Vorgang' des Erinnerns ist ein 'innerer', der 'äußerer Kriterien bedarf'. 16 Erinnern ist ein 'geistiger Vorgang', in dem die 'Beziehung auf Anderes' - das wir als Vergangenes oder Gegenwärtiges oder Zukunftiges unterscheiden - 'Beziehung auf sich' bedeutet. Erinnern bedeutet, das Zeitliche in seiner V e r s c h i e d e n h e i t und die G e l i c h t z e i t i g k e i t, die Erinnern als Aufmerksamkeit auf das Gegenwärtige ist, zu bemerken. Die Gegenstände des Erinnerns unterliegen der Sukzession der Zeit, nicht das Erinnern. Dies aber nicht deshalb, weil wir erinnernd uns sozusagen eine 'zweite' - eine jederzeit abfragbare und zeitlose - 'innere Zeit' einbilden könnten. Wir bedürfen der Erinnerung gerade, weil es das sukzessive Vorübergehen von Zeit gibt. Das hat Augustinus in der memoria-Analyse der "Confessiones" entdeckt: "Also erinnere ich mich, daß ich eingesehen habe, und was ich jetzt unterscheide und einsehe, berge ich in die Erinnerung, so daß ich später erinnern kann, daß ich jetzt eingesehen habe. Also erinnere ich auch, daß ich erinnert habe, so wie ich später, wenn ich erinnern werde, was ich jetzt erinnern konnte, dies künftige Erinnern durch die Kraft der Erinnerung vermögen werde." 17

Zuletzt die 'Zeit des Erinnerns' setzen wir der sukzessiv verstrechenden entgegen, sondern, wie Wittgenstein sagen wird, "die Art, wie die Erinnerungen geordnet sind, ist die Zeit." 18 Das 'Erinnern des Erinnerns' ist als Erinnerung des Gegenwärtigen der springende Punkt unserer Erfahrung von Zeit.

2) Zeit

Gedächtnis scheint sozusagen nicht mehr als ein Souvenirladen zeitlos gewordener Erlebnisse zu sein. "Ganz anders ist es, wenn wir nun das Gedächtnis

14 Vgl. ebda., 579.
16 Vgl. PU, § 580, ebda., 455.
17 "Ergo et intellexisses me saepius ista memini, et quod nunc discerno et intellego, recendo in memoria, ut postea me nunc intellexisses memorerim. Ergo et meminisses me memini, sicut postea, quod haec reminisci nunc potui, si recordabor, utique per vim memoriae recordabor." (Confessiones X,13,20)
18 WWK, in: Werkausgabe, aaO, Bd. 3, 98.
als Quelle der Zeit betrachten." 


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19 PB, aaO, 81.
20 Wie Augustinus in den "Confessiones" selbst, wenn er die memoria wieder den Dimensionen der Zeit und ihrer vor gestellten Sukzession zu- bzw. unterordnet (vgl. Conf. XII,15,18).
21 "(N)ec tempora sunt tria, praeteritum, præsens et futurum, sed (...) proprie dicitur: tempora sunt tria, præsens de praeteritis, præsens de præsentibus, præsens de futuris." (Conf. XI,20,26)
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Was sind die unausgesprochenen Voraussetzungen dieses Ordnens und Verfügens von Zeit? Zu rekonstruieren ist, was in unserer 'ordinary time experience' gleichsam in der Alltäglichkeit gegenwärtig und deshalb 'verborgen' am Werk ist. Analog zu der Feststellung, daß 'die gewöhnliche Sprache völlig in Ordnung ist'\(^{24}\), ließe sich sagen, daß unserer alltäglichen Erfahrung gewöhnlicher Zeit - der chronologischen, 'uneigentlichen' - 'völlig in Ordnung' ist. Was aber sind die unausgesprochenen Voraussetzungen unseres Ordnens von Zeit, die uns, weil sie so alltäglich sind, 'eigens' gar nicht mehr auffallen. "Was also ist Zeit? Wenn es niemand von mir erfragt, weiß ich es; will ich es einem Fragenden erklären, weiß ich es nicht."\(^{25}\) Wissen wir es deshalb nicht, weil wir dann eigens erklären müßte, was im Übersetzen von Erinnerung in Sprache immer schon der Fall ist? Augustins Frage nach der Zeit ist der Versuch einer Rekonstruktion jener Bewußtseinsakte, die so vertraut erscheinen, daß wir sie im Sprechen über und in der Zeit gar nicht mehr bemerken. 'Wir sprechen und hören und werden verstanden und verstehen. Ganz offenkundig und gewöhnlich ist das, und ist doch wieder allzu verborgen, und neu ist sein Finden'.\(^{26}\) Nicht zufällig zieht Wittgenstein gerade diese Stelle aus den "Confessiones" heran, um jene "Sackgasse des Philosophieren(s)" zu kritisieren, "wo (...) die gewöhnliche Sprache uns zu roh erscheint, und es scheint, als hätten wir es nicht mit

\(^{22}\) Vgl. BLB, aaO, 49, 50.
\(^{23}\) Vgl. Conf. XI,14,17: "tendit non esse".
\(^{24}\) Vgl. BLB, aaO, 52.
\(^{25}\) "Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaret, scio; si quaecrenti explicare velim, nescio." (Conf. XI,14,17)
\(^{26}\) Vgl. Confessiones XI,22,28.
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den Phänomenen zu tun, von denen der Alltag redet (...)." 27 Augustinus fragt
nicht danach, 'was Zeit' - in einem unserer Erfahrungen gegenüber 'exakten' oder
'idealen' oder 'eigentlichen' Sinne - 'ist'. Er versucht vielmehr herauszufinden,
was unserem alltäglichen Umgang mit Zeit zugrundeliegt. 28

Daß das in der Zeit Veränderliche vorübergeht, ist Bedingung der Möglich-
keit unserer Zeiterfahrung, aber nicht dasjenige, was wir als Zeit erfahren. Die
'Zeit der Erinnerung' ist von der 'Zeit der Physik' zu unterscheiden 29 - aber nicht
deren Gegensatz. Der Grund unserer Zeiterfahrung ist das Bemerken der
zeitlichen Verschiedenheit dessen, was wir erinnern. Es ist, stellt Augustinus
fest, 'der menschlichen Seele gegeben, Zeiträume wahrzunehmen und zu mes-
sen'. 30 Wie wir Zeit erfahren, führt auf verschiedene Arten, wie wir das Vor-
übergehen des Zeitlichen zu erinnern vermögen. Wenn Wittgenstein von der
"Zeitlichkeit der Uhr" und der "Zeitlichkeit in der Musik" spricht31, so unter-
scheidet er nicht 'zwei Zeiten' - eine 'innere' im Gegensatz zu einer 'äußeren' -,
sondern verschiedene Weisen des Ordnens von Zeit. Entweder ist uns die Chro-
nologie (die zeitliche Differenz des Erinnerten) oder das Zugleichsein des Erinn-
erns (von zeitlich Verschiedenem) bedeutsam. "Die Art, wie die Erinnerungen
geordnet sind, ist die Zeit. Die Zeit ist also unmittelbar mit der Erinnerung gege-
ben." 32 Was wir als Zeit erfahren, ist eine "distentio animi", die in der "memor-
ia" gründet (vgl. Conf. XI,23,30; 26,33). Was in ihr als 'Eindruck haften'
bleibt, 33 ist kein 'Bild', sondern die Spannung zweier Gegenwärtigkeiten. Das
Bemerken der zeitlichen Verschiedenheit dieser beiden im Erinnern 'oszillie-
renden' Gegenwärtigkeiten und das Erinnern, daß dazwischen 'Zeit' vergangen
ist, ergeben jene 'Dehnung des Geistes', die wir sprechend verstehen. Was dabei
'anhält', ist die Aufmerksamkeit, durch die wir auf unser vorübergehendes Erinn-
ern zurückkommen. 34 Im Sprechen übersetzen wir dieses Erinnern in eine
äußere, wieder dem zeitlichen Vergehen unterliegende Form. Deshalb stellt
Wittgenstein unter Berufung auf Augustins 'Frage nach der Zeit' fest: "Wir

27 PU, § 436, aaO, 417.
28 Das "implicatissimum aenigma" der Zeit ist ein ganz 'all tägliches', vgl. Confessiones
XI,22,28.
29 Vgl. WWK, aaO, 53.
30 "(D)atum (anima humana) est sentire moras atque metiri" (Conf. XI,15,19).
31 Vgl. VB, in: Werkausgabe, aaO, Bd. 8, 564.
32 WWK, aaO, 98.
33 "(A)liquid in memoria infixum manet." (Conf. XI,27,35)
34 "Et quis negat praesens tempus carere spatio, quia in puncto praeterit? Sed tamen
perdurat attentio, per quam pergat abesse quod aderit." (Conf. XI,28,37) -
Wittgenstein zu dieser 'attentio memoriae': 'Überlege, was es heißt, »mit der Auf-
merksamkeit auf etwas zeigen«.' (PU § 275, aaO, 367.)
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wollen etwas *verstehen*, was schon offen vor unseren Augen liegt. Denn *das* scheinen wir (...) nicht zu verstehen. Augustinus (Conf. XI/14) (...). Das, was man weiß, wenn uns niemand fragt, aber nicht mehr weiß, wenn wir es erklären sollen, ist etwas, worauf man sich *beenden* muß." 35 Wir können unser Erinnern nicht sehen und hören. Wir müssen ihm eine sinnliche Form geben. Erst in solchen zeitlich bestimmtten Formen 'entsinnen' wir uns. Die Erinnerung "ist der Schlüssel zum >Rätsel der Zeit<, dessen (...) Lösung in der Sprache >offen vor unseren Augen liegt<." 36

3) Schluß


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35 PU, § 89, aaO, 291.
37 Vgl. Confessiones IV,14,23.
38 VB, aaO, 359. "Die falsche Auffassung, gegen die ich mich kehren möchte, ist die, daß wir auf etwas kommen könnten, was wir heute noch nicht sehen (...). In Wahrheit haben wir schon alles, und zwar gegenwärtig, wir brauchen auf nichts zu warten." (WWK, aaO, 183) "Denn, was etwa verborgen ist, interessiert uns nicht." (PU, § 126, aaO, 303).
39 PU, § 415, aaO, 411.

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Eine folgenreiche Bemerkung

Anmerkungen zu Wittgensteins Regelbegriff in den Quellen von Philosophische Untersuchungen 54

Einleitung

Wittgensteins Regelbegriff, wie er mit PU 198 bis PU 242¹ vorliegt, ist nicht zu Beginn, sondern zum Ende seiner zweiten Philosophie entstanden. Weigert er sich in seinen frühen Manuskripten die Regeln der Grammatik als Regeln aufzufassen, "nach denen das Sprechen einer Gruppe von Menschen erfahrungsgemäß vor sich geht" (109. 281), sieht er später gerade in der "Gepflogenheit" (PU 198) Zeichen in einer bestimmten Weise zu gebrauchen, den Kern des Regelfolgens. - Ich will in dieser Arbeit anhand einer Untersuchung der Quellen von PU 54 darstellen, wie weit dieser Regelbegriff zurückzuverfolgen ist. Ich werde dazu (1.) Wittgensteins Aussagen zu dem, "was man 'einen Vorgang, der mit einer Regel übereinstimmt', und dem, was man einen Vorgang, der eine Regel einbezieht" (BIB 31), nennt, aus dem Blauen Buch referieren. Ich werde (2.) diesen Thesen Wittgensteins Bemerkungen aus seinem Brown Book gegenüberstellen, die bereits als Quellen von PU 54 angesehen werden können. In einem weiteren Schritt soll schließlich gezeigt werden, was damit für die Entwicklung des Regelbegriffs getan ist.

1. Das Blaue Buch (1933/34)

Wittgensteins Ausführungen im Blauen Buch aus dem Jahr 1933/34 sind für das Thema "Regelfolgen" von besonderem Interesse, weil er dort den Sprach-

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gebrauch in bezug auf die Frage untersucht, ob in ihm ein "Vorgang, der eine Regel einbezieht" (31), oder nur ein "Vorgang, der mit einer Regel übereinstimmt" (31), abläuft. "Wir werden sagen," so Wittgenstein zur Erklärung dieser Unterscheidung, "daß die Regel in das Verstehen, Gehorchen etc. einbezogen ist, wenn, wie ich es ausdrücken möchte, das Symbol für die Regel ein Teil der Berechnung bildet." (32.) Wittgenstein illustriert seine These anhand von zwei Unterrichtsarten:

A. "Der Vorgang des Lehrens ist ein Drill." (30.) Dem Schüler wird solange ein Muster der Farbe Rot gezeigt und gleichzeitig das Wort "rot" gesagt, bis ihm automatisch diese Farbe in den Sinn kommt, sobald er das Wort "rot" hört; oder bis ein "Gefühl des Erkennens" in ihm auftritt, wenn er etwas Rotes sieht. Man kann in diesem Fall sagen, "daß durch den Drill ein psychischer Mechanismus" (30) entsteht, der dafür sorgt, daß der Schüler das Farbwort der Regel gemäß mit der Farbe verbindet. Wittgenstein bezeichnet den Unterricht, der so einen Mechanismus installiert, als "die Ursache der Phänomene des Verstehens, Gehorchens etc." (31).


Anders verhält es sich im Fall B. Hier können wir sagen, daß er einer Regel

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Obwohl Wittgenstein im B1B eine zutreffende Darstellung davon gibt, wie wir dazu kommen, nach Rot zu greifen, wenn wir "rot" hören (vgl. 34) und er keineswegs übersieht, daß es für eine Handlung keine unendliche Kette von Gründen gibt, (vgl. 34) handelt der, der grundlos - und damit automatisch - handelt, für ihn nicht nach einer in irgendeiner Weise interessanten Regel. Seine abschließende These dazu lautet hier: "Eine Regel wirkt soweit sie mich interessiert, nicht aus der Entfernung." (32.)


Wittgenstein pariert diesen Einwurf jetzt dadurch, daß er dem Gegner klar macht, daß jede Wahl des Stoffes, auch die, die sich eines Musters oder eines Erinnerungsbildes bedient, letztlich auf automatische Vorgänge hinausläuft. Vor diesem Hintergrund, so Wittgensteins eigener Kommentar dazu, "the distinction between automatic and non-automatic appears no longer clear-cut and final as it did at first" (87); und mit ihr auch die nicht zwischen "einem Vorgang, der mit einer Regel übereinstimmt" und "einem, der eine Regel einbezieht". Auch der Vorgang, der auf eine Regel als Werkzeug in der Praxis der Sprache zurückgreift, läßt sich als ein Vorgang, der mit einer Regel übereinstimmt, beschreiben, weil der Werkzeuggebrauch ein Ende hat.

Mit dieser Erkenntnis schwinden auch Wittgensteins Vorbehalte gegenüber der Rolle, die die Abrichtung beim Erlernen der Sprache spielt. Er spricht jetzt nicht mehr vom Drillen, sondern von Erziehung und Abrichtung und was dadurch dem Lemenden ermöglicht wird und wie sie erfolgt. Da eine Abrichtung
bewirken kann, daß das Hören eines Wortes ein Vorstellungsbild automatisch hervorruft, spricht auch nichts dagegen anzunehmen, daß jemand, aufgrund einer Abrichtung einen Befehl ohne Vermittlung eines Bildes befolgt. (Vgl. 89.) Ferner kann ein Schüler durch die Abrichtung nicht nur zum Gebrauch einer Tabelle, sondern auch zum Gebrauch beliebiger Kombinationen von Schriftzeichen und Bildern befähigt werden. (Vgl. 89) - Abrichtungen bilden die Grundlage für den weiteren Spracherwerb, der nicht durch explizite Regeln, sondern durch Ermunterungen, Billigungen und Mißbilligungen etc. gelehrt wird. (Vgl. 89f.)

Nachdem Wittgenstein zeigt, daß die Frage ob etwas eine Regel bzw. ein Regelausdruck ist oder nicht, nur in Abhängigkeit zu dem Sprachspiel entscheidend werden kann, in dem der Ausdruck vorkommt (vgl. 95f.), stellt er einfache Sprachspiele vor, in denen in recht unterschiedlicher Weise von Stammesangehörigen von einer Regel in Form einer Tabelle Gebrauch gemacht wird. Die Sprachspiele unterscheiden sich insbesondere dadurch, daß in ihnen der Ausdruck einer Regel, die Tabelle, zunehmend aus der "Praxis der Sprache" entfernt wird, bishin zu dem seltsamen Fall, in dem das korrekte Verhalten von Stammesangehörigen auf einen Befehl hin nicht nur ohne Hilfe eines Regelausdruck, sondern auch ohne vorhergehenden Unterricht angenommen wird.

Der Grund dafür, daß Wittgenstein dieses etwas seltsame Sprachspiel einführt, wird deutlich, wenn man bedenkt, daß hier genau der Fall beschrieben wird, durch den Wittgenstein im BLB die Regel, die infolge einer Abrichtung gelehrt wird, in Mißkredit bringt. Weil es denkbar ist, "daß alle Vorgänge des Verstehens, Gehorchens usw. geschehen sein könnten, ohne daß jemand die Person jemals die Sprache gelehrt hat" (BIB 31), interessierte ihn dort diese Regel nicht. (Vgl. BIB 32.) Jetzt geht Wittgenstein diesbezüglich in die Offensive und verzichtet im vorhinein auf den für ihn im BLB nur hypothetisch zugänglichen Unterricht. "For, the fact that the training [...] precedet the carrying out of the order does not change the process of carrying out." (97.) Es kommt auf die Frage, ob wirklich eine Abrichtung stattgefunden hat oder nicht, gar nicht an. Dieses festzustellen, ist vielmehr die Aufgabe der experimentellen Wissenschaft. Aufgrund dieser Vorbemerkungen kann Wittgenstein jetzt auf sein eigentliches Anliegen zu sprechen, nämlich einen gegenüber dem BLB erweiterten Begriff vom Regelfolgen vorzustellen. Er schreibt im BrB dazu:

We see that the expression, "A game is played according to the rule so and so" is used not only in the variety of cases exemplified by (37), (40), (41) and (42), but even in cases where the rule is neither an instrument of the training nor of the pratice of the game, but
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stands in the relation to it in which our table stands to the practice of our game (43). One might in this case call the table a natural law describing the behaviour of the people of this tribe. Or we might say that the table is a record belonging to the natural history of the tribe. (BrB 97f..).

3. Vom Brown Book zu den Philosophischen Untersuchungen 54

Die zentralen Thesen des BrB stehen nicht nur im Gegensatz zu dem, was im Bib und in zeitgleichen so wie früheren Skripten zu finden ist, sondern weisen das BrB auch als eine der Quellen zu PU 54 aus. Stellt Wittgenstein im TS 213 noch besonders heraus, daß die Regel "quasi ein Satzradikal" (213. 244) ist, ein Instrument, das auf vielfache Weise gebraucht werden kann, z.B. als Hypothese "sofern sie eine allgemeine Beschreibung unserer Handlungsweise ist" (PG 86), weist der Ausdruck "natural law" im BrB (98) darauf hin, daß sich seine Auffassung von dem, was eine Regel ist, spezifiziert hat. Wichtig ist ihm jetzt nicht mehr die Regel als "Definition" oder als "Hypothese", sondern bloß der "Vorgang der Befolgung des Befehls" wie Wittgenstein im MS 115 ii (S. 152) seinen Bemerkungen aus dem BrB hinzufügt. "Der Ausdruck der Regel", so Wittgenstein in einem weiteren MS, in dem er seine Bemerkungen zum Regelfolgen aus dem TS 213 und dem BrB im Jahre 1938 neu zusammenstellt, "mag nur dazu dienen, die Art und Weise, wie tatsächlich gespielt wird, zu beschreiben." (117. 145.) Daß das, was Hallet in bezug auf PU 54 feststellt,2 bereits auf Wittgensteins Aussagen im BrB zutrifft, läßt sich auch mit MS 140 (1934), einer Uberarbeitung des MS 114, ii unterstreichen. Denn Wittgenstein fragt dort:

Ist nicht auch das ein Kriterium, daß er das Spiel spielen kann, d.h. eben spielt, + könnte er nicht, um die Regeln befragt in Verlegenheit geraten? (140. 18.)3

Wir sehen, daß der Ausdruck "a game ist played according to the rule so and so" (BrB 97) nicht nur bedeutet, daß die Regel weder in der Praxis noch im Unterricht vorkommt, sondern auch, daß dieser Begriff des Regelfolgens nicht

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vorausgesetzt, daß die Stammesmitglieder, die Regeln, denen sie folgen, auf Nachfragen benennen können müssen. 4

Und auch der Einwand, daß hier mit dem Ausdruck "according to the rule so and so" (BrB 97) nicht ein regelfolgendes Verhalten, sondern vielmehr ein Verhalten, das lediglich mit einer Regel übereinstimmt, zu verstehen ist, läßt sich zurückweisen. Zum einen ist erkennbar, daß Wittgenstein zu dieser Zeit in seinen Schriften diesenUnterschied nicht macht. Er spricht im BrB unabhängig von der Frage, ob die Regel in der Praxis des Spiels auftritt oder nicht, davon, daß "nach der Regel R vorgegangen" (115. ii, 153) wird.5 Zum anderen nennt Wittgenstein im MS 152 aus dem Jahre 1936, das wiederum aus dem MS 115ii entsteht, ein Kriterium, durch das sich regelfolgendes Verhalten auszeichnet. Es sind z.B. die Merkmale im Benehmen der Spieler, durch die ein Beobachter "zwischen einem Fehler des Spielenden + einer richtigen Spielhandlung" (152. 58) unterscheiden kann. Anhand dieses Korrekturverhaltens läßt sich zwischen einem nur zufällig mit einer Regel übereinstimmenden Verhalten und einem regelfolgendem Verhalten unterscheiden.6

5 Auch in PU 82 spricht Wittgenstein von einer "Regel, nach der er vorgeht", unabhängig von der Frage, ob die Regel in den Sprachgebrauch involviert ist oder nicht. Vgl. PU 82.
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gen aus dem BrB trotzdem - um einige Aussagen angereichert - in Form von PU 54 schließlich in einer Gesamtinterpretation der PU unterbringen lassen, ist die Vermutung aufzustellen, daß Wittgenstein bereits zu dieser Zeit einer Vorstellung vom Regelfolgern folgt, die er erst Jahre später ganz explizit machen kann.

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Rule-following, "Judicial Legislation," and Hermeneutic Social Science: Wittgenstein and the Rule of Law

In "Reconsidering the Rule of Law," Margaret Radin maintains that Wittgenstein's correct conception of rules implies that "...every application of [a rule] is a reinterpretation. ... each time we feel ourselves to be rule-followers we are rule-creators as well."¹ Seeing how significantly this view misunderstands Wittgenstein can remedy a syndrome characteristic of "interpretive" or "hermeneutic social-science" approaches to philosophy of law.

Contemporary worries over the Rule of Law Ideal's credibility are often thought to require liberating judges from an outmoded, ultimately incoherent picture of rules. This call for liberation typically rests on rejecting traditional theoretical conceptions of rule-governed constraint, constraint that allegedly cannot obtain. Proponents urge judges to escape the apparently rigid yet ultimately illusory fetters of rules that, misconceived as constraints, so often lead judges to decide "mechanically" and contrary to justice.² When judges face apparent conflict, the law rigidly dictating a case-result contrary to what rule-independent justice demands, judges mistake merely psychological qualms or the implications of a false philosophy of language for "what the law requires." The law, it is held, ultimately requires little that is uncontroversial, for only people can "require" anything of people. Constraint by rules, therefore, is ultimately constraint of some people by others. The judge is really free to argue a case as she sees fit, so long as her "take" on the case--it is never more than an interpretation--fits enough of its social context so she has a reasonable chance of "making her interpretation stick."³

While acknowledging that there are rules of law, proponents regard rules as much more pliable and context-sensitive than traditionally thought. If deep and

² See Radin, e.g. at 130 where she asks (and answers in the negative): "Does it make sense to think, as Fuller apparently did, that rules are general in the sense of being logically prior to action, and that they apply formally to particular actions that fall under them?"
hitherto unrecognized facts about the very nature of rules imply that judges create as they apply rules, it is surely irrational to fear judicial lawmaking given its inevitability. If as a conceptual matter judges cannot merely apply without simultaneously creating rules, the Rule of Law Ideal's prescription that judges must only apply and never make rules cannot be heeded. Thus, the ideal, resting on distinguishing rule application from interpretation, is at base incoherent. Rather than regard themselves as constrained by rules, judges should recognize their inevitable freedom and use it wisely. This view allegedly derives from a Wittgensteinian conception of rules and language.

The above picture to the contrary, Wittgenstein is quite clear that there is a conceptual gulf between rule-following and understanding, on the one hand, and rule-interpretation, on the other. In *Investigations* 201 Wittgenstein insists "that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in actual cases," adding that "we ought to restrict the term 'interpretation' to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another." While not denying that understanding is sometimes accomplished via a useful interpretation, he argues that if we mistakenly equate grasping with interpreting a rule we will succumb to section 201's paradox: "no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule"—that is, on some interpretation or other. Yet not every action truly accords with any given rule, for otherwise rules could hardly provide criteria for correct and incorrect behavior and thus could not function as they actually do in our practices. There must therefore be some means for determining whether someone understands a rule that doesn't itself involve interpretation.

Whether facing an ordinary practical or skeptical theoretical challenge, one may justify claiming to know a word's meaning, for example, in part and ultimately necessarily, by claiming that one has learned to speak the language. For Wittgenstein one's ultimate appeal is not to any queer or extraordinary *Wissen*, but to a quite commonplace *Können*. Regardless of whatever processes may enable a person to understand a rule or may accompany acting upon or displaying that understanding, Wittgenstein insists that it is a mistake to regard understanding as itself a kind of process (PI 293-317).

If understanding is neither a process nor a form of *Wissen*, then discriminating those who understand a rule from those who do not, and proper from improper interpretations of a rule formulation, can be grounded neither by checking for the right process, nor by establishing evidentiary relations among pieces of *Wissen*, nor by offering an interpretation not itself grounded in some relevant
social Konnen. Wittgenstein shows us how to secure confidence in our knowledge of rules by portraying that knowledge as primarily and fundamentally a form of Konnen rather than Wissen, thereby showing that rationally grounding our confidence is impossible because radically misguided. My confidence that I know how to use various words properly, for example, cannot be unjustified the way my belief that P may be, but it is justified only in the sense in which my claim to know how to properly play chess is justified. "Know-how," ability- knowledge in the sense of Konnen--is grounded in proper training, not in a set of propositions related to it as "justification" in an epistemic sense. While I may say that I know (ich weiss) that I know (ich kann) Deutsch, and can provide biographical evidence for the former indicating I have indeed learned the language, while evidencing the latter through suitable performances demonstrating linguistic competence, these two sorts of evidence are radically different in nature.4

In applying Wittgenstein's conception of rules to legal practices, it is crucial to recognize that his picture of understanding a rule is meant to apply to non-enacted rather than legislated rules. Our understanding of legislated rules is necessarily mediated by language, for legislation requires promulgation of a rule formulation to be intelligible as an effort to subject behavior to the governance of rules.5 Legislated rules are essentially formulated; non-enacted rules are not. Legislated rules are thus susceptible to linguistic indeterminacies that may, in some cases, require placing a clear interpretation on a rule's formulation. Radin's claim that every application is a reinterpretation must therefore be rejected, though given our actual practices we should admit that some applications require interpreting or reinterpreting a rule.

While non-enacted rules can be formulated, their formulations are rarely used to "offer an interpretation of a practice." Rather, such formulations are typically used in directing, demanding, criticizing, and justifying behavior--speech-acts quite different from interpretation, itself most frequently relevant to teaching rules and, perhaps, to describing practices. Upon a foundation of non-enacted rules, legislation becomes possible, bringing with it the need, occasional rather than omnipresent, for interpretation.

Wittgenstein's conception of non-enacted rules is, then, especially suited to understanding legal rules from the perspective of those subject to their strictures and at risk of suffering law's sanctions, for surely in law one naturally thinks of

4 See also Landers, S. 1990 "Wittgenstein, Realism, and CLS: Undermining Rule Scepticism," Law and Philosophy 9, 177-203.
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rule-followers as adapting their behavior to rules rather than "mastering" in some sense of "dominating" after "adopting" rules. 6 Wittgenstein's conception of rules of language, mathematics, and logic, indeed of rules generally but for enacted ones, is thus in an important sense "juristic." Focusing on Wittgenstein's conception of language as such to understand how enacted legal rules function is mistaken, however. Discovering how enacted legal rules function in any given society ultimately requires a sociological, partly empirical investigation. Such an enterprise Wittgenstein would hardly condemn, but it is an enterprise Wittgenstein would, qua philosopher, refrain from giving further advice about and which, he would insist, mustn't be confused with a philosophical investigation into the nature of rules per se. 7

Professor Radin, inter alios, adopts two views Wittgenstein would reject: applying legal rules in clear cases is essentially continuous in nature with application in hard cases, and judicial decisionmaking is essentially continuous with legislation. 8 Both depend on the illusion that rule application and interpretation can be collapsed. If they could be collapsed, decisions in easy cases would be no more constrained than in hard cases, the only real difference being a feeling of compulsion resulting from training to see an easy case in a way that renders one possible interpretation more salient than others. "Right" answers in easy cases would no more be right, however, than would "wrong" answers, which would simply be answers that happen not to be widely accepted. If rule application and interpretation could be collapsed judges couldn't possibly reach decisions without imposing interpretations on the justificatory rules they cite. Given Hoadly's contention that whoever has power to interpret rules is the true lawgiver, 9 judges would further appear the true legislators. Because rule application and interpretation cannot be collapsed, however, these views appear groundless when conceived as necessary features of legal systems.


These views depend on assimilating non-enacted to enacted rules, and failing to see that even where enactment is possible because preexistent social practices enable explicit actions to count as enactments, enacted rules nonetheless, in Eike von Savigny's words, "live on the fact that people follow rules which are not enacted." Radin partly recognizes this but mistakenly presumes that if enactment depends on a social foundation of shared practices situated within a shared Lebensform, then enacted rules must share the same nature as non-enacted rules. And since enacted rules are susceptible to varying interpretations, so too must be non-enacted rules.

Professor Radin treats a relation of dependence as near-identity, as if the enacted/non-enacted distinction represents but the poles of a continuum. The games we play with rules and the general features of various types of rules share important family resemblances, naturally, but otherwise may be of a most diverse character. Just as they obviously differ ontologically, they differ in what it is to understand them, for enacted rules must be formulated before they can be understood or guide behavior and thus may require, in some cases for some persons, interpretation--further clarification by substituting one expression of the rule for another--to perform any of their distinctive social functions. Once enactment becomes possible the nature, use, and possibilities of interpretation of articulated rules may vary considerably from the nature use, and non-interpretive understanding of non-enacted rules--in ways that cannot be understood or anticipated a priori, but only by examining how practices have actually evolved. When we do look and see, what do we find?

"To the extent that law, when 'we look and see,' is the terrain of 'disputed cases,'" Professor Radin contends, "the pragmatic Wittgensteinian view seems to tell us we had better find another model (other than rules) for what law 'is'" (144). This, however, just isn't true in any significant sense. Insofar as the terrain of law is overrun with "disputed cases," disputes often aren't cognitive. In the vast majority of "legal cases"--cases that don't reach the appellate level or get litigated at all--disputes typically result from competing interests and desires rather than competing opinions on or interpretations of the law. Disputes don't erupt over the general meaning of a stop-sign, or over millions of unlienced contracts, and so on. Even cases brought to trial often involve no real dispute over what the law requires, for non-legal strategic manoeuvring--wearing a party down emotionally or financially, for example--often motivates legal ac-

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tion. If legal disputes did typically erupt, in the sense relevant to Wittgenstein's claim that where behavior is rule-governed disputes do not typically break out (PI 240-241), only then could we reasonably conclude that legal interactions are not largely rule-governed.

Sometimes denominated the Rule of Law-not-Men, the Rule of Law Ideal prescribes that concrete legal dispute-resolutions depend on preexistent rules rather than the vagaries and biases of individual decisionmakers. Given my remarks it should be clear that the Ideal has little relevance to non-enacted rules, since with regard to such rules and most cases they govern, once a rule exists it is as a conceptual matter simply not up to any individual to decide or interpret what the rule requires. Thus, our sense of justice should differ when disputes are shaped and then decided in accordance with rules that are non-enacted and thus have a history of applications, versus when they have recently been enacted and lack such a history. In attempting resolution of disputes structured by and provoked by alleged violation of non-enacted rules, one appropriately appeals to understandings of preexistent practices and what is widely accepted as proper and improper behavior by practitioners. In disputes structured by and provoked by alleged violation of enacted rules, in contrast, bona fide interpretive issues will be more prominent than appeal to what some preexistent practice requires.11

What of the less ambitious view that where interpretive issues predominate, there, at any rate, judges wield power of dubious legitimacy? In one sense this is true but trivial; in another, completely wrong. Insofar as people who get a rule-interpretation to become widely accepted are inevitably regarded as having been right about what the rule requires, what the rule requires indeed depends on what such individuals manage or fail to achieve. Yet the activity of the lone interpreter never determines what the rule is or shall become, for whether an initially controversial interpretation becomes accepted is not within the power of the interpreter to determine but depends, ultimately, on the reactions of many others. It is thus highly misleading to suggest that the rule is nothing but what powerful individuals have determined it to be.

It is possible, certainly, for enacted rules to not be routinely followed, applied, or enforced. Where this occurs we may justly say that constraint by this or that rule is illusory. Here, however, we mean nothing mysterious or ideal-

shattering. Of a non-enacted rule, however, it would be sheer nonsense to hold that it is neither routinely followed, applied, nor enforced and yet for all that exists nonetheless. Thus, in a humble sense we may grant that sometimes constraint by enacted rules is little constraint at all. This hardly suffices to call into doubt the entire Rule of Law Ideal as traditionally conceived.

Professor Radin concludes that while abandoning the expression "the Rule of Law" might be premature, we should at least "drop the slogan, 'the Rule of Law, not of Individuals'" (155). Because there is nothing wrong with contending that rules do govern decisions when the term "govern" is given its ordinary practical rather than a philosophically superlative meaning, and because rules may thus be said to govern in the clear cases that actually monopolize a mature legal system's calendar, however, individuals hardly dominate or create but rather adjust their behavior to fit relatively determinate preexistent rules. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, therefore, Professor Radin and others have drawn exactly the wrong conclusion about the Rule of Law Ideal.

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Wittgenstein on Understanding

What is it like to be in a state of understanding? Is it a mental occurrence in which words are given sense by thoughts which translate mere sounds into definite meanings. For isn't it the case that each utterance I make is accompanied by a thought process in which particular intended meanings make possible the application of that utterance. Hence, on this account when a word is uttered or when I utter a word I understand it because of the meanings that run through my mind indicating what is meant, for example by this ink mark or that symbol. This inner sanctum of meaning that translates the world of marks, sounds, symbols and general chaos into sense is seen, by some as what the understanding consists in. Here, Wittgenstein asks, however "But are the processes which I have described here understanding?" PI 152.

In his article, "Wittgenstein on Understanding" Warren Goldfarb argues that in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein denies the claim that understanding is a mental state or process. This denial, according to Goldfarb, brings objections from those holding a scientific point of view. The scientific worry, of concern particularly to neurophysiology, is that if, as Wittgenstein argues, the understanding does not consist in states and processes, how then would progress in neuro-science be possible. It would seem a redundant occupation, for the very processes it wishes to analyze are hidden, and on a Wittgensteinian view, understanding is not a hidden process. The redundancy of such an occupation, one might think, would not be such a great loss to the world. Goldfarb however takes a different stance when, as an apologist for Wittgenstein's supposedly anti-scientific view, he argues that Wittgenstein is not denying a priori that scientific progress is possible, or denying that there may be such mental processes, but rather is pointing out that such processes do not posses, what Goldfarb calls the "grammar of understanding" and so cannot explain it. Thus for Goldfarb it is not simply a matter of such states being hidden from us, but is, more importantly, a matter of recognising that our understanding is not something that is made sense of by such particular states. For our physiological states in themselves do not render language meaningful and therefore lead us to

understanding. Goldfarb writes: "Hence, Wittgenstein is taken to urge, understanding cannot be conceptually constituted by any such state."2

Goldfarb is concerned to defend Wittgenstein from those who would render him an anti-scientist. He attempts to show how Wittgenstein, rather, wishes to look at the conceptual confusions that arise in our ordinary language when we try to investigate the world scientifically. This is demonstrated in Wittgenstein's response to the child who on learning that the earth is round wonders why all the people in Australia don't fall off. Wittgenstein's response is to draw a circle with a figure atop it, turn it upside down and say, "now we fall into space". In using the same concepts as the child, Wittgenstein hopes to demonstrate to the child the confusion of thinking that "up" and "down" are absolute rather than relative concepts. In other words, the child thinks that up only happens at the top of the world and down at the bottom, but as Wittgenstein points out, when he turns the circle round, up and down are not at the top and bottom of the world. Thus the child has no more reason to think of Australians falling off the world than she has of herself falling off and hence begins to see how she misunderstood up and down.

Goldfarb, in drawing on this example, has shown the importance Wittgenstein places upon the clarification of scientific concepts. Wittgenstein is concerned to look at the circumstances in which scientific concepts arise and to see how in those particular circumstances they are used. Thus his concern is not so much with scientific facts per se but rather with the various philosophical pictures that make possible such scientific conceptualisations of the world. The scientific objector to the account of understanding which rules out mental processes may be willing to concede that there are various scientific pictures and various refutations of those pictures, for it seems she can acknowledge that things may turn out other than had at first been conjectured, which seems consistent with the later Wittgensteinian view, that scientific claims presuppose particular views or practices and thus demonstrate the variety of circumstances in which ascriptions of understanding are made. However this is not consistent, because rather than demonstrating the variety and context dependency of understanding it furthers the scientist's unshakeable belief that there are out there, existing independently of any human context, true scientific facts that can be arrived at through further investigation. For it can be seen that the scientist's conjectures and refutations, rather than exhibiting just various scientific possibilities, do actually aim at objective truth or understanding. As Popper says in

2 Ibid, p110.
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Conjectures and Refutations:\n
If we thus admit that there is no authority beyond the reach of criticism . . . (and here I think he means no authority beyond what can be falsified by observation) . . . to be found within the whole province of our knowledge, however far it may have penetrated into the unknown, then we can retain, without danger the idea that truth is beyond human authority. And we must retain it. For without this idea there can be no objective standards of inquiry.

Hence we can see that the scientific objector identifies the understanding as a state which is arrived at when our observations of phenomena force us to yield to their blinding evidence. We may not have come to such blinding evidence yet, as can be seen in the case of neurophysiology, but, as Wittgenstein's interlocutor in section 158 of the Philosophical Investigations argues, this is due to a lack of progress and can be rectified by more accurate knowledge.

But isn't that only because of our too slight acquaintance with what goes on in the brain and the nervous system? If we had a more accurate knowledge of these things we should see what connections were established by the training, and then should be able to say when we looked into his brain: "now he has read this word now the reading connexion has been set up" (PI 158).

According to the scientific objector to Wittgenstein, then, if we had more empirical evidence of the brain we should be able to read off the mental life from that evidence and so see the understanding at work. Wittgenstein, however, objects to treating understanding as a hidden but not as yet undiscovered mental process. This objection can be seen to raise problems for scientists because if understanding is not discoverable in this way then it looks like there is nothing, particularly for neurophysiologists to discover, since there is nothing empirically observable about states of understanding. Thus rather than being rigorously scientific it seems that the reduction of the understanding to neural states is pure speculation and cannot be based on conjecture or refutation, since there can be no observation of such states of understanding on which to make scientific judgments. Scientific progress in this field, looks bleak, since there is no possibility of testing claims empirically.

Goldfarb is right in saying that there are two main strands in Wittgenstein's work on understanding. The first is concerned with the question, how does the state of understanding function? and further what are we to expect from the state in regarding it as that which fixes our understanding? The second strand is

concerned with the variety of things which are supposedly carried out by the
state of understanding.

In the first strand Wittgenstein is concerned to repudiate the view that un-
derstanding is a state which by its very existence constitutes all that the un-
derstanding is. In order to demonstrate Wittgenstein's point here about the fixing
of the understanding, Goldfarb uses a riveting article from cognitive science
entitled "Mental Tuning Forks Noted in Perfect Pitch". The main gist of the
article is that startling new evidence has been found to suggest why people with
perfect pitch have the ability to acknowledge a note without having the note
identified to them beforehand. This is due apparently to their possession of
"mental tuning forks" which non perfect pitchers lack. Such forks make possi-
ble the identification of tones. But how is all this meant to work. According to
boffins, there is a brain wave called p300 which is concerned with memory.
What they claim to have discovered is that those with perfect pitch when being
asked to identify the "pitches of the tones being played to them", were seen to
have a smaller or non existent p300 brain wave in comparison to those non per-
fect pitchers who had larger p300. The boffins concluded that the non-perfect
pitchers were using memory in order to reconstruct an already remembered
sound, whereas the perfect pitchers employed the use of "mental tuning forks",
rather than memory to identify the sound.

But how would the perfect pitchers be able to distinguish between the vari-
ous pitches of the various forks, they would need for all the notes, if the forks
were sounding all the time. If they are not sounding all at the same time how
would they know which tuning fork to use when given a particular tone. And
how do people with perfect pitch know when a sound is too low. For it could be
the case that they are able to identify higher and lower sounds with the tone
heard because they have one set of tuning forks that indicate lower sounds and
another that indicate higher sounds. However, this still leaves them with the
problem of seeing how the tone actually corresponds with these two sets of tun-
ing forks.

Goldfarb (115) in response to all this suggests a Wittgensteinian interpreta-
tion of mental tuning forks. He argues that "real tuning forks give us the means
to identify pitches, but they do so because we have the practices and abilities to
use them". By "real" Goldfarb, here is obviously referring to the metal rather
than mental reality of tuning forks. The point being made here, however, is that
the tuning fork cannot of itself give us internal standards of this or that pitch. It

is the practices and abilities employed in using tuning forks that make standards for the identification of pitch possible. This relates to what Goldfarb wants to say about understanding, for he wishes to dismiss the view that understanding is some kind of internal standard, picture or rule, against which we measure external stimuli, such as sounds, notes and pitches. Goldfarb, like Wittgenstein, wishes to argue against the idea that there is some fixed internal representation, for example such as tuning forks that make possible all future cases of identifying for example, pitch.

This causal view of understanding seems to break down when we think of cases in which we are not producing manifestations of our understanding. Goldfarb cites examples of being bored or making mistakes in hearing what was said, as indications of being unable to identify a particular state of understanding.

We have, then, been looking at the causal view of how the state of understanding is supposed to operate and determine our understanding. We can now go on to what Goldfarb calls the ‘second strand of Wittgenstein’s thinking’ to look at the variety of practices which indicate the context in which each ascription of understanding or misunderstanding is made. For it is the circumstances in which ascriptions of understanding are made that indicate to us what is meant by utterances and similarly ascriptions of misunderstanding that indicate to us what is not meant to be meant. Thus my understanding or not understanding something is brought out in a variety of differing circumstances in which I understand or do not understand. It is in the employment of understanding or misunderstanding that I come to understand or misunderstand. I do not have a mental picture that tells me how to play chess. I play chess and this reveals to me whether I am following more or less the same rules as the other players involved in the practice. Of course I can always play chess badly and make mistakes through carelessness, apathy or impatience but this is not necessarily to misunderstand the nature of the game. We can understand the nature of games without wanting to play them well. We might even want to deliberately play badly.

This variety of differing circumstances in which ascriptions of understanding or misunderstanding are made, make it difficult to see on a physiological mental state view of understanding what would count as evidence for understanding things in particular situations and not in others. For it seems we cannot see the connection between our mental states and our ascriptions of understandings in different contexts. We cannot observe such states at play in our behaviour in the varying situations of our lives. As Goldfarb points out (p117), there is ‘‘no sur-
viable checklist of such behaviours". Thus we can't see how states can account for each and every ascription of understanding and misunderstanding in each and every circumstance. We can't see how mental states cause us to behave in each situation with understanding or not understanding. There is it seems no single psychological fact in my brain that causes me to act in this way rather than that. My thinking about how to act is not something that I can observe going on in my head. We do its seems put our hands on our foreheads when we are thinking of some problem or other. We do this as if somehow our thoughts were lodged or contained in our heads and that by holding our heads we could somehow think harder about the problem, since the problem and it's possible solution we think will be found in the head.

This view that understanding is somehow in the head and therefore causes us to act in certain ways is problematic for science. For in employing the notion that a mental state causes behaviour, one is no longer doing empirical science but rather one is constructing metaphysical views of the world. Such views are not based on any possible observation of understanding and in this sense tend towards the mystical in their obscurity. Thus again we have the problem of how for example neuro-science is to progress if it is fundamentally metaphysical, for although neurologists have little in the way of empirical evidence of the correlation between understanding and brain states they make the claim that our understanding consists in brain states, this surely is not a very scientific approach. However this is not meant to suggest that if we did find more evidence of such states, they could tell us anything about the understanding anyway, for we would simply infer from the particular states the correlations we wanted to see. For it might turn out that every time my brain registered the word "philosophy" I was violently sick. This disposition, however for being sick on hearing the word "philosophy" cannot be what the understanding of the word "philosophy" is itself but rather must be an accompaniment of my understanding of the word "philosophy". As Wittgenstein says in 153 of the Investigations: "For even supposing I had found something that happened in all those cases of understanding, - why should it be the understanding?"

Thus in conclusion, we can come to see that understanding is not reducible to a mechanism of the brain or the functioning of a mental state. We are led to this conclusion through the recognition that it is from within the different and multifarious practices that ascriptions of understanding are made. Sounds, symbols and words are understood not because they are translated by mental processes into sense but because we take part in practices in which such words, symbols and notes are used meaningfully. The meanings of such words, notes
Wittgenstein on Understanding

etc, are demonstrated in their use, that is to say, in the way that they are expressed in the particular situation of expression. This is not to suggest that one can simply read off from other's behaviour what is meant. For expressions are not always sincere, and, as we mentioned earlier, one can understand the language game being played but refuse to play it. For one could be playing a language game in which thoughts are not expressed sincerely. Here we need to ask more about the word "sincere", for example, what would it be like to play a piece of music insincerely and what would it be like to play it sincerely? Could we say playing a piece of music insincerely, is to misunderstand the music? This it seems is not a matter of understanding or misunderstanding, but rather more a matter of attitude toward what one understands, to play well or to play badly, to be careless or to be precise. Hence playing sincerely has to do with the surroundings of the musical performance and not with some physical state accompanying the performance. Thus what is meant or not meant occurs within our practices and not within our heads. This is not to suggest that nothing goes on in our heads, but is to suggest that even if we knew how what was in our heads related to our understanding we are sure what more could be understood. On a Wittgensteinian view we don't have to search for understanding in a nether world, for understanding and misunderstanding is exhibited here in our lives. But this hereness is the most difficult and obscure thing to grasp precisely because we live it.

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Wittgensteins Ehrfurcht


3 Jonas, a.a.O. 392f.
Wittgensteins Ehrfurcht

Ihre Tätigkeit ist es, ein immer komplizierteres Gebilde zu konstruieren. Und auch die Klarheit dient doch nur wieder diesem Zweck und ist nicht Selbstzweck. Mir dagegen ist die Klarheit, die Durchsichtigkeit, Selbstzweck."^4


"[...] ein primitiver Aberglaube. (Wie der, daß sie sich vor allen Na-

^4 VB 459.
^5 VB 459.
^6 BPP 74.
^7 PU 124.
turkräften fürchten mußten, und wir uns natürlich nicht fürchten brauchen. Aber die Erfahrung mag lehren, daß gewisse primitive Stämme sehr zur Furcht vor den Naturphänomenen neigen. - Es ist aber nicht ausgeschlossen, daß hochzivilisierte Völker wieder zu eben dieser Furcht neigen werden, und ihre Zivilisation und die wissenschaftliche Kenntnis kann sie nicht davor schützen. Freilich ist es wahr, daß der Geist, in dem die Wissenschaft heute betrieben wird, mit einer solchen Furcht nicht vereinbar ist."

Wittgenstein setzt damit seine Einstellung in Kontrast zu einer weithin dominierenden Wirklichkeitsauffassung und zum Geist der westlichen Zivilisation. Der von Wittgenstein sporadisch rezipierte Johann Wolfgang von Goethe bestimmt Ehrfurcht als eine Haltung, "worauf alles ankommt, damit der Mensch nach allen Seiten zu ein Mensch sej". Auf diese Weise wird der »heilige Respekt« zur Grundlage der wahren Religion hochstilisiert. Aufgabe der Religion ist folgerichtig die Erziehung zur Ehrfurcht. Gleichzeitig fungiert Ehrfurcht als notwendige Vorbedingung für jede wirkliche Erkenntnis. Sie steht in Spannung zwischen einer im Menschen angelegten Natur und einer Haltung, die erst ausgebildet werden muß. Goethe unterscheidet in "Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre" die Ehrfurcht vor dem, was über uns ist, von der Ehrfurcht vor dem, was uns gleich ist, und der vor dem, was unter uns ist; aus diesen drei Ehrfurchtsweisen "entspringt die oberste Ehrfurcht, die Ehrfurcht vor sich selbst, und jene entwickeln sich abermals aus dieser, so daß der Mensch zum Höchsten gelangt, was er zu erreichen fähig ist [...]". Die von Goethe genannte Ehrfurcht vor dem anderen Menschen interessiert Wittgenstein weniger, bei ihm fließen die beiden übrigen Weisen der Ehrfurcht ineinander.

**Ehrfurcht vor dem, was über uns ist**

Der rituelle und anerzogene Ausdruck der ehrfürchtigen Haltung einer höheren Macht gegenüber wird von Goethe wie folgt beschrieben:

"Jene Gebäude, die Arme kreuzweis über die Brust, einen freudigen Blick gen Himmel, das ist, was wir unmündigen Kindern auflegen und zugleich Zeugnis von ihnen verlangen, daß ein Gott da droben sei [...]".

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9 VB 457.
11 Goethe a.a.O. 388.
12 Goethe a.a.O. 386.
Wittgensteins Ehrfurcht

Wittgenstein drückt seine Empfindung in der folgenden Formulierung aus:


"Religiöser Glaube und Aberglaube sind ganz verschieden. Der eine entspringt aus Furcht und ist eine Art falscher Wissenschaft. Der andre ist ein Vertraun.15

Wittgenstein diffamiert in diesem Zitat aus dem Jahr 1948 Furcht als Grundzug des Aberglaubens, zeichnet hingegen Furchtlosigkeit positiv als gläubige Haltung aus. Wittgensteins indirekter Zugang zum religiösen Glauben ist die Ehrfurcht vor der sich in Riten und Glaubensvorstellungen Ausdruck verschaf-

13  BFGB 36.
15  VB 551 (1948).

Ehrfurcht vor dem, was unter uns ist

"Die auf den Rücken gefalteten, gleichsam gebundenen Hände, der gesenkte, lächelnde Blick sagen, daß man die Erde wohl und heiter zu betrachten habe [...]".

Jene von Goethe beschriebene distanziert wohlmeinende Betrachtung der Wirklichkeit zeichnet ebenfalls Wittgensteins Zugang zur Welt aus. Er läßt alles, wie es ist. Das Beschreiben Wittgensteins, das er dem Erklären vorzieht,
Wittgensteins Ehrfurcht


Nicht von ungefähr hat Wittgenstein keine Anleitung zum Ehrfurchtigsein geschrieben, dies würde nämlich der von Wittgenstein verstandenen ehrfurchtigen Haltung zuwiderlaufen. Wittgensteins quietistische Einstellung hätte wohl Goethes hellsichtigem pessimistisch gefärbtem Diktum zugestimmt:

"Sich zu fürchten ist leicht, aber beschwerlich, Ehrfurcht zu hegen ist schwer, aber bequem. Ungern entschließt sich der Mensch zur Ehrfurcht, oder vielmehr, entschließt sich nie dazu [...]."[22]

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Privatsprache, Geheimsprache
und Künstliche Intelligenz


L

Wittgensteins Privatsprachenproblem läßt sich in die Frage fassen: "Can there be a Private language?", was auch der Titel einer Arbeit von Rhees ist (Rhees 1954). Die laufende Diskussion hat u.a. durch Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" (Kripke 1982) neue Anstöße erhalten. Daß "Privatsprache" ein offenes Problem geblieben ist, liegt auch an der Unklarheit dieses Begriffs, dessen Auslegung zwischen "weich" und "hart", wie man es nennen könnte, schwankt.


Jeder Versuch, den Begriff der Privatsprache so zu fassen, daß man von einer solitären Person ausgeht und diese, von der Sprachgemeinschaft abgesondert, als Schöpferin neuer Worte, Bedeutungen und Regeln denkt, muß nach meiner Überzeugung scheitern. Die solitäre Person hat ja selbst die Sprache der Sprachgemeinschaft und alle Versuche, von dieser Sprache bewußt abzuwei-
Karl Nähr


Zu der Möglichkeit einer Privatsprache, die von einer privaten Übersetzungstabelle zwischen Wörtern und Bedeutungen Gebrauch macht, heißt es in PU 265: "Denken wir uns eine Tabelle, die nur in unserer Vostellung..."


PU 265 ist eine deutliche Brücke zu Kripkes Ausführungen und weist auch auf den Zusammenhang von Privatsprache und chiffrierter Sprache, was noch erörtert wird. Kripke gibt, wie schon gesagt, eine "harte" Interpretation der Privatsprache. In seiner scharfsinnigen Untersuchung zeigt er die Unmöglichkeit, einer Person eine Rechen- oder Sprachregel mit logischen Argumenten so zu vermitteln, daß diese Person die ihr bisher unbekannte Regel nunmehr selbständig in richtiger, d.h. von dem vermittelnden "Lehrer" gebrauchten Weise anwenden imstande ist. Da dies für Sprachregeln und Wortbedeutungen gilt, zeigt sich hier das - von Kripke so benannte - Wittgensteinsche Paradoxon: Wie ist Erlernen von Sprache möglich, wenn die Weitergabe aller Gebrauchsregeln einer Sprache an eine völlig unwissende Person ausgeschlossen ist?

Kripke gibt eine Lösung, die nach seiner Meinung auch aus den PU folgt, und er versucht zu zeigen, daß sie die einzig mögliche ist. Üblicherweise wird angenommen, daß einzelnen Individuen Sprache irgendwie beigebraucht wird und diese Individuen dann die Sprachgemeinschaft bilden. Nach Kripke (und Wittgenstein) ist es aber umgekehrt: Nicht die Sprachen der Individuen schaffen die Sprachgemeinschaft, sondern diese muß das Ursprüngliche sein; Sprache wird durch die Sprachgemeinschaft konstituiert, Sprache des Einzelnen ist nur von der Sprachgemeinschaft her zu verstehen. Daher ist eine nur einer Person zugehörige Privatsprache nicht denkbar.

Kripkes radikale These gibt zwar eine Lösung des Paradoxons und bestätigt

II.


Eine Geheimssprache entsteht, wenn auf eine beliebige, natürliche oder künstliche Sprache oder eine bloße Zeichenfolge eine logische oder mathematische Verwandlungsvorschrift angewendet wird. Diese entspricht der Abbildungsfunktion bei Quine, die im Fall einer Übersetzung zwischen natürlichen Sprachen grundsätzlich nicht exakt bestimmbär ist, was sich in der Quine’schen These von der Unbestimmtheit der Übersetzung ausdrückt. Anders aber als bei Quine wird bei der Bildung einer Geheimssprache die Übersetzungsfunktion nicht gesucht sondern vorgegeben und es besteht daher eine eindeutige Übersetzung von der Originalsprache in die Geheimssprache. Wegen der Umkehrbarkeit der Verschlüsselung ist auch eine Dechiffrierung, vom Aufwand abgesehen, immer möglich. Denn jeder Versuch einer Dechiffrierung impliziert die Annahme, wieder auf logische Strukturen, sinnvolle Zeichenfolgen, sprachliche Ausdrücke zu stoßen. Die totale Unübersetzbarkeit einer Geheimssprache wäre erst dann gegeben, wenn die ihr zugrunde liegende Originalsprache keine logischen Strukturen aufwiese, also gar keine Sprache wäre, oder wenn dieses Feh-
len logischer Strukturen für die verwendete Verwandlungsvorschrift zuträfe. Eine solche Geheimsprache wäre grundsätzlich nicht zu entschlüsseln, wäre eine echte Privatsprache, wäre aber auch Nicht-Sprache schlechthin. Sie wäre eine Zeichenfolge, die keine mit menschlichen Sprachen gemeinsamen logischen Strukturen hat. Damit wäre sie aber auch für ihren Schöpfer unverständlich, auch für ihn keine Sprache und von ihm, der sich zu ihrer Erschaffung ja der gewohnten Strukturen seiner eigenen Sprache bedienen muß, gar nicht herzustellen.

Ich glaube, daß man Wittgensteins "Privatsprache" in diesem Sinn zu interpretieren hat. Diese radikale Interpretation beantwortet einerseits die Frage, warum die Herstellung einer Privatsprache unmöglich sein soll. Sie begründet aber auch den Primat der Sprachgemeinschaft vor dem solitären Individuum: Dieses müßte sich, wollte es eine Privatsprache schaffen, entweder der Sprache einer Sprachgemeinschaft bedienen und käme damit wieder nur zu einer Variante dieser Sprache, einer Geheimsprache, was eine "weiche" (scheinbare) Lösung des Privatsprachenproblems wäre. Oder aber das solitäre Individuum müßte zur Bildung einer echten Privatsprache Denkoperationen jenseits der Sprachlogik und Wortschöpfungen jenseits aller Sprachen vornehmen, was nur zufällige Zeichenfolgen liefern könnte.

III.

Es ist reizvoll, von den bisher angestellten Überlegungen ausgehend, ein Licht auf die "künstliche Intelligenz" (KI) von Computern zu werfen und von da aus wieder auf das Privatsprachenproblem.

A.M. Turing hat eine Definition der KI gegeben, auf die noch heute zurückgegriffen wird: Wenn eine Person, ohne Sicht- und Hörkontakt, also z.B. über eine elektrische Tastatur, einmal mit einer anderen Person und dann mit einer Maschine eine Konversation führt und allein aus der Kenntnis dieser Konversation nicht entscheiden kann, wann sie mit einem Menschen und wann mit einer Maschine gesprochen hat, darf man nach Turing der Maschine eine KI zuschreiben. Diese Definition scheint zunächst Anlass zu Hoffnungen für die KI von Computern zu geben. Putnam hat jedoch das Turing'sche Gedankenexperiment zu einem "Turing test for reference" erweitert (Putnam 1981), der entscheiden soll, ob Mensch und Maschine in ihrer Konversation Bezug nehmen (und nehmen können) auf Phänomene, die außerhalb von den in der Maschine gespeicherten Programmen und Informationen liegen. Das Resultat dieser Überlegungen ist, daß ein solcher Test nicht entscheiden kana, ob die Äußerun-
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gen der Maschine zu Dingen der Umwelt sich auf eine reale Umwelt beziehen oder eine vorprogrammierte Illusion sind. Zwei miteinander gekoppelte Computer könnten beliebig lange über eine Welt diskutieren, die es gar nicht mehr gibt.


Analog zu der Frage: Wie entwirft man eine Privatsprache? kann man nun fragen, was zu tun ist, um einem Computer die volle KI zu verleihen in dem Sinn, daß er unabhängig von Programmen eine selbständige Handlungsfähigkeit erlangt. Vom Problem des selbständigen Willens abgesehen, muß das jedenfalls bedeuten, die Maschine frei zu halten von Instruktionen, die eine Signalverarbeitung nach vorgegebenen Regeln erzwingen. Das verbietet nicht nur streng deterministische Regeln, sondern auch probabilistische wie etwa die Vorschrift, aus einer Anzahl von Möglichkeiten die wahrscheinlichste auszuwählen, in statistischen Daten Gewichtungen vorzunehmen usw. Völlige Selbstständigkeit führt zu der paradoxen Forderung nach Instruktionen, die den Charakter von Nicht-Instruktionen haben. Das bedeutet aber die Einführung von Regellosigkeit, von Zufallsstrukturen; so könne die Maschine Resultate hervorrufen, die man ihrem "freien Willen" zuschreiben könnte, doch blieben die Resultate unverständlich, sie wären grundsätzlich nicht in menschliche Sprache übersetzbar, wären Privatsprache des Computers. Wir könnten nicht entscheiden, ob die Äußerungen sinnvoll oder sinnlos wären; vermutlich sinnlos, da der Maschine ein Zufallsverhalten, eine Nicht-Sprache vorgeschrieben wurde.

So kommen wir zur Privatsprache zurück: Um dem Computer eine echte KI, ein selbständiges intelligentes Handeln zuschreiben zu können, müßte er innere Verhaltensregeln besitzen, welche eine, nicht von außen gesteuerte Anpas-
sungsfähigkeit an äußere Einflüsse, gegenüber wechselnden Kontexten also, zei-
gen. Er müßte eine individuelle Selbständigkeit haben, die der Sprache men-
schlicher Personen entspricht. Die Frage nach dem Entstehen solcher innerer
Verhaltensregeln führt, wenn wir den Menschen an der Stelle der Maschine
denken, zu dem von Kripke so benannten Paradoxon, dessen Lösung nach
Kripke der Primat der Sprachgemeinschaft ist, welche als konstitutiv für die
Sprache des Einzelnen anzusehen ist. Nach Kripke besteht keine logische Mög-
llichkeit, anderen das Regelfolgen zu vermitteln, analog zu der Unmöglichkeit,
einer Maschine Regeln einzugeben, nach denen sie wirklich selbständig handelt
und nicht nach den indirekten Programminstruktionen des Menschen. Die Un-
möglichkeit einer selbständigen Computersprache hat ihr Gegenstück in der
Unmöglichkeit der Privatsprache. Eine solche wäre nur eine Folge von z.B.
laustlichen Äußerungen, die außerhalb jeder Sprache und Sprachgemeinschaft
stehen, nicht Äußerungen eines Sprachbehinderten, sondern zufällige Laute,
also eine Nicht-Sprache.

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Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Post-Literacy

The notion of post-literacy is here used in the sense of "secondary orality" as defined by Walter J. Ong in the early 1970s.¹ The term refers to the new, electronically mediated culture of spoken, as contrasted with written, language. Secondary orality is post-literal in the sense of being different from, but also rooted in, grafted upon, literacy. Thus secondary orality is certainly not identical with the orality of pre-literate cultures - with primary orality, as Ong calls it. While the orality of pre-literate cultures serves as the sole medium of collective consciousness and memory - think, for instance, of Homer - secondary orality designates a phase in which users of language have recourse to writing, book printing, and the electronic recording of texts and data. However, from a semantic point of view, secondary orality does in important ways parallel primary orality. The meaning of utterances is in both cases intrinsically bound up with the extra-linguistic situations in which those utterances occur. Or rather there is no sharp dividing line between the linguistic and the extra-linguistic: Names have a fundamental function, but they belong together with, and not merely designate, their bearers; and the utterance is not a complex of names, but a dynamic act in itself, a deed. By contrast, written language consists of separate words, each of which has a literal meaning, designates a definite concept or object. Context does play a role, but only as a guide to recognize the proper designation. The meaning of a written text is open to interpretation, but does not alter with the changing circumstances. As the metaphor has it: Spoken language is alive, written texts are dead.

The thesis I will here put forward is that the genesis and the direction of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is not independent of the emergence of secondary orality. The thesis as such is not new. I first propounded it in my essay "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Machine Consciousness" (Nyíri 1989). And Toulmin in his Cosmopolis, in the section "The Return to the Oral" pointed out that the later Wittgenstein "was moving away from the expression of beliefs in written propositions to their transient, contextual expression in language games, speech acts, and utterances generally" (Toulmin 1990:187).² Now in order to

¹ Ong 1971. Ong's major monograph on the subject is his 1982.
² The thesis is fully developed in my The Later Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Post-literacy, in preparation.
render this thesis plausible - to show how natural it is to view Wittgenstein's later philosophy from the perspective of the orality/literacy chasm - I shall introduce my main argument by a two-stage detour. In the second stage of that detour I will draw attention to the importance Plato had for Wittgenstein in the early 1930s; in the first, I will briefly refer to Havelock's interpretation of Plato as the philosopher, of literacy triumphant, in Greece.

What Eric Havelock has shown in his monograph *Preface to Plato*, is that writing was, for Plato, not just a new medium in which to express his philosophy; on the contrary, the experience of literacy formed the very *source* of Platonism. When Plato inquired about the nature of justice, or the beautiful, or goodness, he was not merely asking new questions; he was asking questions with regard to abstract terms that were simply not there in the Greek language prior to the rise of literacy. It is the syntax of writing that creates abstract terms; and it is the impression given by written language that all words signify basically in the same manner, namely by designating something.

It is known that Wittgenstein enjoyed reading Plato; but the significance Plato had for him is quite underrated, and has never been properly understood. In the year 1931 Wittgenstein refers, in his notebooks, at least eleven times to Plato, quoting a number of passages, even quite long ones. Plato certainly plays a role in those notebooks no other philosopher ever came near to. The passages Wittgenstein again and again quotes belong to those where Plato's way from a specific view of meaning to a specific ontology becomes particularly clear. Wittgenstein obviously had a feeling that the point in the history of philosophy to which he wanted to return is the one at which Plato had taken the wrong turning. As he said to Schlick in 1931: "I cannot characterize my standpoint better than by saying that it is opposed to that which Socrates represents in the Platonic dialogues."3

If Wittgenstein's opposition to Plato was motivated, to some measure at least, by the emergence of post-literacy, he was certainly not aware of this. In fact he was unaware of the radical epistemological differences between written and spoken language. Two authors who could have influenced him here, but, judging by the way Wittgenstein's arguments will proceed, clearly did not do so, were Oswald Spengler and Bronislaw Malinowski. In Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* he could have found the idea that writing is, as Spengler had put it, a quite new type of language, implying "a complete change in the relations of man's waking consciousness", liberating the mind "from the tyranny of the pre-

3 TS 302:14
sentire. While speaking and hearing, Spengler emphasized, take place only in proximity and in the present, writing bridges distance both in space and in time. Malinowski's essay "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages" appeared as an appendix in the Ogden and Richards volume The Meaning of Meaning. Wittgenstein of course must have had some acquaintance with the volume; but he nowhere mentions Malinowski. In the latter's essay "primitive living tongue, existing only in actual utterance" is contrasted with "dead, inscribed languages". The former, Malinowski stresses, is "to be regarded as a mode of action, rather than as a countersign of thought". In a primitive language, he writes, "the meaning of any single word is to a very high degree dependent on its context"; indeed it is dependent, as he puts it, on the context of situation - i.e., on the extra-linguistic environment. Written documents, by contrast, are "naturally isolated", the statements contained in them "are set down with the purpose of being self-contained and self-explanatory". Spoken linguistic material "lives only in winged words, passing from man to man", word-meanings being "inextricably mixed up with, and dependent upon, the course of the activity in which the utterances are embedded". Language in a preliterate culture is never "a mere mirror of reflected thought". In writing however "language becomes a condensed piece of reflection", the reader "reasons, reflects, remembers, imagines". And it is significant that in Malinowski's estimate such reflection is a philosophically dangerous enterprise, leading to a "misuse of words", bestowing "real existence" upon meanings - giving rise, that is, to Plato's ideas and to medieval realism.

My suggestion is that although Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, came to represent attitudes we might regard as post-liberal ones, he did not receive them from Spengler, Malinowski, or any possible similar source. Rather, he acquired these attitudes through being directly influenced by phenomena of a secondarily oral type. To such influences Wittgenstein must have been particularly susceptible. Although he was an obsessive writer, Wittgenstein had a problematic relation to written language, especially to written language in its fully developed form: the printed book. Already in the preface to his Wörterbuch für Volkschulen Wittgenstein had complained about the distorting effects of typography; and his reluctance to publish his writings is of course notorious. Here also come

4 Spengler 1934:II:149f.
5 Malinowski 1923:296.
6 Malinowski 1923:306.
7 Malinowski 1923:307 and 311.
8 Malinowski 1923:312 and 307.
9 Malinowski 1923:308.
to mind his poor orthography; his anachronistic predilection for having people read out loud texts to him; the common observation that his favourite readings he really knew by heart; the aphorism and the dialogue as conspicuous stylistic features of his writing; and even his tendency to explain arguments by using pictures and diagrams.\textsuperscript{10}

A post-literal phenomenon clearly having specific impact on Wittgenstein was the film, both in its silent and in its "talkie" versions - to apply here the terminology of late twenties.\textsuperscript{11} Going to the movies was almost an addiction with Wittgenstein; and it is striking that he regularly used the film metaphor to illustrate philosophical points, points in particular where the relation of the signified to signs belonging to more than one media was at issue. In England the first "talkie" films were shown in 1928, in Vienna towards the end of 1929. Wittgenstein must have been exposed to new experiences of language through watching them, as also, earlier, through watching silent films. One is not left without possible conjectures as to the nature of those new experiences. Béla Balázs, in his book Der sichtbare Mensch, published in Vienna in 1924 - a book that soon became very influential - reflecting on the silent film makes the following observation: "On the film ... speaking is a play of facial gestures and immediately visual facial expression. They who see speaking, will learn things very different from them who hear the words."\textsuperscript{12} Balázs published a second book on the film, in Berlin in 1930, this time on the sound film, again addressing the issue of how herewith language comes to be seen in a new perspective.

Now even though coming to articulate linguistic intuitions characteristic of post-literacy, and developing arguments and notions which today serve as important instruments for dealing with philosophical problems pertaining to secondary orality, Wittgenstein, as I have already suggested, was not aware of the true nature of his enterprise. He certainly hit the nail on the head when he wrote, around September 1929: "In mir streut sich ein Freudscher Widerstand gegen das Finden der Wahrheit."\textsuperscript{13} The word "sträubt" Wittgenstein here spells with an "e" instead of an "a". In all other instances I have come across in his manuscripts he does get the word right. The appropriate Freudian explanation would thus be: his resistance is directed, really, against being coerced into standardized spelling - that is, directed against the norms of literacy, and ultimately against the recognition that his philosophical problems somehow per-

\textsuperscript{10} I owe this point to Andreas Roser.
\textsuperscript{11} See e.g. Toeplitz 1985:38ff.
\textsuperscript{12} Balázs 1982:68.
\textsuperscript{13} "There arises in me a Freudian resistance against the finding of truth", MS 107:100.
tained to the technique of writing. If I maintain that, all the same, it was precisely this fundamental issue which confronted Wittgenstein, my reason for this is the central place which the notion of *meaning as use* occupies in his arguments. To think of meaning as use means to think of language as spoken; written words are, typically, used to represent spoken words, and in this sense written words are, typically, names. Under conditions of secondary orality spoken language once more gains a certain dominance, without however losing its ties with writing. It is appropriate that in Wittgenstein's arguments references to both spoken and written signs should figure; a source of confusion, however, is that Wittgenstein himself is not aware of the radically different roles played by spoken signs on the one hand, and written signs on the other; and hence of the radically different implications his arguments can have, depending upon the examples chosen.

Let me just give three illustrations.

In a crucially important passage from the 25th of August Wittgenstein writes:

> If I were to resolve (in my thoughts) to say "abracadabra" instead of "red", how would it show itself that "abracadabra" stood in place of "red"? How is the position of a word determined? Supposing that I were to replace all the words of my language simultaneously by others, how could I know which word stood in place of which other word? Is it here the ideas [*Vorstellungen*] that remain and hold fixed the positions of the words? As if there were a sort of hook attached to each idea, upon which I hang a word, which would indicate the position? This I can't believe. I cannot make myself think that ideas have a place in understanding different from that of words.  

The proposition I am putting forward is that while in a language devoid of the underpinnings of writing it is indeed impossible to perform the permutation Wittgenstein here claims one cannot perform, to do the same in writing is, though cumbersome, yet perfectly possible. Here, then, Wittgenstein must have had spoken language in mind.

Late in 1931 Wittgenstein wrote: "The power language has to make everything look the same which is most glaringly evident in the *dictionary.*" This, clearly, refers to written language. It is the intuitions of written language which suggest that meaning equals naming; and it is this very equation which is re-

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14 MS 109:45f.
15 MS 113:554, cf. CV:22e.
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sponsible for our bewitchment by language.

On p.488 of TS 211, compiled in 1932, one reads: "Die Worte sind diskontinuierlich; die Wortsprache eine Abbildung durch diskontinuierliche Zeichen. Das ist einer der wichtigsten Gesichtspunkte, von der man sie betrachten muss." Here again we might recall that spoken language is not a discontinuous string of words; rather, it is made up of speech acts inextricably bound up with the situations in which they play their role. Written language however is discontinuous; and here one can say that words are pictures, in the sense that written words do indeed represent spoken words.

Let me conclude by pointing out that although by 1931 practically all the main discoveries of the later Wittgenstein have made their appearance in his manuscripts, those discoveries were, well until 1934, again and again lost sight of by him. Wittgenstein's failure to make the distinctions I have referred to earlier, distinctions between language spoken and language written, might serve, I suggest, as an explanation, at least in part, for this frustrating state of affairs; but also for Wittgenstein's ultimate inability to complete the "book" he always wanted to complete. Looking at Wittgenstein scholarship today, it would be difficult to deny that the profession is in a state of crisis. The point I was trying to make here is that coming to terms with the orality/literacy issue could be one of the preconditions for that crisis to be overcome.

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Language-game, Grammar and/or Noema

Because of the vast differences found between phenomenology and analytic philosophy the question of mutual understanding has remained almost insoluble. The gap appears to be unbridgeable. But even during the fifties some attempts to establish substantial links between the two were found in scattered writings, including remarks on possible analogies between Husserl and Wittgenstein. D. Føllesdal's study on the relationship between Husserl and Frege. Another well-known and influential study was K.O. Apel's comparing of Wittgenstein with Heidegger.

There also have been many different interpretations with regards to Wittgenstein's so-called "phenomenology." Putting the exegetic issues aside, in this essay I would like to demonstrate a possible comparison between the two traditions from the general interest in the linguistic expressions of the experience. It is because their differences are plausibly connected to the issue of the interplay between linguistic expression and perception.

In the context of Husserl's phenomenology, the idea of meaning is connected

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1 This essay is based on the paper presented to the American/Japanese Phenomenology Conference 1992, at The University of Tokyo, October 1992.
5 Apel, K.O., Transformation of Philosophy, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973, Chapt.II.
to that of perceptions, especially when he proposes the notion of "noema" or "perceptual noema" in *Ideas*. The concept of noema plays an important role in his analysis of the intentionalty of experience. Perceptual noema here means what is perceived itself in a perception. This notion also designates the entanglement of perception with the linguistic expressions.

In short, what I attempt here is to demonstrate a substantial link between Husserl and Wittgenstein by discussing several points of comparison between "noema" and "language-game" or "grammar."

1) The Phenomenological Approach

Tugendhat points out the fact that Husserl appeals to the linguistic criterion when he exemplifies the "intentionality." Husserl makes use of the grammatical structure of transitive verbs, such as 'perceive', 'state', 'have', etc., which require grammatical objects. According to Tugendhat, Husserl's manner of analysis in nature can be characterized as "propositional attitude." "Propositional Attitudes" mean the attitudes of speakers who use sentence forms such as "I believe that ---," or "I know that---," i.e., sentences of that-construction. The crucial point for us is that Tugendhat takes Husserl's intentionality as modes of consciousness which are expressed and identified with propositional attitudes. Tugendhat's interpretation of intentionality is an attempt to clarify all "non-propositional intentional consciousness" or relations including "perceptual noema" by means of linguistic analysis. In his view, intentionality is a (linguistic) relation. Should we remain within the limits of our language, since it makes no sense to transgress the boundary beyond the sphere of linguistic expression? Instead of "the method of inner intuition," any inquiry into the intentionality of consciousness "turns out to be sentence- understanding." He supports the so-called "Fregean reading of Husserl" which takes the noema as "Sinn," i.e., the linguistic meanings. To interpret intentionality of consciousness in terms of

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12. Ibid., p.74.
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analytic philosophy appears to have two problematic points. First, it would consequently eliminate the special status of the concept of the perceptual noema. The perceptual noema plays a fundamental role in the question of the encounter with reality, i.e., the constitution of objects. Secondly, it relies on the concept of "understanding" which has to share the difficulty Frege's "grasping" bears. Of these two, only the first point must be taken into consideration for our purposes, whereas the latter can be left for future discussions which would treat "propositional attitudes" in connection with the question of referential transparency of subordinate sentences.

Confining us merely to what is linguistically describable, the concept of "language-games," for example, could probably make us avoid such traps as the charge of psychologism. But a linguistic analysis of this kind would merely suspend judgment about the question of what are ineffable. To put the issue in other terms, an inquiry into something ineffable, i.e., the "extra-linguistic" directs us to the question of the relationship between acts of expression and what are expressed, although the boundary between them blurs.

2) Articulations of the Reality and Perception

It appears to be an open question whether there are nonverbal or non-linguistically articulated thoughts or not. It at least is feasible in our everyday experiences that we encounter the world always as an articulated system.

When we come to grasp the meaning of our experience, fix it into words and thus describe the reality, we are often guided by the familiarities of the reality or circumstances around us towards further experiences. According to what Husserl maintains that the perceptual experience involves the horizon of typified world (as sedimentation). Typified familiarity and the universality of language (EJ, p.331) appear to be deeply nested within the network of the "life-world" which makes our experience possible. Whereas the already articulated world is known as "typified world" in Husserl, in Wittgenstein the same is alluded in his concepts of a grammatical space of, for example, colour, pain, etc., and in his later philosophy, the grammar of "language-games," the "forms of life," or the "world-picture." We may well be aware of an affinity between the concepts of the life-world and the forms of life, concerning this typification.

According to Husserlian conceptions, the historical cultural experiences of language-community are stored as the "sedimentation" sunk within "the horizon of language" (EJ, p.425). This opens up other new fields of cultural historical studies of hermeneutics. But phenomenological investigations would deal not with culturally differentiated individual contents of sedimentation, but with the law of the same, thus the common grammars which rule each construction of this sedimentation. The most basic construction might begin with our sensory experience.

It is assumed that the reality is not an amorphous lump but is articulated into distinct objects. Hence, the world could be introduced into language. The world is given, originally, to our perceptual experience where sensations play a decisive role.

Perceptions, characterized as original and pure experiences or the "directly or immediately given" by Husserl, are thus in a sense typified. Here arise questions of how and to what extent they are expressed in language. We explore the question as that of what is counted in "extra-linguistic" and what is fundamentally exceeding our ability of description.

As regards the perception, in the first place, we may count raw sensations in "the extra-linguistic." Then, we are faced with an intractable problem of describing sensory experience on the one hand and that of the boundaries of verbal expression on the other.

3) Sensory Experience

Here come into prominence the questions of "how raw sensations are put into words" and "whether our sensations are the mirrors of the world or not." In other words, this is the question of the encounter with reality. The notion of "perceptual noema" illustrates this encounter.

Let's take a look at the explanations Husserl offered with regards to the relationship between noema and the sensory experience. A set of characterizations, as mainly given in Ideas, provide us with a perspective of the fundamental framework of "intentional experience" in general. Most importantly, noemata are "the intended objects," as the correlatives of the noesis which are acts of consciousness, e.g., linguistically expressing acts. Examining the concept of noema, one point must at least be noted. The correlation found between noesis and noema is never a type of one-to-one correspondence. Husserl states:

"These two doctrines of forms would not, of course, stand related to each other in any sense as images in a mirror" (Ideas, p.287).
Nor are we in the position to presume a mirror-like relationship between the world and sensations. Along this line, crucial concepts concerning sensory experience in Husserl are "adumbration" or "hyle." In constituting the object, noetic intentional acts have intimate relationships with this "hyletic data" which represent material contents of our sensations of colour, forms, etc. The sensory experiences are grasped with the concept of "adumbration," which can be taken to be a sort of articulation\textsuperscript{15}. Although Husserl's arguments about those ideas are not adequate for our comprehension, it is not the case that Husserl takes an atomic view of sense-data. Nor does he consider it possible to point out distinct hyletic data (sense-data) without resorting to an articulated system of adumbration such as a color system.

"Noema" here appears to be a bilateral conception, correlating noetic constitution with "its hyletic varieties of perspectival manifestation" on the one hand, and, on the other, noematic meanings that are accompanied with linguistic articulation. The essential relationship obtained between language and sensory experience thus can be revealed through the concept of "noema" of perceptions.

Noema might well leave something ineffable behind its being expressible, just as Wittgenstein implies something extra-linguistic by the expression of "proto-phenomena" (PI §654) or "primitive behavior" (Z §545). A relation of the grammar to the "forms of life" or "world-picture" is not satisfactorily elucidated.

4) Language-game and Grammar

Wittgenstein's analysis always is focused on anything linguistic and to transgress the boundary of the describable likely lets us relapse into a maze of nonsense for him. Nevertheless this does not mean that Wittgenstein attempts to reduce the pre-linguistic to the linguistic and internal relations to the external. What he rejects is the one-to-one corresponding relation of sensations to expressions. I would like to move to the next stage to examine how far this point of abandonment of "ostensive definition" of meaning can be related to the notion of noema.

To begin with, we can maintain so far that, in line with the above mentioned characterizations of noema, we may find a link between Husserl's refutation of atomic views of sensory data and Wittgenstein's denunciation of ostensive definition of meaning. Presumably, in ordinary perceptual experience, whenever we draw our attention to those objects and grasp them as such, linguistic appa-

tatus is at our disposal. However, Wittgenstein reveals the fact that it is difficult to elucidate how we embody raw sensation into expressions (PI, §§672, 275, 293, etc.). It is because sensations, such as "pain" or "colour," appear to resist any explanation by way of ostensive definition. We cannot directly point to sensations (PI, §672). Raw sensations are ineffable.

Wittgenstein proposes a concept of grammars of "pain," "colour," or even "meaning" with an emphasis of the rejection of ostensive definition of meanings of those words (PI, §33). From the impossibility of "private language," Wittgenstein concludes the impossibility of any type of ostensive definition of sensation\(^{16}\). As we have just seen, instead of ostensive definition, grammars of the words of sensations indicate what they are.

"'Red' means the colour that occurs to me when I hear the word 'red'" - would be a definition [grammar] (PI §239).

He also maintains that everything expressible is expressed within language-games, rules of which are prescribed in grammar in this sense. Moreover, his "grammar" means the "depth grammar," i.e., "the possibilities of phenomena" (PI, §90).

5) Noema as or beyond Grammar

It also can be suggested that the "language-games" also stand for all that are meaningful and the so-called "grammar" represents our application of language to reality\(^{17}\). Wittgenstein characterizes the language-game as follows. "I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the 'language-game'(PI, §7)." In this respect he plausibly includes some types of objectifying acts within language-games. The language-game of objectifying acts is also pre-delineated in the "depth grammar." This phase of the concept of the "language-games" without the ostensive definition appears to be equated with the function of "bracketing" the ontological commitment to the reality.

In relation to this understanding, according to Husserl, all the objects appearing in the noematic manner are grasped as meanings, bracketing any ontological

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commitment to the reality. To maintain that the reality is thus grasped as noemata amounts to the claim that the concept of "noema" indicates the grammar that implies "an objectificatory apparatus."

Here, we, may find a striking similarity within the fundamental features of their approaches, Husserl and Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, in one direction the "noema" still surpass the "grammar." It is because the "noema" not only prescribes the grammar of objectification but also designates what we achieve by the objectifying acts. Brown's statement in his criticism to Smith & McIntyre's Fregean reading of noema helps us to understand this "achievement" of the perceptual noema, which runs as follows:

In the perceptual noema not only is the perceived object seen as having such and such properties but is also seen as occupying a specific spot in my visual field, as "here" rather than "there," as "now" rather than "then."

This marks a significant difference between "grammar" and "noema." In perception, our sense of reality besides the sensory experience of "red" or "blue" and so on give us a unity that one can grasp in the intuitive perceptual field, namely the unity of the immediate direct experience. This unity gives us the intended object as such. Now we come to the conclusive stage. What perceptual noema supplies us with is a "unity" which is revitalized at each moment, i.e., a "living unity."

This living unity surpasses all description. This is the point where the two philosophers differ. But we even here may be able to find an affinity between them.

For Wittgenstein, language-games are the "proto-phenomenon" beyond which nothing is describable and the very point of "this language game is played" is ineffable (PI, §654). Expressions may be mere remnants of performed language games. Within the grammar it is manifested that language-games overlap with all that can be meaningful. Inasmuch as language-games draw the boundary of verbal expression, the grammar prescribes this situation. Nevertheless, this notion of grammar turns out to be not only linguistic- but also pre-linguistic-orientated.

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Epilogue

A metaphorical illustration may in some sense help us to envisage the whole course of Husserl's phenomenological development. Let us imagine an edifice, the total outlook of which one cannot survey because of its consisting only of entrance doors which lead to other entrances. In room after room there are only entrances to another room. Doors of new methods would make paths to new phases and horizons of investigations. Husserl wished to remain "a beginner" throughout his philosophical life. He never blocked any possible move to the deeper dimensions aiming at the utmost foundation. However, he did not seem to establish this foundation except for the "life-world" which itself again opened up a whole new vista of investigation, namely the transcendental studies to explore the so-called "life-world a priori." Lest we might become fruitless quasi-beginners merely following his courses, or drift into hopeless equivocality, we have no plausible way out but our existential language uses.

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Gibt es in der Sprache ein metaphysisches Subjekt? ¹

Einführung


1. Metaphysischen Standpunkt

Die "mentalen Episoden" und die "Gedanken" sind die Säule, auf der die Propositionstheorie aufbaut. Die Propositionstheorie bestimmt die Propositionsformen und die Beziehungen zwischen ihnen. 

¹ Ich möchte mich für die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der These, die ich in dieser Arbeit vertrete und im Rahmen der "Werkstattgespräche" in Graz vorgestellt und mit R. Haller (Graz), R. Hilpinen (Turku/Miami), Th. Uebel (London), K. Puhl, R. Fabian, Marek und W. Sauer (Graz) diskutiert wurde, bedanken.

² Siehe: Haller 1989, 368 f.
nen als psychologische Einheiten, denn sie sind die Inhalte aller dispositionaler Geisteszustände. Sie sind aber gleichzeitig Wahrheitsträger im ursprünglichen Sinn der Wahrheit. Wahrheitsträger sind **objektiv** und **zeitlos**. Die **Objektivität** und **Zeitlosigkeit** bilden den starren Kern des **metaphysischen Standpunktes**. Sprachlich eignen sich die Behauptungssätze für diese Struktur.


Wenn zwischen der Sprache, mittels derer wir denken, und der Welt, in der wir sprechen, eine Isomorphie besteht, dann stellt sich die berechtigte Frage, ob nicht Glauben und Verlangen zusammenfallen. Sollten die Inhalte des Intendierens und des Willens nicht denkbare Inhalte sein, bereit, in die gedachte Welt einzugehen? Freges nahm an, daß das, was geglaubt wird, auch verlangt, begehrt, erfragt und gefordert wird. Allerdings können unter dieser Voraussetzung bestimmte Prozesse nicht dargestellt werden, da wir es mit einem _statischen Bild_ der Beziehung zwischen Sprache und Welt zu tun haben und die indexikalische Rolle der ausführenden Referenz nicht vollständig erkannt wird. Bestimmt werden soll die Referenz auf Gegenstände, als Gegenstände der Erfahrung (bzw. in der Erfahrung), als zu diesem oder jenem Typus gehörig, auf die eine oder andere Weise ausgeführt, oder als Erfahrungssubjekte, wie sie mittels der Bezugnahme durch Personalpronomen gesetzt werden.

2. **Objektgebrauch versus Subjektgebrauch**


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3 Freges *1918/19, 58 ff.*
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leicht ergeben können.4 Dieses Motiv beruht auf Lichtenbergs Aussage: "Ich und mich. Ich fühle mich - sind zwei Gegenstände. Unsere falsche Philosophie ist der ganzen Sprache einverleibt; wir können so zu sagen nicht reasennieren, ohne falsch zu reasennieren."5


Er ist jedoch nicht der einzige. Während Theseus das Schiff reparierte und die auszuwechselnden Teile wegwarf, wandte einer seiner Feinde diese Teile, um, nachdem sie alle einzeln repariert worden waren, aus ihnen ein Schiff zusammenzubauen, das dem Schiff Theseus' gleicht wie ein Haar dem anderen: sie waren identisch. Der Feind segelte mit dem Schiff zur selben Zeit auf dem Meer. Die Frage die sich bereichertweise stellt ist diese: welches der Schiffe ist Theseus' Schiff? Ist es das beschädigte (Schiff 1), das reparierte (Schiff 2) oder das vom Feind neuerlich zusammengebaute (Schiff 3)?

Das Beispiel in 'De Corpore' zeigt die fehlende Garantie für die Wiedererkennung bzw. Identifizierung des Subjekts. Wir stehen somit vor einem Rätsel und, wie bei jedem Rätsel so üblich, gibt es mehrere Lösungen. Die eine ergibt sich aus der Annahme, daß sich das Rätsel daraus ergibt, daß zwischen Theseus Schiff 1, Schiff 2 und Schiff 3 aufgrund der Undurchsichtigkeit propositionaler Kontexte ein Widerspruch entsteht.

Wittgenstein unterscheidet zwei Verwendungen des Wortes "ich", um diese Schwierigkeit der Wiedererkennung bzw. Identifizierung beschreiben zu können, nämlich den "Objektgebrauch" und den "Subjektgebrauch". Die Unterscheidungen zwischen Objekt- und Subjektgebrauch werden so zusammengefaßt:

"Die Fälle in der ersten Kategorie machen es erforderlich, daß eine bestimmte Person erkennt, und in diesen Fällen besteht die Möglichkeit eines Irrtums -oder ich sollte besser sagen: Die Möglichkeit

4 BLB, 106.
5 Lichtenberg 1971, 197[146].
6 Hobbes, (1655) 1911.
des Irrtums ist vorgesehen. ... Andererseits geht es nicht um das Problem, eine Person zu erkennen, wenn ich sage, daß ich Zahn-

Bevor wir die epistemologische Komponente der Unterscheidung zwischen Objekt- und Subjektgebrauch untersuchen, will ich nochmals kurz auf die sprachliche Struktur eingehen.

3. Ein sprachanalytischer Exkurs

Zu beachten ist, daß Wittgenstein zum Objektgebrauch folgende Fälle zählt:8

1. Ich bin zehn Zentimeter gewachsen,

und

2. Ich habe eine Beule auf meiner Stirn.

Die Fälle, die dem Subjektgebrauch entsprechen, sind:9

3. Ich habe Schmerzen.

4. Ich denke, daß jemand ein Philosoph ist.

Im Objektgebrauch wird das Personalpronomen in der ersten Person Singular als Demonstrativpronomen gebraucht. Somit steht das “ich” für einen Namen, der einen Gegenstand bezeichnet. Ein solcher Gebrauch des Wortes kommt in den Sätzen (1) und (2) vor. In beiden Beispielen bezieht sich “ich” eindeutig auf einen Körper, da in (1) “ich” auf das Wachstum meines Körpers Bezug nimmt, und (2) auf die Beule auf meiner Stirn hinweist. Findet die Identifizierung der Person mittels äußerer körperlicher Merkmale statt, so ist man dem Irrtum ausgesetzt.

In (1)-(2)-(3) haben wir es mit einem prädikativen Gebrauch des Personalpronomens zu tun. Die in den Sätzen (1)-(2) verwendeten Prädikate setzen von dem Gegenstand, dem sie zugeschrieben werden, kein Bewußtsein voraus. So kann ich etwa wachsen und nicht merken, daß meine Stimme sich geändert hat, oder nicht wahrnehmen, daß ich eine Beule auf der Stirn habe. Jemand kann mich aber durch den Gebrauch von

(2') Du hast eine Beule auf deiner Stirn

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7 BLB, 106 f.
8 BLB, 106.
9 BLB, 106.
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auf meine Veränderung aufmerksam machen, so daß ich erst dann (1) oder (2) sinnvoll verwende.

Im Gegensatz zu diesen Beispielen sieht Wittgenstein, daß das “ich” in (3) nicht als Demonstrativpronomen angesehen wird. Bei dem Subjektgebrauch geht es nicht um ein Problem der Identifizierung, denn wenn ich stöhne und sage “Ich habe Schmerzen”, so kann ich mich darin nicht irren, wer die Schmerzen hat.10


In (3) weiß der Sprecher dagegen ganz genau, daß er Kopfschmerzen hat. Wittgenstein macht auf diese Differenz aufmerksam, wenn er folgendes schreibt:11

“Ich sage zwar ‘Ich habe jetzt die und die Vorstellung’, aber die Worte ‘Ich habe’ sind nur ein Zeichen für den andern; die Vorstellungswelt ist ganz in der Beschreibung der Vorstellung dargestellt.”

Bedeutsam für unseren Kontext sind nun auch folgende Passagen, die sich unmittelbar anschließen:12


Propositionale Einstellungen, wie sie in (4) präsentiert werden, können durchsichtige und undurchsichtige Lesarten zulassen. Eine durchsichtige Lesart entsteht, wenn wir den Existenzoperator außerhalb des Wirkungsbereichs der propositionalen Einstellung bestimmen, d. h.

\[(4') (\forall x) (\text{ich denke, daß } x \text{ ein Philosoph ist});\]
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Im Deutschen kann der Sinn von (4*) durch den Zusatz “von” verdeutlicht werden, in dem wir diesen Satz so paraphrasieren: “Ich denke von jemandem, daß er ein Philosoph ist.” Der Satz (4) hat dagegen einen undurchsichtigen Sinn, wenn der Existenzoperator innerhalb des Wirkungsbereichs der propositionalen Einstellung liegt, wie z. B.

(4*) Ich denke, daß ($\exists x)(x$ ist ein Philosoph).

Noch ein Beispiel wird die Schwierigkeit verdeutlichen:

(5) Ich glaube, daß ich Millionär bin.


4. Grundstrukturen des Selbstbezugs


(6) Ich habe Kopfschmerzen,

aber das einzige, was mir bewußt ist, ist der Schmerz. Von dieser Seite gesehen ist das cartesianische “Ego” eine rätselhafte Entität. Die Frage ist dabei, ob wir bei “Kopfschmerzen” Kenntnis über eine solche Entität haben? Die Antwort

13 Castañeda 1982, 139 ff.
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kann mit dem Vorschlag Lichtenbergs zusammengefaßt werden, “Ich denke” durch “Es denkt” zu ersetzen. Wittgenstein akzeptiert diese Antwort. Somit kann eine Sprache L_{L-W} konstruiert werden, in der man statt (6) auszudrücken sagt

(7) Es kopfschmerzt.

Ich fühle meine Schmerzen in meinem Körper, d. h. in einem bestimmten Leib. Durch eine Reihe von kontrafaktischen Situationen versucht Wittgenstein zu zeigen, daß es logisch möglich ist, daß ich Schmerzen in einem anderen Leibe fühle. Dabei sei aber zu beachten, daß diese meine Schmerzen sind. Wie wir oben gesehen haben, sind die Sätze:

(8) Ich fühle Schmerzen,

und

(9) Dieser Leib fühlt Schmerzen,


Schluß

Die Debatte um die Bedeutung der ersten Person Singular möchte ich mit dem Themenkreis schließen, den ich das Inkonstanzproblem nennen möchte. Man kann dabei von einer zweifachen Einführung der Indikatoren sprechen. Erstens werden sie semantisch eingeführt, indem mit Hilfe des Leibnizschen Gesetz es die beiden singulären Termini der Aussage der Gleichheit als gleichbedeutend erklärt werden. Zweitens wird die inhaltliche Identifikation der Individuen erörtert. Um zu verstehen, was das inhaltlich bedeutet, muß man natürlich schon über eine semantische Erklärung des Gebrauchs der Indikatoren verfügen, und es stellt sich die Frage, ob die gegebene Erklärung lediglich der Gleichheit zweier singulärer Termini gerecht wird.

Der Selbstbezug kann durch folgende Merkmale charakterisiert werden: Das Personalpronomens Singular hat keine “Zentralität” der Bezugnahme gegenüber

\[14\] BLB, 107.

Nun wäre die Frage zu stellen, ob der Subjektgebrauch durch den Objektgebrauch von "ich" ersetzt werden kann. Diese Frage kann vom sprachlichen Sichtpunkt aus anders formuliert werden: kann ein Satz wie (3), der psychologische Prädikate enthält, substituiert werden durch einen Ausdruck der Beschreibungen, der kein Reflexivpronomina verwendet und also nicht-psychologische Prädikate beinhaltet? Es scheint, daß der Selbstbezug meiner selbst der Selbstidentifikation als Objekt vorausgeht. Um Identifikationen meiner selbst als innerweltliches Objekt durchzuführen, muß ich schon Selbstbewußtsein voraussetzen, welches nicht auf Identifikationskriterien gestützt sein muß. Die Annahme, daß jede Selbsterkenntnis auf Identifikation beruht, führt uns zu einem Regressus ad infinitum. Somit sagt Wittgenstein: "Wie im Gesichtsraum, so gibt es in der Sprache kein metaphysisches Subjekt".15

**Literaturverzeichnis**


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15 Big Typescript, 508.
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Gibt es kollektive Regelfolge-Paradoxien?


Wittgensteins Antwort und Lösungsvorschlag - oder besser gesagt, was man dafür halten kann (denn PU § 202 scheint mehrere komplexe Auflösungen der behaupteten Paradoxie zu erlauben), besteht in einem Verweis auf die gemeinsame menschliche Handlungs- und Sprachpraxis. In dieser gemeinsamen Handlungspraxis kann ein Personenkollektiv zwar - aus wiederum unbekannte Gründen - darin übereinkommen einer Regel so oder anders zu folgen, und insofern tut das Kollektiv nichts anderes als der individuelle Regelanwender. Im Gegensatz zu dessen vermeintlich privater Regelanwendung ist jedoch im kollektiven Fall das Paradigma der Regelanwendung öffentlich festgelegt. Das allein unterscheidet diesen kollektiven Fall nachhaltig von dem des sogenannten privaten Regelanwenders.

Der einzelne skeptische Regelanwender wird also durch das Kollektiv korrigiert, doch diese Korrektur scheint wieder das skeptische Argument des Begründungsabbruchs für das Paradigma einer Regelbefolgung zu enthalten. (Zumindest ist dies eine mögliche Interpretation dieser PU-Stelle.) Das skeptische Argument des vermeintlich privaten Regelbefolgers bleibt in der kollektiven Sprachpraxis erhalten, weil es selbst keiner weiteren Rechtfertigung zugänglich ist. (Darin scheint Kripkes Lösungsvorschlag zu bestehen)

Aus verschiedenen Gründen eliminiert diese skeptische Lösung das Regelparadoxon nicht, sofern es auch kollektive Varianten dieses Regelparadoxons geben sollte.
Einige solcher kollektiven Varianten sollen hier diskutiert werden. Dabei ist jedoch zu betonen, daß dies nur mit größter Vorsicht und unter vielen (nicht nur methodischen) Vorbehalten erfolgen kann. Schon gar nicht ist es die Absicht, aus diesen Beispielen vorschnelle Folgerungen für die Interpretation von PU § 202 abzuleiten. Es soll vorerst auch noch offenbleiben, ob es sich hier (a) um eine Interpretation Wittgensteins, (b) eine logisch Konsequenz seiner Überlegungen oder (c) um davon unabhängige Anschlußüberlegungen handelt. Diese Fragen sollen vorerst ausgeklammert bleiben und das angesprochene Problem allein für sich betrachtet werden.

Wenn die Frage nach dem Kriterium für eine richtige oder falsche Anwendung eines Satzes durch den Hinweis auf den allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch bzw. unsere Sprachpraxis beantwortet werden kann, dann ist eine mögliche Anschlußfrage die nach dem Paradigma dieses öffentlich geregelten Sprachgebrauches.

Wittgenstein: "Es ist in unserem Spiel ein Paradigma; etwas, womit verglichen wird" (PU § 50, vgl. auch §§ 51, 55).

Diese Antwort Wittgensteins scheint jedoch mehr Fragen als Antworten zu implizieren: Was wird hier womit verglichen? Welchem Spiel müssen wir ein Paradigma zuordnen? Welchem Paradigma müssen wir welches Spiel zuordnen?

Es geschieht häufig, daß ein Satz, der in einem Sprachspiel Verwendung findet, auch in einem anderen Spiel vorkommen kann. Der sprachlogische Grund dafür ist die Tatsache, daß ein Satz zahllos viele Anwendungen erfährt kann. Kann er diese Anwendungen in einem Spiel haben, so kann er sie auch in verschiedenen Spielen haben. Hat ein Satz aber in verschiedenen Spielen verschiedene Anwendungen, so ist es auch denkbar daß er in ein und demselben Spiel verschiedene Anwendungen haben kann. Hat nun aber ein Satz in einem Spiel mehrere korrekte, wenn auch verschiedene Anwendungen, dann gibt es keine sprachlogische Garantie dafür, daß diese korrekten Anwendungen in allen Fällen untereinander kompatibel sein müßten.

Mindestens zwei typologisch verschiedene Fälle kollektiver Regelparadoxien scheinen sich anzubieten:

1. Regeln mit offenem Anwendungsbereich (Gebote und Verbote)

2. Regeln, die das Spiel determinieren aber den Spielzweck nicht prognostizieren können
Gibt es kollektive Regelfolge-Paradoxien?

Beide Regeln lasse die Frage offen, welchem Sprachspiel sie zugeordnet werden müssen.

1. Regeln mit offenem Anwendungsbereich (Gebote und Verbote)


Das Problem ist: Wenn alle von diesem Satz eine andere Anwendung machen, dann scheinen sie verschiedene und nicht dasselbe Sprachspiel zu spielen. Denn wenn verschiedene Spachspiele einander dadurch unterscheiden können, daß in jedem von ihnen von einem Satz eine andere Anwendung gemacht werden kann, dann haben wir hier den paradoxen Fall, daß wir unter den Bedingungen, unter denen wir dasselbe Spiel spielen, auch verschiedene Spiele spielen könnten. Dieser Fall enthält genau dann widersprüchliche Satzanwendungen, wenn die Kriterien für die Identität eines Spieles widersprüchlich sind. Ein Kriterium dafür, daß dasselbe Spiel gespielt wird, liegt jedoch sowohl darin, daß wir derselben Spielregel folgen ("Gib' einem Satz irgendeine Anwendung"), als auch darin, die unterschiedlichsten Satzverwendungen als Ausdruck derselben Regel interpretieren zu können. Hier jedoch scheint der Fall eines kollektiven Regelparadoxons vorzuliegen, denn sind Anwendungen jener Regel widersprüchlich, so läßt sich aus ihnen alles Mögliche ableiten, und wir könnten nicht mehr aus den verschiedensten Anwendungen auf dieselbe Regel schließen.

Nun scheint es sich in diesem Falle zwar um eine vage Regel und einen exotischen Ausnahmefall zu handeln. Doch tatsächlich ist dieser Fall weder vage noch unscharf. Denn die Regel kann exakt befolgt werden. Das Regelparadoxon Wittgensteins bleibt auch dann erhalten, wenn alle Mitglieder eines Kollektivs ein und demselben Regel-Paradigma folgen, das Paradoxon bleibt auch in iden-
tischen Regelanwendungen eines Kollektivs erhalten, wenn wir gemeinsam der erwähnten Regel folgen: "Mach irgendetwas (sitz' nicht nur so herum)"). Aus der an diese Regel anschließenden Handlungspraxis läßt sich nicht mehr auf die Regel schließen, obwohl die Praxis der Regelbefolgung Ausdruck der Regel ist - und das ist das Problem. Das kollektive Regelparadoxon verschwindet auch nicht, wenn wir diese Regel mit einer Ausnahme formulieren.

Die Regel der Eltern an ihre Kinder: "Macht' irgendetwas (aber stört uns nicht)!") erlaubt die unterschiedlichsten Handlungsweisen, etwas zu tun oder nicht zu tun.

Was immer auch geschieht, aus der komplexen Handlungspraxis können wir in diesem Falle nicht widerspruchsfrei auf eine Regel schließen oder diese als Ausdruck ein und derselben Regel interpretieren. So können wir etwa nicht sagen: "Allen diesen Regelfolgen der Kinder ist gemeinsam, daß sie die Eltern nicht stören". Denn wenn das Gemeinsame der unterschiedlichsten Regelanwendungen das ist, was die Kinder gerade nicht tun, dann könnten auch konträre und kontradiktorische Beschreibungen Ausdruck einer identischen Regelbefolgung sein.

2. Regeln, die das Spiel determinieren aber den Spielzweck nicht prognostizieren können

Wir müssen dieses Beispiel nur verallgemeinern um zu sehen, daß es auch auf jedes einzelne Sprachspiel anwendbar ist. Wir könnten nämlich statt: "Gibt diesem Satz irgendeine Anwendung" auch sagen: "Gib diesem Sprachspiel irgendeine Anwendung".

Und dieser Fall scheint keineswegs ein kurioser Ausnahmefall zu sein. "Gibt diesem Sprachspiel irgendeine Anwendung" könnte einfach heißen: "Mache dieses Sprachspiel zu einem Bestandteil eines anderen Spiels". Die Frage: "Welches Spiel wird hier eigentlich gespielt" kann auch hier auf widersprüchliche Weise beantwortet werden, wenn z.B. der Fall eintritt, daß ein Spiel Bestandteil eines anderen Spiels wird.

Ein Schachspiel - beispielsweise - könnte für alle Personen eines Personen-Kollektivs regelkonform gespielt werden und doch enthalten die Schachregeln keinen Hinweis darauf, warum wir dieses Spiel spielen. Denn die entscheidende Frage wäre: "Ist es der Zweck dieses Spiels den König des Gegners matt zu setzen?". Doch dies muß verneint werden, den wir hätten auch dann Schach gespielt, wenn keiner gewonnen hätte, ja, wenn nie jemand dieses Spiel gewonnen hätte. Der Zweck dieses Spiels ist nicht im Spiel enthalten, doch andererseits
sagt uns nur das Spielziel, der Spielzweck, welches Spiel gespielt wird. Und darin liegt das Problem. Betrachten wir den folgenden Fall:


Wittgenstein erwähnt im *Big Typescript*1 einen solchen Fall:

"Könnte man sich eine Schachpartie gespielt denken, d.h., sämtliche Spielschritten ausgeführt denken, aber in einer anderen Umgebung, so dass dieser Vorgang [von /A.R.] uns nicht die Partie eines Spiels genannt würde // genannt werden könnte //?"

Gewiss, es könnte sich ja um eine *Aufgabe* handeln, die die Beiden miteinander lösen." (p. 536f.)2

Ein kollektives Regelparadoxon könnte zustande kommen, wenn wir gemeinsam ein und dasselbe Spiel nach denselben Regeln spielen, dennoch aber die Frage: "Welches Spiel wird hier eigentlich gespielt?", eine sprachlogisch sinnvolle Frage nach dem *dominanten Zweck* des Spiels wäre. Ein Spiel ist durch seine Regel auf einen Spielzweck eben nur in einem Spiel festgelegt. Doch wenn in vielen Fällen ein Spiel durch seinen Spielzweck bzw. das Spielziel bestimmt ist, dann ist die Einbettung eines Spiels in ein anderes Spiel einem Vorgang vergleichbar, der diesen Spielzweck einem anderen Spiel unter-

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1 Wittgenstein, L. 1982 Big Typescript, TS 213; hrsg. v. d. Cornell University Library; Ithaca
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ordnen könnten. Wir können dann fragen: "Welcher Spielzweck wird hier eigent-lich verfolgt?".


Das Regelparadoxon müßte sich dann aber auch für Spielgemeinschaften wiederholen, denn jedes Mitglied der Spielgemeinschaft kann - unabhängig von seinem eigenen korrekten gemeinschaftlichem Spielverhalten - beschreiben, von welchen anderen Spielen das eigene Spiel ein Bestandteil ist oder sein könnte. Es könnte öfters geschehen, daß, was wir alle gemeinsam tun, inkonsistent ist, wenn wir unser gemeinschaftliches Tun als Bestandteil verschiedener anderer Handlungskontexte bestimmen. Als Bestandteil eines anderen Spiele von den Plattenherbeitragen z.B. als Mittel für einen anderen Spielzweck verwendet werden. Doch das hängt eben davon ab, innerhalb welcher anderen Spiele dieses Spiel vorkommt. Wenn sich - und das scheint in unserer Alltagspraxis der Regelfall zu sein - verschiedene Spiele überlagern, dann sind wir
in keiner Weise genötigt, ein Spiel und seinen Zweck nur so zu verstehen, als müßten diese gleichsam sich selbst genügen. Wenn zudem der Zweck eines Spiels nicht in seinen Regeln enthalten ist (weil das Spiel selbst Bestandteil unzählig vieler anderer Spiele sein könnte) dann kann uns der Blick auf das Spiel, seine Regeln und deren Befolgung allein nicht sagen, welches Spiel gespielt wird.


1) Die kollektive Regelbefolgung legt fest, welches Spiel wir spielen.

2) Unterschiedliche Spiele können durch dieselben Regelfolgen dargestellt werden, und deshalb legt die Regelbefolgung nicht fest, welches Spiel gespielt wird.

Besteht die Vermutung zu Recht, es handle sich hier um eine kollektive Variante des Regelparadoxxons, dann müßte auch die Frage, ob es ein "privates Regelfolgen" gibt, nicht von vornherein in Opposition zur Analyse der Verwen-

Thomas Sattig

Triangle or Circle?
Davidson on Sharing a Language and The “Wittgensteinian Paradox”

There is an argument for the claim that meaning something by a word requires a convention or practice, in that only a shared way of speaking or agreement within a linguistic community can provide an answer to the “Wittgensteinian Paradox”\(^1\). Donald Davidson argues that this argument is inconclusive: he accepts the problem but denies the answer by claiming that in order to successfully communicate, we don’t have to share a certain way of speaking. The aim of the present paper is to present a critique of Davidson’s approach, in which I will try to show that it fails in answering the paradox.

I

The “Wittgensteinian Paradox” challenges all meaningful use of language. Suppose a sceptic questions my use of the predicate “green” in the past. He represents a non-standard interpretation of “green” in terms of “grue”, defining that past objects were grue if and only if they were green at that time, while present objects are grue if and only if they are now blue. Now the scepticism takes two forms: (1) it questions whether there is any fact about my past history, anything that was ever in my mind, or in my external behavior, that could establish that I meant “green” and not “grue”. (2) Secondly, it questions whether I have any reason to be so confident about having to call grass “green”, rather than the sky. The relationship between the two points is that I am confident that I should call grass “green”, because I am confident that this accords with what I meant. The hypothesis might be bizarre, but it is not logically impossible.

The most straightforward answer Davidson gives to Kripke’s paradox requires a reformulation of the problem. The first move is to state it with respect to entire languages; and a further step is to state the puzzle addressed to an interpreter, such that the main question (for the interpreter) becomes: ‘How is the speaker going to go on?’ According to Davidson, there is a relatively simple answer: Interpreting a speaker as speaking a particular language means to form

expectations about how the speaker will go on. The problem was this: what justifies the interpreter to expect anything? Davidson’s decisive move is just to say that this is the problem of induction: expectations are in the same sense founded as inductive inferences are founded. One could now ask how our inductive procedures in general are justified. But it is important that this is not a question about meaning anymore. Davidson gives the same answer to both problems which leads to his claim that the two problems are essentially identical. His answer is the following: the validity of induction is naturally grounded in an ‘innate standard of similarity’. Thus, the “Wittgensteinian Paradox” can be reduced to the problem of induction. This is, roughly, Davidson’s argument. But it requires further explanation.

Davidson claims that “a common practice isn’t necessary for communication if each speaker goes on more or less as before”(SL,8; my emphasis)\(^2\). But he then has to show two things: first, what he thinks that it is to go on as before; and secondly (as a corollary) why he still maintains that meaning is an essentially social phenomenon. The following two scenarios supply an answer to both questions. “Suppose that each time I point to my nose you say ‘nose’. Then you have it right: You have gone on as before. Why do your verbal reactions count as ‘the same’, i.e. relevantly similar; I find the stimulus in each case similar, and the response similar. You must also, in some primitive sense, find my pointings similar”(SL,8). This is structurally the same inductive situation as above: it can be rephrased as the question - ‘What reasons do I have to believe that you really go on as before, i.e. to expect that you will give a similar answer when I point to my nose again in the future?’. Thus, we have to focus on the notion of similarity. Imagine now a language learning situation in which a child learns to say “table” in the presence of tables. The child is taught to respond in a specific way to a stimulus or a class of stimuli. What plays an essential role in this process, according to Davidson, is “the phenomenon of generalization, of perceived similarity”(SP,262)\(^3\). A discriminative mechanism is required; and if it were not built in, none could be learned. Hence generalization is explained by an innate mechanism; and what constitutes this mechanism is an innate similarity standard.

Even though Davidson thinks that the concept of similarity is ‘innate’, he agrees that there must be a justification that tells me what I ought to say in order

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3 Davidson, D. 1992 The Second Person, in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XVII. (SP)
to accord with my past usage' and that consequently a problem arises if one person is considered in isolation. "As Wittgenstein says, by yourself you can't tell the difference between the situations seeming the same and being the same" (SL,8). To see if I really do follow a certain rule, or if I fail to follow it, something from 'outside' must 'come in', namely a second person: the relation of the speaker to a second person is necessary in order to give an answer to the question about what the speaker means. And the role of the notion of innate similarity is to explain this relation.

In the language learning situation three ‘similarity patterns’ are involved. "The child finds tables similar; we find tables similar; and we find the child’s responses in the presence of tables similar. It now makes sense for us to call the responses of the child responses to tables. Given these three patterns of response we can assign a location to the stimuli that elicit the child’s responses" (SP,263). Before a speaker can mean something by a word there must be another person (one or more) interacting with the speaker. This interaction takes the form of what Davidson calls "triangulation": one line goes from the speaker in the direction of the stimulus, one line goes from the interpreter in the direction of the stimulus, and the third line goes from the interpreter to the speaker. This perspective embracing more than a single, isolated person opens a "common space" in which the stimulus has an objective location. Where the line from speaker to stimulus and the line from second person to stimulus "converge" the stimulus is located. It is thus merely an effect of convergence, and nothing the hypersceptic could easily question. "Triangulation" provides the argument that meaning is a social phenomenon, but does not require a shared practice: "It’s a matter of two private perspectives converging to mark a position in intersubjective space" (CT,198; my emphasis)4. Since the "Wittgensteinian Paradox" was asking for the possibility of failing to follow a rule, the possibility of correction, Davidson concedes that "once the correlation is established, it provides each of us with a ground for distinguishing the cases in which it fails" (SL,8).

An interpreter can correct a speaker who gives a different response in a situation than he did several times before, not by looking into his head, but simply on the basis of what the interpreter perceives as similar stimuli. But this relation in which a speaker is subject to correction by an interpreter is not 'essential', but rather secondary. What is primary is the innate similarity standard for which Davidson gives what he calls a "naturalistic account". Interaction is nec-

necessary in order to locate a stimulus - objective location takes place in the intersection of two or more sets of similarity responses. But innate similarity is the prerequisite of this relation, and this is an essential privacy. The converging perspectives are essentially private, which is one reason for Davidson to say that we don’t have to share a language in order to be able to speak a language.

Concerning our ability to speak a language without sharing one, we in fact do have a ‘private language’. What the paradox is about then, is not the possibility of speaking a private language, but the possibility of being the only person who understands it. The claim is that what Davidson calls a ‘private language’, a first language of a speaker, must be understood by someone else: “Having a private language depends on having a public language” (SP, 266n). This seemingly paradoxical result is produced by an interplay of the two ideas of innate similarity and of the overlap of sets of different innate similarity responses. And since Davidson keeps both the social and the private aspect in his answer to the “Wittgensteinian Paradox”, he is able to reduce the latter to a case of the induction problem. To put it in a simplified way, triangulation is a combination of innate similarity-standards. Induction is possible on the grounds of an immediate relation to the world constituted by such a standard. Obeying a rule and not only thinking one is obeying a rule is possible when at least two such immediate relations come together: triangulation is a complex inductive situation.

II

Davidson claims that an answer to the sceptic depends on a naturalistic grounding of similarity. The critical question now is if the notion of innate similarity can really satisfy the sceptic. Davidson perfectly agrees with the point that by looking at a person in isolation, the sceptic will repeatedly be able to question the answer. Thus I must have a justification that tells me what I ought to say in order to accord with my past usage. In the learning situation considered above it is the teacher who is training the child to make similar responses to what he perceives as similar stimuli. “For this to work, it is clear that the innate similarity responses of child and teacher [...] must be much alike; otherwise the child will respond to what the teacher takes to be similar stimuli in ways the teacher does not find similar” (SP, 264). Now our sceptic could argue as follows: ‘The disagreement described between teacher and learner is not a problem; it is rather just the way ostensive definitions work’. Suppose the word “green” is learned ostensively by a sufficient number of samples. I.e. when learning how
to use “green” I experience a sensation (or a number of sensations) of a certain sort; and I decide to apply the word to every sensation which is similar to the first. But who is to say that it is not “grue” that I learned by such ostensive training? The sceptic’s argument is directed against the view of a special, qualitatively unique experience of understanding the ostensive definition in the right way. Wittgenstein, as Kripke points out, emphasizes that ostensive definitions are always in principle capable of being misunderstood. Davidson denies that this (negative) possibility obtains in principle for ostensive definitions. The child is, by way of contrast, able in principle to understand immediately what the teacher is pointing to, for the way they naturally group together is “much alike”. If in an ostensive situation, ‘going on as before’ in using an ostensively defined concept is naturally grounded in innate similarity responses, then we are predisposed to go on as before. That’s what Davidson means when he says that “each speaker goes on more or less as before” - by herself (i.e. privately). Triangulation is explained by innate similarity, i.e. the way speaker and interpreter are related to a stimulus explains how they can be related to each other; thus, it would be circular to claim that the relation between the speaker/interpreter apices is ‘essential’, as well. That’s what Kripke (and Wittgenstein) claim. Their solution is in this sense ‘orthogonal’ to triangulation: it says that in order to accord with my past meaning, I just have to follow my basic inclinations. But in such a primitive, unanalyzed state I am subject to correction by others; I stand in a relation to a second person. But this relation is ‘essential’ (or effective); it exemplifies my embeddedness in a linguistic community, a circle of speakers as it were. What is ‘essential’ for Davidson is merely the innate similarity relation between speaker and stimulus, and interpreter and stimulus. But what does the “convergence” of the two private perspectives add to the dispositional relation? If I am a speaker uttering the word “green” in the presence of a certain stimulus, and after a while utter the same word in the presence of a new stimulus only an interpreter, according to Davidson, is able to tell me if I have gone on as before by comparing my utterance with the stimulus having an objective location in a “common space”. This is what he calls “cognitive advantage.” But how can the interpreter possibly have any effect on what I am saying, on how I will go on? He can distinguish the cases in which I fail to follow a given rule from the ones in which I don’t, but he won’t have any influence on how I will actually go on. This kind of cognitive access - possible by way of interacting with an interpreter - is non-effective. Someone might tell me if I have used a rule correctly, but still nothing and no one will ever tell me - in a triangular situation - how I ought to use a rule.
Davidson’s approach to the “Wittgensteinian Paradox” can be subsumed under what Kripke calls the “dispositional account” of rule-following. Davidson’s triangle is constituted by private ‘lines’; and his account of rule-following is based on a natural disposition. But if this disposition is considered primary, there is a strong argument which this account has to face. The major defect is that it is merely descriptive. For Davidson’s case this means that reference to an innate similarity standard merely says that I will utter the same word again, if the next stimulus is similar to the last one. But this is not the point of the paradox, it is rather that I should answer it. “The relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative, not descriptive” (WR,37). Davidson’s dispositional account of rule-following (being, as it were, a socially extended account) doesn’t provide the kind of justification the sceptic requires. Hence, the sceptic still remains unanswered. I wish to conclude that Davidson’s notion of “triangulation” is not capable of providing an answer to - in his own words - the “hardest, and most important challenge” his approach must face.

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Wittgenstein and his Commentators

This paper is concerned with a difficulty which affects most attempts to elucidate, characterize, or summarize Wittgenstein's philosophical thinking. A common feature of most commentaries on Wittgenstein's texts is the effort to elucidate his thinking, partly or wholly, in general terms.¹ In some of the most vulgar readings of his work he has been classified, for instance, as a verificationist, an anti-realist, a nominalist, and a pragmatist; these classifications are usually based on very general and schematic characterizations. One could find hundreds of examples of commentaries where a certain unifying point of view is suggested or some more or less uniform method of reading is proposed as essential for the understanding of Wittgenstein's aims, and where the details are explained on the basis of such a general view. The question I would like to discuss is the following: Isn't any attempt to summarize and elucidate Wittgenstein's thinking in general terms bound to be misleading?

Here, I am not just thinking about the obvious fact that authors of commentaries and historical surveys must allow themselves simplifications, must in certain respects permit themselves to be incomplete, schematic, etc. My point is that there seems to be a special difficulty in this respect as regards Wittgenstein's work. Is it not an essential feature of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy that it does not allow itself to be captured in general terms, i.e., as philosophical doctrines, theses or general points of view? Is it not this feature, which, perhaps more than any other, distinguishes him from the philosophical tradition? Is not this feature also an important aspect of Wittgenstein's peculiar way of writing and presenting his thoughts in the form of short remarks, some of which terminate in questions that are never answered? General conclusions, summaries and elucidations of interconnections of the thoughts expressed are rare in his texts, and when a general reflection or summarizing remark does occasionally occur, it usually has an aphoristic form and is made in immediate connection with some specific problem or investigation, which is meant give it a concrete content.

In connection with this, one also notices that Wittgenstein tends to avoid

¹ The term 'commentary' will here be used in a wide sense to include, not only explanatory treatises built out of actual segments of the text explained, but also interpretative works and works belonging to the so-called secondary literature.
using the established philosophical vocabulary which is common parlance among commentators: He does not need it. He tends to regard established philosophical notions as being problematic rather than useful for purposes of clarification. Notions defined by a few paradigm examples or by general explanations are sometimes dealt with by Wittgenstein as a source of confusion, and the roots of the confusion are often found in the characteristic claims to generality and uniformity of the explanations.

Is Wittgenstein's reluctance to stating general conclusions and giving systematic expositions only a consequence of his impatience? Is he just uninterested in this philosophical genre? One could get that impression from the difficulties which occurred in the co-operation that took place for some time between Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann. Waismann aimed precisely at giving a general and systematic exposition of Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas as they stood in the early thirties. Although Wittgenstein apparently had doubts about the project, he had agreed to the co-operation, and he even dictated a list of philosophical theses to Waismann which were presumably intended as a preliminary to a joint effort. But Waismann often complained about Wittgenstein's lack of interest in the collaborative project and regrets that, in their subsequent discussions, Wittgenstein reacted to his own formulations as though he suddenly saw them for the first time and found them unsatisfactory. Like many other commentators hoping to give an exposition of Wittgenstein's philosophy, Waismann was anxious to arrive at general formulations of fundamental ideas that could be considered as definite and final, while Wittgenstein himself tended to find all formulations problematic.

It seems clear that this difficulty in their collaboration was due to the fact that Wittgenstein's thinking was in a transitional phase at the time, but it points to something more, something having to do with the nature and direction of this very change in his thinking. It was a symptom of a peculiar feature of his conception of the nature of philosophy, a feature which is already stated in the Tractatus and which becomes more fundamental in his later philosophy. I am thinking of the statements "philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity", and "philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions."2 This means, of course, also that philosophy is not the activity of applying a system of doctrines, or an activity which aims at assembling a body of doctrines as its result.

An almost constitutive feature of the professional philosophical genres of

exposition, interpretation, and explanation of philosophical texts, is a notion of intelligibility and comprehension according to which a philosopher's thoughts must be rendered in general terms. They have to be rephrased as the application or manifestation of a general, more or less systematic and coherent view or standpoint which is characterized within some vocabulary of philosophical commentary. By doing so, one claims to have 'filled in gaps' or to 'shown the interconnections' between the thoughts expressed. When a philosophical text eludes interpretation according to such standards of intelligibility, many professional philosophers would be inclined to question whether it is philosophy at all, and not perhaps merely literature.

It would seem as though the recent postmodern conceptions of philosophy are exceptions here. Postmodern writers tend to reject the difference between philosophy and philosophical commentary as well as the difference between philosophy and literature. But their conception of intelligibility is no exception to the notion that making a philosophical text intelligible is to summarize its details in general terms, not perhaps as a system of doctrines, but here in the form of a story or narrative that will 'create a context', or as a playful essay which summarizes the text's rhetorical structure.

This common feature of postmodern and traditional notions of making a philosophical text intelligible manifests a traditional and still prevailing attitude within professional philosophy as to the nature of philosophical activity which is strongly opposed to Wittgenstein's, namely, that it is basically a competition and struggle between views, positions, standpoints, arguments, 'isms', explanatory models, methods of reading, paradigms of argumentation, etc., all of which should be characterized within vocabularies that display their mutual relationships, their similarities and dissimilarities, their affinities and oppositions. The standards of intelligibility are usually determined within some autonomous intellectual discourse of philosophical discussion with its own terminology, and with a frame of reference which is taken to have general applicability. Thus, for instance, a philosopher's position may be characterized in terms of whether it admits 'the irreducibility of the intentional', or whether it 'rejects the notion of a mind-independent reality'; whether it has 'a naturalized conception of semantics', or whether 'it takes language to be grounded in social practices', and so forth. That commentaries and expositions of a philosopher's thoughts tend to be given in general terms reflects the fact that their primary aim is to locate the thoughts within the arena of current philosophical debate and discussion. It is only a matter of secondary importance that the thoughts are an individual thinker's response to certain specific problems of his own.
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The difference I am suggesting here shows itself in the fact that most original philosophical thinkers have expressed their thoughts, not in the established academic-philosophical jargon of their own times, but rather in their own style and with their own forms of expression. They have given expression to their thoughts in a manner which they have found to be better adapted to the nature of what they wanted to convey. Descartes made a quite radical break with the tradition in this respect, as did Nietzsche and Heidegger; but it seems to me that Wittgenstein's way of expressing his thoughts differs from traditional philosophy in a manner that is unique. He does not just oppose the attitude to philosophy as a struggle between views and positions, but turns his back on it altogether; he gradually realizes that philosophical thinking which aims at complete clarity, at resolving philosophical problems definitely, cannot be made intelligible according to the standards of traditional philosophy. Philosophical insights cannot be apprehended in general terms.

It may even be misleading to speak of 'a break with tradition' here, if it is taken to suggest that he is just rejecting certain views and positions and replacing them with new ones, in which case he continues the tradition after all, albeit in a different direction. What Wittgenstein calls philosophical grammar is not something similar to a philosophical method in the traditional sense. It is, one might say, almost the opposite of a scientific or theoretical method. It ignores much of the intellectual discipline and virtues of scientific thinking, but at the same time is not characterized by frivolity or postmodern playfulness. It takes an interest in the facts of language which one ignores in the theoretical attitude, with its striving toward generality and uniformity, and which postmodern philosophers ignore in their endeavour to be interesting and witty. Its aim is to remind us of facts which, if attended to, make our problems disappear; its aim is not to achieve general positive philosophical results whatever, e.g., about the essence of language.

Thomas Nagel attributes to the later Wittgenstein "a position so radical that it ... undermines the weaker transcendent pretensions of even the least philosophical of thoughts", and this position means, according to Nagel, "that any thoughts we can form of a mind-independent reality must remain within the boundaries set by our human form of life". This is a good example of an attempt to summarize the essence of Wittgenstein's philosophy in general terms. I would not deny that general characterizations like these can be useful for someone who wants to get introduced to Wittgenstein's later philosophy, but they are

Wittgenstein and his Commentators

misleading when they are put forward, in the professional pride of philosophical commentators, as statements about what his philosophy really amounts to.

I would rather say that the later Wittgenstein's position is really no philosophical position at all. Almost everything he is doing is in the service of reaching complete clarity on various specific points, and not in the service of developing a new philosophical position. To reach this complete clarity means, as Wittgenstein expressed it himself, "that the philosophical problems should completely disappear".\(^4\) His alleged 'radical position' is rather that nothing similar to traditional philosophical positions or views or standpoints or methods, articulated in an autonomous philosophical discourse, can accomplish this disappearance of philosophical problems. These rather tend to become a source of new problems, or just to give the old problems a new shape. What still justifies calling Wittgenstein's later work 'philosophy' is the nature of the problems. The worries, anxiety, doubt, and temptations which his investigations are designed to remove, are of the kind that philosophers traditionally have tried to come to terms with by giving in to their metaphysical inclinations to generalize, simplify, make uniform, and impose order, in a dogmatic and often combative spirit.

Nietzsche and Heidegger are perhaps comparable to Wittgenstein both in the radicalism with which they break with the philosophical tradition and with respect to the features of traditional philosophy from which they turn away. But their thinking is, it seems to me, still too infected by romanticism and historicism to be on the level of Wittgenstein's investigations. In one of Heidegger's late essays, entitled 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking', it is clear that what he has to say in this essay, as well as in other later works, is governed in its very details by the 'world-historical task' he takes upon himself, i.e., to be a thinker after the end of metaphysical philosophy.\(^5\) His concern is more with the future of our culture, and the intellectual tradition that is supposed to have shaped it, than with attempting to get clear about certain specific problems. This fact makes Heidegger, in my view, very much a thinker within the philosophical tradition. He can't help being influenced in his thinking by what he anticipates the future philosophical commentaries will look like. As Nietzsche sometimes does, he is looking at the present within a great historical perspective. What he is saying depends on something which has the character of a story or poetic vision.


I think that Wittgenstein sometimes looked at his later work very much in the same way, i.e., as a thinking that will take the place of traditional philosophy when the latter has played itself out. But he did so only when he looked at his own work from the outside. Unlike Nietzsche and Heidegger, Wittgenstein does not allow his investigations to be governed by ideas of his 'historical task'; or of his role within the epoch and intellectual tradition in which he finds himself. It is a peculiar feature of his method of investigation that he conducts it in the attitude of an ordinary human being with an average, everyday knowledge of language, and not in the attitude of a great thinker with some special calling and intellectual equipment, speaking to other great thinkers. Many, if not most, of his remarks would appear as banalities and insignificant trivialities from a historico-philosophical perspective in which a main concern is with the future of philosophy or the destiny of mankind. I think that he realized that the obsession with such issues among philosophers in our century (e.g., within so-called continental philosophy) is just another manifestation of the attitudes and reactions of traditional philosophy he had left behind him. I think that he realized that any ideas about the historical importance and future significance of his own work had to remain speculation, and, aiming to resolve problems completely, his work could not depend on such ideas. The best he could do 'for the future of mankind' was to shed light upon such issues where he saw a way of achieving complete clarity through the method of investigation which he had been developing since the thirties.

I said before that a constitutive feature of the professional genre of philosophical commentary and interpretation is the aim of making sense of a philosopher's thinking by making it intelligible in general terms, in a more or less autonomous or technical philosophical vocabulary. To some extent, there is a harmony or similarity in this respect between traditional philosophers' own standards of intelligibility and that of their commentators and interpreters, in so far as most philosophers of the past have wanted to present the final result of their work in the form of a position or a body of doctrines. They have wanted to give their work an outside, a façade which would faithfully reflect its inside, and which would make their work comparable to that of their predecessors and contemporaries. With the later Wittgenstein's philosophy, the situation is different. One might say that it has no such façade, despite the efforts of his commentators to supply it with one.

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1. Love As a Feeling Neither a Something Nor a Nothing

Cole Porter's question "What is this thing called love?" is misleading in at least a couple of ways. It may lead us suppose that 'love' has only one meaning or that there is only one concept of love, whereas there are several. Alternatively, it may make us think the feeling is some sort of "thing" with clear boundaries—a "something." This may make us believe there must be something we can point to and ostensibly define. Pointing to it we ought to be able to say, "That's love." However, we don't find anything we can identify love with. Philosophers who think we can--philosophical behaviorists and mind-brain identity theorists—are mistaken in thinking that there is something that love can be uniquely identified with.

Suppose we say, then, at least until someone can show otherwise, that there is nothing that we can identify love with—not a brain state or a pattern of behavior, or our knees going knockitty-knock, or anything else. This conclusion seems to lead to confusion. Obviously love is not a nothing. Its presence has powerful effects. Yet we are at a loss to say what this feeling is. As Wittgenstein says on the first page of the *Blue Book*, "We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: we try to find a substance for a substantive," here the substantive or noun 'love'. That is why he says later in *Zettel*. "'Joy' designates nothing at all. Neither an inward nor an outward thing" (§487). We could say the same of the term 'love' and of other words for emotions. Applying a remark of Wittgenstein's about pain to love, let's say it "is not a *something*, but not a *nothing* either!" (PI, §30).

This sounds paradoxical, yet we can give it a perfectly good sense. What I mean by the statement is that love is not a something like a cow, a car, or a commodity, or any of the things behaviorists, mind-brain identity theorists, or other philosophers have identified it with. It is not anything you can point to, either inwardly or outwardly, though you can point to people who love or are loved and to loving acts. That is the reason for saying it is not a *something*. It follows that the economics of love differs from the economics of money. While
there is a demand for both and both are seen as in scarce supply, love cannot be bought and sold, unlike a currency and other products. That is why prostitutes can only sell false, not true love, as Cole Porter's beautiful song "Love for Sale" brings out. Moreover, when you give money you have less of it, you become poorer. When you give love, you needn't have less love. Indeed, you may have more. As Juliet says to Romeo, "My bounty is as boundless as the sea, my love as deep, the more I give to thee, the more I have" (Romeo and Juliet, II, ii). This is paradoxical only if you think of love as a something.

But love is not a nothing either, despite several well-known philosophers called eliminative materialists' asserting it is. Their view conflicts with the fact that it makes an enormous difference in our lives if we love or don't, and if we are loved. Yet not the way having or not having a car or a house can make a big difference in our lives. When people love, this is not to possess or own something, which does not imply that love is never possessive. Some love—for example, romantic—certainly tends to be. We avoid needless trouble, then, if we do not take the assertion that "Joe feels love" to imply that there are two things: Joe and the thing he feels—namely, love. We should contrast such an assertion with, say, "Mary feels the table," which does imply there are two things: Mary and the table. So let us not think of love as a thing, or substance, or as something that can exist by itself, but rather as something that characterizes us and beings like us and couldn't exist independently of us.

This may be part of what Agathon is getting at in his speech in praise of love, in the Symposium: "[Love] makes his home in the characters, in the souls, of gods and men. . . when [Love] encounters a soul with a harsh character, he turns away; but when he finds a soft and gentle character, he settles down in it." Agathon's lovely words suggests two things to me. First, that love as a feeling is someone's psychological state, not an independent entity; so it resides

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1 Eliminative materialists don't try to give any account of what we call love because they deny its reality. They see it as a nonexistent theoretical entity in a discredited theory--"folk psychology"—that is wrongly thought to explain behavior. Hence from their point of view there is nothing to give an account of. Unlike mind-brain identity theorists, they refuse to make an identity claim; they don't say that neuro-physical processes are identical with psychological phenomena. Paul Feyerabend, in "Mental Events and the Brain," reprinted in The Nature of Mind, David M. Rosenthal, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 266-267, says we cannot carry out such a reduction. Richard Rorty, W. V. O. Quine, and P. M. Churchland agree. For them love is simply a nothing.

in us and other beings like us. You may say you're in love, but what this really means is that there is love in you, you feel it strongly. Second, you must have the right character—you have to have some gentleness and delicacy—before love can become part of you. Both suggestions seem to me to be true.

2. Love an Emotion, Not a Sensation or a Mood

I want to turn now to the question how the feeling of love should be classified. Is it an emotion, a sensation, or a mood? The word 'feeling' is used in many other ways besides these three, but the other uses have no bearing on Cole Porter's question. For example, feeling that something is the case is a kind of belief, while feeling like doing something is having a wish or desire. I will not consider whether love is a feeling in either of these senses. Nor will I discuss perceptual or exploratory uses of 'feeling' ('He felt the heat of the lamp,' "She felt around for the key"). The question I want to raise is whether the feeling of love should be characterized as an emotion or a sensation or a mood, to see into which of these three categories it most naturally falls.

Wittgenstein implies in *Zettel* that certain sensations may go with love or other emotions, but "these sensations are not the emotions" (Z, §488). I shall try to show why this is correct.

Consider some sensations that often accompany, say, romantic love, especially at its onset: sensations of dizziness, of sexual arousal, having butterflies in the stomach, shivers of excitement, of breathlessness, spine tingles, feverish sensations, sweaty feelings, waves of warmth that permeate the body, chills, goose bumps, hot flashes, and so on. It won't do to identify such things with the feeling of love because you could have these sensations without love. Other emotions or some physical condition might bring about these sensations. For example, you might have hot flashes during menopause. Stage fright or vertigo could explain your feeling feverish, shaky, dizzy. And the excitement of going down a steep roller coaster may account for your sensations of breathlessness, of sweating, chills, and shivers. You may even get your spine tingles and thrills by letting a tarantula run down your bare back. Warm sensations also can be produced in different ways. They can come from backrubs, being in the sun, getting the flu. So the presence of such sensations is not a sufficient condition

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3 Gilbert Ryle distinguishes seven uses of the verb 'to feel' but thinks there are plenty more. See "Feelings," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 1, 1951, also reprinted in *Collected Papers: Collected Essays, 1929-1968*, New York: Barnes & Noble, 1971, pp. 272-86.
for love.

Nor is having these sensations necessary for love. If you didn't have them, you might still love. A person suffering from paralysis might lack many of these sensations, yet be deeply in love. If such sensations were identical with the feeling of love, this would be impossible.

There are several respects in which the feeling of love differs from sensations. First, we often, if not always, perceive them with sense organs and we localize or feel them in the body. In contrast, we never perceive love with sense organs. Nor do we locate or feel it in the body. Indeed, discussions of identity theory have shown that it makes no sense to ask where is our feeling of love or to cite which sense organ we perceive it with. To put it crudely, despite the saying that we feel love in our bowels, there is no reason to think that we locate it there or anywhere else in the body. Surgeons doing a colonoscopy may find polyps; but, unless they have a coarse sense of humor, they never report finding feelings of love there.

Second, the emotion of love requires an object. This is not true of sensations. Itches and pains, for example, do not take objects. (Notice that this argument doesn't depend on claiming that all emotions take objects--which claim might be contested. You might question, for example, whether anxiety always has an object.)

Third, while love and sensations both are reasons that are causes, they don't have the same causal powers. Love can explain why you give gifts to those you love, why you defend them from attack or from other dangers, and why you treat them generally the way you do. Having a pain, butterflies in your stomach, or "a quick and subtle flame [running] up beneath [your] skin" (Sappho's image)⁴ could never explain such behavior.

Finally, the feeling of love and sensations differ epistemologically and logically. For example, you can wonder whether you love someone or you can doubt whether you do, but it makes no sense either to wonder or to doubt whether you have an itch, a pain, or a tingling sensation. Just imagine saying to your doctor that you wonder or doubt whether you have a headache! You'd get a funny look. You wouldn't get such a look if you expressed uncertainty about being in love with someone. It's because of this that you can say you know, or are sure, you're in love, but not that you know or are sure you have a pain. As Wittgenstein observes, "I know I am in pain," except for a few unusual uses, is nonsensical (Pl, §246). If I can know X, I can also doubt it.

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This last claim may wrongly be thought to conflict with the view that knowledge and certainty rule out doubt. Thus when you claim to know something, you imply you're sure of it. While that's true, the point I want to make is that knowledge doesn't rule out the logical possibility of doubt. Quite the contrary, it presupposes it. If you know something, you're sure of it; so you don't doubt it. This in turn implies that doubt in this case would be logically possible or make sense. Because it makes no sense to doubt that you have an itch or are in pain, in the present tense, it makes no sense to claim you know now that you have an itch or that you are in pain.

Confusing sensations with love may seem to be merely a conceptual muddle, but it isn't. The confusion can have important practical results. For example, you might get the false idea, simply because you no longer have so many of the sensations you had at first, that you don't love someone any more. Or maybe you think this because you no longer have certain kinds of sensations. The mistake I have in mind is immortalized in the lyrics of the song "This Can't Be Love." One reason the singer thinks it can't be love is that he gets no dizzy spells. But this is a common course of development for romantic love—to have fewer sensations of this sort. It doesn't mean you have stopped loving that person or love him or her any less. Indeed, you may love the person much more.

An equally serious mistake is to think you love someone, even deeply, simply because you feel many of the sensations mentioned. You may not even love the person, or hardly at all. It may just be lust or infatuation. Mozart's Don Giovanni from the opera illustrates the point. He had plenty of these sensations. For example, in Scene 4, he said he was on fire for Donna Elvira, before he recognized her as the woman he had already seduced. Shortly afterwards, in Scene 9, Act 1, he describes himself as aching for Zerlina, a peasant woman. Yet he never loved either of them, nor anybody else, not even himself, for he never was concerned with anybody's well-being, not even his own.

Finally, this sort of confusion of love with sensations can lead to ineffective and wasteful psychological treatments. The psychologist Tennov tells of a client who worked in vain on her (the client's) sensations to get rid of a painful love.\(^5\) Yet getting rid of the sensations may have no effect on getting rid of the emotion with which they are associated. Psychology seems to be full of such conceptual confusions. Wittgenstein suspects this may account for what he calls its barrenness (\(PI\), xiv, p. 232).\(^6\)


\(^6\) The Olds and Milner (1954) experiment that assumed that the more rats pressed a
Ronald Suter

I want to conclude by considering briefly why the feeling of love is not a mood. Examples of moods would be feeling contented, satisfied, vaguely ill at ease, or depressed. Unlike love these feelings are generally objectless; hence it is better to characterize love as an emotion than as a mood, which is not to deny that people may be in a mood for love or loving or that loving someone may put you into a certain moods.

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Philosophy, Happiness and Culture, Or: Why was not Wittgenstein Happy?

Why was Wittgenstein a philosopher? There is always a number of reasons for doing something, but his explicit aim was to attain happiness and he thought that philosophy would adhere to him. For Wittgenstein, philosophy would have lead him there only when it had become superfluous, and provided clarity instead of the unclarity he thought stood in the way of happiness.

Wittgenstein - The Odysseus of Philosophy

Wittgenstein wanted to go home. He was the Odysseus of philosophy searching for his Ithaca: everyday life. In *Philosophical Investigations*¹ Wittgenstein wrote that one must always ask oneself: Is this particular word actually used this way in the language in which it has its home (*Heimat*)? All he wanted to do was to bring the words back to their home in everyday life from the battles and misunderstandings in the Trojan war of metaphysics.

The motivation behind Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations is to be found already in his early diaries. There he wrote that the moral imperative is "Live a happy life!"², which is an imperative that cannot be justified by anything but itself. The happy life must show itself as the best life; it is not a point to be argued. What does this happiness consist of? To fulfill ones goal in life³ which amounts to being in harmony with the world⁴. What kind of life promotes such harmony? Wittgenstein wrote that a life in contemplation is the kind of life that makes man happy, in spite of the suffering we are inevitably exposed to⁵. *Bios theoretikos* is the happy life, and represents a sort of escape from the sufferings of the world. This is, of course, closely related to the young Wittgenstein's concept of will, which I can only briefly comment on here. Wittgenstein's standpoint was that his will cannot determine what happens in the world;

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³ TB 6.7.16
⁴ TB 8.7.16
⁵ TB 13.6.16
therefore, the only way to become happy is to renounce any influence on it.\textsuperscript{6} This stems, of course, from Wittgenstein's reading of Schopenhauer.

I want to claim that these early reflections on happiness, as consisting of some sort of passivity, is precisely what dictated Wittgenstein's general philosophical outlook throughout his life. Indeed, there is a very close connection between philosophy, happiness and passivity. The aim of philosophy is to realise happiness. Happiness consists essentially of passivity and contemplation. Even though Wittgenstein always stressed that philosophy is essentially an activity\textsuperscript{7}, and not a doctrine, it was conceived of as something passive, as something that "leaves everything as it is"\textsuperscript{8}. Almost 30 years after writing the diaries, he wrote that his own peace of mind is what the philosopher is looking for.\textsuperscript{9} The clarity that philosophy was supposed to ascertain, was not understood as means to an end, but as an end in itself.\textsuperscript{10} Clarity equals happiness.

If we make a rather speculative move, it is not too hard to imagine that these views are what made Wittgenstein claim that philosophy leaves everything as it is, and should not try for anything more. Why must it leave everything as it is? Because, according to Wittgenstein, what stands in the way of realising happiness is not something in the external world, but rather something within ourselves. Paul Engelmann seems to be right in his description of himself and Wittgenstein:

\begin{quote}
In me Wittgenstein unexpectedly met a person who, like many members of the younger generation, suffered acutely under the discrepancy between the world as it is and as it ought to be according to his lights, but who tended also to seek the source of that discrepancy within, rather than outside himself.\textsuperscript{11}

[T]he person who consistently believes that the discrepancy lies in himself must reject the belief that changes in the external facts may be necessary and called for.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{6} TB 11.6.16
\item \textsuperscript{7} Cf. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Werkau ge Band 1 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1984). 4.112
\item \textsuperscript{8} PU § 124
\item \textsuperscript{9} Vermischte Bemerkungen (VB). Werkau ge Band 8 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1984). p.511
\item \textsuperscript{10} VB p.459
\item \textsuperscript{12} Engelmann 1967. p. 79.
\end{itemize}
The true revolutions are internal revolutions. As Wittgenstein wrote much later: The true revolutionary is the man who can revolutionise himself.\textsuperscript{13} This is decisive for Wittgensteins "political" philosophy. Happiness will not be achieved by outer political action, but rather by a transformation of consciousness; not revolution by action, but by imagination or cognition. I earlier mentioned that the happy life for Wittgenstein was the contemplative life - 
\textit{bios theoretics}, and the notion of a "revolution by cognition" matches this exactly, as the greek \textit{theorein} means "to look at". The \textit{bios theoretics} is the spectator's way of life.

\textbf{Civilisation and its discontents}

Clearly, Wittgenstein was not in harmony with the world, no matter how much he contemplated. This should come as no surprise to any of us. He, like everybody else, was subjected to our civilisation and its discontents. In the preface to the \textit{Investigations} he mentioned "the darkness of this time". He especially expressed his discontentsments in the famous draft for the preface to \textit{Philosophical Remarks}\textsuperscript{14}, where he claimed that his book was written in another spirit than the main trends in American and European civilisation, whose expression in various arts and political movements was strongly disliked by him.

In opposition to this civilisation he had an ideal picture of what a real \textit{culture} is like. It is like a big organisation in which every member has his task to perform, and a relation to something that is higher than him. In modernity, communal relations have impaired and people are concerned only with fulfilling their private goals. There is some grief here over the loss of community.

Our civilisation is characterised by the term "Progress", but according to Wittgenstein the alleged progress is only the form our civilisation has taken and it does not refer to any aspect of quality. Progress merely consists in making everything more complicated all the time, whereas Wittgenstein's end, as we noted earlier, was clarity, not complexity.

He then criticised the modern sciences, etc. but yet he claimed that his criticism was based on no judgement of value.\textsuperscript{15} How could it not be?

Modern civilisation can be criticised for not letting human beings fulfill themselves, thereby being guilty of \textit{dehumanising} them. There is, however, no

\textsuperscript{13} VB p.513
\textsuperscript{14} VB p.458f.
\textsuperscript{15} VB p.458
room for such a criticism within Wittgenstein's concept of philosophy. The reason being that there has to be some foundation for criticism, but this foundation can hardly be found within the same practises that constitute our civilisation, and, according to Wittgenstein, philosophy loses its ground if it tries to go beyond these practises.

Wittgenstein hoped that a "culture" would develop from modern "civilisation"\textsuperscript{16}, but there was nothing he could do to promote it without going beyond the limits of Wittgensteinian philosophy. Now, the concept of culture is closely related to that of tradition. Tradition, Wittgenstein stated, cannot be learnt, just like one's ancestors cannot be chosen. The person without a tradition, but wanting one, is like someone unhappily in love, Wittgenstein said.\textsuperscript{17} I believe that this is a self-description. In my view, Wittgenstein was absolutely right when he stated that there is very little in the surroundings of modern, civilised man to encourage higher deeds.\textsuperscript{18} Very little reminds us of our origin in something higher. Wittgenstein observed that the city does not produce the kind of sublime spiritual experience which natural phenomena (sometimes) do. Our environment is wrapped up in "cellophane", and we are removed from the "sources of the self".

Wittgenstein longed for a tradition, or culture, but there was nothing he could do, except hoping for it to come.

\textbf{If there is something rotten in the state of civilisation, it cannot be fixed by blending in.}

Now, culture is an "Ordensregel", Wittgenstein wrote, or at least it presupposes an "Ordensregel".\textsuperscript{19} I take this to mean that being part of a culture presupposes shared ways of acting and the observance of these. These shared ways of acting are what bind us together. They make communication and mutual understanding possible. The culture gives us the basis for how we perceive and order the world. We understand each other by means of language, but Wittgenstein denied that this understanding is based on opinions, it is based on the "form of life".\textsuperscript{20}

According to Wittgenstein, my world-picture (Weltbild) stems from the in-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} VB p.541
  \item \textsuperscript{17} VB p. 558
  \item \textsuperscript{18} VB p. 520
  \item \textsuperscript{19} VB p. 568
  \item \textsuperscript{20} PU § 24!
\end{itemize}
Philosophy, Happiness and Culture, Or: Why was not Wittgenstein Happy?

herited background against which I distinguish between true and false"21, and it can only be changed through "a kind of persuasion"22. This is what happens when missionaries convert natives.23 There is no neutral ground and everything takes place within the rhetoric of persuasion.

There is simply no basis for a real criticism of culture (or rather, civilisation) in Wittgenstein's philosophy. All we can say is that practices change24, and if we want to be happy, the only thing we can do is to change with them. This does not seem satisfying to me, and Wittgenstein did not seem to be very pleased with it himself. In a rather crude manner he wrote that you solve the problems in life by living such that they disappear.25 If your life is problematic, it simply means that it does not conform to the form of life. Then you have to change it. By changing yourself, all problems will vanish. He noted, however, that someone who did not see a problem with this, would seem to be blind to something.

To get out of this dilemma, Wittgenstein would have to go beyond the limits he had put on philosophy. It is hard to find the proper beginning, without attempting to go further back26, but if the starting-point and limit of philosophy is the fact that: This is what we actually do27, you cannot break out of the immanence. In his early philosophy Wittgenstein was running up against the limits of language in his later philosophical project, he was running up against the limits of practises.

In Philosophische Bemerkungen Wittgenstein stated: Since language can only acquire its meaning from the world, it is impossible to imagine a language which fails to represent the world.28 Language, world and life are intimately intertwined, and "the regularity of language permeates our life"29. Now, if there is something wrong with the world, that would lead to disorders in our language, and if there is something wrong with our language, that would be reflected in the way we see the world. As von Wright makes clear:

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22 UG § 262
23 UG § 612
24 Cf. UG § 336
25 VB p. 487
26 UG § 471
Because of the interlocking of language and ways of life, a disorder in the former reflects disorder in the latter. If philosophical problems are symptomatic of language producing malignant outgrowths which obscure our thinking, then there must be a cancer in the Lebensweise, in the way of life itself. 30

The only reason why Wittgenstein was so occupied with mending our language and pulling out the philosophical weed called "grammatical fictions" etc., must be that he thought there was something corrupt in the state of language. Otherwise, there would be no point in "plowing through the whole language" 31. If there is something wrong with our language, then there must be something wrong with our civilisation.

Can our civilisation be brought back on the right track simply by changing the way we speak about it or see it? If so, what would guide our changes? There has to be some guideline or ideal, but I fail to see how this ideal could be introduced in Wittgenstein's philosophy, at least not without simply being there as something we must remain silent about. The distinction between ideality and actuality from his early philosophy remained an implicit presupposition in the later writings, and so did the concept of will.

We saw that happiness was in some way related to a Schopenhauer-inspired notion of renunciation of the will. This element was maintained in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, but it was combined with the notion of forms of life. The basic idea was the same. Happiness is achieved by renouncing any influence on the world. In terms of the later philosophy, this means that happiness can only be achieved by conforming to the actual forms of life, but then there would be no foundation for a critique of civilisation.

What Wittgenstein needed (to justify his own critique of civilisation), is probably something like a concept of a sensus communis and this could perhaps be found in the notion of a form of life. One would have to show how our civilisation is at odds with our form of life, which again would have to be based on a determination of the form of life as something non-arbitrary. I think that this very notion lies at the bottom of Wittgenstein's concept of human value as something non-cultural. 32 I do not think, however, that such an inherent human value can be justified within the limits that Wittgenstein placed on philosophy.

32 Cf. VB p. 459
Wittgenstein was all caught up in immanence and could not break out in order to state something ideal.

The "lack" of justification for a Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy.

Does Wittgenstein justify his conception of philosophy? I fail to see that he does. In the lecture on free will, Wittgenstein states that "an argument is all right if it converts you".\(^\text{33}\) If I am not converted, does that imply that Wittgenstein's arguments are not all right?

My world-picture is presumably rather different from Wittgenstein's. We earlier saw that Wittgenstein stated that a world-picture can only be changed through "a kind of persuasion"\(^\text{34}\), and that an example of this is what happens when missionaries convert natives\(^\text{35}\).

He described his own philosophical activity as a form of "persuasion"\(^\text{36}\), stating: "I am in a sense making propaganda for one style of thinking as opposed to another. I am honestly disgusted with the other."\(^\text{37}\). He gave us no reasons for believing that his conception of philosophy is the right one.

Philosophy is conceived of as a therapy, but Wittgensteinian therapy did not work for Wittgenstein. His biography is that of an unhappy man. Wittgenstein said that just as there are several methods of philosophy, there are several forms of therapy.\(^\text{38}\) Does this mean that Wittgenstein would have been open to the suggestion that there could be a philosophical praxis which does not "leave everything as it is", that there could be a philosophy which critically transcends the given?

Wittgenstein would either have to give up his rather narrow conception of philosophy and try to work out an ideal for living (and try to realise it), or he would just have to blend in with the civilisation he so much contested. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.

Indeed, Wittgenstein's own thought can be used against him. We might say that the person who complains about the "darkness of our times", and the "dis-

\(^{34}\) UG § 262
\(^{35}\) UG § 612
\(^{37}\) LCA p. 28
\(^{38}\) PU § 133
appearance of culture", simply has not managed to keep up with the ever changing rules of the language-games. His lack of appreciation for modern art only goes to prove this.

Instead of a conclusion

If the fly is not happy inside the "fly-bottle", it would have to be shown the way out in another way than the one Wittgenstein chose. Wittgenstein remained his entire life within the fly-bottle he himself created. That is also the answer to the question: Why was not Wittgenstein happy?

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Wittgenstein on Natural Attitudes

In this paper I will be interested in Wittgenstein's view on natural attitude (natürliche Einstellung) and its relation to natural language. There are two goals, and consequently, two parts in my paper. In the first part I will make some general points on Husserl, Heidegger, and so called post-modern views on natural attitude and natural language. In the second part of my paper I will show some substantial differences as well similarities with Wittgenstein's view.

I

Husserl and Heidegger on natural attitudes. When introducing his idea of phenomenological reduction Husserl starts from the idea of natural attitude, or everyday commitment to a natural world. This natural attitude reveals itself in natural everyday language with its physical, psychological and other ontological commitment. According to Husserl, however, we can explore what is the structure of this natural attitude and behaviour and how it is related to a natural physical world. As is well known, Husserl thinks that a mere psychological reduction, where attention only to psychological objects of consciousness are paid, is not enough. Another mode of reduction, a transcendental one, is needed. With the transcendental reduction we relinquish our commitments to natural world and natural language. Natural attitude and natural language is described as a naïve attitude which must be replaced by transcendental-phenomenological attitude and transcendental language. It is an attitude which brings with a new language, and gives a new interpretation to natural language.¹

Heidegger rejected Husserl's interpretation of natural attitude.² According to him a natural manner of experiencing the world is not an optional attitude (Einstellung, Verhaltung), and therefore, not an attitude in the proper sense of the word at all, in other words, it is not something of which we normally are conscious. This means that in the natural attitude the consciousness is a part of the world, not something which posit the world opposite to itself. Instead of that the scientific, objective attitude which Husserl strives for, is totally unnatural.

¹ Kusch 1989, 83-86.
² Husserl's assistant Eugen Fink was his first critic in this point, and Heidegger himself later referred to him. Kusch 1989, 87.
We become conscious of the world only when something exceptional happens which makes us to pay attention to things in a peculiar manner, or as Heidegger put it in his familiar example in *Being and Time*, only a broken hammer will show what the hammer is.\(^3\) When something collapses, the meaning of objects emerges directly from the world. The world is noticed only when some breakdown happens.\(^4\) By "nature" and "natural" Heidegger understands, not that which is just present-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*), but that which is connected with the human practical behaviour. Nature shows itself us as the environment (*Umwelt*) and the environing Nature (*Umweltnatur*).\(^5\)

For Heidegger, our natural commitment to an everyday world is something which is given to us with *Dasein*. Heidegger makes a distinction between primitive *Dasein* and *Dasein* in its "everydayness" (*Alltäglichkeit*), and states that they are not identical. "Everydayness does not coincide with primitiveness, but is rather a mode of *Dasein*'s Being." By this he means that there is an immediate link between primitiveness and everydayness, but so that the primitiveness makes possible "a specific everydayness of its own."\(^6\) Heidegger does not share Husserl's willingness to reduce all phenomena to human consciousness, or to transcendental subjectivity. Neither is the language a medium of subjectivity, but rather the subject is the medium where the language itself speaks.

*Post-modernism and natural attitudes.* A great many post-modern thinkers will attach themselves to the despisers of natural attitude. Under influence of Saussurian linguistics they deny that language is in any natural connection to reality. Language, as the system of signs, must be seen, not from a diachronic perspective in its historical development, but from a synchronic perspective, in a certain instant as a whole system. In Saussurian linguistic it is misleading to study language as a concrete speech which de Saussure calls *parole*. He is not interested in the actual use of language but in language (*langue*) as an objective system of signs. There is no natural reason the relationship between a signifier and a signified. In each linguistic system a sign gets its meaning on basis of its *difference* from other signs in that system. There are only differences in the linguistic system. All signs of language are arbitrary and relational in the sense that they can get their meanings from the difference from other signs of language. There are only differences without any positive terms. There is nothing mystical in meaning but it has purely a functional character. Meaning is a func-

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3 Heidegger 1980, 98.
4 Palmer 1969,
6 Heidegger 1980, 76.
tional outcome from the difference of a sign from other signs.7

De Saussure thought that language, despite the difference principle, is limited and steady closed system. But if meaning is merely a result of the functional differences in the system of signs, one can ask, where is the limit for this web of differences. Post-structuralistic and post-modern theories of language are especially fascinated of this idea of an endless circle of differences, which seems to offer a possibility to interpret the system of signs in potentially infinite ways. The pair of signifiers and signified is seen not as an asymmetric, but as a symmetric relation, so that there is no valid general way to determine when some sign is a signifier and when it is a signified. The paradigm case of this kind of approach is a dictionary where one can find an answer what some sign signifies. But the answer always includes other signs, and so one must turn over and over again the leaves of an enormous, actually endless, dictionary. In this "eternal loop" signifiers and signified change places all the time.

This view implies that the meaning is never present in a sign, but rather at one and the same time absent, or more accurately, the meaning is spread out all over the language. Language is not a well defined, or a closed system but the endlessly open web of signs in which its elements can and do change their roles. All transcendent and transcendental signifiers, "the meaning of meanings," which try to lay basis for the language as a whole are fictions. Unlike the main stream in philosophy, post-modern theory of language does not make an essential difference between signifier and signified.8 There is no essential difference between the spoken and written language. It is illusory thought that one could master language when one speaks as if one could determine the meanings only because one is speaking. Writing is not secondary mode of using language. Speaking is as natural and a material phenomenon as written and printed text. They are only spread in a different way in space and time.9 All signs are culturally conventional and arbitrary, and there are no natural signs. Natural is always ideology, or mythology, in disguise, and all natural attitudes ideological attitudes. 10


8 "The difference between signified and signifier belongs in a profound and implicit way to the totality of the great epoch covered by the history of metaphysics, and in a more explicit and more systematically articulated way to the narrower epoch of Christian creationism and infinitism when these appropriate the resources of Greek conceptuality." Derrida 1976, 13.
9 Derrida 1976, 30-35.
10 Barthes 1994,
II

For Wittgenstein natural attitudes are natural just because they are essentially pre- and extra linguistic attitudes. Contrary to that, there are attitudes which presuppose mastering language. A typical example of this way to understand the meaning of "natural" is Wittgenstein’s remark in the Philosophical Investigations (PI p.174) when he poses a question: "Can only those hope who can talk?" He proposes that only such beings can hope "who have mastered the use of language." It is easy to imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled, but not hopeful. For Wittgenstein, it is possible to attribute non-propositional beliefs to animal, for example, to say that "dog believes that his master is at the door." On the other hand, one cannot say that a dog believes he will come the day after to-morrow." What Wittgenstein means, is that ‘hope’ is an attitude which entails the reference to the future state of affairs, and having any idea of what happens in the future necessarily implicates imaginary scenario, and therefore, the mastering of language. The other way to characterise this difference is to say natural attitudes non-propositional attitudes and cultural attitudes propositional attitudes. Wittgenstein is not, however, a naturalist. When discussing on the private language problem in the Philosophical Investigations he rejects the idea that the names of sensations do refer to those sensations. Instead of that these words, the word ‘pain’ for example, "are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensations and used in their place." But this is not a reductive claim. Crying is not the meaning of the word ‘pain’, but the use of the word "replaces crying and does not describe it." (PI §244)

To understand the importance of words and language one has to pay attention to "extremely general facts of nature" which "are hardly ever mentioned because of their great generality.” (PI p.56, fn.) But what are these general facts of nature "which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes.” (PI §415) They are such common features of human life as pain, danger, fear, attachment, care, joy, sorrow, waiting, etc. Typical ways of primitive behaviour are connected to these common phenomena of life, as for example, expressions of pain or taking care of someone who is in pain. "Primitive" means here that the attitude to expressions of pain is pre-linguistic attitude. "Pre-linguistic" means here that the attitude towards other human beings is "natural, instinctive" and the language-game which one uses here is "an extension of primitive behaviour.” (Z §545) The language-game is based on this primitive behaviour, "it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought.” (Z §541) Although these "forms of life" are primitive, animal, and
pre-linguistic", they on the other are inseparable part of the natural history of human beings. This common basis of human behaviour and attitudes makes possible to use and understand language. For example, if our "bodily expressions of sorrow and joy alternated, say with the ticking of a clock", the language-game with the words "sorrow" and "joy" would become impossible. According to Wittgenstein, for example, the feelings of confidence as an inner experience, needs outward criteria, it must be manifested in human behaviour. Inner experiences need outward criteria if the language expressing these experiences is to be meaningful. (PI 579, 580)

This does not mean, however, that the words and the expressions which describe inner life would reduce to mere descriptions of behaviour. The words and the expressions describing the inner experiences and the words and expressions describing outward behaviour belong to different language games, they have different grammars. To identify them derives from the grammatical confusion. (PI 304, 307, 308). But on the other hand, if there were no typical and regular ways of human behaviour, such words as "pain," "joy," and "sorrow" could not have any role in our language games. We may imagine a Spartan community where nobody ever in any circumstances manifest by outward behaviour his or her feelings of pain, and where one cannot see any pain-behaviour. Which consequences this has for the concept of pain in that community? But anyway, is it still possible that the word "pain" has some use and meaning? Nobody can teach or learn the meaning of the word "pain" because explain by pointing at some paradigmatic case, in which this word has its use. The word "pain" is incapable of producing the image and the picture of pain-behaviour in the people's mind because it cannot have anything common to that which people feel in their innermost. In this imaginary community the feeling of pain itself has no part in the language game played with the word "pain." (PI 293, 300)

The use and meaning of the word "pain" can be taught and learned only as a part of the human community, the members of which manifest pain by their behaviour in a typical and regular ways. Even though pain-behaviour belongs to the meaning of the word "pain" as an outward criterion, its reference is not that behaviour or body, but the person who has pains. (PI 286, 288) The subject of pain is a certain person, not the body. Body cannot feel pain, only the person

11 "The kernel of our proposition that that which has pains or sees or thinks is of a mental nature is only, the word 'I' in 'I have pains' does not denote a particular body, for we can't substitute for 'I' a description of a body." BB p. 74. See also BB p. 73.
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can have feelings and sensations. "Pain-behaviour can point to a painful place - but the subject of pain is the person who gives it expression." (Pl 302) This reveals something essential in the grammars of the words "feel" and "pain". Another can see from my pain-behaviour that I am in pain, but I myself do not become convinced that I am in pain by observing my behaviour. Nevertheless, in both cases a typical pain-behaviour is a part of the meaning of the word "pain" as the paradigm of its use. A certain kind of picture of pain-behaviour belong to the language game played with the word "pain." (Pl 300)

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